Tevonian v. Medtronic Inc. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Sarah Tevonian,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-941
Judge James L. Graham
v. 	Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
Medtronic Inc., et al.,
Defendants.
Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Sarah Tevonian originally filed this action on June 25, 2025 in the Court of Common
Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio. 	She alleged that she was wrongfully terminated from her
employment because her former employer, defendant Medtronic Inc., and her supervisor, defendant
Michael Scarcelle, discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her age and gender. All of
her claims were brought under Ohio law.
On August 19, 2025, Scarcelle removed this action to federal court, with the consent of
Medtronic. 	Removal was based on diversity jurisdiction, as Tevonian is an Ohio citizen, while
Medtronic is a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota and Scarcelle
is a Pennsylvania citizen. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.
This matter is before the Court on two separate motions filed by plaintiff. 	The first is
plaintiff’s motion to remand, and the second is plaintiff’s combined motion for entry of default against
Medtronic, for default judgment, and to strike Medtronic’s answer. 	For the reasons stated below,
plaintiff’s motions are denied.
I. 	Motion to Remand
Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded to state court because Scarcelle failed to
timely file a notice of removal after being served with the state court complaint on or about June 30,
2025. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that removal was timely
because plaintiff failed to perfect service on Scarcelle.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal must be filed “within 30 days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.”
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In determining whether and when service of process was made prior to removal, the Court
looks to the state’s rules of civil procedure. See Dernis v. Amos Fin., 701 Fed. App’x 449, 453 (6th Cir.
2017); Ramsey v. Deurmier, No. 1:13–cv–806, 2014 WL 617643, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2014). The
parties agree that Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 4.3 permits service on a nonresident (who otherwise
has sufficient contacts with Ohio to comport with due process) by certified mail. See Ohio R. Civ. P.
4.3(B), 4.1(A)(1)(a).
Service by certified mail to a business address is effective so long as it is “reasonably calculated
to reach” the intended recipient. Akron-Canton Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 2d 403, 406,
406 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ohio 1980) (“We believe therefore that certified mail service sent to a business
address can comport with due process if the circumstances are such that successful notification could
be reasonably anticipated.”). A court should examine the “particular facts” of each case in determining
whether certified mail to a business address is reasonably calculated to reach the interested party. Id.,
62 Ohio St. 2d at 407, 406 N.E.2d at 814. Key factors in making the determination are whether the
defendant has a physical presence at the business address and, if so, the frequency of defendant’s
physical presence. See id.
Here, plaintiff attempted to effect service on June 27, 2025 by sending the summons and
complaint by certified mail to Scarcelle, in care of Medtronic at Medtronic’s operational headquarters
in Minneapolis. See Doc. 1-3 at PAGEID# 41. The address had no specific room or office number
for Scarcelle. Rather, the service packet was sent to the exact same address that the service packet for
Medtronic, the corporate defendant, was sent. See id. at PAGEID# 43.
Defendants have shown that Scarcelle has no physical presence at Medtronic’s Minneapolis
headquarters. According to Scarcelle’s declaration, he resides in Pennsylvania and works as a traveling
sales manager for Medtronic in its East region, which covers portions of the East Coast and does not
include Minnesota. See Scarcelle Decl., ¶¶ 2–4. He spends most of his time traveling the East region
and, when not traveling, he works remotely from his home in Pennsylvania. Id., ¶ 5. Scarcelle does
not have an office or desk at Medtronic’s headquarters in Minneapolis or at any other Medtronic
location in Minnesota. Id. His superiors work in North Carolina and Florida. Id., ¶ 6. He has never
traveled to Medtronic’s headquarters in Minneapolis in his 11 years as an employee. Id., ¶ 7. Scarcelle
has traveled to the Minneapolis region on average of two or three times per year to go to other
Medtronic locations, including one which provides training. Id., ¶¶ 8–9.
Thus, Scarcelle has never stepped foot in the place where plaintiff directed service. Under less
extreme facts than these, courts in Ohio have held that service at a business address was not reasonably
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calculated to reach the intended recipient. For instance in Swinehart, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that service at a business address was not sufficient because defendant’s primary business office was
in another city and he visited the business location where service was attempted only “sporadically,”
or about two to three times per month. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 407, 406 N.E.2d at 814. In Bell
v. Midwestern Educ. Serv., Inc., the court found service at a business address to be invalid where the
individual visited the address just twice a year. 89 Ohio App. 3d 193, 202, 624 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993) (“The business address should not simply be the address of the party’s business, it
should be the address where the party himself has his own office, or at least where he is continually
and regularly physically present most of the time.”). See also Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1094
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (“In light of Swinehart, it would be anomalous to hold that service of the original
complaint in the within matter was sufficient, when Defendants herein visit the Winters business
address only once a month, while the individual sought to be served in Swinehart visited the business
address two or three times a month.”); Cap City Dental Lab, LLC v. Ladd, No. 2:15-CV-2407, 2015 WL
7179663, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-2407,
2015 WL 7888826 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2015). Compare with Stoneking v. Meyers, No. 20 CVA-10-6614,
2023 WL 6444579, at *9 (Ohio Com.Pl. Mar. 15, 2023) (holding that service to business address where
defendant “worked five days per week, eight hours per day” was reasonably calculated to reach her).
Plaintiff does not dispute these facts but argues that service to Medtronic’s headquarters was
reasonably calculated to reach Scarcelle because Medtronic has protocols in place to receive and
deliver mail sent to headquarters. This argument is unconvincing, as the protocols relate to delivery
of mail to Medtronic’s Minneapolis-area facilities, and there is no evidence demonstrating that there
is a mail-forwarding system to employees working in other geographic regions. 	Medtronic hires a
courier to pick up mail (800 pieces per day, on average) from the United States Postal Service and
deliver it to a mail sorting station at the Minneapolis headquarters. See Villa Decl., ¶¶ 3–8. The courier
signs for all mail, including certified mail, once a day on an electronic tablet. 	Id., ¶ 6. 	At the mail
sorting station, a third-party vendor sorts and records each piece of mail. Id., ¶ 8. Mail is then delivered
to mailstops at the appropriate Medtronic facilities in the Minneapolis area. Id., ¶ 9.
Plaintiff is unable to show that a procedure was in place by which it could be anticipated that
mail sent to Medtronic’s headquarters would reach Scarcelle. Plaintiff’s own conduct as an employee
reporting to Scarcelle is telling, in terms of how one could reasonably anticipate reaching him. There
is no evidence that she ever sent items to Scarcelle by way of the Minneapolis headquarters. Instead,
she sent work-related items directly to him at his Pennsylvania residence. See Scarcelle Decl., ¶ 11.
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As it turned out, the service packet addressed to Scarcelle sat unclaimed at one of Medtronic’s
Minneapolis-area facilities for over 30 days before Medtronic’s legal department became aware of
plaintiff’s claim that she had sent it and ordered a search of the facility on August 8, 2025. Id., ¶¶ 11–
12. This case provides support for the approach followed by courts in Ohio to “look suspiciously” at
service attempted at a business address because of the “inherently greater risks involved in attempting
certified mail at a business rather than at a residence by virtue of the oftentimes numerous
intermediate, and frequently uninterested, parties participating in the chain of delivery.” Swinehart, 62
Ohio St. 2d at 406, 406 N.E.2d at 814.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s attempt at service upon Scarcelle by certified mail
at Medtronic’s headquarters was not reasonably calculated to reach him. Having not been properly
served in late June or early July 2025, as plaintiff claims he was, Scarcelle’s removal of the action to
federal court on August 19, 2025 was timely, and the motion to remand is thus denied.
II. 	Combined Motion for Entry of Default, for Default Judgment, and to Strike the Answer
Plaintiff moves for an entry of default against Medtronic on the grounds that it did not timely
plead or otherwise defend after being served by certified mail on June 30, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). Plaintiff also moves for default judgment against Medtronic and to strike the answer Medtronic
filed on August 7, 2025.
The Court denies the combined motion in its entirety. Apart from the fact that the motion is
procedurally improper, see Medina v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., No. 2:08-CV-154, 2008 WL 4411522,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2008) (explaining that a plaintiff must first obtain an entry of default from
the Clerk of Court before moving for default judgment), the Court finds that even if Medtronic were
in default, it has shown good cause for setting the default aside. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
In evaluating good cause to set aside a default, the Court considers whether the default was
willful, if plaintiff would be prejudiced by the set-aside, and whether defendant has a meritorious
defense to present. See Dassault Systemes, SA v. Childress, 663 F.3d 832, 838–39 (6th Cir. 2011). Here,
plaintiff does not dispute that she would not be prejudiced by a set-aside or that Medtronic has a
meritorious defense. Plaintiff focuses entirely on the argument that Medtronic engaged in culpable
conduct which led to the default. Upon a review of the evidence and arguments, the Court cannot
find that Medtronic engaged in willful wrongdoing. The Court’s review is done in light of the “general
preference” for handling cases on the merits – resolving doubts in favor of the defaulting party and
being reluctant to impose “the harsh sanction of default.” 	Id. at 841 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	Medtronic has put forth evidence supporting a finding that it had a good faith (even if
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mistaken) belief in the month of July 2025 that it had not been properly served. Its belief was based
upon: an inaccuracy on the state court’s docket indicating that Medtronic had not been served;
confusion on the part of Medtronic’s legal department over the certified mail item number
corresponding to the service packet directed to Medtronic; and a misunderstanding on the part of
Medtronic’s legal department about the propriety of service by certified mail under Ohio law.
Considering the circumstances, the Court is unwilling to attribute Medtronic’s delay in appearing and
filing an answer to bad faith or willfulness.
III. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 15) is DENIED and plaintiff’s combined
motion for entry of default, for default judgment, and to strike the answer (Doc. 16) is DENIED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: December 5, 2025
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