Drahos v. U.S. Bank National Assocation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LINDSEY DRAHOS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:25-cv-663
v.
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Discovery. 	(Doc. 37). 	For the following
reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case is about Defendants’ alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act
(“FDCPA”). 	As stated in her Complaint, in June 2024, Plaintiff Lindsey Drahos entered into a
loan agreement to purchase a vehicle. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 8). Though she claims she was current on her
payments, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Defendant 	Millenium 	Capital 	and 	Recovery 	Corporation
(“Millenium”) hired Defendant Lost & Found Recovery (“Lost & Found”) to repossess her
vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–9). Lost & Found’s repossession agent allegedly entered Plaintiff’s locked
garage without her consent and damaged the garage door. 	(Id. at ¶ 11). 	Plaintiff claims these
actions violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). 	As
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages; injunctive relief; and
attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 3–4).
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Initially, Plaintiff also brought various claims under state law. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–22 (alleging
negligence and conversion and violations of Ohio Revised Code §§ 1309.609, 2911.21, and
2909.06)). And she alleged some of her claims against Lost & Found’s unidentified repossession
agent. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 10,14, 16–22). When Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint so that she could
identify him, the Court denied her request and separately declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her state law claims. (Doc. 36).
Now, Plaintiff tells the Court that she filed her dismissed state claims in state court. (Doc.
37 at 1). She seeks to stay discovery here until that state court case is resolved. (Id. at 5). This
matter is ripe for consideration. (See Docs. 38, 40).
II. 	STANDARD
“A district court has the inherent power to stay proceedings based on its authority to
manage its docket efficiently.” Ohio Valley Bank Co. v. MetaBank, No. 2:19-cv-191, 2019 WL
2170681, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). But in general,
“a federal court need not dismiss or stay an action on account of parallel state court proceedings.”
Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:06-CV-00292, 2014 WL 4748430, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 23, 2014) (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). Requiring a stay
in such circumstances “would give litigants a powerful tool to keep cases out of federal court or
remove cases to state court simply by filing a parallel suit in state court.” 	Id. (quoting Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 14.2 (6th ed. 2011)).
Thus, in considering a motion to stay discovery, “‘a court weighs the burden of proceeding
with discovery upon the party from whom discovery is sought against the hardship which would
be worked by a denial of discovery.’” Ohio Valley Bank Co., 2019 WL 2170681, at *2 (quoting
Bowens v. Columbus Metro. Library Bd. of Trustees, No. 2:10-cv-00219, 2010 WL 3719245, at
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*1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2010)). In the end, “[t]he Court . . . must tread carefully in granting a stay
of proceedings since a party has a right to a determination of its rights and liabilities without undue
delay.” Id. at *2 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that this Court should stay discovery until her state court case has been
resolved. (Doc. 37 at 5). The Court declines to do so.
To justify a discovery stay, the movant must demonstrate good cause. 	Painter-Hart v.
Sientra, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-418, 2021 WL 6327692, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2021). That is,
she must make “a particularized showing that discovery would burden [the moving party] to an
unusual degree and the stay would not prejudice the [nonmoving party].” Land Res. & Royalties
LLC v. B&W Res., Inc., No. 6:22-CV-220-REW-HAI, 2023 WL 5822750, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar.
28, 2023). For the following reasons, Plaintiff fails to make such a particularized showing.
First, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that discovery would burden her. 	To support her
Motion, she argues that the state court case—filed merely a day before the present Motion—would
“control the substantive issues of liability, damages, contract enforceability, and the chain of
repossession authority.” 	(Doc. 37 at 2). 	Because of this, Plaintiff says, moving forward with
discovery in federal court will cause “duplicative discovery, conflicting obligations, unnecessary
expense, and the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings.” (Id. at 3). But Plaintiff offers no specific
examples of what duplicative discovery will occur. 	At this point, her fears are hypothetical.
Dealer VSC, Ltd. v. Tricor Automotive Grp.-US-Inc., No. 2:21-cv-3880 2022 WL 190054, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2022) (finding concerns about similar discovery occurring in a state court case
too speculative to justify a stay in the federal case). And the Court is unconvinced that the state
issues are even as duplicative as she claims. 	In fact, the Court previously declined to exercise
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supplemental jurisdiction over these very claims because they were not so related to the federal
claims such that the Court needed to adjudicate both at the same time. (Doc. 36 at 4 (holding the
state claims “involve distinct issues of law and fact that would ‘substantially expand the scope of
this case beyond that necessary and relevant to the federal claims under the FDCPA.’”)). 	The
Court declines to make the opposite holding now to stay discovery.
Moreover, “discovery is not per se burdensome merely because it could be duplicative.”
RPM Freight Sys., LLC v. K1 Express, Inc., No. 21-11964, 2023 WL 2933208, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 13, 2023) (denying motion for protective order). To the extent Plaintiff is inconvenienced by
having discovery in federal and state courts, she faces an inconvenience of her own making. And
where discovery is duplicative with state court proceedings, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide other options for addressing such situations short of a complete stay.” Williams v. New
Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0394, 2010 WL 3522397, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2010). 	At
base, Plaintiff overstates the weight of the relevant hardships against her should discovery
continue.
Second, Plaintiff fails to show that a stay of discovery will not burden Defendants. 	At
most, she claims that the case deadlines “will not be compromised by a short stay.” (Doc. 37 at
5). But Plaintiff understates the true length of her proposed stay. As mentioned, Plaintiff requests
a stay “pending resolution of a parallel state-court action.” (Id. at 1). Upon review of the state
court docket, discovery is not set to close until September 2026, with dispositive motions due in
August and trial set for January 2027. Drahos v. U.S. Nat’l Ass’n, et al., 25-CV-10507 (2025).
Theoretically, the state court case may not be resolved for at least a year. This is not a “short stay”
as Plaintiff suggests. (Doc. 37 at 5).
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Rather, such a lengthy discovery stay will prejudice Defendants. Defendants show they do
not need much more discovery before filing their summary judgment motion. (See Doc. 40 at 3–
4 (listing remaining discovery)). 	And the discovery cut-off is mere weeks away. 	(Id. (noting
discovery is set to cut off January 5, 2026)). To stay discovery this close to the finish line—and
perhaps for more than a year—would substantially harm Defendants’ position. What could have
been resolved in a few short months would stall in indefinite limbo. And as time passes, memories
fade and witnesses might become unavailable. Cf. Compound Prop. Mgmt. LLC v. Build Realty,
Inc., No. 1:19-CV-133, 2023 WL 3004148, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2023) (“Further delay could
substantially harm Plaintiffs in that witnesses move, parties die, and memories fade.”). Ultimately,
“[d]efendants have an equal right to expect that their summary judgment motion be resolved in a
just, speedy, and inexpensive manner.” Siler v. Webber, No. 3:05-CV-341, 2009 WL 10680020,
at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2009), aff’d, 443 F. App’x 50 (6th Cir. 2011). 	The Court will not
deprive them of this right so that Plaintiff may see if her claims fare better in a different forum.
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown good cause for a stay of discovery. During the pendency
of this Motion Plaintiff has been unable (or unwilling) to produce remaining discovery. (Doc. 40
at 3). 	Given the Court’s ruling, Plaintiff is ORDERED to participate fully in the discovery
process. 	On or before January 2, 2026, the parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report
updating the Court on the progress of discovery.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc.
37). Plaintiff is ORDERED to participate fully in the discovery process. On or before January
2, 2026, the parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report updating the Court on the progress
of discovery.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: December 23, 2025 	/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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