Mitchell v. KeyBank National Association et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LOWANDA MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEYBANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-310
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Deavers
OPINION AND ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Lowanda Mitchell challenges various conduct that the
sole remaining defendant, KeyBank National Association, undertook in connection
with a foreclosure action that it pursued based on the mortgage it had issued on her
home. (Compl., Docs. 4, 4-1, 5). 1 KeyBank has since moved to dismiss, citing the res
judicata effect of a state court foreclosure judgment. (Doc. 14). When Plaintiff failed
to respond, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order to Show Cause why (1) the motion
should not be treated as unopposed, or (2) the matter should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff’s time to respond to that Show Cause Order
has likewise passed. Accordingly, as explained below, the Court GRANTS KeyBank’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE, due
to Mitchell’s failure to overcome KeyBank’s res judicata argument.
1 After Magistrate Judge Deavers granted permission for Mitchell to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP), (Doc. 3), Mitchell filed three documents labeled as Complaints (Docs. 4, 4-1,
5). Because the Court liberally construes a pro se litigant’s pleadings, the Court considers
these documents collectively as her Complaint and cites them interchangeably.
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BACKGROUND
Back in 2002, Mitchell secured a mortgage on her home from KeyBank. (Doc.
5, #149; Note, Doc. 14-4). Twenty years later, in 2022, KeyBank moved for foreclosure
against Mitchell in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas due to her defaulting
on that loan. (Doc. 14, #185; see also Foreclosure Dkt., Doc. 14-1). The state court
granted judgment in favor of KeyBank, and so the house was sold at a sheriff’s sale
and the proceeds distributed to KeyBank. (Doc. 14, #185; Final J. Entry, Doc. 14-2,
#210; 3d Am. J. Entry, Doc. 14-3, #220–21).
Mitchell, naturally upset by this outcome, sued KeyBank, as well as nine other
Defendants involved in the state court action, in this Court, raising a slew of claims.
(Docs. 4, 4-1, 5; see R&R, Doc. 6, #164–67 (summarizing claims)). Essentially, she
argues the foreclosure was improper because, at some point, KeyBank transferred
the mortgage from one KeyBank entity (“KeyBank National Association”) to another
(“KeyBank 	National 	Home 	Loan 	Trust 	2002–6”). 	(Doc. 	4, 	#115). 	The 	transfer
supposedly “strip[ped] Plaintiff of her rights under the mortgage agreement,” (id.),
and so she was “forcibly removed from her home based on misrepresentations to the
court and fraudulent documents,” (Doc. 5, #150).
Because Mitchell was proceeding IFP, Magistrate Judge Deavers screened her
Complaint and issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R). (Doc. 6, #161). There,
the Magistrate Judge recommended the Court dismiss all of Mitchell’s claims except
those against KeyBank. (Id. at #170). The Court adopted the R&R, leaving KeyBank
as the sole remaining defendant. (Doc. 15).
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Before the Court adopted the R&R, but perhaps recognizing the claims against
it were going to move forward, KeyBank moved for dismissal, arguing that res
judicata bars Mitchell’s claims, (Doc. 14, #189–91), and alternatively, that each claim
fails as a matter of law, (id. at #191–203). Mitchell did not respond. Four months
later, the Magistrate Judge ordered Mitchell to show cause within fourteen days as
to “why the Court should not treat the Motion to Dismiss as unopposed and why this
case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.” (Doc. 16, #268 (emphasis
removed)). Mitchell didn’t respond to that either. So the motion is ready for the
Court’s review.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Court dismisses this action due to the interplay of two reasons. First,
despite express warnings about the consequences that might ensue, Plaintiff declined
to prosecute her action. (Doc. 16, #268). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Given Mitchell’s pro
se status, though, the Court declines to dismiss her action solely of that ground. But
that nonetheless leads to the second reason. Mitchell’s failure to respond means that
KeyBank’s motion is unopposed. And based on the Court’s review of that unopposed
motion, res judicata bars Mitchell’s claims.
A. 	The Motion to Dismiss is Unopposed.
The Court starts with Mitchell’s failure to prosecute this action and oppose
KeyBank’s Motion to Dismiss. KeyBank moved to dismiss on July 7, 2025, (Doc. 14),
meaning Mitchell needed to respond by July 30, see S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(d). But Mitchell did not do so. Giving Mitchell, who is proceeding pro se,
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the benefit of the doubt, perhaps she did not realize she needed to respond by that
day. But even so, the Magistrate Judge has since issued a show cause order that
expressly and unequivocally warned Mitchell that failure to respond could result in
dismissal for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 16). Yet over three months have passed (and
seven months since KeyBank filed the original motion), and Mitchell still has
neglected to respond.
Mitchell’s failure has two consequences. First, when a plaintiff fails to respond
to a show cause order, that lack of response amounts to a failure to prosecute. See
Rogers v. City of Warren, 302 F. App’x 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2008). Second, by failing to
respond, Mitchell has “waived opposition to the motion.” Humphrey v. U.S. Att’y
Gen.’s Off., 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Either, in and
of itself, could provide a basis for dismissing the action. But dismissal would be a
harsh sanction. See Schreiber v. Moe, 320 F. App’x 312, 317–18 (6th Cir. 2008). And
so, especially given Mitchell’s pro se status, the Court declines to rely solely on her
failure 	to 	respond and will instead briefly 	review KeyBank’s 	(uncontroverted)
arguments.
B. 	The Court Grants the Motion to Dismiss Because Res Judicata Bars
Mitchell’s Claims.
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies on the same cause of action.’” U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v.
Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). Federal courts, when analyzing whether res
judicata bars a claim, “must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment
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as that judgment receives in the rendering state.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because
KeyBank argues that an Ohio state-court judgment bars Mitchell’s federal action, the
Court looks to Ohio law. And in Ohio, res judicata requires four elements: (1) a final
decision on the merits; (2) a prior action involving the same parties as the current
action; (3) the current action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in
the first action; and (4) both actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.
William Powell Co. v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 18 F.4th 856, 869–70 (6th Cir. 2021). And
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 13(A) “requires all existing claims between opposing
parties that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence be litigated in a single
lawsuit, regardless of which party initiates the lawsuit.” Rettig Enters., Inc. v.
Koehler, 626 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ohio 1994).
Res judicata clearly bars Mitchell’s claims against KeyBank. The Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas’ order is plainly a final judgment on the merits,
meeting the first criteria. (Doc. 14-2, #214 (noting “this is a final appealable order”);
Doc. 14-3, #220 (confirming sale of house and distributing proceeds)). As for the
second element, the state case also involved KeyBank and Mitchell, the same parties
here. (Doc. 14-1, #206). 2 Moving on to the third element, Mitchell’s various claims—
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, statutory violations, and other misconduct—all
2 The state court case did not necessarily include all of the other Defendants Mitchell sued in
this Court. But those Defendants have already been dismissed on other grounds, (see Doc.
15), so they do not affect the Court’s res judicata analysis. See Bell v. Michigan, No. 1:19-cv-
233, 2019 WL 5677594, at *3–5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2019) (dismissing some defendants due
to sovereign immunity and failure to adequately state a claim while dismissing other
defendants due to res judicata in a similar context).
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center around KeyBank’s alleged conduct surrounding the foreclosure and the events
leading up to those foreclosure proceedings. (See Doc. 6, #164–67 (summarizing key
factual allegations and causes of action)). It certainly seems that she could have
raised these claims and defenses in the original state court foreclosure proceedings.
And, as she has elected not to respond to KeyBank’s motion here, she has voluntarily
foregone (twice over) any opportunity to explain why she could not have done so.
Finally, as KeyBank succinctly states, “[b]oth cases arise from the same transaction
or occurrence—KeyBank’s efforts to enforce the Note and Mortgage.” (Doc. 14, #190).
As all four elements are met, res judicata bars Mitchell’s claims against KeyBank.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS KeyBank’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 14) and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE. Therefore, the
Court ORDERS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of KeyBank and TERMINATE
this matter.
SO ORDERED.
February 19, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UGLAS R. COLE
ITED STATES DISTRICT J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	JU	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	UD	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
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