Seals v. Warden Noble Correctional Institution

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
DANIEL SEALS, 	:
:
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:24-cv-03360
:
- vs - 	: 	District Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
: 	Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN, Noble Correctional, 	:
Institution, 	:
:
Respondent. 	:
OPINION AND ORDER
This habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, brought pro se by Petitioner Daniel
Seals to obtain relief from his conviction in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas on
one count of gross sexual imposition (Petition, ECF No. 1), is before the Court on Petitioner’s
Objections (ECF Nos. 14, 20) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (ECF No.
13) and Supplemental Report and Recommendations on the merits (ECF No. 17). The Magistrate
Judge also denied Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 12) and Petitioner has objected to
that decision.
As required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the District Judge has reviewed
the Magistrate Judge’s order on discovery for clear error and the Reports de novo, with particular
attention to those portions to which Petitioner has particularly objected.
DISCOVERY
The Magistrate Judge denied discovery in the form of a deposition of Petitioner’s brother
because this Court must decide the case on the basis of the record before the state courts who
decided the claims Petitioner makes, relying on Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). The
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
authority relied on by Petitioner pre-dates Pinholster and has essentially been overruled by it. The
Court recognizes that Pinholster made a significant change in the law, but this Court is not at
liberty to reject current Supreme Court precedent in favor of earlier law.
The Magistrate Judge also denied that portion of the Motion for Discovery which sought
to compel the Respondent to file those portions of the trial transcript which had not been filed
before. The Magistrate Judge rejected this request by relying on that portion of Rule 5 of the Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases, which provides for filing those portions of the State Court Record needed
to decide the case. Petitioner’s objection relies on his conclusory claim that he needs the omitted
portions of the transcript to argue the case: he makes no showing of why that is so. The authority
on which he relies, Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2003), decided that a particular part
of the transcript which had not been filed was material to the case, to wit, the closing arguments.
Id. at 406. Indeed, “[a]ppellee d[Id.] not contest the materiality of the closing argument transcript.”
Id. No such showing of materiality has been made here.
The Court concludes the Magistrate Judge did not commit clear error in denying discovery
or expansion of the record. Petitioner’s objections to that result are overruled.
MERITS
Petitioner pleads four grounds for relief in his Petition:
Ground One: Violations of Due Process under the 5th & 14th
Amendments & Fair trial violations under the 6th Amendment.
Supporting Facts:
1. Admission of hearsay evidence over objection.
2. States [sic] failure to follow procedure to file and submit hearsay
evidence.
3. Submission of hearsay evidence that was contrary to law.
4. Tainted jury pool in violation of rights to a fair trial.
5. Sentence contrary to laws and due process.
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel in
Violation of the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Supporting Facts:
1. Failure to argue ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel.
2. Failure to properly convey the tainted jury issue.
3. Failure to file a motion to certify conflict.
4. Failure to raise a Daubert Claim.
Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Violation
of the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Supporting Facts:
1. Failure to object to the States [sic] submission of hearsay evidence
without a procedurally required motion.
2. Failure to question the scientific method or lack thereof of the
“States Expert” CAC testimony & interview by requesting a
Daubert Hearing.
Ground Four: Actual Innocence.
Supporting Facts: As claimed throughout his appeal. As evident on
“lack of remorse” used against him in sentencing. An innocent
person will not show remorse for crimes he did not commit! As
evidenced on the leading questioning. As evidenced by the Agent of
the state CAC Interviewed [illegible] as a medical provider. As
evidenced by the malicious prosecution.
(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 15, p. 5-10).
Petitioner offered a re-framing of the grounds for relief in his Reply, but the Magistrate
Judge analyzed the case in terms of the original Petition because it is inappropriate to allow
substantial revision in a traverse/reply since those are not the claims which the Respondent has
answered.
Petitioner objected to the Report (ECF No. 14), and the Court recommitted the case to the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 16). 	The Magistrate Judge has filed a Supplemental Report and
Recommendations (ECF No. 18), and the case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Objections to the
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
Supplemental Report (ECF No. 20).
GROUND ONE
As to the First Ground for Relief, the Magistrate Judge concluded the first three sub-claims
were procedurally defaulted because they had not been fairly presented to the Ohio courts as
federal constitutional claims. 	Alternatively, he concluded they were without merit because the
Supreme Court of the United States has never held the admission of hearsay evidence violates the
Constitution (Report, ECF No. 13, PageID 301-04). 	On the tainted jury pool sub-claim, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that the decision of the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals on this
claim was entitled to deference because it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent: the venireman who expressed prejudiced views was excused and did
not sit. Id. at PageID 304-07. Finally, the Report found the fifth sub-claim as pleaded raised only
a state law issue over which this Court had no jurisdiction and the claim had not been fairly
presented as a federal claim. Id. at PageID 308-10.
With respect to the First Ground for Relief, Petitioner argues that the first three sub-claims
were fairly presented as federal constitutional claims to the Ohio courts because in his
Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court he claimed "In this case, the
5th, 6th, and 14 th Amendments of the US Constitution. . . have been violated and ignored by the
Lower Courts." (Supplemental Objections, ECF No. 20, PageID 348, quoting Memorandum in
Support of Jurisdiction, State Court Record, ECF No. 5, Ex. 13, PageID 119).
Seals’ objection is not well-taken. 	The Magistrate Judge found this claim procedurally
defaulted because it had not been fairly presented to the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals: the
reference to the federal Constitution had been only conclusory and not supported by citation to
federal law (Report, ECF No. 13, PageID 302-03). Under Ohio law an issue cannot be raised for
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
the first time on appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court, so the Ohio Supreme
Court would not have considered the federal issue because it was being raised for the first time.
Moreover, attempting to raise a federal issue by conclusory reference to an Amendment is
insufficient to present that issue fairly. Merely using talismanic constitutional phrases like “fair
trial” or “due process of law” does not constitute raising a federal constitutional issue. Slaughter
v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6 th Cir. 2006); Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 1987);
McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Petrucelli v. Coombe, 735 F.2d
684, 688-89 (2nd Cir. 1984). Mere use of the words “due process and a fair trial by an impartial
jury” are insufficient. Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir. 2006); Blackmon v. Booker,
394 F.3d 399, 400 (6th Cir. 2004)(same).
Finally, Ohio Sup. Ct. Rep. R. 4.1 provides “The refusal of the Supreme Court to accept
any case for review shall not be considered a statement of opinion as to the merits of the law stated
by the trial or appellate court from which review is sought.” The decision which this Court must
review for reasonable compliance with clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) is that of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, not the denial of review by the Ohio
Supreme Court. There is absolutely no mention of the Confrontation Clause or federal case law
construing it in Seals’ Brief on direct appeal (State Court Record, ECF No. 5, Ex. 7).
GROUND TWO
In the Second Ground for Relief, Seals claims he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. 	The Magistrate Judge noted these claims had been properly presented to the
Fifth District Court of Appeals in an Application for Reopening under Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) and
decided by that court on the merits, applying the governing federal standard from Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Report concluded this was not an objectively unreasonable
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
application of Strickland and was therefore entitled to deference. Id. at PageID 310-14.
Seals’ Supplemental Objections assert the Magistrate Judge did not properly apply Mapes
v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408 (6 th Cir. 1999), in analyzing this Ground for Relief (ECF No. 14, PageID
321). Seals makes no argument as to which factors alluded to in Mapes would count in his favor,
but merely relies on the conclusory citation to Mapes.
More importantly, Mapes was a habeas case filed in 1991, five years before adoption of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214)(the "AEDPA"). 	Because AEDPA was not applicable to cases filed before its enactment,
the Sixth Circuit applied pre-AEDPA standards of review. 171 F.3d at 413. The circuit court had
no opinion of a state court on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to consider. Indeed,
Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) providing a state court remedy for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
was not adopted until 1992. Seals’ objection based on Mapes is without merit.
GROUND THREE
The Report found Seals’ Third Ground for Relief – ineffective assistance of trial counsel –
was procedurally defaulted because it has not been raised on direct appeal (ECF No. 13, PageID
314-15). 	In his first Objections, Seals argued this procedural default was excused by the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to present this claim (ECF No. 14, PageID
322). In the Supplemental Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded this claim was barred by the
Ohio doctrine of res judicata which bars claims which could have been but were not raised on
direct appeal (Supplemental Report, ECF No. 17, PageID 340).
In his Supplemental Objections, petitioner claims res judicata does not apply, but the Sixth
Circuit has repeatedly held that Ohio’s doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases, enunciated in
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175 (1967), is an adequate and independent state ground of decision.
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432 (6 th Cir. 2007); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001);
Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6 th Cir. 2001); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 521-22 (6th Cir.
2000); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted); Van Hook v. Anderson,
127 F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
GROUND FOUR
The Magistrate Judge concluded the Fourth Ground for Relief – actual innocence – did not
state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted (Report, ECF No. 13, PageID 315).
Seals initially objected that the Magistrate Judge was being controlled by confirmation bias
and had recently denied relief on a similar actual innocence claim in Farthing v. Forshey, 2024 U.
S. Dist. LEXIS 101269 (S.D. Ohio June 6, 2024). Seals fails to note that Magistrate Judge Merz’s
Report in Farthing was adopted by the assigned District Judge who also denied a certificate of
appealability, meaning no reasonable jurists would disagree on this point. Farthing v. Forshey,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144744 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 14, 2024). That decision has not been reversed
on appeal, although an appeal is pending.
Seals claims the bias of the Magistrate Judge is shown by a Lexis citation which supposedly
shows the Magistrate Judge’s Report in this case has already been adopted (Supplemental
Objections, ECF No. 20, PageID 356-57). Not so. The citation, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218354,
is to the Magistrate Judge’s Supplemental Report, and not any adoption order. 	The editorial
comment of the LEXIS editor about the content of the cited opinion is simply wrong.
At the beginning of his Supplemental Objections on Ground Four, Petitioner explains that
he should not have compartmentalized his actual innocence claim because it is not a stand-alone
claim (ECF No. 20, PageID 355). This is the point the Magistrate Judge was making in the initial
Report: actual innocence, standing alone, does not entitle a habeas petitioner to relief. See Herrera
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408-11 (1993). Actual innocence, if shown by new reliable evidence of
a certain quality, can act to excuse procedural default or missing the statute of limitations deadline.
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013). 	However, proof of actual innocence requires
presentation of new evidence not considered by the jury which, when considered with the evidence
the jury did hear, shows that no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 at 329 (1995). Seals has presented
no new evidence at all.
Considered as a stand alone claim, Petitioner’s Fourth Ground for Relief does not state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Considered as a claim to excuse procedural default, it
does not meet the standard of Schlup v. Delo, supra.
CONCLUSION
Having considered the Magistrate Judge Reports and Petitioner’s Objections de novo, the
Court concludes the Objections are without merit and they are hereby overruled. The Reports are
adopted and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the Petition with prejudice. Because
reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, Petitioner is denied a certificate of
appealability and the Court certifies to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively
frivolous and should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
DATED: November 19, 2025
Case: 2:24-cv-03360-ALM-MRM Doc #: 21 Filed: 11/19/25 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>