Heartfitt LLC v. Hearthero, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
HEARTFITT LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEARTHERO, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:26-cv-940
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
OPINION AND ORDER
HeartFitt LLC is suing HeartHero, Inc., for, among other things, a declaration
that HeartFitt’s app, Heart Hero Solo, does not infringe on HeartHero’s trademark
rights. (Am. Compl., Doc. 11). On September 17, 2026, the same day it filed the initial
complaint, (Doc. 1), HeartFitt moved for a preliminary injunction and applied for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin any ongoing requests from HeartHero to
either Apple or Google seeking to remove Heart Hero Solo from their respective app
stores, (Doc. 3). The present order resolves only HeartFitt’s TRO application. For the
reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS that application.
BACKGROUND
According to HeartFitt’s co-founder and CEO, Shannon Eads, the HEART
HERO “platform,” which includes the Heart Hero Solo mobile application, “turns
cardiovascular exercise into an interactive game using a participant’s real-time
heart-rate data.” (Eads Decl., Doc. 3-1, #147). The “platform” is already up and
running, with several fitness centers adopting HeartFitt’s technology. (Id. at #48).
Also in the works is a trademark application. HeartFitt applied to register the
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HEART 	HERO 	trademark 	in 	2025. 	U.S. 	Trademark 	Application 	Serial 	No.
99/224,522 (filed June 9, 2025). The Trademark Office later published the mark and
assigned it to an examiner after nobody opposed it. See U.S. Patent & Trademark
Off., 	Trademark 	Search, 	Heart 	Hero, 	https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/search/search-
results/99224522 [https://perma.cc/W7RU-5AGP]. That application remains pending.
As is the case for many growing businesses, at this tender age, “[e]very
customer, facility, partnership and app download matters to HeartFitt enormously.”
(Doc. 3-1, #48). To raise capital, HeartFitt needs more subscribers. (Id.). That made
it particularly disconcerting when HeartFitt became embroiled in takedown disputes
with the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, and HeartHero over Heart Hero
Solo’s possible conflict with defendant HeartHero’s trademark rights. (Id. at #50–51).
HeartHero has a different story. According to its founder and CEO, Gary
Montague, HeartHero is simply defending its turf. The company manufactures
automated 	external 	defibrillators 	and 	provides 	an 	accompanying 	mobile 	app.
(Montague Decl., Doc. 10-1, #132–33). In 2019, it obtained registration from the
USPTO for two trademarks featuring the company’s logo, a superhero with a
lightning bolt in his heart-shaped chest with “HeartHero” (no space between the
words) underneath in text. Reg. Nos. 5,644,175 & 5,874,969. While headquartered in
the United States, HeartHero currently markets these products only abroad, as it has
not yet received FDA approval (which it anticipates will come sometime in 2027) to
sell its AED here. (Doc. 10-1, #135–36).
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While HeartFitt’s CEO assumed that there would be no issues because the two
firms “operate[] in separate categories,” HeartHero had a different view. (Id. at #137).
Through its attorneys, it requested that HeartFitt abandon its current branding.
(Id.). HeartHero is concerned that, once it does enter the U.S. market, “[t]he presence
of another ‘HeartHero’ app in the field of cardiovascular health with a logo that looks
very similar to our logo” would lead to customer confusion. (Id. at #139). Apart from
goodwill concerns about mistaken assumptions that the two brands are affiliated,
Montague worries that someone attempting to use the wrong app in connection with
the AED may miss certain important notifications. (Id. at #140).
After months of fruitless negotiation, HeartHero decided to act unilaterally. It
submitted takedown requests to the Apple and Google app stores. (Id. at #137).
Google complied with the request, so HeartFitt’s app is now unavailable on the Google
Play Store. (Doc. 3-1, #51). Apple took a different tack. It directed the parties to
resolve the matter with each other and “asked to be kept apprised” of their
communications. (Doc. 10-1, #138).
Shortly after learning of the Google takedown, HeartFitt sued. In its Amended
Complaint, it asserts four claims. The first seeks a declaratory judgment that it has
not infringed on HeartHero’s trademark rights. (Doc. 11, #213–14). Its second and
third claims allege tortious interference with business relationships (prospective and
ongoing) under Ohio law. (Id. at #214–15). For those two claims, HeartFitt seeks
injunctive relief to prevent further interference. (Id. at #215–16). Finally, HeartFitt
seeks cancellation of HeartHero’s trademark based on its alleged non-use of that
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mark in interstate commerce. (Id. at #217–18). The declaratory relief and cancellation
claims arise under federal law, see Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667, 671–72 (1950), and the Ohio law claims are closely related. HeartFitt moved for
a preliminary injunction and applied for a TRO on September 17, 2026 (Doc. 3). That
matter is now fully briefed (and then some). (See 10/2/2026 Not. Ord.). So the matter
is ripe for decision, and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1367.
LEGAL STANDARD
The only issue currently before the Court is HeartFitt’s application for a
temporary restraining order. A TRO “is an extraordinary remedy that should only be
granted if the movant can clearly show the need for one.” Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v.
Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Ultimately, “the
purpose of a TRO under Rule 65 is to preserve the status quo so that a reasoned
resolution of a dispute may be had.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d
219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing entitlement to
a temporary restraining order.” Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Charter Indus. Supply, Inc., No.
1:22-cv-160, 2022 WL 1044720, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2022). “To satisfy this burden,
[plaintiffs] must establish [their] case by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. That in
turn means that plaintiffs “may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but
rather must come forward with more than ‘scant evidence’ to substantiate their
allegations.” Patel v. AR Grp. Tenn., LLC, No. 3:20-cv-52, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (collecting cases).
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Whether a movant is entitled to this extraordinary relief is governed by the
same four factors that apply to requests for preliminary injunctions. See Moore v.
Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006). Those factors are whether:
(1) the movant has a substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits,
(2) the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the court does not grant relief,
(3) injunctive relief would unjustifiably harm a third party, and (4) injunctive relief
would serve the public interest. Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shaney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261,
1263 (6th Cir. 1985). A weak showing on the likelihood of success prong of the analysis
is not dispositive. Id. at 1270. But in that situation, preliminary equitable relief is
appropriate only if there are at least “serious questions going to the merits and
irreparable harm” and that harm “decidedly outweighs any potential harm” a TRO
would inflict on the defendant. Id. (quoting Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick,
Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).
LAW & ANALYSIS
So how do those factors play out here? Taking all four together, the Court
concludes that they point toward granting HeartFitt’s requested TRO.
A. 	The Likelihood of Success Factor Does Not Cut Strongly Either Way.
Admittedly, the first factor—HeartFitt’s likelihood of success on the merits—
does not point strongly in favor of granting relief. To see why, take the claims in order.
1. 	At present, based on the information currently available to the Court,
HeartFitt’s claim for a declaration of non-infringement does not appear either
particularly 	likely 	or 	particularly 	unlikely 	to 	succeed. 	To 	establish 	trademark
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infringement, a party must show “(1) that it owns a trademark, (2) that the infringer
used the mark in commerce without authorization, and (3) that the use of the alleged
infringing trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion among consumers regarding the
origin of the goods offered by the parties.’” AWGI, LLC v. Atlas Trucking Co., LLC,
998 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498,
502 (6th Cir. 2013)). So, in the declaratory judgment context here, the Court must
measure the likelihood that HeartFitt ultimately will succeed in showing that
HeartHero cannot prove at least one of those three conditions.
In the context of the current motion, the parties dispute 	only whether
HeartFitt’s activity is likely to cause confusion with HeartHero’s marks. To answer
that question, the Court considers eight factors: (1) “strength of the [senior user’s]
mark,” (2) “relatedness of the goods,” (3) “similarity of the marks,” (4) “evidence of
actual 	confusion,” 	(5) 	the 	parties’ 	“marketing 	channels,” 	(6) “likely 	degree 	of
purchaser 	ca[r]e,” 	(7) the 	junior 	user’s 	“intent 	in 	selecting 	the 	mark,” 	and
(8) “likelihood of expansion of the product lines.” Frisch’s, 759 F.2d at 1264. The
Court’s job in applying this test is not to “balance[e]” the factors with “mathematical
precision.” CFE Racing Prods., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 592 (6th Cir.
2015) (quoting Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1107 (6th Cir. 1991)). Instead, the factors identify “the pertinent facts” bearing on
“whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services offered
by the parties are affiliated in some way.” Id. at 592 (first quoting Frisch’s, 759 F.2d
at 1264; and then Homeowner’s Grp., 931 F.2d at 1107)).
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Even 	with 	that 	helpful 	clarification, 	it 	would 	be 	difficult 	to 	state 	with
conviction that HeartFitt is likely or unlikely to meet its burden under this eight-
factor balancing test. Counting in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion, the Court
notes the striking similarity between the marks and that they are used on closely
related product lines (both parties attach the disputed mark to a mobile app). (See
Doc. 10-1, #148 (showing the parties’ marks next to each other)); U.S. Patent &
Trademark Off., Trademark Search, Reg. No. 5,874,969, https://tmsearch.uspto.
gov/search/search-results/87751454 [https://perma.cc/3BNJ-AXYZ] (listing “mobile
application software” among the goods and services associated with HeartHero’s
registered trademark). But on the other hand, neither HeartHero’s AED nor its
corresponding app are available in the United States, making it hard to see how
confusion would arise in this country. So some factors point toward a likelihood of
confusion and some point away.
2. 	The likelihood of HeartFitt succeeding on its cancellation claim is also
difficult to forecast. Of course, in the right circumstances, “[d]istrict courts can cancel
registrations during infringement litigation.” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 155 (2015). But in cases like this one, where the mark under attack
was registered by the USPTO more than five years before the litigation, 1 cancellation
is improper except where one of the specifically enumerated conditions set out in 15
U.S.C. §§ 1064(c) and (e) applies. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 199 (1985). So, relevant here, HeartFitt must show either that HeartHero
1 Both of HeartHero’s marks were registered in 2019. See Reg. Nos. 5644175 & 5874969.
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“abandoned” 	its 	mark 	or 	that 	HeartFitt 	obtained 	the 	mark’s 	registration
“fraudulently.” 15 U.S.C. § 1064. For the latter, HeartFitt charges that HeartHero
obtained its registrations without meeting the Lanham Act’s requirement that they
be placed on goods “sold or transported in commerce.” Id. §§ 1127, 1051. For the
former, which requires HeartFitt to show that HeartHero “discontinued with intent
not to resume such use,” id. § 1127, HeartFitt claims that HeartHero has “fail[ed] to
use the mark in commerce for at least three consecutive years[,] which constitutes
prima facie evidence of abandonment,” (Doc 12, #228 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127)).
The current record does not provide an overwhelming amount of data on either
of the two issues. The principal evidence comes from Gary Montague, HeartHero’s
founder and CEO. He contends, for example, that in 2018 the company “shipped [its]
HeartHero 	AED 	to 	third-party 	partners 	in 	multiple 	states 	and 	overseas 	for
evaluation and testing.” (Doc. 10-1, #132). He further intimates, although does not
expressly aver, that HeartHero engaged in “inter-state distribution of the HeartHero
App” at the same time. (Id.).
In a second affidavit addressing more recent use, he states that “[s]ince 2020,
there 	have 	been 	multiple 	rounds 	of 	human 	factor 	testing 	conducted 	by 	two
independent 	vendors.” 	(Doc. 	14-1, 	#277). 	That 	testing 	occurred 	in 	Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Florida. (Id.). With the most recent testing occurring “this year”
in Florida. (Id.). And he contends that HeartHero has made the app available through
Apple’s “TestFlight system” to third-party partners in many states. (Id.).
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It is not entirely clear to the Court whether HeartHero’s 2018 shipments to
third-party partners for testing count as “use[s] in commerce” to support registration
under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(C). But even assuming that HeartFitt
is correct that they don’t, the current facts also shed little light on HeartFitt’s fraud
allegation. Fraud under § 1064(3) presumably requires some showing of conscious
deception. 	See 	Fraud, 	Black’s 	Law 	Dictionary 	(12th 	ed. 	2024) 	(“A 	knowing
misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another
to act to his or her detriment.”); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(requiring “proof of intent to deceive” to cancel a trademark registration for fraud
under § 1064(3)). On that front, the Court’s guess is as good as anyone’s, but it would
still be that—a guess.
The story on abandonment is much the same. HeartHero again relies on
deliveries to third-party partners for testing (in the post-registration timeframe) to
show that HeartHero has continued to use its mark. As just noted, such deliveries
may constitute use, but even so, the 2020 to 2022 shipments do little to combat
HeartFitt’s claims of non-use in the last three years. True, the Florida deliveries were
allegedly this year, but that still leaves a potential three-year gap between 2022 and
2026.
At bottom, on the record here, there are currently more questions than answers
on the cancellation claim.
3. 	Finally, 	HeartFitt’s 	likelihood 	of 	success 	on 	its 	Ohio-law 	tortious
interference claims is also difficult to judge. To succeed on such a claim, HeartFitt
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must show that HeartHero “intentionally and improperly interfered with” their
business relations “by either (1) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to
enter into or continue the prospective relation, or (2) preventing [HeartFitt] from
acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.” Couzens v. Union Bank & Tr. Co.,
234 N.E.3d 661, 667 (Ohio 1st Dist. 2024).
Even assuming that the only live question is whether the alleged interference
was improper, that still leaves an opaque picture. To see why, start with the test for
whether an interference is improper, or in other words “without justification or
privilege.” Alexander v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2012-Ohio-3911, ¶ 31 (Ohio 1st Dist.
2012) (first citing Licul v. Swagelok Co., 2006-Ohio-711, ¶ 28 (Ohio 8th Dist. 2006);
and then Norwell v. Cincinnati, 729 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (Ohio 1st Dist. 1999)). To
figure that out, Ohio courts consider seven factors:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the
interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the
interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in
protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual
interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s
conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.
Couzens, 234 N.E.3d at 667, 665; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 & cmt.
a. (A.L.I. 1979). So the question is how those seven factors play out when the
defendant asserts its trademark rights to interfere with the plaintiff’s business
prospects.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is little caselaw on the subject. HeartHero cites to
cases holding defendants immune from liability when they merely assert intellectual
property rights, (see Doc. 10, #116–17), but those holdings are based on an immunity
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defense the Court discusses below, which may or may not apply. So put that aside for
the moment. Armed with the knowledge that, under Ohio law, “the nature of the
actor’s conduct” is the “chief factor” for deciding tort liability, Kand Med., Inc. v.
Freund Med. Prods., Inc., 963 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Restatement
(Second), supra § 767 cmt. c.), and little more, the Court is hard-pressed to identify a
glaringly correct answer on the tortious interference claim. Most of the factors (if not
all) would seem to turn on the merits of the underlying trademark dispute or
HeartHero’s mental state when asserting its infringement claim to Apple and Google.
The record at this stage offers little on either of those fronts beyond bare assertions.
But, while the Court struggles to see why HeartFitt clearly wins on this claim,
the cases that HeartHero cites as creating a slam-dunk defense likewise may not be
the panacea HeartHero thinks they are. The cited cases all rest on the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. But it is an open question whether that doctrine 	covers
HeartHero’s conduct here. By way of background, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
originated in the antitrust law, and it generally immunizes parties from liability for
petitioning the government, even if anticompetitive intent motivated their activity.
See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1961);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–70 (1965). The
Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of the antitrust laws because, in addition
to the concern that such conduct “bear[s] little if any resemblance to the combinations
normally held violative of the Sherman Act,” permitting liability for petitioning
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activity 	would 	“raise 	important 	constitutional 	questions” 	under 	the 	First
Amendment. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136, 138.
Courts have extended the immunity in two main ways. First, “[c]ourts,
including the Sixth Circuit, have extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to anti-
competition claims in trademark cases.” J.M. Smucker Co. v. Hormel Food Corp., 526
F. Supp. 3d 294, 308 (N.D. Ohio 2021) (quoting Restoration Hardware, Inc. v.
Bungalow Home, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-4978, 2020 WL 4436357, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3,
2020)). This includes “common law claims of tortious interference.” Campbell v. PMI
Food Equip. Grp., 509 F.3d 776, 790 (6th Cir. 2007). Second, courts have also held
that the immunity protects activity taken in anticipation of litigation, such as threats
of suit, demand letters, cease-and-desist letters, and other communications about
pending or planned litigation. 2
At first glance, that seems to suggest that HeartHero is right that HeartFitt is
unlikely to prevail on its tortious interference claims. But there are two reasons to
hesitate. First, outside the antitrust context, it strikes the Court as at least a little
odd if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine were to apply to conduct that does not fall within
the constitutional right to petition. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889–91 (10th Cir. 2000)). However important Apple and
Google may have become, submitting a takedown request to their respective app
stores is not “petition[ing] the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const.
2 See J.M. Smucker Co., 526 F. Supp. 3d at 308; Ancestry.com Operations, Inc. v. DNA
Diagnostics Ctr., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-737, 2016 WL 3999315, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 26, 2016); In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Rock River
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 745 F.3d 343, 351 (9th Cir. 2014).
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amend. I. The second cause for concern is that it’s debatable whether these takedown
notices are sufficiently bound-up with litigation to invoke even an expanded version
of Noerr-Pennington immunity that reaches litigation-associated conduct. True,
HeartHero does offer a strikingly on-point case from this district. See Ancestry.com,
2016 WL 3999315, at *1–2, 5 (dismissing a tortious interference claim where the
defendant’s challenged conduct was submitting a trademark infringement complaint
to Groupon, which in turn stopped creating and offering deals for the plaintiff’s
product). But, particularly considering the potential need for a close tie to First
Amendment petitioning activity, the Court is not sure its own analysis would lead it
down that same path.
* 	* 	*
The upshot is that the merits are murky. Indeed, that is often the problem in
the TRO context. A court is asked to shoot from the hip on likelihood of success, based
on a limited record, so it can often be expected to get that wrong. That is especially
true where, as here, the claims are rife with factual uncertainties and open questions
of law. As a result, the Court puts little stock in this TRO factor beyond noting that
HeartFitt has at least some prospect of success.
B. 	HeartFitt’s Claimed Harm is Irreparable, and the Balance of Harms
Clearly Favors Relief Given the Limited Remedy HeartFitt Seeks
Here.
While the likelihood of success element is equivocal, the remaining (and in
some ways more important) elements clearly and convincingly favor HeartFitt. Start
with 	the 	nature 	of 	HeartFitt’s 	harm. 	The 	harm 	that 	would 	occur 	if 	future
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communications from HeartHero to Apple caused Apple to remove the Heart Hero
Solo app from the Apple App Store is clear: users could not download the app at least
in the time between now and the preliminary injunction hearing. This would
compound the ongoing and future irreparable injuries of lost customer goodwill and
diminished competitive position the Google removal inflicted. See Mariner Wealth
Advisors, LLC v. Savvy Advisors, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-351, 2024 WL 3466153, at *11 (S.D.
Ohio July 19, 2024) (collecting cases); (see also Doc. 3-1, #54–55 (explaining the
impossibility of calculating the value of these lost opportunities)).
The balance-of-harms factor also favors HeartFitt. That is especially so in light
of the limited remedy it seeks here. All plaintiff seeks is an injunction essentially
preventing defendant from taking further steps to remove Heart Hero Solo from the
Apple App Store. (Doc. 3, #44). What is the harm to HeartHero from granting that
relief? Precisely zero. HeartHero hasn’t made their app available in the Apple or
Google App Stores in the United States, and it is not even selling its product (the one
with which a user might want the app) here. So there is no meaningful possibility
that HeartFitt’s desired relief would harm HeartHero in this country now. And the
TRO can last, at most, 28 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). So it is hard to see how
much, if any harm could accrue to HeartHero during that time.
The same is true for HeartHero’s theorized harm to the public interest. The
Court can accept as true, at least as a conceptual matter, that coexistence of the two
apps as currently branded threatens “worse outcomes in cardiac emergencies.” (Doc.
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10, #126). Even so, HeartFitt’s requested temporary relief cannot possibly cause that
harm because neither defendant’s AED nor its app are available in the United States.
In short, the merits are murky and thus neutral while each of the remaining
factors points decisively in HeartFitt’s favor. So, at this preliminary stage, a TRO is
appropriate.
That leaves the question of an appropriate bond. Generally speaking, when a
court grants a TRO, it requires the beneficiary of the TRO to post a bond to offset the
damage that the non-moving party accrues in the event it turns out that the court
erred in granting the TRO. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Here, though, for the reasons already
discussed, the Court concludes that HeartHero will not incur a harm as a result of
the limited relief the Court grants here, even if it turns out the Court was wrong to
do so. Accordingly, the Court concludes that HeartFitt need not post a bond.
The long and short is that HeartFitt seeks very limited relief that will not harm
HeartHero in the short term, but that may provide measurable benefit to HeartFitt.
Whether the TRO will ripen into a preliminary injunction is very much an open
question, but it is a question that the Court should (and presumably will) answer on
a fuller evidentiary record than what is currently before the Court.
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CONCLUSION
HeartFitt’s Emergency Application for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
3) is GRANTED. Specifically, effective October 14, 2026, the Court ORDERS that
defendant and its agents refrain from issuing trademark enforcement
communications regarding Plaintiff’s current branding and trademark uses to
Apple’s or Google’s mobile application stores.
SO ORDERED.
October 14, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UGLAS R. COLE
ITED STATES DISTRICT	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
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