Shields v. Hamilton County, Ohio et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TANIKA SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:25-cv-966
District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua
sponte review of Plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion
of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. 	General Screening Authority
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 	To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action
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is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). 	An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need
not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 	A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 	Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. 	Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action against Hamilton County, Ohio, the Hamilton County
Proseuctor’s Office, assistant prosecutor Brian Goodyear, supervising prosecutor Mark
Piepmeier, and senior prosecutorial official Rick Gibson. 	(See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at
PageID 5). 	Plaintiff is the mother of homicide victim Darnay Allmond, who she states
was murdered on July 29, 2021. 	According to Plaintiff, two individuals—Deaundre
Manning and Enijah Wilson—were arrested and charged with the murder. 	Both
prosecutions were handled by Defendant prosecutor Brian Goodyear. (Id. at PageID 6).
Plaintiff claims she was actively involved in the prosecution of Manning and raised
concerns regarding prosecutorial decisions, plea negotiations, and handling of evidence.
According to Plaintiff, Goodyear repeatedly assured her that “no plea agreement would
be accepted that did not reflect the severity of the crime,” but after she raised her concerns
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“Defendants’ demeanor and treatment toward Plaintiff changed.” 	(Id.). 	She claims
Defendants were dismissive and hostile towards her, advising her that her advocacy
would not change the outcome of the prosecutions.
With respect to the Wilson prosecution, which followed, Plaintiff alleges that she
actively requested notice of hearings and plea negotiations, but was informed that
communication would be limited or discontinued. Plaintiff further alleges that she was not
notified of Wilson’s plea hearing or given an opportunity to attend or be heard.
Plaintiff maintains that she was retaliated against and deprived of her due process
rights. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. (Id. at
PageID 7).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed at the screening stage. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
As an initial matter, the complaint should be dismissed against Defendant Hamilton
County Prosecutor’s Office. 	“Section 1983 creates liability for ‘persons’ who deprive
others of federal rights under color of law. Only a ‘person’ faces liability under the statute.”
Hohenberg v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 68 F.4th 336 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at
64). The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office is not a person subject to suit. See Nalls
v. Montgomery Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., No. 3:22-cv-243, 2023 WL 369955, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 24, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2081575 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 17, 2023) (“the complaint must be dismissed as to the Montgomery County
Prosecutor’s Office, as the county office is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 or
a legal entity capable of being sued.”); Howard v. Hamilton Cnty. Just. Ctr., No. 1:19-cv-
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926, 2019 WL 6686863, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 6682153 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019) (“a prosecutor’s office is not an
entity capable of being sued”).
The complaint should also be dismissed against Defendants assistant prosecutor
Goodyear, supervising prosecutor Mark Piempier, and senior prosecutorial official Rick
Gibson. 	Plaintiff does not include any specific factual allegations against Piemper and
Gibson, aside from referring to “Defendants” collectively in portions of the complaint.
Absent any allegation of wrongdoing, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted against these Defendants. And to the extent that Plaintiff may intend to
hold these individuals liable based on their supervisory positions it is well-settled that the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto
supervisory personnel. 	See Wingo v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)).
In any event, “[p]rosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct ‘intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Manetta v. Macomb County
Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). This includes a county prosecutor’s initiation of a prosecution and
presentation of the State’s case at trial. 	Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. 	See also Jones v.
Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1986). Such “absolute prosecutorial immunity is not
defeated by a showing that a prosecutor acted wrongfully or even maliciously.” Lomaz v.
Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 498 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1998).
As noted above, in this case Plaintiff claims that Goodyear retaliated against her
by failing to notify of plea hearings and improperly excluded her from participating in the
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prosecution of Manning and Wilson. 	Because these activities are intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process, Defendants Goodyear, Piemper, and
Gibson are entitled to immunity. See Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658-59
(6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prosecutor’s failure to notify a victim of a hearing in which a
charge was reduced and a guilty plea entered “is within the prosecutor’s function as an
advocate for the state as it is intimately associated within the judicial phase of the criminal
process”).1 	The 	complaint 	should 	therefore 	be 	dismissed 	against 	the 	Defendant
prosecutors. 2
Finally, the complaint should be dismissed against the remaining Defendant,
Hamilton County, Ohio. In order to state a claim for relief against Hamilton County for her
alleged 	injuries, 	Plaintiff 	must 	allege 	that 	“those 	injuries 	were 	the 	result 	of 	an
unconstitutional policy or custom of the County.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1994). See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (municipal policy must be the “moving force” behind
constitutional deprivation). 	“The ‘official policy’ requirement [of Monell] was intended to
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby
make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
1 With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that her exclusion from the criminal proceedings amounted to a due
process violation, the Sixth Circuit also held in Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652 (6 th Cir. 1993)
that the failure to inform a victim of a guilty plea hearing did not violate due process or give rise to a § 1983
claim. Id. at 656-57.
2 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant prosecutors liable in their official capacities, her
claims for damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Cox v. Nord, Case No. 1:23-cv-324, 2023
WL 6276198, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2023) (finding that official capacity claims against an Ohio common
pleas court judge and county prosecutor were the equivalent of claims against the State of Ohio and barred
under the Eleventh Amendment) (Report and Recommendation), adopted 2023 WL7699848 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 15, 2023).
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responsible.” 	Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in
original). Municipalities and other governmental entities cannot be held responsible for a
constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom
and the alleged deprivation. 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery County,
Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993).
Although the complaint includes the allegation that “Hamilton County maintained
policies or customs that permitted” her injuries and seeks “injunctive relief requiring policy
reform” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 7), Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations without
factual enhancement is insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 	Plaintiff has
failed to “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [County] itself and show that the
particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820
F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford,
245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). See also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th Cir.
2013) (“[E]ven assuming there was an underlying constitutional violation, we affirm the
dismissal of the Monell claim because Plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient facts to
establish an unconstitutional custom or policy.”). 	Further, “a custom-of-tolerance claim
requires a showing that there was a pattern of inadequately investigating similar claims.”
Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (citations omitted). The complaint fails to allege the existence
of any other instances of misconduct to plausibly support an inference of such a pattern
in this case. 	Plaintiff’s allegations are the type of legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation that does not pass muster under Twombly or Iqbal. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant
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Hamilton County.
IV. 	Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED this action be DISMISSED
with PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report
and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave
to appeal in forma pauperis.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TANIKA SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:25-cv-966
District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. 	All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. 	A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. 	Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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