Walker v. Fidelity Investments Institutional Operations Company LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
SHARNEE WALKER, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-883
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. 	Bowman, M.J.
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUIONAL
OPERATIONS COMPANY, LLC.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati brings this action against the Fidelity Investments
Institutional Operations Company, LLC. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 	This
matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine
whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 	To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action
is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
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basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). 	An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need
not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 	A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
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couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 	Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Here, liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to provide a
reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff’s documented medical condition in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant retaliated against
her for requesting and taking medically necessary leave. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that
she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on November 21. 2025. (Doc. 1 at 2;
Ex. A). She admits that she has not yet received her Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC,
and asks the Court to waive this prerequisite to federal suit. See Williams v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc., 53 F. App'x 350, 351 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The exhaustion of administrative remedies is
a condition precedent to a Title VII or ADA action). Plaintiff’s contention is not well-taken.
To exhaust administrative remedies for an ADA claim, a plaintiff must first timely
file 	a 	charge 	of 	disability 	discrimination 	with 	the 	Equal 	Opportunity 	Employment
Commission and/or the OCRC. Id. 	See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 	Only after the
administrative body dismisses the charge and issues a right-to-sue letter can a plaintiff
then file a civil action. Id. at 352, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When a plaintiff “files
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suit prior to receiving a right to sue letter, the district court is compelled to dismiss the
premature action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Mitchell v. Chapman,
343 F.3d 811, 821 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003).
For these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further RECOMMENDED
that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in
good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains
free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v.
Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States
Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
SHARNEE WALKER, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-883
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. 	Bowman, M.J.
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUIONAL
OPERATIONS COMPANY, LLC.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. 	All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. 	A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. 	Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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