Engle II et al v. Brown County, Ohio et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
RALPH CURTIS ENGLE II, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-836
Plaintiff, 	Hopkins, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
BROWN COUNTY, OHIO, et al., 	ORDER AND REPORT AND
Defendants. 	RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ralph Curtis Engle II1 has filed a civil complaint against defendants Brown
County, Ohio, Brown County Job & Family Services (JFS), Brown County Sheriff’s Office,
Brown County court2, Deputy Jason Huff, Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, Susie Huff, Verizon
Wireless (Celico Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless), Attorney Johnny Walker, Attorney
Nick Ring, John Doe Brown County JFS employees, and John Doe court personnel. 	By
separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915.
This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine
whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
1 Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of his minor daughter in addition to himself. 	However, the
complaint alleges plaintiff lost his parental rights. 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 23, ¶ 202). 	Because his parental rights
were terminated, plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a claim on behalf of his minor child. 	See Sefa v. Kentucky, 510
F. App’x 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Sefa lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of the minor children, as he does
not establish that he has parental rights over them”); Stephens v. Hayes, 374 F. App’x 620, 622 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“Because their parental rights were terminated, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any claim on behalf of their
children.”) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)); see also Chappel v. Hunter, No.
1:23-cv-728, 2024 WL 1307221, at *5, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55087 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2024) (“the state’s
temporary custody determination . . . has deprived [Chappel] of that [next of friend] status necessary for her to assert
her children’s rights.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
2 While Brown County court is not named as a defendant in the caption of the complaint, it is clear from the body of
the complaint and allegations that plaintiff intends to name this entity as a defendant. 	Therefore, liberally
construing plaintiff’s pro se complaint as the Court is required, the Court concludes that Brown County court is a
named defendant in this action.
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who is immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Screening of Complaint
A. 	Legal Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant
whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” 	Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. 	Id.; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 	A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the
plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. 	Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). 	An action
has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. 	Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 	An action
has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the
irrational or “wholly incredible.” 	Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. 	The
Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing
a complaint for frivolousness. 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 	A complaint filed
by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than
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formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 	By the same token, however,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71
(“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a
claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	The Court must accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). 	Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. 	Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” 	Id. at 557. 	The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 	Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint
The introduction to the complaint alleges the following:
This is a civil rights action arising from a coordinated effort by state actors and
private individuals, working in concert, to retaliate against Plaintiff Ralph Curtis
Engle II for making a protected disclosure to Brown County Job & Family Services
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on August 1, 2024. 	Within 48 hours of that disclosure, Plaintiff was forcibly
removed from his home by law enforcement, made homeless, and separated from
his minor daughter without due process. 	Over 450 days later, Plaintiff remains
homeless and separated from his child, while also being denied critical medical
treatment for a potentially cancerous condition.
(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 9).
The complaint contains numerous conclusory statements asserting the defendants denied
plaintiff his constitutional rights. 	The Court will largely omit recitation of those conclusory
allegations and recount the factual allegations of the complaint for purposes of this Report and
Recommendation.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2024, he made “a protected disclosure to Brown
County Job & Family Services concerning child safety issues and agency conduct.” 	(Id. at
PAGEID 12). 	On August 3, 2024, he was forcibly removed from his residence by defendant
Deputy Jason Huff, “in coordination with his sister Defendant Abigail Higle and other family
members.” 	(Id.). 	He alleges the removal was effected by the Brown County Sheriff’s Office
without probable cause, a warrant, consent, notice, or an opportunity to be heard. 	Plaintiff then
became homeless and remains so to this date. 	Plaintiff alleges his removal from his residence
was in retaliation for making the “protected disclosure.” 	(Id. at PAGEID 13). 	He alleges,
“Defendants Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, and Susie Huff actively participated in and facilitated
these actions through coordination with Deputy Jason Huff and other state actors.” 	(Id.).
The complaint also alleges that “[o]n or about August 4, 2024, Defendants separated
minor child Jane Doe from her father without providing constitutionally adequate due process.”
(Id. at PAGEID 13). 	The complaint states, “No emergency circumstances existed that would
justify immediate removal of the child without prior notice and hearing.” 	(Id. at PAGEID 13).
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Plaintiff alleges “state court proceedings” ensued, and on November 13, 2024, he was
denied entry to a court hearing despite his timely appearance. 	He alleges, “Court staff falsely
stated that Plaintiff was ‘not available’ when he was in fact present and seeking to participate.”
(Id.). 	The judge set a trial date “without hearing from Plaintiff or allowing him to present
evidence or argument.” 	(Id.). 	The complaint states that defendant Attorney Johnny Walker,
who represented defendant and adverse party Abigail Higle, received more favorable treatment
during this court proceedings than plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges he is a person with disabilities as defined by the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. 	His disabilities include PTSD-like symptoms, severe anxiety and
depression, abdominal and pelvic muscle weakness, chronic pain, mobility issues, and stress-
induced cognitive limitations. 	(Id. at PAGEID 14). 	Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly requested
ADA accommodations, including electronic service of documents; written confirmation of
filings; remote appearance options; plain-language written guidance; additional time when
needed; and assistance identifying required forms and procedures, which were known and denied
by defendants Brown County, Brown County JFS, Brown County Sheriff’s Office, Brown
County court, and court personnel. 	(Id.).
The complaint further alleges that “[a] court order required Verizon Wireless to separate
a phone line for Plaintiffs use.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff alleges defendant Verizon Wireless failed to
comply with the order and caused numerous communication failures, including dropped calls
during critical communications; inability to initiate or receive messages to and from JFS, courts
and attorneys; and service disruptions that prevented plaintiff from managing his medical care,
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benefits appeals, and court deadlines. 	(Id.).
The complaint also alleges that plaintiff was in the process of purchasing land at the time
of the removal from his residence. 	Plaintiff alleges that defendant Attorney Nick Ring provided
him legal advice to not purchase the land, which Ring later denied. 	Relying on the advice,
plaintiff did not purchase the property to his detriment.3
The complaint also includes claims for “Monell Liability”:
97. The violations alleged herein were not isolated incidents but rather reflect
customs, policies, practices, and deliberate indifference on the part of municipal
Defendants Brown County, Brown County JFS, Brown County Sheriff’s Office,
and Brown County courts.
98. Brown County and its agencies maintain policies, customs, or practices that:
fail to provide adequate due process before separating families; permit law
enforcement officers to use official authority to advance family members’ private
interests; fail to screen for conflicts of interest when law enforcement officers are
related to parties in civil matters; fail to provide reasonable accommodations to
persons with disabilities; fail to provide timely hearings and reunification services;
permit retaliation against individuals who make protected disclosures to JFS; fail
to provide adequate oversight of court personnel to ensure neutral access to justice;
provide preferential treatment to represented parties over pro se litigants; and fail
to train employees on constitutional requirements, ADA obligations, and due
process protections.
99. These policies and customs were the moving force behind the violations of
Plaintiff[’]s constitutional rights.
100. 	Brown 	County 	and 	its 	agencies 	were 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	the
constitutional rights of persons in Plaintiff[’]s position.
101. Brown County’s policymakers knew or should have known that these policies,
customs, and practices would lead to constitutional violations but failed to take
corrective action.
3 The complaint alleges, “Defendants Stephen Huff and Susie Huff were involved in or connected to matters related
to the land deal and interference with Plaintiff’s property interests.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 16). 	As with other
allegations in the complaint, this conclusory statement is not supported by any factual enhancement such that the
Court could conclude that plaintiff states a plausible claim against defendants Stephen Huff or Susie Huff.
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(Id. at PAGEID 16-17).
The complaint alleges 14 causes of action based on the foregoing and seeks monetary,
declaratory, and injunctive relief.
C. 	Resolution
At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this
action and liberally construing the pro se complaint, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff may
proceed with his First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims
against defendant Jason Huff (Counts I and V); his procedural due process claim against
defendants Brown County court and John Doe court personnel (Count III); his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims against defendants Brown County court and John Doe court personnel
in their official capacity (Count VII and Count VIII); and his negligence claim against defendant
Verizon Wireless (Count XII). 	Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are deserving of
further development and may proceed at this juncture. 4
Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants should be dismissed. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
Monell Municipal Liability Claims (Count IX)
Count IX, which plaintiff identifies as a “Monell Municipal Liability” claim, is brought
against defendants Brown County, Brown County JFS, and Brown County Sheriff’s Office.
Whether these defendants are entities that may be sued is governed by the law of the state in
4 The Court has not made a determination as to the merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor is
defendant precluded from filing a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3
(D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).
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which the district court is held. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). 	Under Ohio law, neither a county—
as a political entity—nor its department of job and family services have the legal capacity to be
sued. 	See Vo v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., No. 1:21-cv-241, 2021 WL 6033681, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 969552 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Lowe v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., No. 1:05-cv-117,
2008 WL 816669, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2008) and McGuire v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 253 F.
Supp. 2d 988, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). 	In addition a county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity
capable of being sued. 	Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., 144 F.4th 880, 891 (6th Cir. 2025)
(citing Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that, “under Ohio
law, a county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued for purposes of § 1983”)
(abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2017));
Barrett v. Wallace, 107 F. Supp. 2d 949, 954 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 	Therefore, because Brown
County, Brown County JFS, and Brown County Sheriff’s Office are not legal entities capable of
being sued under § 1983, the complaint against these defendants should be dismissed.
In any event, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	An Ohio county can be sued under § 1983
through its board of commissioners. 	See Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Commissioners, No. 1:22-cv-319, 2023 WL 4466855, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2023); Smith v.
Grady, 960 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 	Even if plaintiff named the Brown County
Commissioners as defendants, the complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim for relief against
Brown County because counties are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees
under § 1983. 	“It is firmly established that a municipality, or . . . a county, cannot be held liable
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under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” 	Gregory v. Shelby Cnty.,
Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 	To state a claim for
relief against Brown County for plaintiff’s alleged injuries, the complaint must allege facts
showing that the misconduct giving rise to those injuries was the result of a policy, statement,
regulation, decision, or custom promulgated by Brown County. 	Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio,
753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 556 (6th Cir.
2003)); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). 	See also Monell, 436 U.S. at
694; Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). 	“The ‘official policy’
requirement [of Monell] was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.” 	Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479 (1986). 	“[P]laintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took
place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality’s policy
or custom caused that violation to happen.” 	Bright, 753 F.3d at 660 (citing Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)). 	See also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981) (municipal policy must be “moving force” behind constitutional deprivation).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts showing that the actions taken against him
stemmed from an identified policy, custom, or practice of Brown County that caused a violation
of plaintiff’s civil rights. 	While the complaint contains several paragraphs alleging the
violations reflect the “customs, policies, [and] practices” of Brown County and that such policies
and customs were the moving force behind the violations (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 16-17, ¶¶ 97-
101), these are the types of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations that do not pass
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muster under Twombly or Iqbal. 	“A mere conclusory allegation that a municipality employs an
unlawful policy or custom, without identifying the policy or stating a pattern of conformance to
that custom, is not sufficient.” 	Gibson v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:21-cv-292, 2021 WL
2934710, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL
3207923 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2021) (citing Hargrow v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., No. 13-2770, 2014
WL 3891811, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 7, 2014)). 	Blanket assertions of a policy or custom,
without supporting facts, are not enough to establish a Monell claim. 	See Bickerstaff v.
Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 402 (6th Cir. 2016). 	See also Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No.
08-1638, 2009 WL 3154241, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2009) (finding that “bare allegations of a
custom or policy, unsupported by any evidence, are insufficient to establish entitlement to
relief.”); Biggin v. Ohio, No. 3:17-cv-2193, 2019 WL 3500921, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2019)
(“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, utterly devoid as they are, of any factual underpinning,
simply cannot sustain a policy/practice failure to train claim.”); Austin v. City of Cincinnati, No.
1:15-cv-608, 2015 WL 5680382, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2015) (finding “plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations of an ‘implicit or explicit’ unidentified policy and of a failure to train and
supervisor, without more, fail to state” a plausible claim under § 1983), report and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1718264 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2016). 	Nor does the
complaint allege facts showing “a direct causal link” between any such policy and the
defendants’ actions. 	Bickerstaff, 830 F.3d at 402 (citations omitted). 	Therefore, even if
plaintiff named the proper defendants to sue Brown County, the complaint fails to state a
“Monell Municipal Liability” claim for relief under § 1983.
Conspiracy Claim (Count VI)
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In addition, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim of conspiracy against
defendants Deputy Jason Huff, Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, Susie Huff, and Brown County
Sheriff’s Office (Count VI). 	“A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is an agreement between two or
more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” 	Crowley v. Anderson Cnty.., Tenn., 783 F.
App’x 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 	“To prevail
on a civil conspiracy claim, [a plaintiff] must show that (1) a ‘single plan’ existed, (2) [the
defendant] ‘shared in the general conspiratorial objective’ to deprive [the plaintiff] of his
constitutional (or federal statutory) rights, and (3) ‘an overt act was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy that caused the injury’ to [the plaintiff].” 	Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d
598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985)). 	“[I]t is
well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague
and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a
claim under § 1983.” 	Bickerstaff, 830 F.3d at 400 (quoting Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub.
Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of meeting the specificity requirement. 	He simply
alleges that these defendants “conspired and agreed among themselves to deprive Plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 21). 	While the complaint alleges defendant
Higle “initiat[ed] or support[ed] legal actions; Stephen Huff and Susie Huff coordinat[ed] and
facilitate[ed] actions; and all Defendants work[ed] together to retaliate against Plaintiff,” the
complaint fails to allege any specific facts to support these conclusory assertions. 	Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim for relief. 	Therefore,
plaintiff’s conspiracy claim should be dismissed.
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Retaliation (Count I) and Fourth Amendment (Count V) Claims
Similarly, plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Count I) against defendants Abigail Higle, Stephen
Huff, Susie Huff, and “Additional JFS Employees” (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 17) and Fourth
Amendment claim (Count V) against defendants Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, and Susie Huff
should be dismissed. 	The complaint alleges that defendant Deputy Huff, “in coordination with
his sister and other family members [Stephen Huff and Susie Huff], caused Plaintiff to be
forcibly removed from his residence” (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 12) and acted “in concert with
Defendants Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, [and] Susie Huff” to seize plaintiff’s person and
remove him from his residence. 	“[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported
by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” 	Harbin v. Rutter, 420
F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (6th Cir.
1987)). 	The complaint fails to allege any facts indicating how and when these defendants
coordinated with defendant Deputy Huff to retaliate against plaintiff or what actions they took
“in concert” with Deputy Huff to violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 	Similar to
plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, the conclusory allegations that these defendants “coordinated” or
“acted in concert” with Deputy Huff are insufficient to state a plausible claim of retaliation or a
Fourth Amendment violation against these defendants. 	Without any “further factual
enhancement,” plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are simply insufficient to state an actionable
claim for relief. 	Twombly, 550 at 555-57.
“State-Created Danger” Claim Under Section 1983 (Count X)
Plaintiff’s “state-created danger” claim under Section 1983 (Count X) should also be
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dismissed. 	Plaintiff appears to allege he was deprived of his constitutional rights and privileges
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the special relationship and state created danger doctrine (also
known as a Deshaney claim, in reference to DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). 	That claim requires: “(1) An affirmative act by the state which
either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of violence by a
third party; (2) A special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state’s actions placed the plaintiff
specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) The state
knew or should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff.” 	Shaw v. City
of Dayton, Ohio, 183 F. Supp. 3d 876, 885 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (citing Jahn v. Farnsworth, 617 F.
App’x 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Shaw v. City of Dayton, No.
16-3575, 2017 WL 11775840 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2017). 	Plaintiff does not allege that any
defendant created or increased the risk that he would be exposed to an act of violence by a third
party. 	Therefore, this claim should be dismissed as to all defendants.
Access to the Courts Claim (Count XI)
The complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim for denial of access to the courts
(Count XI) by defendant Attorney Johnny Walker or any of the other defendants named in
conjunction with this claim.5 	A denial of access to the courts claim has four elements: “(1) a
non-frivolous underlying claim; (2) obstructive actions by state actors; (3) ‘substantial[ ]
prejudice’ to the underlying claim that cannot be remedied by the state court; and (4) a request
for relief which . . . is now otherwise unattainable.” 	Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 174
5 As noted, infra, plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims alleging a denial of access to the courts may
proceed against defendant Brown County courts and “court personnel” in their official capacity. 	See Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (Title II prohibits States from denying disabled persons access to the courts.);
Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 814-15 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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(6th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to identify the exact nature of the underlying claim for which he was denied
entry to the court on November 13, 2024, although he intimates that the proceeding on that date
involved his parental rights. 	Without more, the Court is unable to discern if the claim was non-
frivolous. 	Plaintiff also alleges the judge set the case for trial “without hearing him” and denied
him discovery. 	Plaintiff fails, however, to allege any facts supporting these allegations or that
he suffered substantial prejudice that cannot be remedied by the state court. 	Nor does the
complaint allege facts suggesting plaintiff has made “a request for relief which is now otherwise
unattainable.” 	Flagg, 715 F.3d at 174. 	Plaintiff also alleges he was denied an audio recording
of the November 13, 2024 proceeding, which denied him an adequate record for appeal, but he
does not allege facts indicating when he requested the recording, who denied him the recording,
and what steps he took following the alleged denial. 	Without additional facts addressing the
four elements of his denial of access to the court claim, including the actions taken by specific
defendants, the Court is unable to conclude that plaintiff states a plausible claim for denial of
access to the courts.
Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim (Count XI) against defendant Attorney Johnny
Walker must also be dismissed for a separate reason. 	In order to maintain an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the person engaging in the offending conduct was acting
under color of state law, and this conduct deprived plaintiff of some right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. 	Graham v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 804 F.2d
953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). 	As a lawyer representing a client,
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defendant Walker was not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983. 	See Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defender does not act under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying Polk
Cnty. to retained criminal lawyers). 	See also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th Cir.
1998). 	Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against
defendant Walker.
Substantive Due Process Claim
The complaint fails to state a plausible claim for a substantive due process violation.
Substantive due process provides that “irrespective of the constitutional sufficiency of the
processes afforded, government may not deprive individuals of fundamental rights unless the
action is necessary and animated by a compelling purpose.” 	Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d
520, 539 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bartrell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2000)). 	To
prove such a claim, plaintiff “would need to establish either (1) ‘deprivations of a particular
constitutional guarantee,’ or (2) government actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” 	Garner v.
Harrod, 656 F. App’x 755, 761 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011)).
In connection with plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, the complaint alleges:
34. On or about August 4, 2024, Defendants separated minor child Jane Doe from
her father without providing constitutionally adequate due process.
35. No emergency circumstances existed that would justify the immediate removal
of the child without prior notice and hearing.
36. The timing of the removal—within 48 hours of Plaintiffs protected disclosure—
demonstrates retaliatory intent.
37. Defendants Abigail Higle, Stephen Huff, and Susie Huff actively participated
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in and facilitated these actions through coordination with Deputy Jason Huff and
other state actors.
(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 13).
It is clear that plaintiff has “a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment for familial association.” 	Corso v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, No. 1:18-cv-692, 2021
WL 2829170, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 7, 2021). 	However, the complaint’s allegations that
“defendants” took actions, without specifying the identity of the defendant and the specific
actions he or she engaged in, are insufficient to state a plausible substantive due process claim.
The complaint does not allege facts showing how certain defendants “actively participated” or
“facilitated” the actions or when such actions occurred. 	Plaintiff’s allegations amount to the
type of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations that do not state a claim for relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff alleges a substantive due process claim in connection
with the termination of his parental rights, “the juvenile court decides whether to grant
permanent custody to [the county’s department of children and family services] or to grant legal
custody to a relative” in the State of Ohio. 	Pittman, 640 F.3d at 729 (citing Ohio Rev. Code §§
2151.353(A)(3), 2151.414(A)(1)). 	“Because the juvenile court has the ultimate decisionmaking
power with respect to placement and custody, it alone could deprive [the plaintiff] of his
fundamental right.” 	Id. at 729; see also Teets v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 460 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th
Cir. 2012) (“Because Ohio law refers custody decisions to the juvenile court, which has
independent authority to conduct hearings and collect evidence, we held that even intentional
misrepresentations by a social worker during an investigation leading up to Ohio custody
proceedings do not violate the parent’s substantive due process rights because the social worker
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has no independent ability to institute the alleged deprivation.”) (citation omitted). 	In other
words, a defendant cannot incur liability for due process violations that he or she did not
personally commit. 	Pittman, 640 F.3d at 730. 	The complaint fails to allege any of the named
defendants engaged in conduct that violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.
Therefore, the complaint does not state a plausible substantive due process claim.
Procedural Due Process Claims
“[A] state must afford a parent fair process before interfering with a parent’s fundamental
right to family integrity and the companionship of his or her children.” 	Schulkers v. Kammer,
955 F.3d 520, 543 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir.
2008)). 	“Notice and an opportunity to be heard are necessary before parental rights can be
terminated.” 	Smith, 520 F.3d at 599 (quoting Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978)).
The complaint alleges that plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in the care, custody,
and companionship of his daughter, and that “all defendants” violated his procedural due process
rights by the following:
134. Defendants failed to provide a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing before:
removing Plaintiff from his residence on August 3, 2024; and separating Plaintiff
from his daughter on August 4, 2024.
135. Defendants failed to provide adequate and timely post-deprivation procedures,
including: denying Plaintiff entry to the November 13, 2024 hearing; failing to
provide audio recording of proceedings; setting case for trial without hearing
Plaintiff; denying discovery; providing preferential treatment to opposing counsel;
and failing to provide neutral court access.
***
137. Over 450 days have passed without Defendants providing adequate process to
challenge the deprivations or seek reunification.
(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 19).
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The complaint fails to state a plausible claim for a denial of procedural due process
against “all defendants.” 	Aside from the “court personnel” who allegedly denied plaintiff
access to the November 13, 2024 hearing and the judge who “set the case for trial without
hearing from plaintiff or allowing him to present evidence or argument,” (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID
13), plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any other named defendant took any action to
violate plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. 	While denying plaintiff a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on the issue of his parental rights may assert a colorable procedural due
process claim, the Court cannot discern how the other named defendants were involved in the
alleged deprivation. 	The other named defendants have “no independent duty” to ensure plaintiff
received notice or was permitted to meaningfully participate in court proceedings. 	Pittman, 640
F.3d at 730. 	To state a claim for relief against the other named defendants, plaintiff must show
that each individual defendant, “through [his or her] individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. 	With the exception of “court personnel” and the Brown
County (juvenile) court involved in the state court proceedings, the complaint fails to state a
claim for a denial of due process against the named defendants.
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff alleges he was denied procedural due process in
connection with his seizure and removal from his residence by deputy Huff, the complaint fails
to state a claim for relief. 	Reliance on Fourteenth Amendment due process in this context is
misplaced. 	The “Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and
its balance between individual and public interest always has been thought to define the ‘process
that is due’ for seizures of persons or property in criminal cases, including detention of suspects
pending trial.” 	Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
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Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n. 27 (1975)). 	Thus, “it is the Fourth Amendment which
establishes procedural protections in this part of the criminal justice area.” 	Wilson v. Morgan,
477 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Radvansky, 395 F.3d at 313). 	“The Due Process
Clause does not mandate any additional safeguards beyond the Fourth Amendment.” 	Halsell v.
Etter, No. 1:04-cv-63, 2005 WL 2850140, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2005) (citing Radvansky,
395 F.3d at 313), aff’d, 208 F. App’x 413 (6th Cir. 2006). 	For this reason, the complaint fails to
state a claim for relief under the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against defendant Huff.
Equal Protection Claim
The complaint alleges that defendants Brown County, Brown County Courts, court
personnel, and Attorney Johnny Walker deprived plaintiff of the equal protection of the law as
follows:
142. Plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class: pro se litigants with disabilities
who are homeless.
143. Defendants treated Plaintiff differently from similarly situated individuals,
specifically represented parties and parties without disabilities.
144. Defendant Attorney Johnny Walker, representing adverse party Abigail Higle,
received extensions, accommodations, and favorable treatment that were not
afforded to Plaintiff.
145. Court personnel provided preferential access and treatment to represented
parties while denying Plaintiff basic access to hearings.
146. This disparate treatment was intentional and without rational basis.
(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 20).
In Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900 (6th Cir. 2019), the Sixth Circuit stated:
To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the
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government actor treated her “disparately as compared to similarly situated
persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right,
targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” 	Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org.,
Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006), overruled on
other grounds by Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008). 	Thus,
“[t]he threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment,”
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 912.
Plaintiff states he was denied equal protection of the laws based on his alleged
classification of being a pro se litigant with a disability who is homeless, but he alleges no facts
to suggest he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals. 	While plaintiff
alleges Attorney Walker “received extensions, accommodations, and favorable treatment” that
plaintiff did not receive, he fails to allege any facts to support such claims of disparate treatment.
His allegations of unequal treatment are entirely conclusory and fail to state a claim under
Section 1983. 	See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).
Moreover, an equal protection claim requires proof of “intentional and arbitrary discrimination.”
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 	Plaintiff alleges no facts showing
discriminatory animus. 	Instead, without alleging what each defendant did that forms the basis
of his claim of unequal treatment, plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that “Defendants’
actions were taken with malice, willful disregard, or reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s federally
protected rights, warranting an award of punitive damages.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 20). 	These
legal conclusions, couched as factual allegations, do state a claim for relief. 	Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. 	This claim should be dismissed.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Plaintiff brings his ADA claim (Count VII) and his Rehabilitation Act claim (Count VIII)
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against defendants Brown County, Brown County JFS, Brown County Sheriff’s Office, Brown
County court, and “court personnel.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 14, ¶ 51, PAGEID 21). 	Plaintiff
alleges he is a person with disabilities who “repeatedly” requested ADA accommodations,
including “electronic service of documents; written confirmation of filings; remote appearance
options; plain-language written guidance; additional time when needed; and assistance
identifying required forms and procedures.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 14). 	Plaintiff also alleges:
169. Defendants excluded Plaintiff from participation in, denied him the benefits
of, or subjected him to discrimination in programs, services, or activities by reason
of his disability, including: JFS services and proceedings; court proceedings; access
to reunification services; and communication with agencies.
170. Defendants failed to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when such modifications were necessary to afford Plaintiff access to
services, programs, or activities.
(Id. at PAGEID 21). 	Plaintiff alleges that defendants Brown County, Brown County JFS,
Brown County Sheriff’s Office, Brown County courts, and court personnel failed to provide him
with reasonable accommodations. 	He also alleges that defendants Brown County, Brown
County JFS, Brown County Sheriff’s Office, and Brown County Courts are recipients of federal
financial assistance and are therefore subject to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 	He
asserts claims under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794.
Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that no qualified individual with a
disability shall, because of that disability, “be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 	Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). 	A “public entity”
means, inter alia, “any State or local government” or a department or agency thereof. 	42 U.S.C.
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§ 12131(1)(A), (B). 	The proper defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity or an
official acting in his official capacity. 	Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396-97 (6th
Cir. 2002). 	See also Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (Title II of the ADA
does not provide for suit against a public official acting in his individual capacity). 	To state a
claim for relief under Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that plaintiff was
denied the opportunity to participate or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities
or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiff’s disability. 	See
Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2008). 	See also Jones v. City of Monroe,
341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .” 	29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 	A Rehabilitation Act
claim includes the element that the state program or entity receives federal funds. 	See Burns v.
City of Columbus, Ohio, 91 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1996). 	“Generally, [the Sixth Circuit]
interprets claims under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act together because the
language of the two statutes materially differs in only two ways.” 	Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr.,
86 F.4th 314, 323 (6th Cir. 2023).6
6 The “Rehabilitation Act applies only to federally funded, rather than ‘public’ entities” and “requires that
discrimination occur ‘solely by reason of’ the plaintiff’s disability, whereas the ADA requires that it occur ‘because
of’ the plaintiff’s disability.” 	Bennett, 86 F.4th at 324 (citing S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2008)
and Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
& 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
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As an initial matter, the Court notes that “the proper defendant under a Title II claim is
the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity.” 	Everson, 556 F.3d at 501 n.7 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citing Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2002)). 	Neither
Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide a private right of action against a public
employee acting in his or her individual capacity. 	Everson, 556 F.3d at 501 n.7; Lee v. Mich.
Parole Bd., 104 F. App’x 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[N]either the ADA nor the [Rehabilitation
Act] impose[s] liability upon individuals.”). 	Therefore, any individual capacity claims against
“court personnel” under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be dismissed.
That said, plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims may proceed for further
development at this juncture against defendant Brown County court and the “court personnel” in
their official capacity, i.e., against the Brown County court. 	See Bowie v. Hamilton Cnty. Juv.
Ct., No. 1:18-CV-395, 2019 WL 1305864, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2019) (denying motion to
dismiss Hamilton County Juvenile Court’s motion to dismiss ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims) (citing Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, 276 F.3d 808, 813-16, 817 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Robinson v. Univ. of Akron Sch.
of Law, 307 F.3d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 2002)).
However, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be dismissed against Brown
County, Brown County JFS, and Brown County Sheriff’s Office because the facts alleged in the
complaint concerning the failure to accommodate plaintiff’s disabilities relate solely to court
proceedings. 	The complaint does not allege facts showing that plaintiff asked these other
entities for a reasonable accommodation which they failed to provide or otherwise discriminated
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against him based on his disabilities. 	Rather, his allegations relating these defendants are
conclusory. 	Plaintiff does not allege what particular actions these defendants took that could
plausibly amount to a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 	Accordingly, the complaint
fails to state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim against defendants Brown County, Brown
County JFS, and Brown County Sheriff’s Office and should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count XIV) should also be
dismissed. 	A claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress under Ohio law includes these
four elements:
(1) the defendant intended to cause, or knew or should have known that his actions
would result in serious emotional distress; (2) the defendant’s conduct was so
extreme and outrageous that it went beyond all possible bounds of decency and can
be considered completely intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the defendant’s
actions proximately caused psychological injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff
suffered serious mental anguish of a nature no reasonable person could be expected
to endure.
Woods v. Sharkin, 192 N.E.3d 1174, 1200 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Lombardo v. Mahoney,
No. 92608, 2009 WL 3649997, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009)). 	“[L]iability has been
found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” 	Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp. 2d 725, 736 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (quoting Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983)) (overruled on other grounds). 	“Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
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resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” 	Id. (quoting Yeager, 453
N.E.2d at 671). 	“Conduct that is merely cruel or insensitive does not reach the threshold of the
sort of extreme and outrageous conduct that is necessary to establish a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” 	Hunt v. City of Toledo L. Dept., 881 F. Supp. 2d 854, 886-87
(N.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Roelen v. Akron Beacon Journal, 199 F. Supp. 2d 685, 696 (N.D.
Ohio 2002)).
In support of this claim, plaintiff alleges he was forcibly removed from his home,
separated from his child for over 450 days, denied medical care, access to the courts, and due
process through the coordination “among family members to use state power for private
retaliation.” 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 24). 	Aside from the conclusory nature of these allegations,
the Court cannot find they rise to the level of conduct “beyond all possible bounds of decency.”
Hale, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 	While it is plausible that plaintiff suffered some emotional
distress as a result of the actions alleged above, it is not plausible that the emotional distress he
experienced was of a degree and “a nature that ‘no reasonable [person] could be expected to
endure it.’” 	See Pyle, 463 N.E.2d at 103. 	Nor does the complaint describe emotional injury
that approaches this degree of severity. 	Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the remaining
elements of the claim are wholly conclusory. 	Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims should be
dismissed.
Legal Malpractice Claim
Finally, plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against defendant Attorney Nick Ring arises
out of separate incidents and involves a different defendant and factual circumstances unrelated
to the other defendants. 	A plaintiff may not join unrelated claims and various defendants unless
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the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and . . . any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 	See also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (unrelated claims
against defendants belong in different suits).
“[T]he proper remedy for . . . misjoinder is to sever the claims against the unrelated
parties and dismiss those claims without prejudice.” 	Cage v. Mich., No. 16-cv-11679, 2018 WL
3729062, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2018). 	Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, courts have “broad
discretion ‘to order severance to avoid causing unreasonable prejudice and expense to the
defendant . . . and to avoid great inconvenience in the administration of justice.’” 	Proctor v.
Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Nali v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corrections, No. 07-10831, 2007 WL 4465247, *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007)) (alteration in
original).
Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim alleges that on two occasions he relied on defendant
Attorney Nick Ring’s “advice that was not in Plaintiff’s best interest,” which resulted in the loss
of land purchase opportunities and associated financial losses. 	(Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 24). 	This
claim is improperly joined because it is unrelated to the factual circumstances and claims against
the other defendants. 	Therefore, Count XIII is improperly joined in this action and should be
dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff re-filing a separate action including such claim if he so
wishes. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 21.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff may proceed with his First Amendment retaliation and Fourth
Amendment unlawful seizure claims against defendant Jason Huff (Counts I and V); his
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procedural due process claim against defendants Brown County court and John Doe court
personnel (Count III); his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against defendants Brown County
court and John Doe court personnel in their official capacity (Count VII and Count VIII); and his
negligence claim against defendant Verizon Wireless (Count XII). 	Plaintiff’s claims against
these defendants are deserving of further development and may proceed at this juncture.
2. 	Plaintiff has not submitted a copy of his complaint, completed summons or
completed U.S. Marshal forms for service on defendants Huff, Brown County court, or Verizon
Wireless. 	Within thirty (30) days of receipt of this Order, plaintiff SHALL submit to the Court
a completed summons and U.S. Marshal form for defendants Huff, Brown County court, and
Verizon Wireless.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to email plaintiff summons form and U.S.
Marshal forms for this purpose. 	Upon receipt of the completed summons and U.S. Marshal
forms from plaintiff, the Court will order service of process by the United States Marshal in this
case as directed by plaintiff.
4. 	Plaintiff SHALL file a motion to issue service, including updated U.S. Marshal
and summons forms, if and when plaintiff discovers the identities of defendant John Doe(s) court
personnel through discovery. 	Plaintiff is advised that no service will be issued on these
defendants unless plaintiff complies with this Order.
5. 	Plaintiff shall serve upon defendants or, if appearance has been entered by
counsel, upon defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. 	Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any
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document was mailed to defendants or counsel. 	Any paper received by a District Judge or
Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of
service will be disregarded by the Court.
6. 	Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address, email, or
phone number which may occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	The complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), except for
plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims against
defendant Jason Huff (Counts I and V); his procedural due process claim against defendants
Brown County court and John Doe court personnel (Count III); his ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims against defendants Brown County court and John Doe court personnel in their official
capacity (Count VII and Count VIII); and his negligence claim against defendant Verizon
Wireless (Count XII).
2. 	The Court SEVER and DISMISS plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against
defendant Attorney Nick Ring without prejudice to plaintiff re-filing a separate action including
such claim if he so wishes. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 21.
3. 	The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good
faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff remains free to
apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. 	See Callihan v. Schneider, 178
F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d
274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Date:
Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge
12/10/2025
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
RALPH CURTIS ENGLE II, et al., 	Case No. 1:25-cv-836
Plaintiffs, 	Hopkins, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
BROWN COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. 	Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report
objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. 	If
the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the
record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the
record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems
sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. 	A party may respond to another
party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. 	Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. 	See Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case: 1:25-cv-00836-JPH-KLL Doc #: 7 Filed: 12/10/25 Page: 30 of 30 PAGEID #: <pageID>