Secrest v. Harris Mountain West, LLC et al

JUSTIN SECREST,
V.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
Case No. 1:25-cv-215
Plaintiff, 	Judge Matthew W. McFarland
HARRIS MOUNTAIN
WEST, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Turner Construction Company's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 11), to which
Defendant filed a Reply in Support (Doc. 12). Thus, this matter is fully briefed and ripe
for the Court's review. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Turner
Construction Company's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8).
FACTS AS ALLEGED
Plaintiff Justin Secrest was employed as a Foreman when he suffered an injury
from moving a heavy air unit on August 8, 2024. (Compl., Doc. 5, ,r,r 10, 12.) At the time,
he was working for Defendant Harris Mountain West, LLC ("Harris Mountain")-a
mechanical 	contractor 	company- and 	Defendant 	Turner 	Construction 	Company
("Turner Construction")-a provider of construction services. (Id. at ,r,r 8-10.) Plaintiff's
medical providers placed him on a "light duty" restriction after diagnosing him with a
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pinched nerve and a sports hernia, which substantially limited Plaintiff's ability to bend,
lift, or carry objects. (Id. at ,r,r 14-15.) Accordingly, Plaintiff notified Defendants of the
situation and requested a light duty accommodation. (Id. at , 	17.) Defendants initially
approved the accommodation but then placed Plaintiff on unpaid leave and banned him
from the work location only days later. (Id. at , 	18.) Within the month, Plaintiff's
supervisor notified Plaintiff that he was terminated for refusing a drug test. (Id. at ,r 21.)
Plaintiff responded that he was never asked to take a drug test on the relevant date in
question; nevertheless, his supervisor explained that Defendants had instructed him to
terminate Plaintiff. (Id. at ,r 23.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas
for Hamilton County, Ohio. (See Compl., Doc. 5.) Then, on April 4, 2025, Defendant Harris
Mountain- with the consent of Defendant Turner Construction- removed this matter to
this Court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1.) Relevant for
present purposes, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant Turner Construction for
disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. (Compl., Doc. 5, ,, 26-
41, 60-69.) In turn, Defendant Turner Construction responded by filing a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 8), which is now ripe for the Court's review.
(See Response, Doc. 11; Reply, Doc. 12.)
LAW
A motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"
tests the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Golden
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v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958 (6th Cir. 2005). A claim for relief must be "plausible
on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Put differently, the
complaint must lay out enough facts for a court to plausibly infer that the defendant
wronged the plaintiff. 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502,504
(6th Cir. 2013). Courts must accept all allegations of material fact as true and must
construe such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
554-55; Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575,581 (6th Cir. 2018). However, courts are not bound to
do the same for a complaint's legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
ANALYSIS
Defendant Turner Construction seeks dismissal on the basis that it is not Plaintiff's
employer and Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a joint-employer relationship.
(Motion, Doc. 8, Pg. ID 201.) Plaintiff responds that he has plausibly alleged claims
against Defendant Turner Construction- especially in light of its supposed involvement
in his termination- and that dismissal would be premature. (Response, Doc. 11, Pg. ID
260.)
Courts may consider federal case law to help 	determine whether disability
discrimination claims brought under Ohio Revised Code § 4112 plausibly allege an
employer status. Bracken v. DASCO Home Med. Equip., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 686, 699 (S.D.
Ohio 2013) (citing Columbus Civil Serv. Comm. v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 573 (Ohio
1998)); see also Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F. App'x 488,492 (6th Cir.
2011 ). As for the joint-employer theory raised by the parties in this case, courts examine
whether "one employer while contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent
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company, has retained for 	itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer." Bracken, 954 F.
Supp. 2d at 699 (quoting Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990,993 n.4
(6th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted)). Specifically, courts consider whether the entity had
the ability to govern II
the essential terms and conditions of employment," such as "the
ability to hire, fire, and discipline, affect compensation and benefits, and direct and
supervise performance." Id. (quoting Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n.4; Sanford, 449 F. App'x
at 492).
Turning to the Complaint here, Plaintiff alleges that he worked for Defendant
Harris Mountain and Defendant Turner Construction. (Compl., Doc. 5, ,r 10.) Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor terminated his employment through a phone call on
August 30, 2024. 	(Id. 	at ,r 	21.) When Plaintiff contested the proffered reason for
termination by stating that he never received a request for a drug test, his supervisor
responded that "he was not aware of the details, but Defendants instructed him to
terminate [Plaintiff]." (Id. at ,r,r 22-23.) And, prior to this development, Defendants had
already placed Plaintiff on II
unpaid leave and banned him from entering the work
location." 	(Id. 	at ,r 18.) Plaintiff alleges that both Defendant Harris Mountain and
Defendant Turner Construction are "employers" for purposes of pursuing his legal
claims. (Id. at ,r,r 29-30, 34-36, 63-64, 68-69.) Taking all these allegations-including
Defendant Turner Construction's role in banning and thereafter terminating Plaintiff-
as true, Plaintiff has 	plausibly pled that Defendant Turner 	Construction was his
employer. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity, Comm'n v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., No. 2:10-
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CV-2717, 2011 	WL 13103437, at *3 	(W.D. 	Tenn. Sept. 	20, 	2011) 	(emphasizing the
defendant's alleged ability to terminate the plaintiff); Sutton v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No.
1:16-CV-1318, 2017 WL 3611757, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2017) (explaining that the
"complaint asserts that [the defendants], collectively, have the power to hire and fire [the
plaintiff]").
Defendant Turner Construction, to be sure, contends that it "had no involvement
in Harris' decision to end Plaintiff's employment with Harris." (Reply, Doc. 12, Pg. ID
265-66.) 	However, 	this 	assertion 	squarely 	contradicts 	Plaintiff's 	allegations 	in his
Complaint: 	"Defendants instructed 	[Plaintiff's supervisor] 	to 	terminate 	[Plaintiff]."
(Compl., Doc. 5, ,r 23.) It is well established that courts cannot resolve such factual
disputes on a motion to dismiss of this nature. See, e.g., Fite v. Giles Cnty. Gov't, No. 1:25-
CV-18, 2025 WL 1387054, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May 13, 2025); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Inf. Care Chiropractic, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-819, 2021 WL 4449996, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28,
2021). And, to the extent that Defendant Turner Construction offers facts not found
within the four corners of the Complaint (see, e.g., Motion, Doc. 8, Pg. ID 201-02, 204), the
Court declines to consider these assertions because they extend beyond the Complaint's
allegations. See Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 F. App'x 694,697 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that "a court generally may not consider any facts outside the complaint and exhibits"
when adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Morris v. Michigan Auto. Compressor, Inc., No.
18-CV-12847, 2019 WL 3068039, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 12, 2019) (declining to consider
factual assertions offered only through the briefing). Thus, this 	argument fails 	to
convince.
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Similarly, in light of the foregoing analysis and the governing standards, the Court
is unpersuaded by Defendant Turner Construction's argument that more detailed
allegations are required at this stage. See, e.g., Bracken, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (concluding
that the plaintiff had plausibly pied employer control despite not "provid[ing] specifics
as to the control that [one defendant] had over his conditions of employment"); Branning
v. Romeo's Pizza, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-2092, 2020 WL 3275716, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2020)
(explaining that the plaintiff" does more than merely assert that [the defendants] are 'joint
employers'"); Ali v. Piron, LLC, No. 17-CV-11012, 2018 WL 1185271, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 7, 2018) ("Contrary to [the defendant's] position, [the plaintiffs] do not need to plead
detailed 	factual 	allegations 	about 	Defendants' 	employment arrangements."). 	And,
"collecting defendants under a defined term then claiming all defendants are liable for
the same misconduct is, at the pleading stage, sufficient to give each of them notice of the
claims alleged against them." Faloba v. Ultium Cells LLC, No. 4:24-CV-1569, 2025 WL
1042699, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 2025) (cleaned up) (collecting cases).
Thus, for all these reasons, the Court declines to dismiss the claims against
Defendant Turner Construction at this early juncture. This conclusion accords with the
often-voiced recognition by sister courts throughout the Sixth Circuit that "[t]he extent of
[defendant's] control is a fact-specific inquiry that will be better addressed after discovery
on the issue has occurred." Bracken, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 699; see also Ali, 2018 WL 1185271,
at *6 (finding the motion to dismiss "premature" given the context); Morris v. Michigan
Auto. Compressor, Inc., No. 18-CV-12847, 2019 WL 3068039, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 12, 2019).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Turner Construction Company's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By :	~Y-11~~
JUDGE MATTHEWW. McFARLAND
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