Mounts v. Roadstar Motors, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
LARRY JOE MOUNTS,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
v.
ROADSTAR MOTORS, LLC,
Defendant-Counter Claimant.
Case No. 1:24-CV-312
Judge Michael R. Barrett
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
Plaintiff Larry J. Mounts, (Doc. 27), and the cross-motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendant Roadstar Motors, LLC, (Doc. 36). Also before the Court is Roadstar’s
motion to strike Mounts’s motion for summary judgment and its accompanying
exhibits. (Doc. 32).
I. BACKGROUND
In early-April 2024, Mounts and his wife, Bobbi Jo DeBruhl, saw a Roadstar
advertisement on Facebook Marketplace for a “2016 GMC Canyon with 148K miles
at a cash deal special price of $16,999.” (Doc. 7, PageID 56). After filling out an online
credit application and speaking over telephone with Roadstar salesperson Deontae
Sturgill to confirm that the Canyon (hereinafter, “the vehicle”) was still available,
Mounts and DeBruhl drove from their home in Gallipolis Ferry, West Virginia, to
Roadstar’s dealership in Hamilton, Ohio, on April 10. (Doc. 27, PageID 391).
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After Mounts and DeBruhl examined the vehicle, they entered the dealership
to discuss a potential purchase with Sturgill. Mounts asserts that he “informed
Sturgill that he was dyslexic where he received monthly social security disability
benefits for his condition,” and “therefore, chose to trust [Sturgill] to read and
describe each of the documents on which he authorized his electronic signature to be
placed.” (Doc. 27, PageID 391). However, in his deposition testimony, Mounts said
that he was watching “Wolf of Wall Street” on a television in the dealership, and when
Sturgill attempted to show him something on the computer screen, he responded “I
cannot read that, but my wife can.” (Doc. 31, PageID 710).
Mounts then represented that Sturgill turned the computer screen away and
would not let him or DeBruhl see what was on it. (Id.). Roadstar disputes this through
Sturgill’s sworn affidavit, in which he says that DeBruhl “sat down in [his] chair and
began reading the sales agreement. Some of it she read aloud, the rest I assume she
read to herself.” (Doc. 33, PageID 758). The summary judgment record is rife with
factual disagreements between the parties, including whether Mounts and DeBruhl
had a conversation with Sturgill about financing terms and the final price of the
vehicle.
What the parties do not dispute is that Mounts made a down payment of
$10,500, which consisted of a $1,000 cash payment and a 2014 Toyota Tundra, valued
at $9,500. The parties also agree that Mounts signed a retail installment contract for
the vehicle—to be assigned to the Credit Acceptance Corporation (“CAC”)—in which
he agreed to finance $21,838.28 at an annual percentage rate of 18.99%, totaling
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$33,993 in payments and resulting in a final sale price of $44,493. (Doc. 27, PageID
424).
After Mounts and DeBruhl took possession of the vehicle and returned home,
Mounts alleges that they “read the paperwork” and “were shocked to learn of [the
financing] numbers.” (Id., PageID 393). Following a phone call between DeBruhl and
Sturgill on April 12, Mounts retained the services of attorney Steven Shane, who in
turn began to correspond with CAC and eventually with Roadstar, represented by
attorney Jeffrey Burd. Believing that Mounts was exercising his statutory right to
rescission, Roadstar cancelled the financing contract and informed Mounts that it
would refund his down payment, trade-in value, and financing payment upon the
return of the vehicle to their dealership, thereby returning the parties to the pre-
purchase status quo. (Doc. 36, PageID 804).
The vehicle was never returned to Roadstar, however, and Mounts did not
collect his refunds. Mounts now brings two claims against Roadstar—the first under
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and the second under
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01, et seq.
In its motion for summary judgment, Roadstar argues that Mounts refused to honor
his own offer of rescission, and “instead tried to re-negotiate the [rescission] deal to
include attorney fees.” (Id.). Mounts counters in his own motion for summary
judgment that he “was entitled to reimbursement for attorney fees he expended,” but
Roadstar “unilaterally declared the case settled and refused to budge from its
position.” (Doc. 27, PageID 394).
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986) (noting that a fact is “material” only when its resolution affects the
outcome of an action, and a dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). The Court views
the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere
allegations in the pleadings, but must instead put forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
This standard of review remains the same for reviewing cross-motions for summary
judgment. Ohio State Univ. v. Redbubble, Inc., 989 F.3d 435, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2021);
see Harris v. City of Saginaw, 62 F.4th 1028, 1032-33 (6th Cir. 2023) (“In review of
the defendant's motion, we accept the plaintiff's view of the facts as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff;” whereas “in review of the plaintiff's
motion, we accept the defendant's view of the facts as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the defendant.”).
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III. ANALYSIS
a. OCSPA
Mounts first contends that Roadstar violated the OCSPA both when it failed
“to sell a motor vehicle at the advertised price,” and when it did not transfer the
vehicle’s title within forty days of that sale. (Doc. 27, PageID 387). But as a threshold
matter, the Court must determine whether—as Roadstar argues—Mounts foreclosed
any ability to recover damages or file suit in the first place by choosing to rescind the
consumer transaction.
Under the OCSPA, an aggrieved consumer may choose one of two remedies:
they “may ‘rescind the transaction or recover [their] actual economic damages plus
an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars in noneconomic damages.’” J & D Rack
Co., Inc. v. Kreimer, 2011-Ohio-2358, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.) (quoting Ohio Rev. Code
§ 1345.09(A)); see 1 Anderson's Ohio Consumer Law § 3.27 (2025) (“Rescission is a
completely alternative remedy to damages under the CSPA.”). “The law highly favors
settlement agreements.” Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Props. II, 37 N.E.3d
1211, 1216 (Ohio 2015)
Rescission, much like any other settlement agreement, “is a particularized
form of a contract,” Breech v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2017-Ohio-9211, ¶ 34 (5th
Dist.). Notably, “[i]f a contract encompasses the essential terms of an agreement, it
is binding and enforceable.” Id. “Once a settlement offer has been accepted, the
settlement agreement is mutually binding; the settlement agreement cannot be set
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aside simply because one of the parties later changes its mind.” Zele v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., 2023-Ohio-2875, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).
While there must be a meeting of the minds over essential terms, “not every
disputed term raised by a party to a settlement discussion is an ‘essential’ term
impeding the existence of a settlement agreement.” Moton v. Schafer, 2022-Ohio-
3505, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). Indeed, “where ‘the essential terms’ of a settlement agreement
have been established, certain terms . . . ‘are secondary to the meeting of the parties’
minds on the essential terms of the agreement.’” Smith v. PGN OP. Echo, LLC, 2025-
Ohio 185, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.) (quoting Kinnett v. Corp. Document Solutions, Inc., 2019-
Ohio-2025, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.)); see Breech at ¶ 41 (“If a contract encompasses the
essential terms of an agreement, it is binding and enforceable. If less essential terms
are omitted from an agreement, they may be resolved by later agreement or judicial
resolution.”).
Although Mounts acknowledges repeatedly that he opted for rescission and
“authorized counsel to demand statutory rescission on his behalf,” (Doc. 27, PageID
393), he proceeds to argue that Roadstar did not actually accede to his demand and
instead “unilaterally declared the case settled and that all of Plaintiff’s claims were
released through some imaginary settlement refusing to consider paying any further
damages or attorney fees,” (Id., PageID 388). Roadstar counters that its acceptance
of the demand for rescission “was clearly communicated in a reply email and also
accepted by performance—the financing was called off and the first payment
refunded.” (Doc. 33, PageID 753).
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The record before the Court includes two certified letters written by Steven
Shane that are particularly helpful for the Court’s purposes. In the first—dated May
13, 2024, and addressed to the Credit Acceptance Corporation (“CAC”)—Shane
elaborates upon the allegations against Roadstar and represents that Mounts is
entitled to “significant damages . . . which would make rescission not the most
appropriate remedy.” (Id., PageID 764).
But in an apparent about-face, the second letter—dated May 21, 2024, and
addressed to both CAC and Jeffrey Burd—is entitled “re: Larry J. Mounts vs.
Roadway (sic) Motors LLC., et al., NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR RESCISSION
PURSUANT TO O.R.C. § 4505.181(B)(1).” (Id., PageID 765). Shane proceeds to note
that Roadstar failed to tender the vehicle title to Mounts within the statutorily-
defined period,1 and asserts accordingly that “[t]his failure entitles our client to full
rescission of this transaction and to receive a refund of all payments including their
down payment as well as payments made to the third party financing source as well
as being released from this obligation with CAC which they hereby demand.” (Id.,
PageID 765-66).2 The second letter ends with a clear request to “[p]lease act
accordingly to allow Mr. Mounts to rescind this transaction.”3 (Id., PageID 766).
1 It is unclear to the Court whether the title was in fact tendered in a timely fashion, partly due to
Sturgill’s assertion to DeBruhl on April 12 that he “transferred the title over into your name already.”
(Doc. 27, PageID 501). Regardless, the answer to that question would not change the Court’s
conclusions here.
2 In deposition testimony, Mounts confirmed his preference for rescission at the time Shane sent the
demand letter. (Doc. 31, PageID 728). Mounts was well aware of that remedy because DeBruhl, as
early as two days following the purchase, told a Roadstar salesperson that she “wanted to bring the
truck back and cancel everything and take my trade-in home and give him his vehicle back.” (Doc. 30,
PageID 675).
3 A slightly different version of this letter, bearing the same date and subject line, is among the
summary judgment evidence submitted by Mounts. (Doc. 27, PageID 509-10). Although this
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In an email written following receipt of Shane’s letter on May 21, Burd
responds that Roadstar “accedes to and accepts” Mounts’s outstanding demand for
rescission. (Id., PageID 769). That acceptance is further evidenced by the actions of
Roadstar’s manager Anis Cherradi, who had cancelled the transaction and obtained
“a refund check from Credit Acceptance Corp. made payable to Larry Mounts.” (Id.,
PageID 761). But in another letter to Burd dated seven days later, Shane attempts
to add a previously undiscussed term to the rescission agreement: “$3[,]150
reimbursement for attorney fees for all time spent to date.” (Id., PageID 772).4
Based upon the facts and circumstances before it, the Court concludes that the
parties reached a meeting of the minds on May 21 as to the essential term of their
agreement, rescission. The record is entirely devoid of any discussions regarding
attorney fees prior to Shane’s correspondence with Burd on May 28 and May 29, and
Mounts did not so much as reference attorney fees in the details of his “NOTICE AND
DEMAND FOR RESCISSION” on May 21. (Doc. 33, PageID 765-66). By his
unequivocal written demand for rescission, Mounts essentially offered “to return all
money, property[,] or other benefits received under the instrument,” thereby
returning the parties to the status quo. Ady v. Miller Day Iseli Energy Co., No. 624,
1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 7242, at *5 (7th Dist.). And because Roadstar unequivocally
accepted the demand as it was stated, Mounts is bound to the rescission.
alternative version omits the request to “act accordingly to allow Mr. Mounts to rescind this
transaction,” it contains identical language regarding the entitlement to rescission.
4 Although Shane acknowledged later that “R.C. 4505.181 doesn’t expressly provide for recovery of
fees,” he argued to Burd that the alleged deceptive sales practice “obviously provides for attorney fees.”
(Doc. 33, PageID 772). But Ohio courts have been clear that even “the ‘knowing’ commission of an act
that violates [the OCSPA] does not mandate the imposition of attorney fees.” White v. Lima Auto Mall,
Inc., 2009-Ohio-411, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.) (quoting Charvat v. Ryan, 879 N.E.2d 765, 772 (Ohio 2007)).
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b. TILA
TILA was enacted as a means “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15
U.S.C. § 1601(a). “TILA requires a creditor to ‘disclose to a consumer buying on credit
exactly how much he will pay for that credit.’” Poulin v. Balise Auto Sales, Inc., 647
F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales, Inc., 155 F.3d 927,
932 (7th Cir. 1998)); see Diaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 519,
529 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“TILA requires clear and accurate disclosures by creditors to
consumers of any finance charge that the consumer will bear under the credit
transaction.”).
As relevant here, a finance charge is defined under TILA “as the sum of all
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended,
and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of
credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a). Notably for these purposes, fees charged by third parties
need not be classified as finance charges under TILA unless a seller “[r]equires the
use of a third party as a condition of or an incident to the extension of credit,” or
“[r]etains a portion of the third-party charge.” 12 C.F.R. § 1206.4(a)(1).
Mounts alleges that Roadstar violated TILA by “failing to make accurate credit
disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. [§] 1638(a).” (Doc. 13, PageID 108). Specifically,
Mounts contends that Roadstar impermissibly charged Mounts $28,999 for the
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vehicle, as opposed to the $16,999 base price that DeBruhl says she saw on the
Facebook Marketplace advertisement. (Id.). Roadstar did so, Mounts argues, by
folding a hidden financing charge (what Roadstar effectively represents as a CAC’s
time-price differential for subprime borrowers) into the cash price of the vehicle.
For its part, Roadstar counters that the high-risk finance fee was a “third-party
lender fee” that it did not retain. (Doc. 33, PageID 754-55). Pointing to a dearth of
evidence suggesting that the extension of credit was conditioned on the use of a third
party, Roadstar then argues that the fee was exempt from the TILA disclosure
requirements at issue—in other words, “not a[] ‘finance fee’ that must be separated
from the purchase price.” (Id., PageID 755). And Mounts does not argue that the fee
was hidden entirely, nor could he, because the purchase contract stated a base cash
price, the amount Mounts would be financing, the total of his payments along with
the total number and amount of each individual payment, and the total sale price of
the vehicle.
Based upon the pleadings and evidence properly before the Court at this
juncture, the Court must enter summary judgment on Mounts’s TILA claim in favor
of Roadstar. To be sure, the Court is not without concerns over the propriety of
including a third-party fee into the base cash price of a vehicle, even if that fee is
exempt from the statutory scheme’s disclosure requirement. But the question before
the Court is not an equitable one of whether rolling high fees into the price of an item
is a scrupulous practice. Rather, the question before the Court is whether Roadstar
violated TILA in this instance.
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According to the testimony of Anis Cherradi, the “purchase of the 2016 GMC
Canyon was financed by a high-risk financing policy that carried significant lender
fees of thousands of dollars,” which were in turn financed by Mounts. (Doc. 33, PageID
760). On its face, this could point to an unlawful hidden finance charge. However,
Cherradi proceeds to declare that the lender fees in question “go to the financing
companies and not Roadstar.” (Id.). This is again alluded to in Sturgill’s testimony
and then set forth outright in Roadstar’s pleadings: “Here, Roadstar did not retain
any portion of the third-party lender fee.” (Id., PageID 755).
In response to that assertion, Mounts has presented not a scintilla of evidence
on summary judgment, direct or otherwise, to show that Roadstar retained (or would
have retained, had the transaction not been cancelled) any part of the disputed lender
fee. And “[t]he ‘mere possibility’ of a factual dispute is not enough.” Pitcher v.
Waldman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152087, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (quoting
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992)). Thus, because
“[c]onclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts are insufficient to
establish a factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment,” Roadstar is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir.
2009).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mounts’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED, and Roadstar’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Roadstar’s
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motion to strike is DENIED as moot, and the parties will bear their own fees and
costs.
Within ninety (90) days of the date of this order, Mounts must either (1)
facilitate the return of the subject vehicle to Roadstar (whereupon the deposit, trade-
in value, and financer check will be tendered to Mounts); or (2) tender a payment of
$6,499 (plus any applicable state taxes and fees) to Roadstar, representing the
difference between the advertised all-cash sales price of the vehicle and the amount
Mounts paid through his down payment and trade-in.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge
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