McFadden v. Boyer et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JERE S. MCFADDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLARISSA BOYER, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 5:25-cv-1692
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Jere S. McFadden has filed a civil complaint against Clarissa Boyer, the
State of Ohio, and the State of North Carolina. (ECF No. 1). The complaint attaches a notice of
appeal and appears to be an attempt to appeal/overturn state court decisions in Ohio and North
Carolina concerning Plaintiff’s parental rights. (See id.; ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff has also filed an
amended notice of removal. (ECF No. 3).
With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
That motion is GRANTED. 	For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is
DISMISSED.
II. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint stems, in part, from a final divorce decree entered in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas in Case No. DR-2017-01-0160, in which the court awarded
Plaintiff’s ex-wife, Clarissa Boyer, full legal custody of the couple’s minor children; later, the
court stripped Plaintiff of any visitation rights. (See ECF No. 1-1, PageID #9–10); see generally
Boyer v. McFadden, Case No. DR-2017-01-0160 (Summit Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas). The complaint
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also stems from custody decisions entered in Case No. 25JT000091-890 before the General Court
of Justice, District Court Division in Union County, North Carolina, which Plaintiff alleges is “yet
another case by Boyer to strip my parental rights.” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID #11). The complaint
alleges “Constitutional rights of child and parent have been taken without due process” and
requests dismissal of the state court judgments and restoration of Plaintiff’s parental rights. (ECF
No. 1, PageID #4). 	On October 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Amended Notice of
Removal,” in which Plaintiff purports to remove the two state court cases referenced in the
complaint and notice of appeal: (i) Case No. DR-2017-01-0160 from the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas; and (ii) Case No. 25JT000090-890 from the General Court of Justice in Union
County, North Carolina. (ECF No. 3).
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required
to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any
such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 	See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal
standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at
471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading
that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro
se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). 	Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading
requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the
nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
It is unclear whether Plaintiff intended to file a civil action seeking to appeal/overturn the
state courts’ determination of his parental rights or whether he intended to remove the relevant
state actions from Ohio and North Carolina. In either case, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiff’s claims and the complaint must be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
First, federal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. 	Danforth v.
Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703,
112 S. Ct. 2206, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992) (“[T]he domestic relations exception . . . divests the
federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”). “Although this
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction does not apply to a civil action that merely has
domestic relations overtones, . . . federal courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense
and the suit is actually concerned with domestic relations issues.” Danforth, 76 F. App’x at 616
(internal citation omitted). Here, although Plaintiff alleges due process violations, the core concern
in Plaintiff’s complaint is domestic relations. 	Plaintiff seeks to overturn state court decisions
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concerning child custody and visitation and he requests restoration of his parental rights. 	The
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a case or grant such relief. See Edelstein v. Flottman, No. 24-
3156, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 570, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) (affirming the district court’s
dismissal when the plaintiffs “couched their claims . . . in terms of constitutional violations” but
“the substance of the claims revolves around the state courts’ decisions in the domestic-relations
proceedings as they relate to [child] custody and [child] visitation rights”).
Second, the Court is also barred from granting Plaintiff’s requested relief by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to review final judgments, as well as interlocutory orders, from state courts. 	See
Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child and Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir.
2010); RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380, 396 (6th Cir. 2021); see also
Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
“prevents a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court
decision”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“[A] federal court lacks jurisdiction to review a
case litigated and decided in state court, as only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to correct state court judgments.” 	Higgs v. Dupuis, No. 5:19-cv-192, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104359, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 3, 2021); see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983), Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d
271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A party raising a federal question must appeal a state court decision
through the state system and then directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.”). Federal
courts may raise the issue of abstention sua sponte. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 642
(6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte”); see also
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Louisville Country Club v. Watts, Nos. 97-5758 and 97-5829, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7828, *7
(6th Cir. Apr. 16, 1999).
The Court cannot discern from the record whether Plaintiff has exhausted his appeal rights
in either the Ohio or North Carolina courts. 	That said, the Sixth Circuit has held that Rooker-
Feldman abstention does not require a state court judgment to have been finalized after the
exhaustion of all appeal rights. See RLR Invs., LLC, 4 F.4th at 393–96; see also T.M. v. Univ. of
Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 139 F.4th 344, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2025) (adopting the same approach); Parker
Law Firm v. Travelers Indem. Co., 985 F.3d 579, 584 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Even so, that an appeal is
pending in the New York state courts does not mean that a federal district court has jurisdiction to
consider a parallel appeal. 	This court, like other circuits, has concluded that Rooker-Feldman
applies to state court judgments that are not yet final.”). Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction
to review and overturn the state court decisions.1
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal
from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
1 To the extent that Plaintiff intended to bring any claims against the State of Ohio and the State of North Carolina
under § 1983, such claims would also be barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment grants
sovereign immunity to the States, guaranteeing that “nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in
federal court.” Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 936 (6th Cir. 2019). Neither the State of Ohio nor the State of
North Carolina has consented to be sued under § 1983 and Congress has not otherwise abrogated their Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to § 1983 claims. See Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“Notably, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d
635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“The State of Ohio has immunity for all claims against it because Ohio has not consented
to suits in federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio’s immunity under § 1983.”); Bright v. McClure, 865 F.2d
623, 626 (4th Cir. 1989) (“North Carolina has done nothing to waive its immunity.”).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 14, 2025
__________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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