Ascencios v. Healy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MIGUEL ENRIQUE ASCENCIOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
IAN M. HEALY, Warden,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:25-cv-1720
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Miguel Enrique Ascencios, an inmate currently incarcerated at FCI
Elkton, filed this action without a lawyer against Ian M. Healy, the prison’s warden.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant improperly denied him access to the Federal Bureau
of Prisons Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (“TRULINCS”). He alleges
that the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Bureau of Prisons’
guidelines “prohibit discrimination against individuals or groups.” (Id., PageID #6.)
He seeks an order granting him access to email.
BACKGROUND
The Federal Bureau of Prisons allows inmates to have limited access to
computer services through TRULINCS. Although inmates do not have access to the
Internet, they are able to use TRULINCS to monitor their inmate trust accounts,
send internal communications to prison staff, and use messaging services, including
email, 	to communicate with 	others outside 	of the prison. 	See BOP 	Program
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Statement 4500.12, § 14.1 pg. 126. 	By participating in the TRULINCS program,
inmates consent to having all of their activity, including email and transactional data,
monitored and retained by prison personnel. 	Emails may only be exchanged with
authorized contacts, and they can be rejected by prison staff if they are deemed to
jeopardize the safety of the institution or the public. 	See BOP Program Statement
4500.12, § 14.3(d) pg. 127. Inmate use of TRULINCS is a privilege, and the warden
or associate warden may deny an inmate access to all or any part of it. 	The BOP
encourages wardens to provide all inmates with access to TRULINCS terminals due
to its self-service nature. See BOP Program Statement 4500.12, § 14.9 pg. 130.
Plaintiff contends that he previously had full access to TRULINCS email before
access was “suddenly terminated,” and the Warden provided “no factual basis” for the
termination. 	(ECF No. 1, PageID #3 & #5.) 	Documents attached to Plaintiff’s in
forma 	pauperis 	application 	demonstrate 	that 	Plaintiff 	appealed 	the 	Warden’s
decision through the BOP’s administrative remedy system, and each appeal was
denied. (See ECF No. 2-4; ECF No. 2-6.) Plaintiff claims that he had no email-related
disciplinary issues warranting denial, yet other inmates, including drug dealers and
sex offenders with serious contact offenses, still have access to TRULINCS email.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has provided no explanation for this disparity, and
he appears to allege that this disparate treatment violates his equal protection rights.
(Id., PageID #5–6.)
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GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	application 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	pursuant 	to
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 2). 	By separate order, the Court grants that application.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is before
the Court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 	The district
court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted or if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler
v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). 	A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact where it is
premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions
are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted where it
lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564
(2007). 	In any civil action, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise
the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption 	that all the
allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not
required to include detailed factual allegations, but he must provide more than “an
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unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a
cause of action does not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. 	Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559,
561 (6th Cir. 1998).
ANALYSIS
Upon 	review, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	even 	liberally
construed, fails to state to a plausible claim upon which the Court may grant relief
and warrants dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff filed this civil rights complaint against a federal employee; therefore,
he brings this action is pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Sullivan v. United States, 90 F. App’x
862, 863 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming a ruling construing a complaint as a Bivens action
where the plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of a right secured by persons acting
under color of federal law).
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action against
federal officials acting under color of federal law in three narrow circumstances: (1) a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure (in Bivens itself); (2) sex discrimination in
violation of the Fifth Amendment (in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)); and
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(3) 	cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment (in Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)). 	See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017). 	Expanding
Bivens remedies to other causes of action is “‘disfavored.’” 	Id. at 135 (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). “‘[I]n all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause
of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.’” 	Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 942
(2025) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022)).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims in a new context not previously recognized
under Bivens. Therefore, the Court must consider whether Bivens should be extended
to this new context. 	If presented with a new context, then a court must determine
whether 	“‘special 	factors 	counsel[] 	hesitation’ 	in 	recognizing 	the 	new 	claim.”
Callahan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 965 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139). 	Such factors include whether existing legislation governs
the issue, whether Plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies available to him, and
whether recognizing a new claim would “interfer[e] with the authority of the other
branches and whether the judiciary can competently weigh the costs and benefits at
stake.” Id. (citing Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136, 143; Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 108
(2020)).
The Court concludes that an extension of Bivens is not warranted here. First,
Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which limits the scope of
remedies available to prisoners. See Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 148-49. 	The Act does not
provide for a standalone damages remedy, which “suggests Congress chose not to
extend 	the 	. 	. 	. 	damages 	remedy 	to 	cases 	involving other 	types 	of 	prisoner
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mistreatment.” 	Id. Additionally, “when alternative methods of relief are available,
a Bivens remedy usually is not.” Id. at 145. Plaintiff had alternative remedies
available to him under the BOP’s administrative remedy program, which he, in fact,
exhausted. 	Finally, the task of running a prison falls within the province of the
executive branch. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987). 	“Given the array of
challenges facing prison 	administration 	and the complexity of those problems,”
separation of powers concerns “counsel in favor of the judiciary not creating new
causes of action[.]” 	Callahan, 965 F.3d at 524 (declining to extend Bivens to a First
Amendment claim).
For these reasons, the Court declines to extend Bivens to Plaintiff’s purported
equal protection claim concerning the denial of his access to email through the
TRULINCS system. 	See Galpin v. Healy, No. 4:25-cv-1566, 2025 WL 2959624, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205821 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2025) (dismissing equal protection claim
concerning access to TRULINCS email because it is not a recognized Bivens claim);
McConnell v. Healy, No. 4:25-cv-00755, 2025 WL 2969333, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
206830 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2025) (stating that the plaintiff’s equal protection claim
for the denial of TRULINCS email is not a recognized Bivens claim).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which the Court may grant
relief.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 24, 2025
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