Westley v. Harris et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES WESTLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRANDESHAWN HARRIS, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 4:21-CV-01672
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
MAGISTRATE JUDGE AMANDA M. KNAPP
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(ECF Docs. 68 & 69)
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff James Westley’s (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Westley”)
Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) Due to Fraud on the
Court (ECF Doc. 68 (“Motion for Relief from Judgment”)) and Motion for Reconsideration and
Reinstatement of Claims with Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF Doc.
69 (“Motion for Reconsideration”)) (collectively “Motions to Vacate”). Defendants Haines,
Gregory, Grimm, Kline, Miller, Garvey, Prasky, and Eubank filed Memoranda in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motions to Vacate. (ECF Docs. 74 & 75.) The motions have been referred to the
undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 72.1 and 72.2(a).1 (ECF Doc. 63.)
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY
Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 68) and Motion for Reconsideration
(ECF Doc. 69) and all relief requested therein.
1 The Motions to Vacate seek to vacate a prior judgment by this Court entered on Defendants’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Thus, the undersigned proceeds with a report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(b)
and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) rather than an Order under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(a) and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
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I. 	Procedural History
The relevant procedural history is set forth in the contemporaneously filed Order denying
Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence and Notice of
Defendants’ Continued Bad Faith Litigation Tactics and Abuse of the Judicial System (ECF Doc.
82 (“Order on Motion for Sanctions”))2 and is incorporated herein.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motions
A. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 68)
In his Motion for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate and set
aside all prior judgments and orders dismissing Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(d)(3). (ECF Doc. 68.) He alleges:
Defendants, their counsel from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, and officers of
this Court engaged in a scheme to suppress and destroy irrefutable evidence that
was subject to a litigation hold and preservation notice. This misconduct constitutes
fraud upon the judicial process itself, striking at the integrity of this Court’s
proceedings.
(Id. at p. 1.) He argues that this Court and the Sixth Circuit entered rulings disposing of certain
claims before learning “the truth of this spoliation” and “without knowledge of the full extent of
the destroyed evidence.” (Id. at p. 2.) Thus, Plaintiff contends that this Court should vacate all
prior dismissals of Plaintiff’s claims and reinstate all claims and defendants. (Id. at pp. 2-3.)
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, arguing that the motion
is duplicative of a prior motion that was denied by this Court (ECF Doc. 59), and adopting the
arguments they asserted in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Relief, Sanctions, and
Default Judgment (ECF Doc. 72). (See ECF Doc. 74, p. 2.)
2 In his Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff sought sanctions based on Defendants’ alleged spoliation of surveillance
video evidence. (ECF Doc. 48.)
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While a motion to alter a final judgment is typically governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), the savings clause established in Rule 60(d)(3) “allows a judgment to be
attacked for fraud on the court[.]” Maloof v. Level Propane, Inc., 429 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th
Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3)). To demonstrate “fraud on the court” under that
savings clause, a litigant must show “conduct (1) by an officer of the court; (2) directed to the
‘judicial machinery’ itself; (3) which was intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or in
reckless disregard of the truth; (4) which was a positive averment or a concealment when under a
duty to disclose; and (5) which deceived the court.” Maloof, 429 F. App’x at 467 (citing
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff seeks “relief from judgment” on certain previously-dismissed claims in
“Counts 1 through 9” of the operative complaint based on his assertion that Defendants
“maliciously destroyed” video evidence relating to all of his claims—not only the four claims
that remain following the Sixth Circuit’s remand—and that the district court dismissed those
other claims “before the truth of this spoliation was revealed to the Plaintiff.” (ECF Doc. 68, pp.
1-2.) This request for relief must fail for numerous reasons, as detailed below.
First, the present motion is not Plaintiff’s first attempt to seek reinstatement of previously
dismissed claims based on allegations of malicious destruction of evidence. (See ECF Doc. 51.)
In denying the prior motion, this Court explained that Plaintiff misunderstood the Sixth Circuit’s
remand, which “left in place [this Court]’s rulings on all matters except that it vacated the
judgment on Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim three; and vacated dismissal of claims five, six,
and seven.” (ECF Doc. 59, p. 1.) The undersigned finds no basis to reconsider that decision.
Second, Rule 60 provides for relief from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added); Dassault Systemes, SA v. Childress, 663 F.3d 832, 840 (6th
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Cir. 2011) (holding it is a “well-established rule that Rule 60(b) applies only to final, appealable
judgments”). But where, as here, “a plaintiff brings different claims . . . in the same complaint, .
. . a ruling that fails to dispose of the whole complaint is not final.” In re Refrigerant
Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Because four
claims remain pending following the Sixth Circuit’s remand, there is currently no “final
judgment” in this case that is subject to challenge under Rule 60(d)(3).
Third, for the reasons set forth in detail in the Court’s Order on Motion for Sanctions
(ECF Doc. 82), Plaintiff has failed to show a “fraud on the court” sufficient to support an award
of relief under Rule 60(d)(3). While Plaintiff submitted some written grievances to authorities
during the 14-day retention period for the relevant video surveillance evidence, Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that authorities had a duty to preserve the video evidence at the time that it
was automatically overwritten, and has certainly failed to prove that the video evidence was
destroyed “maliciously” as he now alleges. Further, considering the Sixth Circuit standard to
prove “fraud on the court,” Plaintiff also has not shown conduct “by an officer of the court” that
was “directed to the ‘judicial machinery’ itself” and was “intentionally false, willfully blind to
the truth, or in reckless disregard of the truth.” Maloof, 429 F. App’x at 467.
Finally, the undersigned notes that the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal of all
claims except the four remaining claims at the pleading stage.3 See Westley v. Harris, No. 23-
3177, 2024 WL 4111143 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2024). In considering this Court’s earlier rulings on
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Sixth Circuit was required to “construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all the factual allegations as true, and
determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
3 When appealing this Court’s ruling on the judgment on the pleadings, Mr. Westley did not challenge the dismissal
of other defendants at the initial screening stage. See Westley, 2024 WL 4111143, at *1.
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on its face.’” Id. at * 2 (internal citation omitted). Because the prior rulings of this Court that
were upheld by the Sixth Circuit were based on the factual allegations in the complaint, not the
evidence, the evidentiary matters raised in Plaintiff’s spoliation allegations are not relevant to
that prior decision and accordingly do not support reconsideration.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY
Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 68).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF Doc. 69)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff requests that this Court “reconsider its prior
rulings dismissing certain claims and Defendants” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(2), (3), and (6), and reinstate the claims and Defendants “in light of the Sixth Circuit’s
reversal, Defendants’ admissions of malicious spoliation of evidence, and binding precedent
from the United States Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit.” (ECF Doc. 69.) Plaintiff also requests
that the Court issue specific findings of fact and conclusions of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
(Id.) Defendants oppose the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that this Court should deny the
motion and further asserting that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not appropriate in
the context of the pending motion. (ECF Doc. 75.)
Most of Plaintiff’s arguments in the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF Doc. 69) are
duplicative of arguments asserted in the Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 68) and
other previous filings, and will not be addressed at length here. As discussed with respect to the
Motion for Relief from Judgment in Section II.A., supra, the undersigned concludes that the
Motion for Reconsideration should be denied for numerous reasons, including: (1) the motion
effectively seeks reconsideration of a prior decision of this Court (ECF Doc. 59), which is not
warranted; (2) the motion seeks relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), (3), and
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(6), which is not available because a “final judgment” is not in place; (3) the motion seeks relief
based on allegations of malicious destruction of evidence, but the Court found those allegations
to be unsupported by the evidence in its Order on Motion for Sanctions (ECF Doc. 82); and (4)
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding spoliation of video evidence are irrelevant to the claims
previously dismissed by this Court and upheld in dismissal by the Sixth Circuit because those
dismissals were based on Plaintiff’s allegations in his pleadings, not the evidence.
As to the few elements of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration that have not already
been addressed, the undersigned concludes that they do not change the analysis. For example,
Plaintiff also seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), but a motion to alter or amend a judgment
under that rule must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. There is “no
possibility of an extension” of that deadline. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507–08 (2020)
(citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2)). Since this Court issued its ruling on Defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings on January 27, 2023 (see ECF Docs. 32 & 33), Plaintiff is nearly
three years too late to file a timely Rule 59(e) motion.4 Further, Plaintiff’s request for the
issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) is not appropriate
in this procedural context. Rule 52 provides that “[t]he court is not required to state findings or
conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 56, or unless these rules provide
otherwise, on any other motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3). Plaintiff has not identified any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that would require the issuance of findings of fact or conclusions
of law when deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). Thus, Plaintiff has offered
no arguments in support of his Motion for Reconsideration that would justify the relief sought.
4 Because the Sixth Circuit’s March 6, 2025 mandate reinstated four of Plaintiff’s claims (ECF Doc. 38), there is no
longer a final judgment subject to challenge via a Rule 59(e) motion. But Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion would also
be untimely if the 28-day filing deadline were calculated from the date the Sixth Circuit mandate.
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For all of the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY
Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 69).
III. 	Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY
Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF Doc. 68) and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration (ECF Doc. 69) and all relief requested therein.
December 5, 2025
/s/Amanda M. Knapp
AMANDA M. KNAPP
United States Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. 	Failure to file objections
within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Berkshire
v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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