Westley v. Harris et al

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES WESTLEY, 	) 	CASE NO. 4:21-CV-01672
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
v. 	)
)
BRANDESHAWN HARRIS, et al., 	) 	MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) 	AND ORDER
Defendants. 	) 	[Resolving ECF No. 66 and ECF No. 67]
The Court considers two filings, both from pro se Plaintiff James Westley. First, a
Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of the District Judge (ECF No. 66). Second, an
Objection of Referral to the assigned Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 67). The motion is denied and
the objection is overruled for the reasons herein.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case, filed over four years ago, has a protracted history: entry of judgment, appeal,
partial remand, appointment and withdrawal of pro bono counsel, and myriad conferences,
notices, and motions. See Westley v. Harris, et al., No. 4:21-CV-01672 (N.D. Ohio filed Aug.
27, 2021). After a late-summer status conference, the Court referred the dispute to the assigned
magistrate judge for case management and motion resolution under 28 U.S.C. § 636. See
Minutes of Proceedings [Non-Document] 8/14/2025; ECF No. 63. Since then, Plaintiff has filed:
(1) an Emergency Motion for Expedited Relief (ECF No. 64); (2) a Motion for Sanctions (ECF
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No. 64); (3) a Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 64); (4) a Motion for Recusal and
Disqualification of the District Judge (ECF No. 66); (5) an Emergency Motion for Relief from
Judgment (ECF No. 68); (6) a Motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatement (ECF No. 69); (7)
an Objection to Referral (ECF No. 67); (8–9) two Notices of Correction (ECF Nos. 70, 71); (10)
a Notice of Continued Fraud (ECF No. 77); and (11–12) two Manual Evidentiary Filings (ECF
Nos. 65, 78). While most of these filings will be resolved (via Report and Recommendation, or
otherwise) by the magistrate judge, the Court steps in to resolve two of Plaintiff’s protests:
District Judge recusal and Magistrate Judge referral.
II. DISCUSSION
A. RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
1. Law
A district judge must disqualify herself sua sponte from any proceeding in which her
impartiality––typically via bias or prejudice––may reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. §
455; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 547–48 (1994). The lack of impartiality must be
personal or extrajudicial. See United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing United States v. Hartsel, 199 F.3d 812, 820 (6th Cir. 1999)). Extrajudicial partiality is
“bias . . . arising out of the judge's background and association and not from the judge's view of
the law.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). Personal partiality
emanates “from some source other than participation in the proceedings or prior contact with
related cases.” Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Wheeler v.
Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251–52 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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Relatedly, when “a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice . . . such judge shall
proceed no further therein[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). The affidavit must set forth
facts allowing a reasonable person to believe “that [the] judge has a personal bias against the
moving party.” Gen. Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1043 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Sixth Circuit holds that § 144 and § 455 “must be construed in pari materia” and that
“disqualification under § 455(a) must be predicated as previously under § 144, upon extrajudicial
conduct rather than on judicial conduct.” Youn, 324 F.3d at 423 (quoting United States v. Story,
716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983)).
2. Arguments
Plaintiff motion for recusal of the District Judge is sponsored by a whirlwind of
allegations of improper dismissal, ex parte communication, improper referral to pro bono
counsel for purposes of settlement, prejudice, bias, and obstruction. See ECF No. 66 at PageID
#: 1077. He tenders conclusory claims rooted in speculation, attenuation, and indignation. See
ECF No. 66. He contends that “[t]he District Judge arranged for a referral attorney to contact
Plaintiff on the record, for the sole purpose of pressuring Plaintiff into settlement.” ECF No. 66
at PageID #: 1078. He moves on to claim, “knowledge of the Court’s predetermined views on a
dispositive issue.” ECF No. 66 at PageID #: 1079. He accuses the Court and the pro bono
counsel of using “the exact same cautionary language[.]” ECF No. 66 at PageID #: 1079. He
alleges ex parte communication that demonstrates “coordination and a chilling effect on
Plaintiff’s right to present evidence of systemic misconduct and corruption.” ECF No. 66 at
PageID #: 1082. Finally, he claims the Court “deliberately ignored and denied [his] [injunctive]
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motion” addressing his unfounded fear that Defendants “may attempt to silence or destroy him”
through bodily injury. ECF No. 66 at PageID #: 1082. Defendants oppose the motion,
contending that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the requisite bias from “any extrajudicial
knowledge or exposure.” ECF No. 73 at PageID #: 1122. They argue that Plaintiff was merely
“dissatisfied with the advice of pro bono counsel and theorized, without justification[,] that the
presiding district judge was biased against him.” ECF No. 73 at PageID #: 1123.
3. Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion is without merit. He offers no coherent arguments or supporting
evidence of personal or extrajudicial bias actionable at law or equity. See Wheeler, 875 F.2d at
1252. Rather, he “grounds” his motion on misquotations from status conferences, surreptitious
recordings, and misconstructions of transcript. See ECF Nos. 66 at Page ID ##: 1080–81, 66–1
at PageID #: 1088, 66–3 at PageID #: 1090; Youn, 324 F.3d at 423. His arguments culminate
with conclusory flourishes and logical incoherence, attempting to transfigure his imagined biases
into a reality of impartiality. He offers no facts “which a reasonable person would believe would
indicate [the] judge has a personal bias against [him].” Gen. Aviation, 915 F.2d at 1043.
Without evidence of particularized bias, recusal is unwarranted. See Wheeler, 875 F.2d at 1252.
Plaintiff’s contentious behavior throughout this dispute––including lashing out at the Court as if
it were a mere party opponent––further justifies this determination. See Youn, 324 F.3d at 423.
Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
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B. REFERRAL TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1. Law
The Federal Magistrates Act provides that a “magistrate may be assigned such additional
duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(3). A district court may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine myriad
pretrial matters, including—by Report and Recommendation---motions for injunctive relief,
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information, to suppress criminal evidence, to dismiss or maintain a class action, to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, or involuntarily dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.
Moreover, a district court may refer matters without the parties’ consent and is “free to do as it
sees fit with the magistrate judge's recommendations” therefrom. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S.
580, 585 (2003) (addressing the difference between involuntary referral under § 636(b)(1) and
consensual referral under § 636(c)).
2. Arguments
Plaintiff objects to the Court’s referral of case management and motion resolution to the
magistrate judge, claiming it is “inappropriate and prejudicial.” ECF No. 67 at PageID #: 1091.
He claims that referral is improper because his case “involves systemic constitutional violations,
malicious spoliation of evidence, and judicial integrity concerns that fall squarely within the
Article III Court’s responsibilities.” ECF No. 67 at Page ID #: 1092. He also claims that
“[d]elegating this matter away from the presiding District Judge . . . violates both due process
and judicial duty.” ECF No. 67 at PageID #: 1093. Finally, he claims that referral to the
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magistrate judge “risks compounding the prejudice caused by the destruction of evidence.” ECF
No. 67 at PageID #: 1093.
3. Analysis
The Court has treated Plaintiff no differently than any other pro se litigant seeking relief
under the Civil Rights Act. The case was lawfully referred to the magistrate judge on August 19,
2025 under Local Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636. See ECF No. 63. Plaintiff has shown his
distaste for that referral by flooding the docket with frivolous motions and redundant notices. He
attempts to support his objection with a citation from Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858
(1989) positing that “[r]eferral to a Magistrate Judge is improper where the case presents
exceptional circumstances implicating due process, judicial impartiality, and Plaintiff’s safety.”
ECF No. 67 at Page ID ##: 1092–93. There are at least two problems here. At the threshold,
Plaintiff fails to reveal how Gomez supports his claim of improper referral. See ECF No. 67 at
PageID ##: 1092–93. Specifically, Gomez––a criminal case––contains legal conclusions and
factual circumstances inapposite to Plaintiff’s circumstances, both imagined and concrete. See
490 U.S. at 876 (holding that a magistrate judge exceeded his statutory duty by presiding over
jury selection in a felony trial). Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
If Plaintiff disagrees with a ruling of the magistrate judge, he will have opportunity to
object, as provided by 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72. Until then, neither Article III
nor the Court bends to his will.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of the District
Judge (ECF No. 66) is denied and his Objection of Referral to the Magistrate Judge (ECF No.
67) is overruled.
The Court construes pro se filings liberally and extends lenience when warranted. There
is, however, no tolerance for Plaintiff’s continued misconduct in this litigation. Plaintiff is
hereby given notice that continuing to flood the docket with frivolous motions, oppositions,
notices, or filings will subject him to sanctions––including the assessment of costs, attorneys’
fees, permanent enjoinment from filing new documents, and dismissal of his case. See Local
Rule 7.1(i). 	Similar consequences shall be imposed, if Plaintiff does not cease attempting to
communicate with the Court via email and telephone calls. The Court speaks through its docket;
and so too shall Plaintiff, but reasonably.
A separate Case Management Conference Plan/Order will issue, and this case will
proceed towards adjudication on merits, not feelings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 3, 2025 	/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date 	Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
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