Cook v. Best, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
REBECCA ANN COOK, 	CASE NO. 3:26 CV 266
Plaintiff,
v. 	JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
JUDGE RHONDA LYNN BEST, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendants. 	ORDER
I NTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court are numerous motions filed by both pro se Plaintiff
Rebecca Ann Cook and various Defendants. See Docs. 2, 7, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 26, 30, 31.
The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2), but for the reasons
set forth below, finds this action subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this suit based on actions arising out of several traffic-related cases
brought against her in 2024 and 2025 in the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court. See Doc. 1, at 2.
Plaintiff was convicted of the charges and put on probation in April 2025. Id. She now brings
suit against multiple individuals involved in those underlying cases and her subsequent
probation: (1) Judge Rhonda Lynn Best; (2) Prosecutor Barbara Dibble; (3) court-appointed
counsel Wilson Alexander Smith; (4) Probation Officers Erica L. Mackling and Patrick Del
Turco; (5) City of Fostoria Officers Nicholas Cole Noftz and Timothy Ink, Sergeant Brandon
Bell, and Chief of Police Gabriel Wedge; (6) Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court Clerks of Court
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 1 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

2
Jennifer McClure and Heather M. Eidenour,1 (7) Attorney General Dave Yost; (8) Attorney
General Section Chief Lucas Ward; (9) Private Landlord Steve Gibbs; and (10) Madison County
Court of Common Pleas Assignment Commissioner Mara Fox. See Doc. 1.
Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and
1986; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. See id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990). A claim
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal
theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of
action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the
complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but
he 	or 	she 	must 	provide 	more 	than 	“an 	unadorned, 	the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
1. Eidenour was originally named as “Heather Eigel” in the Complaint and Answer. See Doc. 1,
at 1, 12; Doc. 9, at 1.
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 2 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

3
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Upon review, for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint must
be dismissed.
Rule 8 Pleading Standard
Several Defendants move to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. See Docs. 7, 11, 14.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff lists “Facts and Dates” and then “Applicable U.S. Code
Sections” for each Defendant. See Doc. 1. For each Defendant, this includes some or all of the
statutes below. For example Plaintiff cites:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Deprivation of rights under color of state law
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) – conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
42 U.S.C. § 1986 – Failure to prevent known civil-rights violations
42 U.S.C. § 2000d Title VI – Discrimination in programs receiving federal
financial assistance
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
See, e.g., id. at 2. The Court addresses these in reverse order.
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against various Defendants under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and
242. See Doc. 1. She cannot do so. These are criminal statutes that do not provide a private right
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 3 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

4
of action. See Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge Co., 108 F. App’x 307, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2004)
(explaining the plaintiff, a private citizen suing under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and other statutes,
possessed no private right of action against defendants for alleged violations of those statutes and
had no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution against the defendants for their
allegedly unlawful acts); United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (same);
Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[A] private citizen has no authority to initiate a
federal criminal prosecution” and “[o]nly the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 (the criminal analogue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)”).
When no private right of action is available to a plaintiff, she does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Kafele, 108 F. App’x at 308-09. Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242 must be dismissed.
Title VI
Plaintiff also cites Title VI as the basis for some of her claims. Title VI provides “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. But Plaintiff has
not alleged any of Defendants’ actions were taken because of her race. Douglas v. Kazlaukas,
2011 WL 462971, at *2 (W.D. Ky.) (finding plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VI where
he did not allege the defendant’s actions were taken because of his race); Lee Testing & Eng’g,
Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 855 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (stating the plaintiff
failed to allege any actions based on racial discrimination and declining to “infer the possibility
of race discrimination”). More still, only programs that benefit from federal financial assistance
are subject to Title VI’s regulations. Douglas, 2011 WL 462971, at *3; see also David K. v.
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 4 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

5
Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1275–76 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff did not allege any Defendants receive
federal funding. Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege Defendants’ actions were taken
because of her race or that they received federal funds, her allegations fail to state a claim under
Title VI.2
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986
Plaintiff also repeatedly references 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and § 1986 as the basis for her
claims. See, e.g., Doc. 1, at 2 (citing a “[c]onspiracy to interfere with civil rights” and “[f]ailure
to prevent known civil rights violations”); id. at 3 (citing a “[c]onspiracy to deprive equal
protection”).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the plaintiff must plausibly allege “both
membership in a protected class and discrimination on account of it.” Ohio ex rel. Moore v.
Brahma Inv. Grp., Inc., 723 F. App’x 284, 288 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Est. of Smithers ex rel.
Norris v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Complaint does not allege
Plaintiff was targeted by Defendants because of her membership in a protected class.
Liberally construing the Complaint to assert a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the Court
notes “[a] civil conspiracy under § 1983 is ‘an agreement between two or more persons to injure
another by unlawful action.’” Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss this claim,
the Complaint needs to “allege facts that, when accepted as true, would allow a juror to find that
(1) a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the
2. Indeed, in one of Plaintiff’s opposition briefs, she expressly states “[t]his action is not based
on discrimination, but solely on violations of federal law and constitutional rights committed
under color of law.” (Doc. 12, at 1).
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 5 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

6
conspiracy that caused the injury.” Id. (citation modified). While a conspiracy may be proved
with circumstantial evidence, “conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity
and . . . vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to
state such a claim under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d
556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no such specificity, and instead just
references the conspiracy statute and other “vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by
material facts.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
And because Plaintiff has no viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as explained above,
her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 must also be dismissed. “Section 1986 establishes a cause of
action against anyone, who has knowledge of a conspiracy under § 1985, and ‘having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do.’”
Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1986). Because the Complaint does not state a claim under § 1985, it necessarily follows that
there can be no liability under § 1986. Id. at 315; Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must identify a right
secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a person acting
under color of state law.” Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiffs need to demonstrate (1) the relevant actor engaged in the conduct at issue while
operating under color of state law, (2) the conduct caused a deprivation of constitutional rights,
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 6 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

7
and (3) the deprivation occurred without due process of law. Nishiyama v. Dickson Cnty., 814
F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987). Because § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
only a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred, a plaintiff must set forth
specific constitutional grounds for asserting a § 1983 claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
393-94 (1989); Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 2002).
Below, the Court addresses the arguments presented by each group of Defendants for
dismissal of the § 1983 claims.
Court and Probation Officer Defendants
Judge Best, McClure, Smith, Mackling, Del Turco, Eidenour, and Fox move for
judgment on the pleadings as to the claims against them, arguing Plaintiff has failed to state a §
1983 claim against any of them upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 14, at 3-4). Best,
McClure, Mackling, Del Turco, Eidenour and Fox further assert they are entitled to judicial or
quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 6-8. Plaintiff opposed (Doc. 15), and these Defendants replied
(Doc. 18).3
First, the Court agrees with these Defendants (Doc. 14, at 4) that Plaintiff’s allegations
against them under § 1983 amount to little more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me 	accusation.” 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	at 	678. 	Plaintiff 	simply 	describes 	actions 	each
Defendant took and then lists statutes, including § 1983. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify
what constitutional right was violated. Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 109 F.4th
864, 870 (6th Cir. 2024) (“To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first identify a
constitutional right, then show that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of
3. Plaintiff filed two more “opposition” briefs after Defendants’ reply. See Docs. 21, 25. These
filings are improper, and the Court will not consider them. See Loc. Civ. R. 7.1 (providing for a
motion, opposition, and reply).
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 7 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

8
that right.”). “Because Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but only a method
for 	vindicating 	federal 	rights 	elsewhere 	conferred, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	set 	forth 	specific
constitutional grounds for asserting a Section 1983 claim.” Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 452
F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff does not do so here, instead asserting Defendants, e.g.,
committed a “deprivation of rights under color of state law,” engaged in “[j]oint action with state
actors affecting civil rights,” or 	“[m]iuse[d] . . . probation authority.” See Doc. 1, at 2, 4, 7.4
Similarly, 	in 	opposition, 	Plaintiff 	merely 	argues 	she 	“alleged 	specific 	facts 	describing
Defendants’ criminal, unlawful, and unconstitutional actions.” (Doc. 15, at 3); see also id. at 4.
(“Defendants’ conduct, as alleged, violates . . . The Constitution of the United States.”). But the
facts Plaintiff asserts as to these Defendants do not plausibly allege a specific constitutional
violation.
Second, it is well established that judicial officers are generally entitled to absolute
immunity from civil suits for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are afforded this broad protection to ensure
the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is not impaired by the
exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute
immunity is overcome only when (1) the conduct alleged is performed at a time when the
defendant was not acting as a judge; or (2) the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, was
taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he or she
presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A judge will not be deprived of
4. Further, Smith – Plaintiff’s public defender or court-appointed counsel – is “not [a] state
actor[] against whom claims can be asserted under § 1983.” West v. Lambert, 3 F. App’x 440,
441 (6th Cir. 2001) (first citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); then citing
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); and then citing Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d
279, 289 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 8 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

9
immunity even if the action at issue was performed in error, done maliciously, or exceeded his or
her authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271
(6th Cir. 1984) (merely acting in excess of authority does not preclude immunity). Here, there is
no suggestion in the Complaint that Judge Best acted in any capacity other than that of a judicial
officer when the conduct alleged in the Complaint occurred. See Doc. 1, at 2 (alleging Best
presided over Plaintiff’s traffic related cases, entered convictions and probation orders, and
denied or failed to address Plaintiff’s filings). Nor is there any suggestion that she acted clearly
outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which she presides. Judge Best is
absolutely immune from suit.
Judicial immunity may also be extended to non-judicial officers, like a Clerk of Courts or
a court administrator, who perform in a quasi-judicial capacity. See Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842,
847 (6th Cir. 1994). “Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune.” Id. The fact that an error was made is immaterial. Foster v.
Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988). Court clerks and other court officials and employees
have therefore been accorded absolute immunity from civil rights actions on claims arising from
conduct intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., id. (court clerk); Denman v.
Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (municipal court clerk); Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (court
administrator and referee). Plaintiff does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting McClure,
Eidenour, or Fox acted outside the scope of their quasi-judicial immunity flowing from their
positions as Clerks of Court and Assignment Commissioner, respectively. See Doc. 1, at 11-13,
15-16. These Defendants are also immune from suit.
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 9 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

10
This quasi-judicial immunity also applies to “a probation officer performing duties to
ensure a probationer was complying with the terms of probation.” Loggins v. Franklin Cnty., 218
F. App’x 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff asserts Mackling supervised her probation, filed a
motion to revoke her probation, alleged Plaintiff failed to submit a urine sample, appeared at
Plaintiff’s residence, and “[p]articipated in actions that Plaintiff alleges contributed to eviction
pressure.” (Doc. 1, at 5-6). Plaintiff asserts Del Turco participated in her probation supervision,
appeared at her residence, and assisted in serving eviction-related documents. Id. at 7. As to both
Mackling and Del Turco, Plaintiff asserts “[j]urisdiction exists because [they] acted under
probation authority” conferred “by the court and state.” (Doc. 1, at 5, 6). Thus, Plaintiff alleges
only that these probation officers were performing tasks intertwined with the judicial process. As
such, they are immune from suit.
Prosecutor and Officer Defendants
The Prosecutor (Dibble) and City of Fostoria Police Defendants (Noftz, Ink, Bell, and
Wedge) contend Plaintiff’s factual assertions against them are insufficient to state a claim under
§ 1983. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. 8).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Dibble “[p]rosecuted Plaintiff in traffic-related cases,”
“[p]roceeded despite Plaintiff’s objections to jurisdiction and authority,” and “[p]articipated in
proceedings resulting in convictions and probation.” (Doc. 1, at 3). She then, as she does
elsewhere in the Complaint, simply lists statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The Court
agrees this is insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983 and grants Dibble’s motion to
dismiss such a claim.
As to the police Defendants, Plaintiff alleges they “[i]nitiated enforcement actions related
to Plaintiff’s traffic cases;” “[t]estified against Plaintiff in court proceedings in 2025” (Plaintiff
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 10 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

11
“alleges [this] testimony was false”); “[p]articipated in arrest and enforcement actions leading to
Plaintiff’s 	incarceration” 	or 	“leading 	to 	prosecution 	and 	probation;” 	“[p]articipated 	in
enforcement and supervision related to Plaintiff’s cases;” “testified or was involved in actions
leading to Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution;” and “[a]llowed continued contact and enforcement
actions against Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, at 7-11). Again, Plaintiff fails to connect these facts to a
particular constitutional violation. She references an “unlawful arrest,” but provides no factual
detail. See id. at 8. To the extent Plaintiff alleges the Officers provided false testimony, she does
so conclusorily and without any detail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
held § 1983 does not authorize a plaintiff to assert a claim for damages against a government
official for giving false testimony as a witness at a trial or court hearing. See Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983) (holding a police officer who gave perjured testimony at trial was
absolutely immune from money damages suit under § 1983).
The Court again finds Plaintiff’s’ allegations insufficient to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Attorney General Defendants
Dave Yost and Lucas Ward (“Attorney General Defendants”) move to dismiss, arguing,
in part, “the § 1983 actions are not plead with any specificity to understand what actions the
Attorney General has taken to warrant a possible violation.” (Doc. 11, at 7). Moreover, they
point out that, to the extent Plaintiff disputes the validity of the debts from the Municipal Court,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars such claims.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost and
Lucas Ward, an Attorney General’s Office employee. (Doc. 1, at 14). She asserts “Yost acted
through his office to enforce and collect fines and costs arising from Plaintiff’s municipal court
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 11 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

12
cases” and Plaintiff “disputes the validity of the underlying debts.” Id. She alleges Yost
“[a]ttempted collection or enforcement of alleged debts without proof of contract” and was
involved “in enforcement actions tied to municipal court matters.” Id.
First, the Court agrees with the Attorney General Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to
connect the cited statutes to the actions of these Defendants or explain how her rights were
violated. This alone is sufficient for dismissal. Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge a
court determination that she owed these underlying debts, any attempt to overturn that
determination is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Stephens v. Nat’l City Corp., 2021
WL 3027864, at *2 (6th Cir.) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district
courts generally lack jurisdiction to review and determine the validity of state court judgments,
even in the face of allegations that ‘the state court’s action was unconstitutional.’”) (quoting D.C.
Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)).
For these reasons, the Attorney General Defendants have demonstrated their entitlement
to dismissal.
Motion for Default / Claims Against Gibbs
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Default and Default Judgment against Gibbs. (Doc.
17). Federal Civil Rule 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Although Plaintiff’s Motion
asserts Gibbs “was properly served with the Summons and Complaint pursuant to Rule 4” and
“Proof of Service has been filed with this Court,” (Doc. 17, at 1-2), the Court’s docket does not
reflect any summons issued by the Clerk of Court nor any return of service demonstrating
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 12 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

13
service on Gibbs being filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(b). As such, Plaintiff has not established
her entitlement to default or a default judgment.
Moreover, private actors are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when their activity is
fairly attributable to the State. Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing, inter alia, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The Sixth
Circuit uses three tests to determine when a private actor engages in state action: the public
function test, the state compulsion test, and the symbiotic relationship or nexus test. Revis, 489
F.3d at 289.
Plaintiff states Gibbs “[u]sed probation officers to serve eviction-related documents
during 2025-2026” and “alleges coordination with probation officers to pressure and intimidate
her.” (Doc. 1, at 15). But this alone is not enough to assert state action. Notably, Plaintiff does
not challenge the statutory scheme governing evictions. “[I]nvocation of [a] presumptively valid
state procedure[] therefore amounts, at most, to the sort of statutory misuse or abuse that . . . does
not give rise to state action.” Revis, 489 F.3d at 291 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941).
Alternative theories also fail to transform Gibbs into a state actor. The nexus test, which
focuses on the relationship between the state and private actors, is traditionally the test applied in
eviction cases like this one. See id. at 289; Partin v. Davis, 675 F. App’x 575, 585-86 (6th Cir.
2017). “Under the nexus test, ‘the action of a private party constitutes state action when there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.” Lansing, 202 F.3d at 830
(quoting Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). And while the nexus test
resists “readily applicable formulae,” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961), a private actor using a public service does not attribute private action to the state,
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 13 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

14
Lansing, 202 F.3d at 831; see also Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 354 (3d Cir.
1982) (holding a private landlord’s use of state eviction procedures did not constitute state
action).5 The Court finds Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting Gibbs is a state actor
against whom a § 1983 suit can be brought. Thus, the claims against him fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Finally, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a conspiracy between Gibbs and anyone else.
A civil conspiracy claim requires “a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the
general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir.
1985). But police assistance alone is not enough to show a single plan exists. Ellison v.
Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 1995). Nor are Plaintiff’s vague assertions of “joint action” or
“coordination.” (Doc. 1, at 15).
The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s claims against Gibbs must be dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Amended Complaints / Motion for Leave to Amend
Since filing her original complaint, Plaintiff has filed (without leave of court) two
Amended Complaints (Docs. 20, 29), and a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc.
31).
Federal Civil Rule 15 governs amendment. It provides:
5. The Court also finds neither the compulsion test nor the public-function test applicable to the
facts here. See Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335 (“The public function test requires that the private
entity exercise powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state, such as holding
elections, or eminent domain.”) (citations omitted); id. (“The state compulsion test requires that a
state exercise such coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that in law the choice of the private actor is deemed to be that of the state.”).
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 14 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

15
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should
freely give leave when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). As Defendants pointed out in their Motions to Strike the filings (Docs. 26,
30), Plaintiff did not file her Amended Complaints within the time frame identified in Rule
15(a)(1) 	and 	did 	not 	obtain 	written 	consent 	or 	the 	court’s 	leave 	under 	Rule 	15(a)(2).
Accordingly, both are improperly-filed, and the Court grants Defendants’ Motions to Strike
(Docs. 26, 30). See, e.g., McGee v. Suciu, 2021 WL 2313669, at *9 (S.D. Ohio) (“District courts
within the Sixth Circuit routinely strike amended pleadings that are filed without leave of
court.”) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4169392.
This leaves Plaintiff’s latest Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 31), which was filed after
the above-discussed Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings were fully
briefed. Therein, Plaintiff seeks to add eleven new Defendants. Id. at 1. She seeks to amend her
Complaint “to include all individuals, officers, employees, and entities involved in the events of
May 28, 2026, and all related municipal court proceedings.” (Doc. 31-2, at 2). These claims
appear to relate to an arrest of Plaintiff made by City of Findlay police officers on May 28—over
three months after she filed the instant suit. See id. at 3. She alleges excessive force and an
unlawful search. See id.
Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits. Hetep v. Warren,
27 F. App’x 308, 309 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding a district court does not abuse its discretion in
denying a motion to amend where the motion to amend “sought to allege new, unrelated claims
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 15 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

16
against new defendants”); see also Burfitt v. Erving, 2018 WL 6313377, at *1 (S.D. Ohio)
(denying leave to amend to add unrelated constitutional claims); Whipple v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles,
2018 WL 1387066, at *8 (E.D. Tenn.) (“A court may deny leave to file a supplemental pleading
where that pleading relates only indirectly, if at all, to the original complaint and the alleged
cause of action arose out of an entirely unrelated set of facts.”) (citation modified).
Here, even if indirectly related to the events of the original complaint, there is a clear
demarcation between the allegations of the original complaint as brought against fifteen
Defendants (which relate to Plaintiff’s prosecution and probation supervision from 2024 to
January 2026), and the proposed amendment, which brings separate constitutional claims against
eleven new Defendants for an arrest and search that occurred in May 2026. Should Plaintiff wish
to pursue the claims in her proposed Amended Complaint, the proper way to do so is in a
separate case. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 31) is denied.
Motion for TRO
Plaintiff additionally filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and
Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 19). Therein, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining enforcement of a
state-issued warrant for her arrest. See id. Several Defendants oppose, arguing the Anti-
Injunction Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine preclude the Court from granting the relief
Plaintiff seeks. See Docs. 22, 23. The Court agrees with Defendants that the Anti-Injunction Act
bars Plaintiff’s request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”).
Moreover, it appears the arrest Plaintiff sought to prevent may have occurred rendering her
request moot. See Doc. 31-2, at 3; see also Tiffin-Fostoria Mun. Ct., No. TRD2403704A.
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 16 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

17
Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 19) is denied. Defendants’ Motion to Strike this Motion (Doc. 22) is
therefore denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) be, and the
same hereby is GRANTED;
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 11), and Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 14) be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Deny 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 15), be and the same hereby is, DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of Default and Motion for
Default Judgment (Doc. 17) be, and the same hereby is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Gibbs be, and the same
hereby are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
19), be and the same hereby is, DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 22), be and the same
hereby is DENIED as moot; and it is
FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendants’ 	Motions 	to 	Strike 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended
Complaints (Docs. 26, 30) be, and the same hereby are GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
(Doc. 31) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED; and it is
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 17 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

18
FURTHER CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 8, 2026
Case: 3:26-cv-00266-JRK Doc #: 33 Filed: 10/08/26 18 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>