USA v. Gibson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
United States of America, 	Case No. 3:23-cr-329
Plaintiff,
v. 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Ricardo Gibson,
Defendant.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Defendant Ricardo Gibson seeks to suppress evidence seized during a search of his
residence. (Doc. No. 24). He also moves to dismiss this case for alleged violations of his right to a
speedy trial. (Doc. No. 23). The government opposes both motions. (Doc. Nos. 26 and 27).
Gibson did not file a brief in reply. For the reasons stated below, I deny the motions.
II. 	BACKGROUND
In May 2023, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) received a report from an adult
woman who sold girls’ clothing on eBay to Gibson. (Doc. No. 27-1 at 5). The woman stated that,
after she shipped the clothing, Gibson contacted her and requested that she look for items similar to
those depicted in “images of child erotica” Gibson sent the woman. (Id. at 6). Gibson also
reportedly told the woman that “he would pay extra for underwear which had not been washed and
that he had pictures of minor females which he could not share.” (Id.).
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An FBI On-Line Covert Employee (“OCE”) began to converse with Gibson as though the
OCE was the woman from whom Gibson made a purchase through eBay. (Id.). Gibson
subsequently sent the OCE images and videos containing child pornography. (Id.); (see also id. at 23-
26). Investigators traced Gibson’s internet activity to a hotel in Willard, Ohio, which matched the
address to which the woman shipped the clothes Gibson purchased. (Id. at 21).
Investigators obtained a search warrant for Gibson’s hotel room on June 14, 2023, and
executed the warrant the following day. (See id. at 1). They recovered, among other things, two
mobile phones, girls’ clothing, two firearms, three magazines, and nineteen rounds of ammunition.
(Case No. 3:23-mj-5246, Doc. No. 1-1 at 17-18). Gibson subsequently was charged by indictment
with one count of receipt and distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2), and one count of illegal possession of a firearm following a prior felony conviction in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (Doc. No. 1).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Gibson moves to suppress the two handguns, the three magazines, and the ammunition.
(Doc. No. 24). He argues that, because the search warrant affidavit made no mention of those
items, “[t]heir seizure converted a targeted warrant into a general search that exceeded the warrant’s
scope, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at 2). The government opposes Gibson’s
motion, arguing investigators were legally permitted to seize the items during the lawful search of
Gibson’s property because the items were in plain view. (Doc. No. 27).
“The ‘plain-view’ doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that
warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” Horton v. California, 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
One example of the plain view doctrine that is particularly relevant here is “‘the situation in which
the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search
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come across some other article of incriminating character.’” Id. at 134 (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)).
Here, the search warrant permitted investigators to search Gibson’s hotel room. (Doc. No.
27-1 at 37-38). And it was within Gibson’s hotel room that investigators located the firearms,
magazines, and ammunition. (Doc. No. 27-2 at 3-4). Because investigators did not exceed the
scope of the warrant in the places they searched, Gibson has not shown his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 486 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 2007) (“For purposes
of general search analysis, we will find that an officer flagrantly disregards the limitations of a
warrant only where he ‘exceed[s] the scope of the warrant in the places searched’ (rather than the items
seized).” (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 43 n.3 (1984)) (alteration and emphasis added by
Garcia)).
B. 	MOTION TO DISMISS
Separately, Gibson moves to dismiss the indictment due to alleged violations of the Speedy
Trial Act and his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. (Doc. No. 23). The government opposes
this motion as well. (Doc. No. 26).
1. 	The Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act requires that “the trial of a defendant charged in an information or
indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing
date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Section 3161 excludes certain days from the 70-day total, including,
in pertinent part:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time
within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
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(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant, including but not limited to—
(A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations,
to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the
defendant;
. . .
(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion;
. . .
(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is
actually under advisement by the court.
. . .
(7)
(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his
counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the
judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the
ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest
of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of
delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance
with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless
the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in
writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the
granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
(B) The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider in
determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph in any case are as follows:
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
. . .
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case
which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to
fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable
time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the
defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or
would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
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Government the reasonable time necessary for effective
preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
Gibson challenges two periods of excluded time. First, in Gibson’s words, he objects to the
exclusion of time between February 13, 2024, and May 8, 2024:
Ryan R. Parker was appointed counsel on 2/13/24, on 2/27/24 Meira F. Zucker was
paid by the government – that is 14 days. From 2/27/24 to 3/7/24 that is 8 days,
from 3/8/24 to 5/8/24 is 60 days which should have not been excluded because I
never seen or viewed discovery, FD302 reports is not discovery, which Judge
Helmick admitted FD302 report inadmissibility during a hearing for Ryan Parker to
withdraw as counsel.
(Doc. No. 23 at 2-3).
I overrule Gibson’s objection because the days within this period were properly excluded.
During a pretrial conference on October 19, 2023, following consultation with counsel for the
government and the defense, I set this case for trial in May 2024, with voir dire to begin on May 6,
2024. (See non-document order dated Oct. 19, 2023). I excluded time from October 20, 2023, until
May 6, 2024 “to accommodate trial preparation.” (Id.).
Zucker, Gibson’s first attorney, filed a motion to dismiss Gibson’s felon in possession
charge on December 31, 2023, before moving to withdraw as counsel on January 29, 2024, citing a
complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (Doc. Nos. 10 and 12). I granted the
motion to withdraw following a hearing on February 12, 2024, and set the case for a pretrial
conference. (See non-document order dated February 12, 2024). I did not enter a Speedy Trial
exclusion on that date because I previously excluded time through May 6, 2024, for trial preparation,
and the trial date remained in place. Thus, Gibson’s assertion that the time between February 13,
2024, and March 7, 2024, was not properly excluded is contradicted by the record.
Parker, Gibson’s second attorney, was appointed the day after the hearing. (See non-
document order dated Feb. 13, 2024). I subsequently granted Gibson’s motion to vacate the trial
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date during a pretrial hearing on March 7, 2024, and concluded that the interests of justice
compelled the exclusion of time until May 8, 2024, “for defense counsel review of discovery with
defendant.” (See non-document order dated March 7, 2024). Gibson’s apparent dissatisfaction with
his attorney during that time period is not an appropriate basis to revoke that time exclusion, and I
overrule his objection to this period as well.
Second, Gibson argues I failed to properly exclude time from February 19, 2025, until
September 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 23 at 3-4). During a pretrial conference on February 19, 2025,
Defendant made an oral motion for a referral to the Federal Bureau of Prisons for a mental
competency evaluation. (See non-document order dated Feb. 19, 2025; Doc. No. 23 at 3). A copy
of the evaluation report was provided to my chambers on May 28, 2025. (Doc. No. 21) (filed under
seal). I held a competency hearing on July 28, 2025, and found Gibson to be competent to stand
trial. (See non-document order dated July 28, 2025).
As I noted above, § 3161(h)(1) excludes “[a]ny period of delay” related to a competency
determination. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A). I did not need to enter an order excluding time from
Gibson’s Speedy Trial clock because this exclusion applies automatically and covers the period of
time spanning from a party’s motion for a competency determination to the court’s issuance of that
competence determination. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 722 F.3d 544, 548 (3rd Cir. 2013); United
States v. Harris-Franklin, 146 F.4th 631, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2025). See also Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S.
196, 206 (2010); United States v. Pina, 724 F. App’x 413, 419 (6th Cir. 2018). Thus, Gibson’s Speedy
Trial Act challenge fails on this basis as well.
2. 	Sixth Amendment
Gibson also argues the delays in this case violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
But I conclude the four factors identified by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), do not support a finding that Gibson’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right has been
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violated. See id. at 530 (instructing courts to balance “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant”).
Even if I assume, for the sake of argument, that the delay in this case was “uncommonly
long,” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), the other factors do not tip the scales in
Gibson’s favor. There has been no showing that any of the delays in this case were the result of the
government’s attempt to “secure a tactical advantage.” United States v. White, 985 F.2d 271, 275
(1993) (citation omitted). Indeed, much of the delay in this case arose from Gibson’s disagreements
with his attorneys, counsel’s efforts to secure a defense forensic expert, and the proceedings
following Gibson’s motion for a competency evaluation. While none of these events were
illegitimate, each required a significant period of time to resolve, slowing the progress of this case.
See Wilcher v. Rose, 85 F.3d 630, at *1 (6th Cir. 1996) (unreported table decision).
Moreover, even if the third factor favored Gibson, he has not shown that his ability to
present a defense has been impaired and, thus, he has not shown he has been prejudiced by the
delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; White, 985 F.2d at 275-76.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I deny Gibson’s motion to suppress and his motion to
dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 23 and 24).
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
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