Taylor v. Turner-McCall et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Nathaniel Darrell Taylor, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 2508
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
v. )
) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Judge Sheila Turner-McCall, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Nathaniel Darrell Taylor filed this civil rights action against Cleveland
Municipal Court Judge Sheila Turner-McCall, Prosecutor Isaiah Pinckney, III, Officer Matthew
France #1924, Officer Lombardo #9333, Prosecutor Aimee Fanter, City of Cleveland, Cleveland
Municipal Court, Cuyahoga County, the State of Ohio, and the Cleveland Police Department.
The Complaint is difficult to decipher. It contains no factual allegations and Plaintiff’s legal
claims are stated only as violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 4,
with no mention of any particular constitutional rights he believes to have been violated by the
Defendants. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff attaches numerous documents which suggest he relinquished his driver’s license
and all other state and federal identification materials on the erroneous belief that it would
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exempt him from complying with federal, state, or local laws and ordinances. He drafted a
document he titles as an “Affidavit of Jurisdictional Challenge, Status Declaration, and
Emergency Demand for Dismissal for Want of Jurisdiction” in which he claims he is not a
“‘person’ as defined by any corporate statute” but instead is a “living breathing man.” He states
he does “not consent to being subjected to artificial constructs, agencies, policies or statutes
created without [his] knowing, willing, and deliberate consent.” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 32).
He states that “All instruments presumed to bind [him] - including State ID, Driver’s License,
Social Security Applications and contracts issued by coercion, fraud, or non-disclosure - have
been formally rescinded, revoked, and returned.” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 32). He claims
that his “lawful identity and status have been authenticated through the Secretary of State of
Ohio, including my original Certificate of Live Birth, bearing the red number, which now stands
as sovereign proof of identity... .” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 32).
Plaintiff received a traffic citation in the City of Cleveland in October 2024 for driving
on a suspended or revoked license. He states that Cleveland Municipal Court Judge Sheila
Turner-McCall “threaten[ed] to incarcerate [him] unless [he] submit[ted] to commercial
identification and enter into forced contract.” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 32). The case was set
for trial in November 2025. Plaintiff does not indicate the outcome of that proceeding. He
indicates he filed a UCC-1 financing statement which he claims establishes a commercial lien in
the amount of $77,000,000.00 against each of the Defendants. (Doc. No. 1-12 at PageID #: 71).
He asks this Court to issue a temporary restraining order but does not specify from what he
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would like the Defendants restrained. He also indicates that he would like “emergency
protective designation and immunity from local detainment.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #:2).
In addition to the relief requested in his Complaint, Plaintiff filed two Motions for
Temporary Restraining Orders (Doc. Nos. 3, 7). The Court previously denied his first Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order. Therein, Plaintiff asked the Court to restrain the traffic court
from conducting the trial, and grant him unlimited protected status so that law enforcement
could never engage him, stop him, or detain him for any reason. (Doc. No. 3). His second
Motion focuses on events that transpired after he filed this action and which appear to be wholly
unrelated to any of the events in the Complaint. There is no indication that any of the
Defendants was involved in the events described in this second Motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 7) is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is required to construe Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint liberally and to hold it to a
less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248,
250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Pursuant to Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), district courts are permitted to conduct a
limited screening procedure and to dismiss, sua sponte, a fee-paid complaint filed by a
non-prisoner if it appears that the allegations are “totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial,
frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple, 183 F.3d at 479 (citing
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Dismissal on a sua sponte basis is also
authorized where the asserted claims lack an arguable basis in law, or if the district court lacks
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subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 480; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.1996); Lawler v. Marshall,
898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir.1990).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not allege any facts in his Complaint and did not
include any specific legal claims. The Court can get a general idea of what may have prompted
the filing of this Complaint from the exhibits Plaintiff attached to his pleading. However, neither
the Court nor the Defendants are obligated to search through the Complaint and its numerous
exhibits in order to glean a clear and succinct statement of each claim for relief. It is Plaintiff’s
responsibility to edit and organize his claims and supporting allegations into a manageable
format. Laster v. Pramstaller, No. 08–CV–10898, 2008 WL 1901250, at *2 (E.D. Mich. April
25, 2008) (citing Windsor v. Colorado Dep't. of Corr., 9 Fed. App'x. 967, 968 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quotation marks omitted)). To meet minimum pleading requirements, the Complaint must give
the Defendants fair notice of what the Plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds upon
which they rest. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.
2008). The Complaint, as written, does not meet these basic pleading requirements.
Furthermore, the Complaint lacks an arguable basis in law and is totally frivolous and
devoid of merit. Plaintiff claims in an “Affidavit of Status, Identity, and Non-Consent” that he
is not “an entity, franchise, U.S. citizen, resident alien, artificial construct, trust or vessel subject
to statutory obligations or administrative jurisdiction of the State of Ohio or the corporate
United States.” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 29). He also states that he does “not consent to
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being subjected to artificial constructs, agencies, policies or statutes created without [his]
knowing, willing, and deliberate consent.” (Doc. No. 1-9 at PageID #: 32). It appears that
Plaintiff believes that by making these statements and renouncing his driver’s license, he can
exempt himself from complying with any federal, state, or local laws and ordinances, including
those laws that require a valid driver’s license to operate a motor vehicle.
While Plaintiff does not specifically identify himself as a sovereign citizen in his filings,
his arguments bear the hallmark of sovereign citizen ideology. Federal courts, including the
United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have routinely dismissed these sovereign citizen
arguments as frivolous and a waste of court resources. See Dunn v. Post, No. 21-1412, 2022
WL 1297586, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2022)(rejecting sovereign citizen arguments and stating
that there is no constitutional right to drive without a valid state-issued driver’s license); United
States v. Warfield, 404 F. App’x 994, 996 (6th Cir. 2011)(no constitutional right to drive without
a valid state-issued driver’s license); Joyce-Simpson v. AT&T Mobility, No. 1:23 CV 1216, 2023
WL 8248061, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2023)(rejecting sovereign citizen arguments as
frivolous); Burnett v. Michigan, No. 1:24-CV-55, 2024 WL 3721741, at *6-7 (W.D. Mich. June
18, 2024)(“[The] complaint is based upon the meritless rhetoric espoused by sovereign citizens.
This Court has no jurisdiction for fictitious claims which are not based in law, but based in the
fantasies of the sovereign citizen movement.”). Plaintiff’s rhetoric fails to establish a viable
legal claim with an arguable basis in law, and is “totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial,
frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion” Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. This action
must be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th
Cir. 1999). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Court Judge
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