Fankhauser v. Doe et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Jonathan Fankhauser,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
Warden Jane Doe, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25 cv 1693
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Background
Pro se Plaintiff Jonathan Fankhauser, a state prisoner incarcerated in the Grafton Correctional
Institution, has filed an in forma pauperis prisoner civil rights complaint in this case pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Warden of the Lorain Correctional Institution where he was previously
incarcerated and “John and Jane Doe” Defendants. (Doc. No. 1.)
The basis for his complaint is that “a large metal exterior door” in the prison “did not have a
working closer on it as required,” and, as a result, “a gust of wind slammed” the door shut on his
finger and severed and broke his finger. 	(Id. at ¶¶ 12, 18.) 	He states that the John and Jane Doe
Defendants were employed in the prison’s health and safety and/or maintenance department and were
responsible for, but did not assure that a closer was properly installed on the door. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
He states he was satisfied with the medical care he received to reattach and set his broken
finger after the incident, and that his “finger ultimately healed as expected.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) But he
contends that the “acts and omissions” he describes in his complaint violate his right under the Eighth
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Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Id. at p. 5, ¶ VIII.)
Standard of Review and Discussion
Although pro se complaints are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), the
“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits” and pro se plaintiffs are not
automatically entitled to take every case to trial. 	Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996).
Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A,
to screen all in forma pauperis actions filed in federal court and any action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from governmental defendants, and to dismiss before service any such action that the court
determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se “‘complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. at 471 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
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Upon review, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s complaint warrants dismissal pursuant to §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Even liberally construed, his allegations are insufficient to allege plausible
constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although prison conditions are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, not every
harm or injury suffered in prison rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Constitution; “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “An accident, although it may produce added anguish,
is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
To state a constitutional Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate objective and
subjective components. Green v. Martin, 18 F. App’x 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2001), citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834. 	He must demonstrate both that he suffered an objectively “extreme” deprivation in the
prison context, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992), and, that a defendant prison official
acted with subjective “deliberate indifference” with respect to the deprivation. Wilson v. Setier, 501
U.S. 294 (1991). See also Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001). The second, subjective
component of a claim requires the prisoner to show more than mere negligence on the part of a prison
official. 	Rather, the prisoner must allege facts demonstrating that a prison official actually,
“subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner [as a result of the
alleged prison condition], that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that
risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001). As the Supreme Court explained in
Farmer, acts or omissions of prison employees “unaccompanied by [their] knowledge of a significant
risk of harm,” might well be something society wishes to discourage and may merit compensation
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under state tort law. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38. “But an official's failure to alleviate a significant
risk that he should have perceived but did not . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 838.
Although Plaintiff asserts in entirely conclusory terms that “Defendants demonstrated
deliberate indifference and callous disregard for [his] safety when they failed to assure that the large
metal door at issue had a properly working closer,” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 24), he does not plead facts
supporting his assertion or demonstrating the required subjective component of a deliberate
indifference claim. That is, he has not alleged facts permitting plausible inferences that any prison
official was subjectively aware of the dangerous condition existing on the exterior door of which he
complains, that an official drew an inference that the condition presented a risk of inmate harm, and
that an official disregarded such risk despite such awareness. Conclusory allegations like Plaintiffs
are insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim. See Hix v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections,
196 Fed. Appx. 350, 357, 2006 WL 2431103, at *6 (6th Cir. 2006).
At most, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest negligence on the part of prison employees with
respect to discovering and addressing the dangerous condition in the jail of which he complains, but
such allegations are insufficient to allege a plausible constitutional deliberate indifference claim
against any Defendant prison employee or official.
Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to allege a plausible constitutional due process claim. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a person may not be deprived of “life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. A person who seeks to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection must demonstrate that one of those interests is at
stake. 	Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 	Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify any life,
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liberty, or property interest of which he contends he was deprived, and none is plausible on the face
of his complaint. 	The Supreme Court has made clear that “the Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
property,” which is the most Plaintiff’s complaint alleges. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986).
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No.
2) is granted and his complaint is dismissed for failure to state a plausible federal civil rights claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamel A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: 	November 26, 2025 	U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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