United States of America v. Noble

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:14-cr-135
)
)
PLAINTIFF, 	) 	CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. 	)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
SIARRES NOBLE, 	)
)
)
DEFENDANT. 	)
On December 17, 2014, defendant Siarres Noble (“Noble” or “defendant”) was sentenced
to a custody term of 240 months. (Doc. No. 46 (Judgment); see Minutes of Proceedings [non-
document], 12/17/2014.) Noble is currently serving his sentence at Lee USP and has an anticipated
release date of February 12, 2031.1 Now before the Court is Noble’s motion for compassionate
release. 	(Doc. 	No. 	67 	(Motion).) 	Appointed 	counsel 	filed 	a 	supplement. 	(Doc. 	No. 	72
(Supplement).) Plaintiff United States of America (the “government”) opposes the motion (Doc.
No. 74 (Response)), and Noble filed a reply. (Doc. No. 76 (Reply).) For the reasons that follow,
the motion for compassionate release, as supplemented, is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 1, 2014, a superseding indictment issued charging Noble with seven counts of
distributing controlled substances, including heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 19 (Superseding Indictment).) Counts 4 and 5 contained
enhancements under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) for death or serious bodily injury resulting from the
1 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited December 29, 2025).
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sale of a controlled substance. (Id. at 3,2 4.) In particular, the superseding indictment charged that,
on or about November 8, 2013, Noble distributed fentanyl to an individual and that distribution
resulted in a fatal overdose. (Id. at 3.) The next day (November 9, 2013) Noble distributed fentanyl
to another individual and that distribution resulted in another overdose. (Id. at 4.) But-for the
actions of first responders, who quickly administered a dose of Narcan to the second victim, Noble
would have been responsible for a second fatality in as many days. (Doc. No. 54 (Sentencing
Hearing Transcript), at 9.)
On September 15, 2014, with the benefit of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Noble
entered a guilty plea to the charges in the superseding indictment. (Minutes of Proceedings [non-
document], 9/15/2014; Doc. No. 40 (Plea Agreement). Prior to sentencing, the Court ordered the
preparation of a PSR. (Doc. No. 44 (PSR).) In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the Court first
determined the combined adjusted offense level to be 45. (Doc. No. 54, at 4; see also Doc. No. 44,
at 10 ¶ 54.) After the appropriate adjustments were applied—namely, a 3-level reduction3 for
acceptance of responsibility—the resulting total offense level was 42. (Doc. No. 54, at 4; see also
Doc. No. 44, at 10 ¶¶ 56–58.) Noble had adult convictions for contributing to the unruliness of a
child, unauthorized use of property, and driving under a suspension, as well as multiple convictions
for drug trafficking and possession of controlled substances and/or drug paraphernalia, which
collectively scored 12 criminal history points. (Doc. No. 54, at 12; see also Doc. No. 44, at 11–16,
19 ¶¶ 64, 66–74, 78.) Because Noble committed the present drug trafficking offenses while under
2 All page number references are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual document by the Court’s
electronic filing system.
3 In his pro se motion, Noble complained that he only received 2 points for acceptance of responsibility. (Doc. No.
67, at 1.) The record clearly reflects, however, that he received 3 points. (See Doc. No. 54, at 4.) And, as discussed
supra, Noble’s sentence was dictated by the terms of the parties’ agreed Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. (See Doc.
No. 40, at 6 ¶ 15.)
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supervision for certain state convictions, 2 “status” points were added, bringing the total criminal
history score to 14 and resulting in a criminal history category of VI. (Doc. No. 54, at 5; see also
Doc. No. 44, at 19 ¶¶ 79–80.) Because Noble was determined to be a career offender, his criminal
history category was VI for this additional reason. (Doc. No. 54, at 5; see also Doc. No. 44, at 10,
19 ¶¶ 55, 81.) With a criminal history category VI and an offense level of 42, the advisory guideline
range was 360 months to life imprisonment. (Doc. No. 54, at 5; see also Doc. No. 44, at 23 ¶ 102.)
Nevertheless, the Court accepted the parties’ negotiated sentence and imposed a custody term of
240 months, which also represented the minimum mandatory sentence for Counts 4 and 5. (Doc.
No. 54, at 17, 28; see also Doc. No. 44, at 23, ¶¶ 101, 103; Doc. No. 40, at 6 ¶ 15; Doc. No. 46.)
On June 23, 2025, Noble filed the present motion for compassionate release, in which he
requests a sentence reduction. In his pro se motion, Noble raises many unsupported claims,
including that he received an unduly harsh sentence, that he was entrapped, and that he suffers
from several serious health conditions for which he believes that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
has not provided adequate treatment. (Doc. No. 67, at 1–3.) He also registers various complaints
regarding the conditions in his facility (see id. at 3), and he underscores his rehabilitation efforts
and his desire to care for his mother. (See id. at 4–5.)
In the supplement, appointed counsel argues that Noble meets the requirements for a
compassionate release because his mother is incapacitated and Noble is the only available
caregiver for her. (Doc. No. 72, at 1–3.) Appended to the supplement are various BOP records,
letters of support, and a medical discharge record that indicates that his mother suffers from
lumbosacral spondylosis without myelopathy and chronic pain syndrome. (Doc. No. 72-1 through
Doc. No. 72-6.)
The government believes that the motion should be denied because Noble has failed to
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establish the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons under the governing statute and
because the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 do not weigh in favor of early release. (Doc.
No. 74, at 1.)
II. 	MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A. Governing Law
The sentencing court has no inherent authority to reconsider and/or modify an otherwise
valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, the
authority of the Court to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston,
529 F.3d 743, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2001)); see United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Generally speaking,
once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that
sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.”). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a
court may only modify a term of imprisonment under the following circumstances: (1) upon a
motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or defendant for compassionate release;
(2) as expressly permitted by statute or by Fed. R. Crim. P. 35; or (3) where a defendant has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission. § 3582(c)(1)–(2).
Noble does not seek relief under Rule 35, nor does he claim that he was sentenced to a term
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered.4 Instead, he claims
4 Subsequent to Noble’s sentencing, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were amended to limit the impact of “status
points” on a criminal defendant’s criminal history score. Part A of Amendment 821, which now appears in the
guidelines at § 4A1.1(e), limits criminal history “status points” by decreasing them by one point for individuals with
seven or more criminal history points and eliminating status points for those with six or fewer criminal history points.
See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). The Amendment was given retroactive effect. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(e)(2) (Nov. 1, 2023).
Under Part A, Noble’s criminal history score is reduced by one to 13, which still corresponds to a criminal history
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that he is entitled to a compassionate release. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a
sentence 	reduction 	“only 	if 	it 	finds 	that 	the 	defendant 	satisfies 	three 	requirements: 	(1)
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; (2) the ‘reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’; and (3) the relevant §
3553(a) factors support the reduction.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021)); see United
States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020). Additionally, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a mandatory claims-processing rule that must be satisfied before a defendant may seek
compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
The policy statement applicable to compassionate release motions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, was
amended effective November 1, 2023, and describes six categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons that individually, or in combination, may support a request for compassionate
release. These categories are: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the
defendant; (3) a defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by the
defendant while in custody involving a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other reasons”
similar in gravity as those articulated in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(b).5
category of VI. And, in any event, as a career offender, Noble’s criminal history category remains a VI. Noble’s
advisory guideline range, therefore, was not affected by Amendment 821.
5 To extent that Noble relies on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)—unusually long sentence—the Court notes that the Sixth
Circuit has recently determined that particular subsection to be invalid. See United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427,
430 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the United States Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating §
1B1.13(b)(6)). In any event, Noble would not have been able to meet the requirements of this subsection as it required
a qualifying change in the law that resulted in a gross disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence likely
to be imposed at the time the motion was filed. See § 1B1.13(b)(6). Because Noble can point to no non-retroactive
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B. Exhaustion
Noble maintains, and the government does not dispute, that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies. (See Doc. No. 72, at 3.) In particular, appended to the supplement is an
email from Noble to the warden of his facility, dated August 29, 2025, requesting a compassionate
release. (Doc. No. 72-2.) The Court, therefore, finds that Noble has satisfied this mandatory
claims-processing rule.
C. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Even though he has exhausted his administrative remedies, Noble must still demonstrate
that he is entitled to relief under the compassionate release statute (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) and
the relevant BOP policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). The Court, therefore, turns to a
consideration of whether defendant has demonstrated the existence of extraordinary and
compelling reasons identified in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and discussed in detail in § 1B1.13(b), as
amended.
1. 	Rehabilitation
In his motion, Noble insists that he is fully rehabilitated and ready to be a “free man” and
a “model citizen[.]” (Doc. No. 67, at 3–6.) Further, it appears from the prison documentation
appended to his supplement, that he has engaged in prison programming and completed several
self-improvement programs. (Doc. No. 72-1 (BOP Records); Doc. No. 72-6 (BOP Certificates of
Completion).) While Noble’s rehabilitative efforts are commendable, alone they do not amount to
an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d) (stating that
“rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason”); United
change in the law that would have yielded a grossly disparate sentence if he were sentenced today, Noble would not
have been able to take advantage of this subsection.
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States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1004, 1009 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that “[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant 	alone 	shall 	not 	be 	considered 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason” 	for
compassionate release (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t))); see also United States v. Jethrow, No. 4:08-
cr-520, 2025 WL 461800, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2025) (“[T]hough rehabilitation is to be
encouraged and applauded, it is also part of what is expected from all inmates.”).
2. 	Family Circumstances
Noble also invokes U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)—family circumstances of the defendant—as
a basis for compassionate release. Pertinent to the present motion, § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) provides that
the “incapacitation” of the defendant’s parent may qualify as an extraordinary and compelling
reason for early release where “the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent.”
Noble has not demonstrated that the situation with his mother, though unfortunate, meets
the policy statement’s definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate
release. As an initial matter, Noble has not established that his mother is “incapacitated,” as
required under the policy statement. Noble has provided some documentation that shows that his
mother suffers from several serious medical conditions for which she is prescribed medication and
is seen monthly by her physician. (See Doc. No. 72-4 (Medical Records).) But he offers only his
unsupported conclusion that as a result of these conditions, his mother “is, or will soon be,
incapacitated.” (Doc. No. 72, at 3 (emphasis added).)
In his counseled reply, Noble cites an unreported district court decision in support of his
position that “it is sufficient for a defendant to allege that their family member is ‘on the verge of
incapacitation.’” (Doc. No. 76, at 1 (quoting United States v. May, 4:22-cv-484-8, 2024 WL
5170002, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2024).) The decision is easily distinguished and provides little,
if any, persuasive support. In May, defendant invoked § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)—death or incapacitation
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of the caregiver of a defendant’s minor child—as the basis for a finding of an extraordinary and
compelling reason. Unlike § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C)—incapacitation of a parent or spouse—upon which
Noble relies, § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A) does not even require a showing that there is no other available
caregiver. May, 2024 WL 5170002, at *3 (“under § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A), a defendant need not show
that no available alternative caretakers exist for their child”). Moreover, the defendant in May
demonstrated that her 21-year old daughter did not have the financial means or the mental,
physical, and emotional health to care for defendant’s five minor children along with her own three
minor children. Id. at *5. Additionally, the court found that the fact that the daughter did not have
any legal guardianship over defendant’s children meant she could not enroll them for school or
take them to doctor’s appointments, rendering her an especially inappropriate caretaker. Id. at *4.
In contrast here, Noble has merely demonstrated that his mother suffers from medical
conditions for which she is under a physician’s care. There is nothing in the medical records that
demonstrates that she is incapacitated, and nothing beyond Noble’s unsupported belief to show
that his mother “will soon be” incapacitated. The reality is that “[m]any if not all inmates, have
aging and sick parents. Such circumstance is not extraordinary.” United States v. Ingram, No. 2:14-
cr-40, 2019 WL 3162305, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2019); see United States v. Villasenor, No.
21-3477, 2021 WL 5356032, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021) (recognizing that prisoners often have
aging and sick parents and that this fact does not necessarily establish an extraordinary and
compelling reason). A parent that merely requires assistance is not “incapacitated” as that term is
understood in the policy statement. United States v. Steel, No. 1:20-cr-13-4, 2024 WL 1928945, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2024) (citing, among authority, United States v. Jones, No. 13-cr-252, 2021
WL 1060218, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2021) (noting that “incapacitated” refers to “someone
who cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a bed or chair”)). In short, Noble has
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failed to demonstrate that his mother suffers from any medical or physical condition that has
rendered her incapacitated.
Noble has also failed to demonstrate that, if his mother were incapacitated and required a
caregiver, Noble would be the only available caregiver for her. While Noble concedes that he has
an uncle who checks on his mother daily, as well as an adult sister who lives in the area, he offers
only his unsupported declaration that neither are available to serve as a caregiver.6 (See Doc. No.
72, at 3; Doc. No. 76, at 2–3; see also Doc. No. 44, at 21 ¶ 88.) See, e.g., United States v. Putty,
No. 5:19-cr-2, 2024 WL 3066913, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2024) (rejecting unsupported
conclusion that defendant was the only available caregiver for his family members (citing United
States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2023) (“a mere allegation . . .without more” does not
establish an “extraordinary and compelling reason for early release”))). Noble also acknowledges
that he has an adult sister who lives in Georgia. (Doc. No. 76, at 2; see also Doc. No. 44, at 21 ¶
88.) While he underscores the fact that she lives out-of-state, Noble has not explained why his
mother could not move to Georgia where this sister could care for her. In fact, in his pro se motion,
Noble indicated that, if he was released early, he did not “plan on going back to Ohio [] only to
get my mom [and m]ove to Georgia [to] start over enjoy[ing] life.” (Doc. No. 67, at 5.) Noble has
failed to establish that his family situation, though unfortunate, meets the requirements of §
1B1.13(b)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Raymore, No. 1:19-cr-81, 2025 WL 2323560, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 12, 2025) (denying compassionate release motion where defendant failed “to provide
any information regarding his mother’s specific health conditions or that would show he is the
6 In his reply, he also suggests, without any support, that this sister “suffers from mental health issues[.]” (Doc. No.
76, at 2.) Again, it was Noble’s burden to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons for early
release.
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only available caretaker as required under § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C)”).
3. 	Other Reasons
None of Noble’s other stated reasons, including his unsubstantiated medical conditions,
rise to the level of an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release under the statute. See
United States v. Goodwin, No. 5:21-cr-85, 2023 WL 4711351, at *2 (E.D. Ky. July 24, 2023)
(noting that “courts have denied . . . requests for compassionate release on the grounds of medical
conditions where the defendant has failed to provide medical records” (quoting United States v.
Gray, No. 4-cr-580, 2019 WL 4564735, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2019) (further citations
omitted)). Moreover, Noble’s challenges to his underlying conviction and sentence, as well as to
the conditions of his confinement, are not properly brought in a compassionate release motion. See
United States v. Harris, No. 4:21-cr-29, 2025 WL 466447, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2025) (“[A]
compassionate release proceeding is not the proper vehicle to seek relief for a claimed
constitutional violation.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, No. 3:21-cr-47, 2024, WL
3656187, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2024) (similar) (collecting cases); United States v. Livesay,
No. 3:18-cr-36, 2023 WL 8101845, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 21, 2023) (noting “complaints about
prison conditions should be raised in a separate civil suit, not a motion for compassionate release”).
4. 	Conclusion
None of the stated reasons for release considered separately or in combination—even when
considered in further combination with Noble’s rehabilitation—constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons. Because Noble has failed to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary and
compelling reasons, his motion for compassionate release must be denied for this reason alone.
D. Sentencing Factors
But even if Noble had cleared the initial hurdle of demonstrating the existence of
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extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Court would still have denied his motion because the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not favor release. The nature and circumstances of
the charged offenses were serious. The trafficking of controlled substances is certainly dangerous,
as evidenced by the fact that at least two of Noble’s drug sales resulted in serious overdoses, one
of which was fatal. See United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 947 n.6 (6th Cir 2010) (“To be sure,
drug trafficking is a serious offense, that, in itself, poses a danger to the community.” (citations
omitted)). Additionally, the convictions in the present case were not Noble’s first drug-related
convictions. As part of an adult criminal history that spans more than 20 years, Noble has multiple
prior convictions in state court for drug trafficking,7 and prior custody sentences for drug
trafficking have failed to discourage him from returning to this dangerous and destructive
behavior.8 (See Doc. No. 44, at 13, 15–16 ¶¶ 68, 71, 74.)
In his reply, Noble suggests that his prison programming is more indicative of the person
he has become and should receive more consideration than his offense conduct and his lengthy
criminal history. (Doc. No. 76 at 3–4.) Prison records, however, show that Noble’s early post-
conviction conduct included multiple disciplinary infractions, including write-ups for fighting,
assault, possessing a dangerous weapon, and destroying property. (Doc. No. 72-1.) These
infractions all occurred in 2016 and 2017, and there is no evidence that he has had any serious
disciplinary problems since. The Court is pleased to see that Noble now appears to be thriving in
7 At sentencing, the Court observed that “at the age of 30, Mr. Noble has compiled a troubling criminal history which
began when he was 16 years old. And possession and distribution of drugs” has been “at the root of his problems.”
(Doc. No. 54, at 26.) The Court further noted that “[t]his record amassed at such a young age is alarming and suggests
to the Court that Mr. Noble’s risk of recidivating is great.” (Id.)
8 In fact, the government represents that a review of Noble’s jail calls revealed that Noble “remained involved in the
distribution of narcotics, even while incarcerated.” (Doc. No. 74, at 7; see Doc. No. 54, at 18 (noting that Noble’s
comments in jail calls “ran the gamut from ‘I’m going to walk straight’ to ‘I can’t wait to get back involved with
drugs’”).)
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a controlled environment where he does not have access to controlled substances. The Court has
taken this into consideration, but it remains concerned that when given access to drugs, Noble has
repeatedly chosen to engage in trafficking.
The Court has considered Noble’s stated release plan, including his uncle’s promise to refer
him for a position at Ridge Tools (see Doc. No. 72-3, at 8), his prison programming, and his
willingness to provide support for his mother. But after considering all of the § 3353(a) factors,
the Court finds that a reduction in sentence would undermine the need for the sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the offenses, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for
the offenses, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant. Based on these same facts, the Court also finds that defendant continues to pose a
danger to the community.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant’s motion, as supplemented, for a
compassionate release.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 29, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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