USA v. Brown

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. 	DECISION AND ORDER
RAYSEAN BROWN, 	6:25-CR-06046-EAW-MJP
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Raysean Brown (“Defendant”) stands accused by way of an indictment
returned by a federal grand jury of a narcotics conspiracy between September 2023 and
February 4, 2025, involving 400 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a
detectable amount of fentanyl and 10 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing
a detectable amount of a fentanyl analogue, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count one),
and possession of firearms in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (count two). (Dkt. 24). If convicted as charged, Defendant faces
a 15-year mandatory minimum incarceration sentence.
After a detention hearing held before the magistrate judge,1 Defendant was ordered
released upon conditions.2 	(Dkt. 17). 	The government appealed that decision to the
1 	At the time of the magistrate judge’s release order, Defendant had not been indicted
and instead, was charged by criminal complaint with a narcotics conspiracy involving 400
grams or more of fentanyl. (Dkt. 1).
2 	The conditions set by the magistrate judge included home incarceration (i.e., 24-
hour-a-day lock-down), and the posting of unsecured bonds in the amount of $90,000 and
a $100,000 bond secured by two properties owned by Defendant’s girlfriend’s mother.
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undersigned (Dkt. 30)3 and oral argument was held on March 26, 2025, at which time the
Court reserved decision (Dkt. 31).4
After carefully considering the record and the factors as set forth at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g), the Court hereby revokes the release order and orders Defendant detained
pending trial, based on its findings that there are no conditions of release that will
reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.5
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant is 33 years old, and a lifelong resident of the area with strong family
support.6 Defendant is in a relationship with a woman who is the mother of his 5-year old
child, although they were not living together at the time of his arrest. 	Defendant has no
prior criminal convictions, and his only prior arrest was in 2020 for a misdemeanor Driving
While Intoxicated (resolved through a guilty plea to an infraction). At the time of his arrest,
(Dkt. 17). Initially the conditions set by the magistrate judge had required $200,000 bail
“secured to the extent practicable” by real estate and cash. (See Dkt. 13 at 24).
3 	The government filed its appeal on March 7, 2025 (Dkt. 18), and then filed an
amended appeal on March 10, 2025 (Dkt. 30).
4 	By the time of the oral argument before the undersigned, Defendant’s assigned
counsel had been replaced with new counsel due to a breakdown in communications. (Dkt.
27; Dkt. 28).
5 	Although the government also moved for detention based on risk of flight, the Court
does not reach that issue.
6 	Family members and friends have submitted letters to the Court attesting to
Defendant’s character, they have appeared at the court appearances before the magistrate
judge and the undersigned, and they have expressed their willingness to vouch for
Defendant and sign bonds securing his release.
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Defendant reported he was self-employed as a rapper, although Defendant’s girlfriend was
unaware that this was his purported employment.
Defendant was arrested at his residence 7 on Castlewood Drive in the City of
Rochester on February 4, 2025, at around the same time search warrants were executed at
the residence. 	Upon execution of the search warrants, law enforcement seized three
firearms—two of which were loaded including one with a defaced serial number. Two of
the firearms were immediately adjacent to a bag containing 72.5 grams of fentanyl as
confirmed positive through a DEA Lab Report. 	(See Dkt. 29). 	Also seized was about
$3,300 in cash, cell phones that according to the government contained evidence of drug
trafficking, and various paraphernalia and tools for processing and bagging drugs for
redistribution, including a kilo press, gas mask, chemical suit, rubber gloves, scales, a
sifter, and cutting agent.
The government proffered that a confidential source—who had cooperated with law
enforcement for over 15 months pursuant to a plea agreement and whose information was
corroborated through “independent investigation, physical and electronic surveillance, and
by information received independently and separately from other law enforcement
agencies,” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 12)—had “advised DEA agents that [Defendant] was a violent drug
7 	At the argument before the undersigned, defense counsel argued against the notion
that Defendant was responsible for the items in the residence, citing to the fact that another
individual was present upon execution of the search warrant. But Defendant told the USPO
that he lived alone at the residence. (See Pretrial Services Report dated Feb. 10, 2025, at
1). And law enforcement surveillance supported the conclusion that Defendant resided at
and sold drugs from the residence. (See Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 36-62).
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dealer that specialized in robbing other drug dealers, as well as distributing his own supply
of fentanyl” (id. at ¶ 11).8 The confidential source stated that he had observed Defendant
in possession of over half a kilogram of fentanyl at one time. (Id.).
A second confidential source also provided information that Defendant was a
fentanyl drug trafficker whose customers included multiple individuals outside Monroe
County who would travel to the area to conduct drug transactions with Defendant. (Id. at
¶ 13). This source engaged in a controlled buy with Defendant and an individual believed
to be his associate in February 2024. 	(Id. at ¶¶ 33-35). 	This source identified a phone
number associated with Defendant that was consistent with one of the cell phones seized
upon execution of the search warrant. (See Dkt. 30 at 9). And a third confidential source
provided information that Defendant was a cocaine and fentanyl trafficker who had an alias
of “Threatanyl.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 16).
In addition, an undercover New York State Police investigator engaged in controlled
buys of fentanyl from Defendant on numerous occasions—purchasing over 20 grams in
September 2023 (id. at ¶¶ 22-23); about 20 grams in October 2023 (id. at ¶¶ 24-25); about
20 grams in December 2023 (id. at ¶¶ 26-29); and about 30 grams in late December 2023
(id. at ¶¶ 30-31).
8 	The government proffered that two of the drug dealers robbed by Defendant were
prosecuted in federal court before the undersigned. (See Dkt. 30 at 6-7).
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LEGAL STANDARD
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., sets forth the procedures
for the release or detention of a person pending trial, sentence, and appeal. The procedures
and standards for release or detention of a person pending trial are set forth at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142. A defendant awaiting trial must be released unless the release will present a risk
of flight or danger, or both, and no set of conditions can reasonably protect against those
risks. See United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining
that the Bail Reform Act codified “traditional presumption favoring pretrial release for the
majority of Federal defendants” (quotation omitted)).
The government bears the burden of proof to establish risk of flight and/or danger,
and that no conditions can reasonably protect against those risks. The burden of proof with
respect to risk of flight is preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Mercedes, 254
F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). 	On the other hand, the Government must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that a defendant should not be released due to his risk of
danger. 	United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). 	Clear and
convincing evidence “means something more than ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ and
something less than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. In other words, the evidence must
support a conclusion of danger to the community “with a high degree of certainty.” Id.
Although there is “only a limited group of offenders who should be denied bail
pending trial,” United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations and
quotations omitted), when there is “a strong probability that a person will commit
additional crimes if released, the need to protect the community becomes sufficiently
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compelling that detention is, on balance, appropriate,” Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 403
(quotations omitted). 	While a prior record of violence or dangerous conduct “eases the
government’s burden of showing dangerousness, it is not essential. 	The government’s
burden is only to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.” United States
v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1991).
Because of the nature of the charges against Defendant, there is a rebuttable
presumption pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) & (B) that no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant and the safety of the
community if Defendant is released. See United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54-55
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a grand jury indictment establishes probable cause for purposes
of the rebuttable presumption under the Bail Reform Act, and when faced with an
indictment, the Court does not need to make an independent finding of probable cause).
The presumption shifts to Defendant “a limited burden of production—not a burden of
persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not
pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d
433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). 	“[A] defendant must introduce some evidence contrary to the
presumed fact[s] in order to rebut the presumption.” United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d
85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991). 	If a defendant satisfies this burden of production and rebuts the
presumption, it does not disappear; rather, the presumption “remains a factor to be
considered among those weighed by the district court.” Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436. Even
in a presumption case, at all times the government retains the ultimate burden of
persuasion. Id.
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The statutory factors that a court must consider in making any detention decision
are as follows:
(1) 	the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether the offense is a crime of violence, . . . or involves . . . a
controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
(2) 	the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) 	the history and characteristics of the person, including—
(A) 	the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family
ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in
the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating
to 	drug 	or 	alcohol 	abuse, 	criminal 	history, 	and 	record
concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) 	whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial,
sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense
under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) 	the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 	“[A] district court has broad discretion to determine how much
weight to assign the factors listed in § 3142(g) based on the circumstances of a particular
case.” 	United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2022). 	As explained by the
Second Circuit in Zhang:
Although § 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act lists various factors to consider,
it says nothing about the relative weight a court should give them when
deciding 	whether 	to 	release 	or 	detain 	a 	defendant. 	That 	silence 	is
unsurprising, because the weight given to each factor will inevitably vary
from case to case, and might even vary depending on whether the inquiry
relates to a defendant’s danger or to his risk of flight. What is more, certain
factors might interact with one another in a particular case in a way that alters
a court’s analysis of a defendant’s danger to the community or flight risk.
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Id. at 149-50 (citation omitted).
In reviewing a detention order of a magistrate judge, a district judge should not
simply defer to the judgment of the magistrate judge, but rather must reach her own
independent conclusions. United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985). “When
making its de novo review, the district court may rely on the record of the proceedings
before the magistrate judge and may also accept additional evidence.” 	United States v.
Marra, 165 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). “The rules of evidence do not apply
in a detention hearing” and “the government may proceed by proffer.” 	United States v.
Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995). But “[w]hether presented by proffer or direct
evidence, courts retain the responsibility for assessing the accuracy of the Government’s
proof.” United States v. Enix, 209 F. Supp. 3d 557, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also United States v.
Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (Court “retains the responsibility for assessing
the reliability and accuracy of the government’s information, whether presented by proffer
or by direct proof.”). However, “a detention hearing is not to serve as a mini-trial . . . or
as a discovery tool for the defendant . . . [and therefore] a government proffer need not
always spell out in precise detail how the government will prove its case at trial, nor specify
exactly what sources it will use.” Martir, 782 F.2d at 1145.
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ANALYSIS
The 	Court has 	considered 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	reasoning, 	as 	well 	as 	the
recommendation of the United States Probation Office (“USPO”) in favor of release. 9 But
upon this Court’s de novo review, it respectfully disagrees with their conclusions and finds
that the government has established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
conditions can protect against the danger posed by Defendant’s release.
The nature and circumstances of the offenses with which Defendant is charged
strongly favor detention. 	The offenses involve loaded firearms, lethal narcotics, and the
penalties that Defendant faces are significant. Similarly, the strength of the evidence also
strongly favors detention. The evidence consists of three confidential sources, controlled
buys with an undercover officer, and a trove of incriminating evidence seized from a
residence where Defendant admitted he resided alone. 	And consideration of the fourth
§ 3142(g) factor also strongly supports detention. 	These three factors lead to the
conclusion that Defendant is a violent drug dealer engaged in the trafficking of lethal
narcotics out of his residence where he operated a drug distribution center and possessed
dangerous weapons.
Only the third § 3142(g) factor tips in favor of Defendant—because of his strong
family and community support, lifelong ties to the area, and lack of criminal history. But
on the other hand, Defendant has no apparent employment (other than his alleged drug
9 	As noted by the probation officer, the USPO does not consider the weight of the
evidence, any rebuttable presumption, or the potential penalties, in making its assessment
and recommendation.
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trafficking) and the evidence proffered by the government supports the conclusion that he
has been involved in dangerous drug trafficking activities for many years—he has just
avoided detection up until now. Thus, while the lack of criminal history and strong family
support admittedly give the Court some pause about whether to detain Defendant—and
those facts may rebut the presumption in favor of detention—on the whole they are
insufficient to overcome the other considerations favoring detention.
Thus, on the whole, the Court cannot conclude that the third § 3142(g) factor weighs
sufficiently in favor of Defendant so as to overcome the other factors, all of which support
detention. 	And while the magistrate judge put in place some strict conditions, the
undersigned disagrees that they will reasonably protect against the serious danger posed by
Defendant’s release.
Therefore, based on its consideration of all the evidence and the factors set forth at
§ 3142(g), 	the 	Court concludes 	that 	the 	government 	has 	established 	by 	clear 	and
convincing evidence that if released, Defendant would present a risk of danger that could
not be reasonably protected through the imposition of conditions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the government’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s release
order is granted, and the Court hereby orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) that defendant
Raysean Brown be detained pending trial. Defendant shall be committed to the custody of
the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent
practical, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending
appeal. 	The Court further orders that Defendant be afforded reasonable opportunity for
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private consultation with counsel. Finally, the Court directs that, on order of the Court of
the United States or on request of an attorney for the government, the person in charge of
the corrections facility in which Defendant is confined shall deliver the Defendant to a
United States Marshal for the purposes of his appearance in connection with any court
proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
________________________________
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: 	April 1, 2025
Rochester, New York
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