Tripathy v. Schneider et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SANJAY TRIPATHY,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
v. 	6:21-CV-6392 FPG CDH
ANDREA N. SCHNEIDER, Acting
Superintendent, Gowanda CF, Gowanda, NY,
D. LOCKWOOD, Acting Deputy Superintendent
of Security, Gowanda CF, Gowanda, NY, DR.
S. HAQUE, MD, Facility Health Services
Director, Gowanda CF, EDWARD BURNETT,
Superintendent Fishkill CF, SHARON FROST,
DSA Fishkill CF, AKINOLA AKINYOMBO,
DSH Fishkill CF, D.S.P LEANNE LATONA,
Superintendent Collins CF, RICHARD MOFFIT,
DSA Collins CF,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Sanjay Tripathy (“Plaintiff”) was previously incarcerated at
Gowanda 	Correctional 	Facility 	(“Gowanda”), 	Fishkill 	Correctional 	Facility
(“Fishkill”), and Collins Correctional Facility (“Collins”). Plaintiff alleges, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that defendants Andrea N. Schneider, D. Lockwood, Dr. S.
Haque, Edward Burnett, Sharon Frost, Akinola Akinyombo, D.S.P. Leanne Latona,
and Richard Moffit (collectively, “Defendants”)—who are or were all prison officials
at these three correctional facilities—violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
exposing him to risks related to COVID-19. Currently pending before the Court is a
motion by Plaintiff for leave to depose non-party staff from the New York State
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Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). (Dkt. 216). Also
before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
for sanctions against defense counsel Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) Muditha
Halliyadde. (Dkt. 221). In addition, Defendants have requested sanctions against
Plaintiff (Dkt. 223 at 2, ¶ 12) and filed a motion to file a sur-reply in connection with
the briefing on Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion. (Dkt. 227).
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motions to depose non-party
DOCCS staff (Dkt. 216) and for Rule 11 sanctions (Dkt. 221) are denied. Defendants’
request for sanctions (Dkt. 223 at 2, ¶ 12) is denied and Defendants’ motion to file a
sur-reply (Dkt. 227) is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Pleading History
Plaintiff 	commenced 	this 	action 	on 	May 	20, 	2021, 	while 	he 	was 	still
incarcerated, bringing claims specifically arising out of his incarceration at Gowanda.
(Dkt. 1). District Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr. screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims with leave to amend. (Dkt.
2). Judge Geraci subsequently screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. 5) and
allowed Plaintiff to proceed to service only on an Eighth Amendment claim that
defendants Schneider, Lockwood, and Haque exposed him to harmful conditions of
confinement by failing to enforce COVID-19 safety protocols at Gowanda. (Dkt. 7).
Magistrate Judge Marian W. Payson, to whom this case was previously
referred, later granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to add as
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defendants Burnett, Frost, Akinyombo, Latona, and Moffitt, and to assert analogous
COVID-19-related 	Eighth 	Amendment 	claims 	arising 	out 	of 	his 	subsequent
incarceration at Fishkill and Collins. (Dkt. 35). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
(Dkt. 36) is the operative complaint in this action to the extent that it asserts Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claims related to Defendants’ failure to enforce
COVID-19 safety protocols at Gowanda, Fishkill, and Collins. (See Dkt. 49; Dkt. 184;
Dkt. 187).
II. 	Depositions of Non-Party DOCCS Staff
Plaintiff has made several attempts throughout this litigation to depose non-
party DOCCS employees. He first filed a motion on May 4, 2023, for a subpoena to
depose DOCCS Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer Carol Moores. (Dkt.
118). On November 9, 2023, the Court denied this motion without prejudice, advising
Plaintiff that he must first depose the party Defendants, and “[f]ollowing those
depositions, if he still believes a deposition of Moores is appropriate, he may so move
and explain why additional testimony from her would be relevant and important to
his claims.” (Dkt. 133 at 16).
Nevertheless, on November 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of depositions for
three party defendants as well as a “DOCCS Representative(s) with information and
knowledge” of various COVID-19-related topics. (Dkt. 137 at 3). Plaintiff later moved
on December 8, 2023, for the Court to issue a subpoena to a non-party DOCCS
representative so he could conduct a deposition on the same COVID-19-related topics.
(Dkt. 172). The Court denied this motion on June 21, 2024, and “reiterate[d] its earlier
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instruction that Tripathy should first depose the party defendants concerning the
COVID-19 	policies 	implemented 	at 	each 	of 	the 	three 	facilities” 	and 	that 	any
subsequent motion for a subpoena to depose any non-party “should include an
explanation of why additional testimony is relevant and important to his claims.”
(Dkt. 184 at 14).
Plaintiff filed the instant motion for depositions on December 12, 2024,
explaining that he has now deposed six of the party defendants and that “[t]hese
depositions 	revealed 	that 	the 	named 	defendants 	possessed 	limited 	knowledge
regarding some key issues, indicating that DOCCS staff are the appropriate source
of the information.” (Dkt. 216 at 2). According to Plaintiff, the following four topics
“remain unresolved and necessitate” the deposition of non-party DOCCS staff:
Medical Parole: The named defendants disclaimed direct knowledge
of the denial of Petitioner’s medical parole application. Information is
needed regarding who made the denial decision, the analysis performed,
and the individuals consulted.
COVID-19 Policies and Procedures: DOCCS formulated policies
including the absence of special dorms for high-risk individuals and the
lack of specific self-isolation programs or conditions. Information is
needed regarding who made these medical decisions and the rationale
behind them. This includes masking, sanitation, testing and vaccination
protocols.
Severe 	Underlying 	Health 	Conditions: 	Information 	is 	needed
regarding the definition of severe underlying health conditions and the
decisions regarding special treatment to minimize adverse outcomes,
including who made these decisions and the rationale.
Habeas Relief: DOCCS opposed Petitioner’s federal and state habeas
petitions for early release due to severe COVID-19 risks. Information is
needed regarding who made the decision, what analysis was conducted,
who all were consulted, to oppose these petitions and the rationale. Only
relevant factual information is sought. As this Court is aware the
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Federal Government released 1000s of high risk inmates to home
confinement. Further just today President Biden also commuted their
sentences so they don’t have to go back to prison. Nevertheless, DOCCS
and The State of New York actions and rationale with the same are vital
as part of this lawsuit.
(Id. at 2-3) (citations to the record omitted). Plaintiff does not identify any specific
DOCCS employees he wants to depose. Rather, he states that if the Court grants his
motion, he “will then collaborate with defense counsel to determine appropriate
individuals 	and 	schedule 	depositions.” 	(Id. 	at 	3-4). 	Plaintiff 	also 	requests 	an
amendment of the scheduling order to accommodate the requested depositions and
an oral argument and evidentiary hearing on his motion.1 (Id. at 4).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s proposed depositions of non-party DOCCS staff.
(Dkt. 218 at ¶ 1). Specifically, Defendants assert that the only remaining claims
under 	Plaintiff’s 	operative 	complaint 	are 	Eighth 	Amendment 	conditions 	of
confinement claims, which they characterize as “directed to the implementation of
COVID-19 protocols in” Gowanda, Fishkill, and Collins. (Id. at ¶ 2). Defendants note
that Plaintiff’s operative complaint “does not challenge medical parole, COVID-19
policies and procedures, or his request for habeas relief.” (Id. at ¶ 3). Defendants also
claim that Dr. Haque is the only employee at DOCCS “who could be identified to
provide details about the definition of severe underlying health conditions” and that
they “are unable to identify any DOCCS employee who has the knowledge about
implementation of COVID-19 protocols in each [of] these facilities other than the
1 	The Court has determined that neither an oral argument nor an evidentiary
hearing is necessary for the disposition of these motions and accordingly resolves
them based on the parties’ papers.
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Defendants named in Plaintiff’s operative complaint.” (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). Additionally,
Defendants strongly object to an extension of the discovery deadline, as an extension
would “greatly prejudice Defendants in this action who [have] waited over three years
for a resolution of this case.” (Id. at ¶ 7).
In his reply, Plaintiff argues that the denial of his medical parole requests and
habeas petitions are “directly related to his conditions of confinement and [] therefore
cognizable.” (Dkt. 219 at 2). Plaintiff asserts that “[d]espite these matters being
clearly outlined in the complaint, [Defendants have] failed to provide any discovery
materials 	pertaining 	to 	them.” 	Regarding 	COVID-19 	policies 	and 	procedures,
specifically, Plaintiff claims that:
The 	deposition 	of 	Dr. 	Haque 	from 	Gowanda 	CF 	unequivocally
demonstrated that he lacked expertise and responsibility regarding
DOCCS-wide COVID-19 policies and procedures, and the decisions
regarding medical parole. Dr. Haque testified that COVID-19 policies
were set at the DOCSS level and merely implemented at Gowanda. He
further clarified that his opinions regarding high-risk individuals,
medical parole, and the impact of COVID-19 policies on Plaintiff were
based 	on 	his 	general 	medical 	knowledge, 	not 	on 	specific 	DOCCS
directives or analysis. Therefore, depositions of appropriate DOCCS
personnel, such as the Chief Medical Officer and staff from the Office of
Counsel, are essential to understand the rationale behind statewide
policies[.]
(Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff also states that he “reserves the right to amend his complaint
based on material information obtained through the requested DOCSS depositions.”
(Id. at 4).
III. 	Inmate Liaison Committee (“ILC”) Briefing Minutes
Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against AAG Halliyadde stems from
her alleged “misrepresentations and bad faith conduct regarding the production of
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Inmate 	Liaison 	Committee 	(ILC) 	briefings/minutes 	related 	to 	COVID-19 	at
Gowanda[.]”2 (Dkt. 221 at 1). On June 21, 2024, in an attempt to help the parties
resolve 	an 	ongoing 	dispute 	over 	Defendants’ 	production 	of 	COVID-19-related
communications, the Court ordered Defendants to “search for and produce all Covid-
19-related ILC briefings” distributed at Gowanda between January 2020 and March
2021, Fishkill between January 2020 and December 2021, and Collins between
January 2020 and December 2022. (Dkt. 184 at 13).
On July 23, 2024, AAG Halliyadde submitted a declaration from Megan Yaiser,
DOCCS’s Assistant Commissioner for the Health Services, stating that DOCCS did
not distribute written briefings related to COVID-19 to ILC members during these
time periods. (Dkt. 188 at 6, ¶ 5). AAG Halliyadde’s own declaration averred that
“[a]ll such briefings were verbal communications.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 4). The same day,
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel, asserting that “[t]his is 100% a lie, a fabrication
and an attempt to bury the truth as [Plaintiff] has himself seen/read (on multiple
occasions of more than 5-6 times) that minutes of these ILC . . . Meetings related [to]
Covid-19 were posted on the dorm notice board[.]” (Dkt. 189 at 2). The Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion to compel because he failed to meet and confer in good faith
pursuant to Rule 37(a)(1), but directed the parties to confer regarding whether
“written ILC meeting minutes that reflected the content of the verbal briefings
provided by DOCCS staff to the ILC members . . . 	exist for the relevant facilities
2 	As discussed in the Court’s June 21, 2024 Order, the correctional facility
superintendents regularly briefed their facility’s respective ILC throughout the
COVID-19 pandemic. (See Dkt. 184 at 13).
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during the relevant time periods and, if so, whether those minutes are in the
possession of DOCCS.”3 (Dkt. 190 at 2).
Plaintiff then filed a letter requesting that Defendants produce all COVID-19-
related ILC “minutes/communications” (Dkt. 191). AAG Halliyadde responded that
she was “working with relevant parties to see whether there are any documents
responsive to this request.” (Dkt. 192). Defendants subsequently produced two sets of
responsive documents. (Dkt. 200). Plaintiff then moved to compel production of
additional “minutes/communications,” in part, because Defendants had not produced
any ILC briefing minutes from Gowanda. (Dkt. 203; Dkt. 205). On November 7, 2024,
the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel, finding that Defendants “searched in
good faith for such records from Gowanda and found none.” (Dkt. 209 at 4). However,
on November 22, 2024, Defendants produced a set of ILC briefing minutes from
Gowanda, stating that “[i]n further search for documents, Defendant Schneider was
able to find . . . ILC briefing minutes that belong[ed] to Gowanda CF.” (Dkt. 215 at
1).
3 	The parties’ dispute over whether the ILC briefings were in writing or just
verbal appears to have evolved into a collateral dispute over whether Defendants
were required to produce ILC “briefing minutes” or “meeting minutes.” (See Dkt. 200
at 1). Notwithstanding, the parties were directed to confer regarding the existence of
“written ILC meeting minutes that reflected the content of the verbal briefings[.]”
(Dkt. 190 at 2). Whether those are labeled as “briefing minutes” or “meeting minutes,”
the scope of the documents at issue is clear. And, as Judge Payson resolved
subsequent disputes regarding Defendants’ production of such documents without
belaboring this distinction, it is evident that the documents Defendants ultimately
produced were consistent with the Court’s directive.
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On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff emailed AAG Halliyadde, apprising her that he
intended to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions in connection with the belated
production of ILC briefing minutes from Gowanda, and attached a safe harbor notice
and a notice of motion. (Dkt. 221-1). Plaintiff says that “there was no response from
Defense Counsel on the subject,” and he filed his instant motion for Rule 11 sanctions
on December 23, 2024. (Dkt. 221 at 2). Plaintiff requests a formal, written apology by
AAG Halliyadde and an award of reasonable expenses including attorney’s fees. (Id.
at 4). Defendants filed a response opposing Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions,
arguing that: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly serve the safe harbor notice; (2) the Court
already addressed this same dispute in its November 7, 2024 decision; (3) defense
counsel made a good faith effort to locate ILC briefing minutes from Gowanda and
did not intentionally withhold them; and (4) pro se litigants are not entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees. (Dkt. 223-1 at 2-10).
Plaintiff filed a reply. (Dkt. 224). Defendants then filed a second response to
Plaintiff’s motion that appears to be identical to their first response, except for one
minor change in the memorandum of law.4 (Dkt. 225). Plaintiff then filed a second
4 	Defendants’ first memorandum of law includes the sentence: “Plaintiff’s Rule
11 motion against defense counsel should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s Rule 11
motion: (1) was directed to a discovery dispute in another lawsuit rather than to a
proper subject of Rule 11.” (Dkt. 223-1 at 5) (emphasis added). In the second
memorandum of law, the sentence now reads: “Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion against
defense counsel should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion: (1) was
directed to a discovery dispute rather than to a proper subject of Rule 11.” (Dkt. 225-
1 at 5). There do not appear to be any other changes. The Court advises defense
counsel, to the extent that Docket No. 225 was not filed in error, that such minor
corrections do not warrant a separate filing event, but can be brought to the Court’s
attention via letter.
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reply 	addressing 	both 	Defendants’ 	“initial 	response” 	and 	“corrected 	response,”
wherein he claims that Defendants acknowledged receiving the safe harbor notice
attached to his December 1st email. (Dkt. 226 at 2). Defendants subsequently moved
to file a sur-reply to address Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants acknowledged receiving
the safe harbor notice. (Dkt. 227). Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion to file a sur-
reply. (Dkt. 229). Plaintiff has also filed a letter stating that “the Rule 11 Safe Harbor
Notice, a copy of which was previously served via email on December 1, 2024, has
now been formally and properly served on the Defendant’s Counsel, Muditha
Halliyadde, on January 7, 2025 . . . via a process server.” (Dkt. 231 at 2).
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the handling of all non-
dispositive pretrial matters. (Dkt. 230).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Depose Non-Party DOCCS Staff
A. 	Legal Standard
While neither side cites any legal authority to support their respective
positions regarding Plaintiff’s proposed depositions of non-party DOCCS staff, the
Court understands the parties’ dispute as concerning the relevance of the proposed
deposition topics.5
5 	Defendants also claim that there are no non-party employees at DOCSS who
have knowledge of (1) “the definition of severe underlying health conditions” or (2)
“the implementation of COVID-19 protocols in each [of] these facilities.” (Dkt. 218 at
¶¶ 4-5). However, Rule 30(b)(6)—which is arguably the most applicable discovery
mechanism for what Plaintiff is requesting—permits “depositions in order to obtain
testimony binding on [an organization] even though the testimony [is] likely to
essentially duplicate information which ha[s] already been stated in an individual
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Rule 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “‘Relevance’ under Rule 26 is
‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could
lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’” Est.
of Tillman by Tillman v. City of N.Y., 345 F.R.D. 379, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The party moving to
compel discovery bears the burden of demonstrating relevance. Beverley v. New York
City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 18-CV-08486 (ER), 2024 WL 2125402, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2024). Conclusory statements by the party that the discovery sought is
relevant do not satisfy this burden. Id.; Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 14-CV-7126 (JMF), 2016 WL 6779901, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016).
“The 	Court 	has 	broad 	discretion 	in 	determining 	relevance 	for 	discovery
purposes.” Cuomo v. N.Y. State Assembly Judiciary Comm., 683 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267
(E.D.N.Y. 2023), reconsideration denied, 727 F. Supp. 3d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)
(quotation omitted); see also Dongguk Univ., 270 F.R.D. at 73 (“Generally, courts have
deposition.” Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 2010). Such
depositions can be useful because “[a] party may also have an interest in getting the
[organization’s] testimony on an issue, rather than the testimony of an individual. Id.
A Rule 30(b)(6) witness need not have personal knowledge of the proposed deposition
topics. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Jorda Enters., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 676, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Defendants’ assertions do not clearly establish that, if the proposed depositions were
relevant or otherwise within the scope of discovery, DOCCS could not designate and
prepare an adequate representative to testify on its behalf. See Rubik's Brand Ltd. v.
Flambeau, Inc., No. 17-CV-6559-PGG-KHP, 2018 WL 11250294, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
28, 2018). The Court therefore finds that, for the purposes of resolving this motion,
the dispositive issue is whether the proposed deposition topics are relevant.
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been reluctant to define discovery relevance in the abstract, instead tending to ground
their decisions on the particular facts of the case.”). The Court also has discretion to
limit discovery that is disproportionate to the needs of the case. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 318 F.R.D. 9, 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “[A] non-
party especially should not be burdened with preparation for a broader array of topics
than is proportional to the needs of the case.” Pearlstein v. BlackBerry Ltd., 332
F.R.D. 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), on reconsideration in part, 2019 WL 5287931
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Proposed Deposition Topics are not Relevant and are
Disproportionate to the Needs of the Case
Here, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he information sought is directly relevant to
[his] claims and necessary to establish liability.” (Dkt. 219 at 2). Defendants argue
that the proposed deposition topics are not relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claims. (Dkt. 218 at ¶¶ 2-3). The Court agrees
with Defendants that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are about the implementation of
COVID-19 	safety 	protocols 	in 	Gowanda, 	Fishkill, 	and 	Collins 	by 	the 	specific
defendants named in this action, each of whom are alleged to have been personally
involved in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not
met his burden of demonstrating that his proposed deposition topics are relevant to
any issue in this case.
“To demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, the plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subject
test.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480 (2d Cir. 1996). For the objective prong, “the
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plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result[ed] in
unquestioned 	and 	serious 	deprivations 	of 	basic 	human 	needs.” 	Id. 	(quotation
omitted). “This prong is satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff's ‘conditions [of
confinement] . . . pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health,’ that is,
a deprivation of ‘basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and
sanitary living conditions.’” Nellis v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
No. 22-CV-6429 CJS, 2025 WL 306532, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2025) (quoting Smith
v. N.Y. State, No. 23-6601-CV, 2024 WL 4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024)). In
the COVID-19 context, “the relevant inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] has shown a
substantial risk of serious harm from COVID-19 . . . in light of the countermeasures
that the facility has in place.” Chunn v. Edge, 465 F. Supp. 3d 168, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
2020) (emphasis added). For the subjective prong, “the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendants imposed those conditions with deliberate indifference.” Jolly, 76
F.3d at 480 (quotation omitted). “To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
show that a prison official . . . ‘has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk
of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate the harm.’” Nellis, 2025 WL 306532, at *6 (quoting Smith, 204 WL 4746554, at
*2 (quoting Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Beginning with the denial of Plaintiff’s medical parole application, Plaintiff
says that “[i]information is needed regarding who made the denial decision, the
analysis performed, and the individuals consulted.” (Dkt. 216 at 2). However,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated how this topic is relevant to his conditions of
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confinement claims or any of the defenses alleged by Defendants in this action.
Plaintiff does briefly reference the denial of medical parole in his complaint as a
“Step[] Taken . . . for Relief” and attaches to his complaint applications for medical
parole and written denials from DOCCS. (See Dkt. 36 at 10, 31-35). However, neither
Judge Geraci, in screening Plaintiff’s initial complaints, nor Judge Payson, in
allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint, has ever construed Plaintiff as challenging
the denial of his medical parole in this action. (See Dkt. 2; Dkt. 7; Dkt. 35). Plaintiff
is not entitled to discovery on a topic merely because it is referenced in his complaint,
where it otherwise has no bearing on any issue in this case. See Polaris PowerLED
Techs., LLC v. Nintendo Co., 623 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1137 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (“The
court reminds Polaris that a party is not entitled to discovery of a factual issue merely
because it is alleged in the pleadings.”). Medical parole in New York involves distinct
procedural issues and statutory considerations, see generally Aponte v. Bd. of Parole,
No. 9:17-CV-0305-GTS-DEP, 2017 WL 8780766 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2017); Ifill v.
Wright, 94 A.D.3d 1259 (3d Dep’t 2012), that have no relevance to the conditions of
the 	facilities 	where Plaintiff 	was 	incarcerated, 	the 	facilities’ 	COVID-19 	safety
protocols, any action undertaken by a defendant in this case, or any defendant’s state
of mind relative to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. Plaintiff’s claim that the
deposition of a non-party regarding the denial of his medical parole applications
would be relevant and necessary to establish Defendants’ liability in this action is
unfounded.
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Next, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how his federal and state habeas
petitions are relevant to this case. Plaintiff says that “[i]nformation is needed
regarding who made the decision [to oppose his petitions], what analysis was
conducted, who all were consulted, to oppose these petitions and the rationale.” (Dkt.
216 at 3). However, the State’s litigation of these habeas petitions has no relevance
to this case. The habeas proceedings themselves do not bear on the conditions of
Plaintiff’s confinement, and Plaintiff has not shown that any of the defendants were
involved in or knew about those proceedings, or, even if they were involved, how that
would be relevant to the Eighth Amendment claims that are the subject of this action.
(See Dkt. 219 at 3; Dkt. 232-1 at 13-14; Dkt. 232-2 at 23). “[C]ourts should not grant
discovery requests based on pure speculation that amount to nothing more than a
‘fishing expedition’ into actions or past wrongdoing not related to the alleged claims
or defenses.” Collens v. City of N.Y., 222 F.R.D. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Moreover,
as the Court understands it, Plaintiff seeks information that, in addition to not being
relevant, is privileged or would have been litigated in the federal and state habeas
proceedings.
Plaintiff’s final two proposed deposition topics are not relevant under Rule
26(b)(1) and disproportionate to the needs of the case. While aspects of DOCCS’s
COVID-19 	policies 	and 	procedures 	are 	relevant 	in 	a 	broad 	sense, 	Plaintiff 	is
singularly focused on obtaining discovery regarding the formulation of statewide
COVID-19 policies at the highest level of DOCCS, such as “who made these medical
decisions and the rationale behind them.” (Dkt. 216 at 3). That information has no
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utility here. How DOCSS developed its statewide COVID-19 policies has no bearing
on the objective conditions at the three correctional facilities. Nor does it have any
bearing on the subjective state of mind of the defendants in this case, none of whom
are alleged to have been involved in the development of DOCCS’s statewide COVID-
19 policies. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with his deposition of Dr. Haque because he
“testified 	that 	COVID-19 	policies 	were 	set 	at 	the 	DOCCS 	level 	and 	merely
implemented at Gowanda” (Dkt. 219 at 3) is misplaced, as Plaintiff’s claims in this
case are fundamentally about the implementation of such policies and other safety
measures instituted by Defendants in the correctional facilities where he was
incarcerated. Having had ample opportunity to obtain discovery on this issue through
depositions of the party defendants, Plaintiff has not shown any basis to permit the
deposition of a non-party on issues outside the scope of relevant discovery.
For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s proposed deposition topic of “the definition of
severe underlying health conditions and the decisions regarding special treatment to
minimize adverse outcomes” (see Dkt. 216 at 3) is not relevant and is disproportionate
to the needs of the case. The only context Plaintiff gives for this topic is a citation to
his proposed third amended complaint (which he was not permitted to file (see Dkt.
184; Dkt. 187)), where he discusses his “severe underlying health [medical] conditions
that place him at ‘highest risk of death [pain, anguish and suffering]’ from Covid-19.”
(Dkt. 179-1 at 11) (bracketed text in original). Drawing on additional context from his
reply, the Court understands this topic as seeking “to understand the rationale
behind statewide policies” regarding protocol for high-risk individuals, “including the
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lack of separate dorms for high-risk individuals [and] the criteria for identifying high-
risk individuals.” (See Dkt. 219 at 3). But like COVID-19 policies and procedures more
generally, the rationale behind statewide policies for high-risk individuals has no
bearing on the objective conditions at the three correctional facilities or the subjective
state of mind of any defendant in this case.
In sum, Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating the relevance of his
proposed deposition topics. As these topics are outside the permitted scope of
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), Plaintiff’s motion for leave to depose non-party DOCCS
staff (Dkt. 216) is denied. Plaintiff’s request to extend the fact discovery deadline to
accommodate such depositions (Id. at 4) is therefore also denied.
II. 	Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
A. 	Legal Standard
Rule 11(b) provides:
(b) “By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—
an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, 	will 	likely 	have 	evidentiary 	support 	after 	a 	reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
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(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The Court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney,
law firm, or party that violates Rule 11(b) or is responsible for the violation.6 Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(1). “When deciding whether to grant Rule 11 sanctions, the Court applies
an objective standard of reasonableness, and looks to, among other factors, whether
the party acted in bad faith; whether they relied on a direct falsehood; and whether
the claim was utterly lacking in support.” Benitez v. King, 298 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Notably, ‘even when a district court finds a
violation of Rule 11, [t]he decision whether to impose a sanction for a Rule 11(b)
violation is . . . committed to the district court’s discretion.’” Id. at 540 (quoting Ipcon
Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 698 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Rule 11(c)(2) sets forth specific procedural requirements that apply to a motion
for Rule 11 sanctions. The motion must (1) be made separately from any other motion;
(2) describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b); and (3) be served
in accordance with Rule 5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). In addition, the motion “may not
be presented to the court until the expiration of a twenty-one-day ‘safe harbor’ period,
during which the alleged violator has the chance to withdraw or correct the
challenged filing.” Kyros L. P.C. v. World Wrestling Ent., Inc., 78 F.4th 532, 543 (2d
6 	The issue of whether a magistrate judge has authority to impose sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11 is unsettled in the Second Circuit. See Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d
78, 79 (2d Cir. 2010). However, because I am denying Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11
sanctions, I do so in a Decision and Order.
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Cir. 2023). This provision requires service of the Rule 11 motion on the subject of the
sanctions motion in order to trigger the 21-day safe harbor period. Star Mark Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.
2012). Any motion for Rule 11 sanctions that does not comply with these procedural
requirements must be denied. Adams v. Taylor, 643 F. Supp. 3d 392, 395 (W.D.N.Y.
2022).
B. 	Rule 11 Sanctions are Not Warranted
Plaintiff argues that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted against AAG Halliyadde
because of (1) her July 23, 2024 representation that written ILC briefings related to
COVID-19 did not exist and were only verbal communications; (2) her allegedly bad
faith interpretation of the Court’s June 21, 2024 Order as pertaining only to verbal
communications rather than written minutes; and (3) her belated production of ILC
briefing minutes from Gowanda, which Plaintiff claims were “intentionally withheld
to gain a tactical advantage.” (Dkt. 221 at 3).
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion should be
dismissed on procedural grounds because it was not served in accordance with Rule
5—rather, it was only emailed to AAG Halliyadde, who did not consent in writing to
service by electronic means as required under Rule 5(b)(2)(E). 	(Dkt. 223-1 at 3-4).
The Court agrees. See Sit n’ Stay Pet Servs. Inc. v. Hoffman, No. 17-CV-00116-LJV-
JJM, 2019 WL 719825, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019) (“absent prior written consent,
emailing does not meet the requirements of Rule 5”) (quotation and alterations
omitted), adopted, 2019 WL 718758 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2019). However, because
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Plaintiff subsequently filed his motion on CM/ECF and formally served it upon AAG
Halliyadde, the Court will also address the merits of the motion, rather than decide
solely on procedural grounds.
On the merits, the Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. First,
AAG Halliyadde has credibly explained that she relied on the representation of
DOCCS Assistant Commissioner Megan Yaiser, who stated that DOCCS did not
distribute written briefings related to COVID-19 to ILC members. (See Dkt. 223 at 1,
¶ 3; Dkt. 188 at 6, ¶ 5). Defendants’ subsequent production of written briefings does
not evince a violation of Rule 11(b)(3). AAG Halliyadde’s representation that briefings
were verbal, made in reliance on an appropriately consulted DOCCS employee, was
reasonable under the circumstances and not utterly lacking in support.
Second, as discussed supra, AAG Halliyadde did not act in bad faith with
respect to the Court’s prior directives regarding the production of ILC briefing
minutes. Plaintiff’s claim that the Court’s June 21, 2024, Order “explicitly state[s]
that these briefings include[] any and all communications/minutes, including those
posted on notice boards at Gowanda CF” is patently false. (See Dkt. 221 at 1-2). The
Court only instructed Defendants to produce “all Covid-19-related ILC briefings.”
(Dkt. 184 at 13). When a subsequent Court Order instructed the parties to confer
regarding the existence of “meeting minutes that reflected the content of the verbal
[ILC] 	briefings” 	(see 	Dkt. 	190 	at 	2), 	and 	Plaintiff 	then 	made 	a 	request 	for
“minutes/communications” (see Dkt. 191 at 2), Defendants provided Plaintiff with ILC
briefing minutes from Fishkill and Collins and searched for the same from Gowanda
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but found none. (See Dkt. 200). When Judge Payson was then presented with this
exact same dispute on Plaintiff’s motions to compel production, she found that
Defendants had provided Plaintiff with the appropriate documents from Fishkill and
Collins and made a good faith search for such documents from Gowanda. (See Dkt.
209 at 4). Thus, there is no basis to now find that AAG Halliyadde acted in bad faith
with respect to the Court’s prior orders.
Third, there is no basis to sanction AAG Halliyadde for the belated production
of ILC briefing minutes from Gowanda. AAG Halliyadde reasonably relied on the
DOCCS employees who searched for such documents at her request. (See Dkt. 200 at
3; Dkt. 223 at 6). Specifically, defendant Schneider has stated that he could not locate
any ILC briefing minutes from Gowanda when AAG Halliyadde originally requested
them, but he subsequently found copies of minutes while searching for other
documents on or about November 18, 2024. (Dkt. 223 at 6, ¶ 4). Schneider then
provided the minutes to AAG Halliyadde, who produced them to Plaintiff on
November 22, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 5; Dkt. 215 at 1). Plaintiff’s speculation that these
documents were intentionally withheld is without support in the record. And in any
event, Plaintiff does not explain how this belated production would warrant sanctions
under Rule 11.
The Court concludes that Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted against AAG
Halliyadde. 7 Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Dkt. 221) and all relief
7 	The Court accordingly need not and does not reach the issue of whether
Plaintiff would be entitled to attorney’s fees as a pro se litigant.
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requested therein is denied. Because Plaintiff’s motion is denied on the merits,
Defendants’ motion to file a sur-reply addressing an issue related to Plaintiff’s safe
harbor notice (Dkt. 227) is denied as moot.
C. 	Defendants’ Request for Attorney’s Fees
In AAG Halliyadde’s declaration in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11
sanctions, she states that Defendants request an award of attorney’s fees against
Plaintiff “for filing frivolous motions against defense counsel.” (Dkt. 223 at 2, ¶ 12).
“While a court may order a pro se litigant to pay legal fees, the court must adequately
warn the pro se litigant before imposing such an order.” Papadimitriou v. Mullooly,
Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn, LLP, No. 22-CV-2065-LDH-LB, 2023 WL 6385769, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023).
Plaintiff 	appears 	to 	have 	received 	a 	warning 	in 	a 	separate 	proceeding
regarding his use of inflammatory language toward AAG Halliyadde. See Tripathy v.
Schneider, No. 21-CV-6339-FPG-MJP, 2024 WL 4528763, at *5-6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2024) (“Tripathy is WARNED that any future violations of the Rules of Federal Civil
Procedure, including Rule 11, or the Local Rules of Civil Procedure of this Court may
result in monetary sanctions, in dismissal of this action, or in other appropriate
sanctions. The Court now considers Tripathy on notice that he must FOLLOW all
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. If he violates
any rule such that sanctions are warranted, he has been given the warnings to which
he is entitled. In sum, Tripathy's pro se status is no longer going to shield him.”). He
was also subsequently ordered to pay attorney’s fees in that proceeding because his
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motion to compel was denied in full. See Tripathy v. Schneider, No. 21-CV-6339-FPG-
MJP, 2024 WL 5152785, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024), reconsideration denied, 2025
WL 79861 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2025).
However, it is not clear that Plaintiff would have understood this warning,
issued in a separate proceeding, to apply in this matter. It is also unclear to what
extent Plaintiff is aware of Defendants’ instant request for sanctions, as Defendants
do not reference the request in their memorandum of law and Plaintiff has not
acknowledged it (despite filing several subsequent replies in connection with the Rule
11 motion). See Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester City Sch. Dist., 196 F.R.D. 220,
224 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Before a court imposes any type of sanction, due process
requires that court provide notice and opportunity to be heard.”) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, I find it more appropriate to issue a warning to Plaintiff, rather
than impose sanctions at this time. Plaintiff is warned that any future motions
or filings made in this case that are found to be for the purpose of harassing
defense counsel, or any other person, may result in the imposition of
sanctions, including the payment of attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to depose non-party
DOCCS staff (Dkt. 216) is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against
AAG Halliyadde (Dkt. 221) is denied. Defendants’ motion to file a sur-reply in
response to Docket No. 226 (Dkt. 227) is denied as moot. Defendants’ request for
attorney’s fees (Dkt. 223 at 2, ¶ 12) is denied.
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SO ORDERED.
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
June 11, 2025
COLLEEN D HO	HO	H	H 	LL	LLAND
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