Green v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MELANIE G.,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
v. 	25-CV-289-A
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Melanie G. (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action
pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) seeking review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner” or
“Defendant”), who denied her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). On October 2, 2025, this Court issued an
Order, based upon a stipulation between the parties, see, Dkt. 14, directing that the
case be remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings, see,
Dkt. 16, and judgment in favor of Plaintiff was entered. Dkt. 17.
Now before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act. Dkt. 18. Counsel is requesting a fee of $8,014.47 which
represents payment for 30.8 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $260.21. The
Commissioner has filed a response to Plaintiff's motion, indicating, that it has no
objection to the payment of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s attorney, “[i]f Plaintiff does
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not owe a debt that is subject to offset at the time of the EAJA order.” Dkt. 20. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
II. 	DISCUSSION
The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... brought by or
against the United States ... unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Here, in securing a remand, Plaintiff clearly has established her “prevailing
party” status for purposes of the EAJA. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–
02 (1993); see also Caplash v. Nielsen, 294 F. Supp. 3d 123, 129 (W.D.N.Y.
2018)(collecting cases). Having determined that Plaintiff was a “prevailing party”
and that the Defendant’s position was not “substantially justified,” this Court must
next determine whether the Plaintiff’s attorney has met her burden of establishing
that the hours expended and the rates charged were reasonable. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). EAJA fees are determined by examining the
amount of time expended on the litigation and the attorney's hourly rate, which is
capped by statute. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002); 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). “When determining how many hours in a particular case are
reasonable, courts weigh factors such as the size of the administrative record, the
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complexity of the factual and legal issues involved, counsel's experience, and
whether counsel represented the claimant during the administrative proceedings.”
Lofton v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00454 (KAD), 2020 WL 858649, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 21,
2020).
“Courts throughout the Second Circuit have consistently found that routine
Social Security cases require, on average, between twenty and forty hours of
attorney time to prosecute.” Id. (internal brackets omitted). “Determining counsel's
hourly rate under the EAJA involves applying a cost-of-living adjustment, as
measured by the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”), to the statutory ceiling of $125.00
per hour set by the EAJA on March 29, 1996.” Montes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
17-CV-322, 2019 WL 2264967, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 28, 2019) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). “The hourly rate should only be increased by the
corresponding CPI for each year in which the legal work was performed.” Id.
(internal brackets omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's attorney, Jeanne Murray, Esq., submitted a declaration in
support of this motion which indicates that he spent 30.8 hours working on Plaintiff's
case. See, Dkt. 18-2. Plaintiff's attorney seeks compensation at the rate of $260.21
per hour, which she asserts is the appropriate hourly rate under EAJA after
adjustment for inflation using the appropriate Consumer Price Index (CPI). See
Ventura v. Barnhart, 2007 WL 1051846, *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2007)(“Courts in the
Second Circuit have repeatedly approved fee applications under EAJA based upon
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an hourly rates adjusted to reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index.”)(citing
cases).
Defendant does not object to these amounts. The Court has broad discretion
to determine the amount of time reasonably expended, but the court is not required
to “scrutinize each action taken or the time spent on it” when determining what is
reasonable. Aston v. Sec'y. of Health and Human Serv., 808 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.
1986). Applying the relevant legal principles, the Court finds that the 30.8 hours
sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable. In her declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel
adequately accounts for the 30.8 hours she spent working on this case in 2025. Dkt.
18-2. Thus, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to attorney’s fees
totaling $8,014.47.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, see, Dkt. 18,
is GRANTED, and to the extent that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to
offset at the time of the EAJA order, Defendant is directed to remit directly to
Plaintiff's counsel $8,014.47.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: January 21, 2026
Buffalo, New York
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