Mayer v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER MAYER,
Plaintiff,
v. 	8:25-CV-0510
(GTS/DJS)
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISON,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
SANDERS & SANDERS 	HARVEY P. SANDERS, ESQ.
Counsel for Plaintiff
401 Maryvale Drive
Cheektowaga, NY 14225-2601
HON. LETITIA A. JAMES 	ELIZABETH V. LOMBARDI, ESQ.
N.Y.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL 	Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Defendant
300 South State Street, Suite 300
Syracuse, NY 13202
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this action pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) filed by Christopher Mayer (“Plaintiff”) against the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“NYSDOCCS” or “Defendant”), is Defendant’s
motion to stay proceedings in this action pending the resolution of arbitration. (Dkt. No. 32.)
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
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A. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint
Generally, in his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant retaliated against him in
violation of the FMLA by terminating his employment for being absent from work despite the
fact that those absences were covered by validly approved FMLA leave. (Dkt. No. 1.)
B. 	Parties’ Briefing on Defendant’s Motion to Stay
1. 	Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
Generally, in its motion, Defendant makes three arguments. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 1.)
First, Defendant argues that this action should be stayed pending the completion of arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because (a) such a stay is mandatory when a
petition is made and the Court determines that the issues involved are referrable to arbitration
under a qualifying agreement, (b) Plaintiff, as a member of the New York State Corrections
Officer and Police Benevolent Association (“NYSCOPBA”), is subject to the terms of
NYSCOPBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which covers disputes concerning
the application and interpretation of the CBA as well as grievances alleging improper or unjust
discipline, (c) Plaintiff’s claim that he was improperly terminated for being designated absent
without authorization while he was on FMLA leave falls within the terms of the CBA, and (d)
Plaintiff has indeed filed three grievances under the CBA challenging his termination based on
similar facts and proposed relief as those alleged here, and those grievance are currently ongoing
toward a resolution conference and arbitration. (Id. at 13-16.)
Second, Defendant argues that the Court alternatively should stay this matter pursuant the
abstention doctrine outlined in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 42
U.S. 800 (1976) because (a) this federal action and an active state court action between
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NYSCOPBA and Defendant are parallel in that they involve the same parties and issues
presented for resolution as well as the same remedy sought, and (b) the relevant factors support a
stay in that (i) granting a stay would avoid piecemeal litigation and prevent inconsistent findings,
(ii) the state court action was filed first and the federal action is in the early stages of
development, and (iii) the state procedures are adequate to protect Plaintiff’s federal rights under
the FMLA. (Id. at 16-19.)
Third, Defendant argues that the Court alternatively should grant a stay pursuant to its
inherent power because (a) considerations of comity weigh in favor of a stay, (b) a stay would
serve judicial efficiency, (c) the state proceedings are adequate to provide full and fair relief, (d)
the parties in interest are essentially the same between the actions, (e) there is no reason to
believe the state court proceedings will not provide a prompt resolution, (f) the parties are served
by having the issues resolved in one forum, and (g) Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a stay. (Id.
at 19-21.)
2. 	Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law
Generally, in opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff makes four arguments. (Dkt.
No. 33.) First, Plaintiff argues that a stay should not be granted pursuant to the FAA because his
grievances under the CBA are distinct from his FMLA claims in this case. (Id. at 5-6.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that a stay should not be granted pursuant to the FAA also
because the allegations in this federal action are not within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration
agreement in that the CBA does not make explicitly clear that claims brought under the FMLA
specifically (or all causes of action arising from employment generally) are subject to arbitration.
(Id. at 7-9.)
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Third, Plaintiff argues that a stay should not be granted pursuant to Colorado River
because (a) the state court case between NYSDOCCS and NYSCOPBA is not a parallel
proceeding in that involves issues and remedies distinct from those raised here, namely the
termination of health insurance, and those are governed by different legal standards, and (b) the
relevant factors weigh decidedly in favor of this Court exercising its jurisdiction. (Id. at 10-14.)
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the Court also should not issue a stay pursuant to its
discretionary powers because (a) the federal and state actions, while containing some factual
similarity, require different analyses and seek different remedies pursuant to different statutes,
(b) resolution of the state action will not completely resolve the claims raised in this federal
action, and (c) there is also reason to believe based on Defendant’s past conduct that resolution
in the state court case will not be prompt. (Id. at 14-17.)
3. 	Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law
Generally, in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendant makes three arguments. (Dkt. No.
34.) First, Defendant argues that the case should be stayed pursuant to the CBA because (a)
unlike in the cases Plaintiff relies upon, arbitration has not yet been completed and he could
continue this federal action if that does not yield a mutual resolution, and (b) Defendant is not
attempting to compel arbitration, nor has it asserted that Plaintiff has waived any rights to assert
an FMLA claim by being subject to the CBA but rather seeks only a stay pending the outcome of
the grievance process (which includes arbitration) that is already occurring. (Id. at 5-8.)
Second, Defendant argues that a stay is also appropriate under the Colorado River
standard for the reasons it has already argued. (Id. at 8.)
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Third, Defendant argues that the Court should exercise its inherent power to stay this
federal action because (a) Plaintiff’s three grievances have advanced past step three of the
required process and are proceeding to a resolution conference and arbitration, suggesting there
will be a prompt resolution on those issues that will then inform whether this federal action needs
to proceed, (b) Plaintiff did not file a motion for preliminary injunction related to his concerns of
receiving a prompt resolution or preventing prejudice to himself, and (c) Plaintiff has not argued
that any delay in this action caused by granting a stay will prejudice him through the loss of
evidence, increased difficulties related to discovery, or the creation of opportunities for fraud or
collusion. (Id. at 8-10.)
II. 	ANALYSIS
After careful consideration of whether this matter should be stayed pending the resolution
of the arbitration proceedings, the Court answers that question in the affirmative for the reasons
Defendant stated in its memoranda of law as to the FAA. See, supra, Part I.B.1 and 3 of this
Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
“To decide whether a dispute is arbitrable, a court assesses: ‘(1) whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the claims at
issue.’” Shirazi v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 25-CV-2992, 2026 WL 2516964, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2026) (quoting Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., LLC, 802 F.3d 391, 394 [2d Cir. 2015]).
“‘Under the FAA, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’” LeDeatte v. Horizon
Media, 571 F. Supp. 3d 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA,
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387 F.3d 163, 171 [2d Cir. 2004]). Where a dispute is arbitrable and a party has requested a stay
pending arbitration, granting such a stay is mandatory under Section 3 of the FAA. See Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024) (noting that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute,
a court is required to stay proceedings if the statutory conditions are met); accord Jules v. Andre
Balazs Props., 608 U.S. 200, 204 (2026).
The parties do not dispute that the agreement that controls the Court’s analysis here is the
CBA, which was entered into between the Executive Branch of the State of New York and
NYSCOPBA. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 4.) Article 7 of the CBA subjects disputes concerning “the
application and/or interpretation of this Agreement” to “all steps of the grievance procedure
including arbitration” unless the provision is specifically excluded, and specifies that “[a]ny
other dispute or grievance concerning a term or condition of employment … shall be processed
up to and including the conference phase of the Alternate Dispute Resolution Process, and not
beyond,” unless the issue involved has a review procedure established by law or pursuant to rules
or regulations filed with the Secretary of State. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 4, at 12.) The relevant
procedure involves first a multi-step grievance procedure, and then, if that procedure does not
resolve the issue, it proceeds to the outlined Alternate Dispute Resolution Process. That process
involves (a) submitting a demand for arbitration, (b) a resolution conference, and then (c) either
expedited or full arbitration. (Id. at 13-14.) Notably, pursuant to this process, any dispute
between the parties as to whether an issue is arbitrable is itself explicitly subject to determination
by the arbitrator. (Id. at 15.)
Beyond this general grievance procedure, the CBA also includes, in Article 8, a specific
procedure to be used in cases where a disciplinary action is sought, including “a loss of leave
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credits or other privilege, written reprimand, fine, suspension without pay, reduction in grade, or
dismissal from service.” (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 4, at 16.) Upon receiving the required notice of
the disciplinary action sought, the individual may file a grievance, which, if not settled or
resolved, may be appealed to disciplinary arbitration. (Id. at 16-17.)
Here, it appears that, as to the relevant dispute resolution proceedings, Plaintiff submitted
three grievances: (1) on March 11, 2025, he asserted that Defendant inappropriately classified
certain of his absences from work as his being absent without authorization (“AWOA”) despite
his approved FMLA request, a misclassification that resulted in termination of his employment
based on Article 14 of the CBA, which deems an employee to have resigned from his position if
he or she is AWOA for a certain number of consecutive workdays; (2) on March 12, 2025, he
asserted that DOCCS ordering him to return to duty during a time period covered by his medical
provider’s declaration that he was unable to work “violated Article 14 of the Agreement, New
York Civil Service Law and/or the Family Medical Leave Act”; and (3) also on March 12, 2025,
he asserted that DOCCS violated his right to due process pursuant to Article 8 of the CBA by
terminating his employment without an arbitration hearing or a finding of just cause, especially
considering he has documentation of approved FMLA leave that provides a satisfactory
explanation for his absences and that undermines the basis for terminating his employment.
(Dkt. No. 32, Attachs. 5, 6, 7.)
Although the underlying action that led to the filing of these grievances was the
termination of his employment, all of them appear to be governed by the procedure outlined in
Article 7 of the CBA rather than Article 8. Indeed, all of these grievances assert a disagreement
regarding Defendant’s application of Article 14 and Article 8 of the CBA, namely his dispute
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with being classified as AWOA rather than as being on approved FMLA/worker’s compensation
leave at the relevant time and his dispute that Defendant did not comply with the due process
requirement of Article 8 before terminating his employment. Because these grievances all
appear to be disputes related to the “application and/or interpretation” of the CBA, the relevant
dispute resolution process includes all of the enumerated steps, including arbitration, as there is
no indication that either Article 14 or Article 8 are excluded. As a result, there is an agreement
to arbitrate present in the CBA.
Having made this determination, the next question is whether Plaintiff’s FMLA claim
asserted in this action falls within the scope of that agreement. The Second Circuit has indicated
that, in circumstances where there is an arbitration clause covering a broad range of disputes, “‘if
the allegations underlying the claims touch matters covered by the parties’ contracts, then those
claims must be arbitrated, whatever the legal labels attached to them.’” JLM Indus., Inc., 387
F.3d at 172 (quoting Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 77 [2d Cir. 1998],
abrogated on other grounds). Here, a key basis of Plaintiff’s argument in his grievances is that
he was improperly considered to be AWOA because he in fact was using his approved FMLA
leave. The allegations in the Complaint overlap with the factual assertions made in the
grievances that will be subject to arbitration in that both rely upon the existence of approved
FMLA leave validly used on the relevant dates. As such, whether Plaintiff had been approved
for FMLA leave and validly applied it to the relevant dates when he was absent from work (both
of which questions are relevant to whether he had a “satisfactory explanation for such absence”
as required by Article 14.10 of the CBA) will almost certainly be issues presented during the
arbitration of his grievances, even if those proceedings would not be arbitrating the full scope of
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his FMLA claim specifically. As a result, at least some aspects of Plaintiff’s FMLA claim are
arbitrable as related to his filed grievances.1
1 	Plaintiff’s reliance on Slaughter v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d
319, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) is not persuasive. That case notably did not arise in the context of a
party seeking a stay pending arbitration, but rather where the arbitration had already occurred
and the defendant sought to use the arbitrator’s decision to warrant the application of collateral
estoppel to the plaintiff’s FMLA claim. Slaughter, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31. However, the fact
that an arbitration decision is not preclusive of a federal claim because it involved findings on
contractual issues rather than a decision specifically on the FMLA claim says nothing about
whether the issues underlying an FMLA claim might be arbitrable so as to warrant a stay
pending arbitration.
Further, Plaintiff’s argument that the agreement must specifically name the FMLA to
place his claim here within the scope of the arbitration agreement for the purposes of
determining whether a claim is arbitrable misrepresents the authority he cites. 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) involved a question of whether union members could be
compelled to arbitrate discrimination claims brought pursuant to various federal and state statutes
based on language in the collective bargaining agreement, which, in part, notably stated that [a]ll
such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure … as the sole and
exclusive remedy for violations.” 556 U.S. at 251-52 (emphasis added); see also Fernandez v.
Windmill Distrib. Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d 351, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that the terms of the
antidiscrimination provision in the collective bargaining agreement stated that “[a]ny claim by an
employee of any such discrimination will be submitted to arbitration under Article 12 as the
exclusive forum for resolving such a claim”) (emphasis added). In other words, in these cases,
the collective bargaining agreement acted as a waiver of the union members’ right to file an
action related to any such claims in federal court. That is not the case presented here. There is
nothing in the CBA that suggests that Plaintiff has waived his right to file an FMLA claim in
federal court merely because there is a grievance procedure in place to resolve disputes about the
application or interpretation of the CBA. The question here is not whether Plaintiff should be
compelled to arbitrate his FMLA claim, but rather whether that claim is sufficiently within the
scope of the pending arbitration to warrant a stay of these proceedings until that arbitration has
been completed; that a claim is not required to be arbitrated does not inherently mean that it is
removed from the scope of arbitrability for the purposes here where, again, resolution of the
issues Plaintiff himself has submitted to the process through his grievances would touch upon
issues bearing upon his FMLA claim. Because finding a matter is arbitrable and granting a stay
does not constitute a finding that Plaintiff waived his right to bring his FMLA claim in this
Court, the cases he relies upon are inapplicable. Cf. Anderson v. Phoenix Beverages, Inc., 12-
CV-1055, 2017 WL 9481014, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (supporting the proposition that,
absent express waiver, a party may bring a claim in federal court); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary, (12th Ed. 2024) (defining the word “arbitrable” as “[s]ubject to or suitable for
arbitration”) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, to the extent the parties do not agree whether any aspect of the FMLA claim is
arbitrable for the purposes of this motion for a stay, Article 7 explicitly states that “[i]n the event
a disagreement exists regarding arbitrability of an issue, the arbitrator shall make a preliminary
determination whether the issue is arbitrable under the express terms of this Agreement.” (Dkt.
No. 32, Attach. 4, at 15.) 	Thus, the CBA expresses that the parties have agreed that the very
question of whether the issues here are arbitrable is a matter for arbitration. See Vargas v. Bay
Terrace Plaza LLC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 190, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that “courts are generally
tasked with deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, unless ‘the parties agreed to submit the
question of arbitrability itself to arbitration’”) (quoting All. Bernstein Inv. Rsch and Mgmt, Inc v.
Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 125 [2d Cir. 2006]). Lastly, as was noted above, it is a general
principle that doubts regarding the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitrability. LeDeatte, 571 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (quoting JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 171).
For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that core issues related to Plaintiff’s FMLA
claim here appear to be arbitrable. Having made that finding, Article 3 of the FAA requires that
this action be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration related to Plaintiff’s pending
grievances. To the extent that perhaps only some issues related to Plaintiff’s FMLA claim rather
than the entire claim are arbitrable, the Court nevertheless would exercise its discretion to stay
this action in light of the fact that development of certain important aspects related to Plaintiff’s
FMLA claim in arbitration could inform the record in this action and a stay would prevent the
expenditure of unnecessary resources or duplicative discovery. See Duke v. Luottica U.S.
Holdings Corp., 167 F.4th 16, 32 (2d Cir. 2026) (indicating that a court has the discretion to stay
even matters not subject to arbitration pursuant to its discretionary power to control its docket).
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ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to stay pending arbitration (Dkt. No. 32) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that this action is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration
proceedings related to Plaintiff’s grievances under the CBA. Once those proceedings have
resolved, the parties should notify the Court of that fact, upon which notice the Court will lift the
stay and reset the deadlines applicable to this action.
Dated: October 8, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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