Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. United States of America et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	8:24-cv-01479 (AMN/PJE)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ROBERT F.
KENNEDY, JR., in his official capacity as
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; and BENJAMIN SMITH, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, Indian Health Service,
Defendants.
_________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
HOBBS, STRAUS, DEAN & WALKER, LLP 	JENNIFER P. HUGHES, ESQ.
7 Woodlawn Place
Clinton, New York 13323
215 SW Washington Street – Suite 200 	GEOFFREY D. STROMMER, ESQ.
Portland, Oregon 97204 	CALEB J. NORRIS, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiff 	STEPHEN D. OSBORNE, ESQ.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE 	EMER M. STACK, ESQ.
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 	Assistant United States Attorney
100 South Clinton St. – Suite 9000
Syracuse, New York 13261
Attorneys for Defendants
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On December 5, 2024, the Saint Regis Mohawk 	Tribe (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action
against the United States, the Secretary of Health 	and Human Services (“HHS”) in his official
capacity, and the Director 	of 	the 	Indian Health 	Service (“IHS”) 	in her official capacity
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(“Defendants”).1 	Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff seeks declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive
relief compelling Defendants to execute Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to a funding agreement
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which would allow Plaintiff to
assume from IHS the responsibility for operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities. 	See id.
Presently before the Court are 	Plaintiff’s motion, Dkt. No. 25, and Defendants’ cross-motion, Dkt.
No. 29, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	See also 	Dkt. Nos.
24, 26, 30, 31, 32. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on February 26, 2026. For the
following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and denies Defendants’ motion.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Relevant Statutes
1. 	Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
(“ISDEAA”). 	Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 	(1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-99). The ISDEAA aims to promote Indian self-determination and assist the development
of strong and stable tribal governments by giving tribes more control over federal programs and
services benefiting Indians. 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 5302(b).
To that end, Title V of the ISDEAA requires the Secretary of HHS to establish and
administer the “Tribal Self-Governance Program” within and through IHS, which is an agency
within HHS. 25 U.S.C. § 5382. Under this program, participating tribes negotiate and enter into
written compacts with the United States via the Secretary to assume direct responsibility for
administering programs, functions, services, and 	activities (“PFSAs” or “programs”) that the
1 	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Secretary of HHS, Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr., and the current Acting Director of IHS, Benjamin Smith, have been substituted for
their predecessors Xavier Becerra and Rosalyn Tso, respectively.
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Secretary would otherwise administer to American Indians and Alaska Natives under federal law.
See 	25 U.S.C. §§ 5321(a)(1), 5384, 5385. 	As part of these compacts, tribes also negotiate and
enter into funding agreements with the Secretary. 25 U.S.C. § 5385(a). These funding agreements
may include:
all programs, services, functions, activities (or portions thereof), including grants
(which may be added to a funding agreement after an award of such grants), with
respect to which Indian tribes or Indians are primary or significant beneficiaries,
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services through the Indian
Health Service and all local, field, service unit, area, regional, and central
headquarters or national office functions so administered 	under the authority of—
(A) section 13 of this title [the Snyder Act];
(B) the Act of April 16, 1934 (48 Stat. 596; chapter 147; 25 U.S.C. 452 et
seq.) [now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1632];
(C) the Act of August 5, 1954 (68 Stat. 674; chapter 658) [the Transfer Act];
(D) the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (25 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.);
(E) the Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
of 1986 (25 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.);
(F) any other Act of Congress authorizing any agency of the Department of
Health and Human Services to administer, carry out, or provide financial
assistance to such a program, service, function or activity (or portions
thereof) described in this section that is carried out for the benefit of Indians
because of their status as Indians; or
(G) any other Act of Congress authorizing such a program, service,
function, or activity (or portions thereof) carried out for the benefit of
Indians under which appropriations are made available to any agency other
than an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, in
any case in which the Secretary administers that program, service, function,
or activity (or portion thereof).
25 U.S.C. § 5385(b)(2).
Should compact or funding agreement negotiations result in a stalemate between the
parties, under Title V the tribe may submit a final offer to the Secretary. 25 U.S.C. § 5387(b). The
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Secretary then has 45 days (or longer by agreement with the tribe) to review and either accept or
reject the offer in whole or in part. 	Id. 	But the Secretary may only reject the final offer in
conjunction with:
a timely written notification to the Indian tribe that contains a specific finding that
clearly demonstrates, or that is supported by a controlling legal authority, that—
(i) the amount of funds proposed in the final offer exceeds the applicable
funding level to which the Indian tribe is entitled under this subchapter;
(ii) the program, function, service, or activity (or portion thereof) that is the
subject of the final offer is an inherent Federal function that cannot legally
be delegated to an Indian tribe;
(iii) the Indian tribe cannot carry out the program, function, service, or
activity (or portion thereof) in a manner that would not result in significant
danger or risk to the public health; or
(iv) the Indian tribe is not eligible to participate in self-governance under
section 5383 of this title[.]
25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). 	The Secretary must also provide the tribe with technical
assistance to overcome IHS’s stated objections, the 	option to enter into the severable portions of
the proposed compact or funding agreement that the Secretary did not reject, as well as a hearing
on the record with the right to discovery and an opportunity for appeal. 25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(B)-
(D). In lieu of an administrative appeal, the tribe may instead file an action in federal district court
pursuant to Section 5331 of the same title, pursuant to which this Court has original jurisdiction.
25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(C).
2. 	Sanitation Facilities Statutes
Also relevant to this matter are statutes 	that specifically address IHS’s provision of
sanitation facilities and services to tribes.
First, as background, in 1921, Congress passed the Snyder Act, which was the first statutory
authorization for Indian health care programs. Pub. L. No. 67-85, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified at
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25 U.S.C. § 13). In 1954, through the Transfer Act, Congress transferred responsibility for Indian
health care programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service within HHS. Pub. L. No. 83-568, § 1, 68 Stat. 674 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2001).
One year later, HHS established IHS. Dkt. No. 25-1 at 11 n.3.2
In 1959, Congress passed the Sanitation Facilities Construction Act (“SFCA”), which
amended the Transfer Act to include provisions specific to sanitation facilities. 	In relevant part,
the SFCA provides that the Surgeon General, and thus IHS, is authorized
(1) to construct, improve, extend, or otherwise provide and maintain, by contract or
otherwise, essential sanitation facilities, including domestic and community water
supplies and facilities, drainage facilities, and sewage- and waste-disposal facilities,
together 	with 	necessary 	appurtenances 	and 	fixtures, 	for 	Indian 	homes,
communities, and lands;
. . .
(3) to make such arrangements and agreements with appropriate public authorities
and nonprofit organizations or agencies and with the Indians to be served by such
sanitation facilities (and any other person so served) regarding contributions toward
the 	construction, 	improvement, 	extension 	and 	provision 	thereof, 	and
responsibilities for maintenance thereof, as in his judgment are equitable and will
best assure the future maintenance of facilities in an effective and operating
condition; and
(4) to transfer any facilities provided under this section, together with appurtenant
interests in land, with or without a money consideration, and under such terms and
conditions as in his judgment are appropriate, having regard to the contributions
made and the maintenance responsibilities undertaken, and the special health needs
of the Indians concerned, to any State or Territory or subdivision or public authority
thereof, or to any Indian tribe, group, band, or community or, in the case of domestic
appurtenances and fixtures, to any one or more of the occupants of the Indian home
served thereby.
42 U.C.S. § 2004a(a)(1), (3)-(4).
2 	Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system.
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In 1976, Congress further clarified the authority granted by the SFCA in the Indian Health
Care Improvement Act (“IHCIA”). Pub. L. No. 	94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-85). 	Section 1632(b)(2) of the IHCIA states, in relevant part, that when IHS provides
sanitation facilities and services under the SFCA, it is authorized to provide
(A) financial and technical assistance to Indian tribes and communities in the
establishment, training, and equipping of utility organizations to operate and
maintain Indian sanitation facilities;
(B) ongoing technical assistance and training in the management of utility
organizations which operate and maintain sanitation facilities; and
(C) operation and maintenance assistance for, and emergency repairs to, tribal
sanitation facilities when necessary to avoid a health hazard or to protect the Federal
investment in sanitation facilities.
25 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(2)(A)-(C). Additionally, Section 1638e of the IHCIA authorizes the Secretary
to “accept” and “use funds, equipment, and supplies to plan, design,, [sic] construct, and operate
health care or sanitation facilities for Indians, including pursuant to a contract or compact” under
the ISDEAA. 25 U.S.C. § 1638e(a)(2)(A)-(B).
B. 	Factual Background
The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe located on the Saint
Regis Mohawk Reservation in Franklin and St. Lawrence Counties in New York. Dkt. No. 31 at
¶ 1. In 2010, Plaintiff entered into a compact (“Compact”) under Title V of the ISDEAA with IHS
to assume certain PFSAs, and in 2021, entered into a multi-year funding agreement for the
Compact effective for calendar years 2021-2024 (“Funding Agreement”). 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 2-3.
On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a proposed amendment to the Funding
Agreement (“Proposed Amendment”) to IHS, 	which included, among other things, a new
sanitation facilities program (the “Sanitation Facilities Program”). Dkt. No. 29-3 at ¶ 3; 	see also
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Dkt. No. 26 at 111-12.3 	Under the proposed Sanitation Facilities Program, Plaintiff would, among
other things, plan, design, and construct new sanitation facilities, 	and also “operate and maintain
the sanitation facilities to effectively treat sewage, manage wastewater, dispose of solid waste, and
provide clean water.” Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 26; 	see also 	Dkt. No. 26 at 111-12.
IHS responded with comments and counter-edits on February 16, 2024, including a
proposal to strike the language related to the Sanitation Facilities Program because, in its view,
“the plain language of the IHCIA does not create a water/sewer operation and maintenance PFSA
that may be included in an ISDEAA contract.” 	Dkt. No. 31 at ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff responded on
February 21, 2024, disagreeing with IHS’s interpretation and stating that it could “assume
responsibility for the operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities” pursuant to the ISDEAA
and the IHCIA. 	Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 30. 	After further negotiation, Plaintiff and IHS reached an
agreement on certain proposals, but not on “the 	proposals to add operation and maintenance of
sanitation facilities as a PFSA, or the individual sanitation facilities as facilities or locations where
PFSAs are provided.” Dkt. No. 31 at ¶¶ 33, 35 (quoting Dkt. No. 26 at 122). In an email dated
May 9, 2024, IHS reiterated its position that IHS “is not authorized” to perform PFSAs constituting
the operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities. Dkt. No. 29-3 at ¶ 7.
On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a final 	offer (“Final Offer”) to IHS regarding its
Proposed Amendment, which continued to include the Sanitation Facilities Program. Dkt. No. 29-
3 at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 40. During its review of the Final Offer, IHS continued to communicate
3 	Specifically, 	Plaintiff 	proposed 	incorporating 	“Sewage 	Treatment” 	and 	“Wastewater
Management” into its current environmental health program, Section 4(b)(8), and a new section
creating a sanitation facilities program, Section 4(b)(20). Dkt. No. 26 at 26-27. With this proposed
language, Plaintiff intended to create one program for the operation and maintenance of sanitation
facilities. 	See 	Dkt. No. 26 at 136 (“The Tribe . . . shared . . . that the proposed edits to the
Environmental Health [PFSA] is tied to the request to add operation and maintenance of sanitation
facilities as a [PFSA] and should 	be interpreted as such.”).
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with Plaintiff, offering technical assistance and sharing relevant information to avoid rejection
pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 137.144. Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 41. Plaintiff extended the deadline to respond
from August 1 to August 8, 2024, but did not withdraw the Final Offer. Dkt. No. 31 at ¶¶ 45, 47;
Dkt. No. 26 at 145.
On August 8, 2024, IHS partially rejected Plaintiff’s Final Offer. Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 48.4 	As
relevant here, IHS rejected the proposed Sanitation Facilities Program and maintained its position
that IHS is not authorized to perform routine operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities and
thus the Sanitation Facilities Program could not be included in the Funding Agreement. 	See 	Dkt.
No. 31 at ¶ 50. In the alternative, IHS also partially rejected the Final Offer under certain of the
criteria provided in Section 5387(c)—“namely, that the amount of 	funds proposed in the final offer
exceeded the applicable funding level to which the Tribe was entitled under Title V, and that the
PFSA that is the subject of the final offer is an inherent Federal function that cannot legally be
delegated to an Indian tribe.” Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 51 (citing Dkt. No. 26 at 16-18).
Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 5387(c)(1)(C), 5331(a), and 5391(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
Plaintiff now asks the Court to (1) declare that IHS is authorized to administer programs for the
operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities, thereby subjecting such programs to inclusion
in a funding agreement for a Title 	V compact; (2) reverse Defendants’ rejection of Plaintiff’s Final
Offer; and (3) compel Defendants to approve the Final Offer and execute and enter into the full
Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement. 	See 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 65; Dkt. No. 25-1 at 10;
Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 53.
4 	IHS accepted and made effective the portions of the Proposed Amendment not involving the
Sanitation Facilities Program—Sections 4(b)(3), 4(b)(4), and 4(d)(11)-(12)—as of the date of the
partial rejection letter. Dkt. No. 26 at 1.
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III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted only if, upon reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 	see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 	Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1993).
As to questions of law under the ISDEAA, the court applies a 	de novo 	standard of review.
See, e.g., 	Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe v. Azar, 486 F. Supp. 3d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2020); 	Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Azar, 	376 F. Supp. 3d 100, 108 (D.D.C. 2019); 	Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, 170 F.
Supp. 3d 243, 247 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Maniilaq II”).5 	When conducting such review, the Court
employs the Indian law canon of statutory construction codified in Title V of the ISDEAA: “Each
provision of this title and each provision of a compact or funding agreement shall be liberally
construed for the benefit of the Indian tribe participating in self-governance and any ambiguity
shall be resolved in favor of the 	Indian tribe.” 	25 U.S.C. § 5392(f); 	see also 	25 C.F.R.
§ 900.3(b)(11); 	Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93-94 (2001) 	(“‘statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions 	interpreted to their benefit’”)
(quoting 	Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). In some circumstances
where 	there 	is 	countervailing 	evidence 	of 	congressional 	intent, 	this 	canon 	“need 	not 	be
conclusive,” 	see Jamestown S’Klallam, 486 F. Supp. 3d at 88 (quoting 	Chickasaw Nation, 534
U.S. at 94), but at least one circuit court has found that where the canon has been incorporated into
5 	While there is some question as to whether courts should review an IHS rejection under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), district 	courts have held that the ISDEAA requires 	de novo
review. 	See, e.g., 	Fort McDermitt Paiute & Shoshone Tribe v. Price, No. 17-cv-837, 2018 WL
4637009, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (“Fort McDermitt I”). 	Here, Plaintiff does not bring an
APA claim and neither party disputes that 	de novo 	review applies. 	See 	Dkt. No. 25-1 at 21; Dkt.
No. 29-1 at 24.
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the binding language of a compact, the court 	“merely must conclude 	that the language is
ambiguous to read it as the Tribe does.” 	San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Becerra, 53 F.4th 1236, 1240-
41 (9th Cir. 2022).
Additionally, the ISDEAA provides that the agency must “interpret all Federal laws,
Executive orders, and regulations in a manner that will facilitate--(1) the inclusion of programs,
services, functions, and activities (or portions thereof) and funds associated therewith, in the
agreements entered into under this section; (2) the implementation of compacts and funding
agreements entered into under this subchapter; and (3) the achievement of tribal health goals and
objectives.” 25 U.S.C. § 5392(a). Thus, “Congress intended the ISDEAA to be implemented in a
manner favoring flexibility in 	funding agreements.” 	Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, 72 F. Supp. 3d
227, 233 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Maniilaq I”). 	As such, with respect to 	a final offer pursuant to the
ISDEAA, the agency bears “the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence the
validity of the grounds for rejecting 	the offer[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 5387(d).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Statutory Authorization to Operate and Maintain Sanitation Facilities
The primary question before the Court is whether either of the relevant statutes to which
Title V of the ISDEAA refers, namely the SCFA and the IHCIA, grants IHS the authority to operate
and maintain sanitation facilities. If IHS has such authority, a tribe may properly include a program
to operate and maintain sanitation facilities in a Title V compact and funding agreement. 	If the
plain language of the relevant statutes clearly grants or denies IHS the authority to operate and
maintain sanitation facilities, the Court’s inquiry ends there. 	See 	Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v.
United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 467, 476 (2006); 	see also 	Susanville Indian Rancheria v. Leavitt, No.
07-259, 2008 WL 58951, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2008) (“Our first step in interpreting a statute is
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to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous
and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting 	Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997)). If, however, the statutes support more than one plausible reading, the
Court’s inquiry continues.
Plaintiff principally argues that IHS has the authority to operate and maintain sanitation
facilities pursuant to the plain language of both the SFCA and IHCIA. 	See 	Dkt. No. 25-1 at 23-26.
As to the SFCA, Plaintiff notes that the relevant text of the statute authorizes the Secretary, through
IHS, to “construct, improve, extend, or otherwise provide and maintain, by contract or otherwise,
essential sanitation facilities.” 	Id. 	at 24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(1)). 	Plaintiff argues that
this language provides IHS with the option to contract out the provision and maintenance of such
facilities or to retain the responsibility for doing so. 	Id. 	As to the IHCIA, Plaintiff points to
language in Section 1632(b)(2), which authorizes the Secretary to provide “operation and
maintenance assistance for, and emergency repairs to, tribal sanitation facilities when necessary to
avoid a health hazard or to protect the Federal investment in sanitation facilities,” 	id. at 24-25
(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(2)(C)), as well as language in Section 1638e, which expressly
authorizes the Secretary to use funds, equipment, and supplies available to IHS to operate
sanitation facilities, 	id. at 25 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1638e(a)(2)(B) (“The Secretary may accept from
any source . . . funds, equipment, or supplies that are available for the construction or operation of
health care or sanitation facilities; and use those funds, equipment, and supplies to plan, design,,
[sic] construct, and operate health care or sanitation facilities for Indians, including pursuant to a
contract or compact under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act[.]”)).
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Plaintiff also argues that the IHCIA generally grants the Secretary broad authority and
discretion to “provide health promotion and disease prevention services” to achieve the statute’s
Indian “health status objectives.” Dkt. No. 25-1 at 25 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1621b). According to
Plaintiff, such services reasonably include “the 	routine operation and maintenance of sanitation
facilities, which would further the agency’s goals 	of making safe water and sanitation facilities
available to Indian communities.” 	Id.; 	see also 	25 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (declaration of national Indian
health policy); 25 U.S.C. § 1603(11)(D), (G)(vii), (xx), (xxv) (definitions of 	“health promotion”).
In response, Defendants argue that standard canons of construction require an opposite
reading of the relevant statutes: that IHS is not authorized to perform routine operation and
maintenance of sanitation facilities. 	See 	Dkt. No. 29-1 at 25-35. 	As to the SFCA, Defendants
argue that one can only understand the statute’s meaning regarding the maintenance of sanitation
facilities by reading subsections (1) and (3) of Section 2004a together. 	Id. at 27. As to subsection
(1), Defendants apply the 	noscitur a sociis 	canon of construction—“a 	word is known by the
company it keeps”—and argue that because the word “maintain” is part of the phrase “and
otherwise provide and maintain,” which refers to the preceding authority to “construct, improve,
extend,” then “maintain” must be 	understood in the context of that list. Dkt. No. 29-1 at 29. Thus,
Defendants contend that subsection (1) only authorizes IHS “to provide new or to maintain
sanitation facilities 	through 	construction, improvements, or extensions.” 	Id. 	(emphasis in
original); 	see also 	42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(1). As to subsection (3), Defendants contend that its plain
language, read together with subsection (1), creates an inference that 	“the Tribe to be served by a
constructed or improved sanitation facility will, in turn, assume responsibility for the maintenance
of it.” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 27; 	see also 	42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(3).
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As to the IHCIA, Defendants argue that the full text of Section 1632(b)(2) only provides
IHS authority in limited circumstances—namely, 	providing assistance to tribes in operating and
maintaining sanitation facilities “in emergency situations.” 	Dkt. No. 29-1 at 31-32. 	Moreover,
Defendants assert that Section 1638e only authorizes IHS to fund sanitation facilities, not operate
them. 	See id. 	at 11. Defendants further argue that the 	overall “statutory context” of the SFCA and
IHCIA, as well as related Congressional appropriations, further support a reading that limits IHS’s
authority to constructing sanitation facilities before transferring them to tribes for routine operation
and maintenance. Dkt. No. 29-1 at 7-9, 29-33.
Following 	de novo 	review, the Court holds that IHS has the authority to operate and
maintain sanitation facilities. The Court finds that the plain language of the SFCA and IHCIA is
determinative of the scope of IHS’s authority. 	See Tudor v. Whitehall Cent. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th
242, 246 (2d Cir. 2025) (“‘When interpreting a statutory 	provision, we start with the text.’”)
(quoting 	Salazar v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 118 F.4th 533, 546 (2d Cir. 2024)).
As an initial matter, this conclusion is supported by the fact that the SFCA and IHCIA grant
IHS 	permissive, rather than mandatory, authority to contract out the provision and maintenance of
sanitation facilities and transfer such facilities to tribes or other entities. For example, the SFCA
states that IHS “is authorized” to make arrangements and agreements with various parties—
including public authorities, nonprofits, as well as Indian tribes and individuals—regarding
maintenance responsibilities for sanitation facilities. 	42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(3). 	Similarly, the
SFCA states that IHS “is authorized” to transfer sanitation facilities to an appropriate party. 	42
U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(4). And relatedly, the IHCIA invokes the authority provided in the SFCA and
further provides that IHS “is authorized” to assist tribes with establishing, equipping, and training
utility organizations that operate and maintain sanitation facilities. 24 U.S.C. § 1632(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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In contrast, Defendants argue that the text of the SFCA “assigns 	IHS the task of making an
agreement with 	the Tribe 	to ensure 	the Tribe’s responsibility 	for the maintenance of the sanitation
facility going forward,” which suggests that IHS must make agreements to relieve itself of the
responsibility to operate and maintain sanitation facilities post-construction. Dkt. No. 29-1 at 27
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(3)). 	Similarly, Defendants argue that while the SFCA authorizes IHS
to transfer title of a completed sanitation facility to a tribe, it does not explicitly authorize IHS to
retain title after construction or improvements have been completed. 	Id. 	at 27-28 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2004a(a)(2), (4)). 	And as to the IHCIA, Defendants interpret it to 	mean that “Congress
authorized IHS to provide support services that will enable Indian 	tribes,” and only tribes, to
operate and maintain sanitation facilities. 	Id. 	at 32 (emphasis in original).
Defendants’ narrow reading of the SFCA and the IHCIA disregards the permissive nature
of the statutory language. The 	SFCA does not direct that IHS “shall” make such 	arrangements,
agreements, or transfers, and the IHCIA does not direct that IHS “shall” 	assist tribes in establishing
utility organizations. 	Cf. Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 310 (2020)
(“The first sign that the statute imposed an obligation is its 	mandatory language: ‘shall.’”). 	Thus,
while it may be good policy and common practice to arrange for Indian tribes and individuals to
assume operation and maintenance responsibilities for sanitation facilities after construction,
neither statute categorically mandates it. The absence of a mandate to contract or transfer indicates
that IHS may also determine to do neither of those things, in which case IHS retains responsibility
for the operation and maintenance of the sanitation facilities.6 	Thus, while the Court acknowledges
6 	The only other possibility is that, absent a contract or transfer, responsibility for operation and
maintenance of the sanitation facilities would be unassigned. Such an outcome would be absurd
and runs contrary to the declared 	policy of the IHCIA to “ensure the highest possible health status
for Indians.” 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 1602(1).
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the federal government’s historical 	preference to transfer facilities post-construction or contract
for essential services, it finds that the SFCA and the IHCIA authorize IHS to operate and maintain
sanitation facilities where it deems it appropriate to further the aims of the statute.
In addition, the Court finds that the remaining language in the relevant statutory provisions
affirmatively grants IHS the authority to operate and maintain sanitation facilities. As to Section
2004a(a)(1) of the SCFA, the Court finds that, consistent with Plaintiff’s 	interpretation, the phrase
“or otherwise provide and maintain” is part of 	a list of discrete, authorized actions and thus
authorizes IHS to maintain sanitation facilities. 	See 	Dkt. No. 25-1 at 24; 42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(1).
The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that it should apply 	noscitur a sociis 	to find
that the phrase “construct, improve, extend” cabins the meaning of “provide and maintain” through
the adverbial phrase “or otherwise.” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 28-29. 	Noscitur a sociis 	typically applies
where a list of terms contains an ambiguous word that “is capable of many meanings.” 	McDonnell
v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016); 	cf. Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 509 (2024)
(Barrett, J., dissenting) (noscitur a sociis 	is typically used to select among multiple accepted
meanings, not to modify terms via adverbial phrases). And, on a 	natural reading, “maintain” in
this context does not present such ambiguity in relation to sanitation facilities. 	See Maintain,
Black’s Law Dictionary 	(12th ed. 2024) (stating that, in the context of property, “maintain” means
either “to continue in possession of” or “to 	care for (property) for purposes of operational
productivity or appearance; engage 	in general repair and upkeep”).
Moreover, Section 2004a(a)(3) of the SCFA 	authorizes the Secretary “to make such
arrangements and agreements . . . regarding contributions toward the construction, improvement,
extension, and provision [of sanitation facilities], and responsibilities for maintenance thereof[.]”
25 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(3). 	Here, subsection (3) clearly groups “construction, improvement,
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extension, and provision” separately from “maintenance,” thereby indicating that “maintain” is to
be understood on its own. Bearing in mind Defendants’ own argument that “subsections (1) and
(3) of [Section] 2004a(a) must be read together, in their context[,]” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 27, the Court
finds that 	noscitur a sociis 	is inapplicable to “maintain”. 	Thus, the SFCA authorizes IHS to
maintain sanitation facilities based on its plain meaning.
Next, the IHCIA also provides IHS with affirmative authority to operate and maintain
sanitation facilities. Specifically, Section 1632(b)(2)(C) provides that IHS is authorized to operate
and maintain such facilities under a flexible set of circumstances. 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 	1632(b)(2)(C).
Contrary to Defendants’ claim that Congress intended to limit IHS assistance under this section to
situations 	in which “emergency repairs” 	are necessary, the plain language of the statute
distinguishes “emergency repairs” from “operation and maintenance assistance” by using the
conjunctive “and,” thereby articulating two distinct types of services that IHS is authorized to
provide: operation and maintenance assistance 	and 	emergency repairs. 	See 	id.; 	see also 	Dkt. 30 at
15; 	New York v. Dep’t of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 104 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating that conjunctive structure
of statute served to expand the 	statute’s requirements). 	Furthermore, the text of the statute
indicates that IHS may provide these services in 	two circumstances: “when necessary to avoid a
health hazard” or “to protect 	the Federal investment in sanitation facilities.” 	25 U.S.C.
§ 	1632(b)(2)(C). 	Thus, in either of these circumstances, IHS may provide operation and
maintenance assistance and/or emergency repairs.
This reading of the SFCA and the IHCIA is further supported by Section 1638e of the
IHCIA, which authorizes the Secretary to “use [accepted] funds, equipment, and supplies
to . . . operate . . . sanitation facilities for Indians, including pursuant to a contract or compact”
under the ISDEAA. 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 1638e(a)(2)(A)-(B). In expressly authorizing the Secretary
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of HHS to accept and use “funds, equipment, and supplies” from other sources to operate sanitation
facilities pursuant to a Title V compact, this provision indicates that IHS has the authority to
operate such facilities in the first place. 	Even if neither the SFCA nor the IHCIA affirmatively
authorize IHS to operate and maintain sanitation facilities, “it has long been 	held that whenever a
power is given by a statute, everything necessary to making it effectual or requisite to attaining the
end is implied.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 	Garner, Reading Law 192-93 (2012). Thus, to give
full effect to Section 1638e, it cannot be that IHS only acquires the authority to plan, design,
construct, and operate health care and sanitation facilities 	if 	it accepts funds from other federal or
state agencies. The section as written does not articulate a set of conditions for new powers, but
rather articulates HHS’s authority to accept funds, equipment, and supplies from other agencies,
then use them 	to execute powers it already possesses.
In this section, the IHCIA also specifically 	differentiates “operate” from “construct,”
situating both among lists of distinct applicable uses to which the Secretary may apply the relevant
“funds, equipment, and supplies.” 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 1638e(a)(2)(A) (authorizing the Secretary to
accept “funds, equipment, and supplies” available for the “construction 	or 	operation” of sanitation
facilities) (emphasis added); 25 U.S.C. § 1638e(a)(2)(B) (authorizing the Secretary to “use those
funds, equipment, and supplies to plan, design,, [sic] construct, 	and 	operate” sanitation facilities)
(emphasis added). 	Here, the meaning of “operate” is 	not even arguably cabined by any other
qualifying word or list of words. Thus, the Court need not look to any other context to discern its
scope.
Defendants assert that Section 1638e only “authorizes IHS to 	provide financial assistance
to Tribes for tribal operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities.” 	Dkt. 29-1 at 11. 	Such a
reading, however, is belied by the plain language of the statute. First, Section 1638e(2)(B) states
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that the agency may “use [accepted] funds, equipment, and supplies to . . . operate . . . sanitation
facilities.” Defendants’ interpretation reads the language authorizing the agency to use funds “to
operate” sanitation facilities out of the statute. 	It also glosses over the terms “equipment” and
“supplies” in the phrase “funds, equipment, and supplies.” It is the Court’s duty “to give effect, if
possible[,] to every clause and word of a statute[.]” 	United States v. Davis, 961 F.3d 181, 188 (2d
Cir. 2020) (quoting 	Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court “must therefore try to ‘avoid 	statutory interpretations that render provisions
superfluous[.]’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Salovaara, 326 F.3d 130, 139 (2d. Cir.
2003)). 	Ignoring “to operate,” as well as “equipment” and “supplies,” in favor of “funding”
inappropriately treats the former terms as surplusage and distorts the plain meaning of the statutory
provision.
Defendants also more generally, and somewhat flippantly, protest that a reading of the
relevant statutes that authorizes IHS to operate and maintain sanitation facilities would absurdly
result in the federal government acting as “an 	on-call plumber for clogged water and sewage lines
connected to a family home.” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 28; 	see also 	Dkt. No. 32 at 4 (arguing that such a
reading would “obligate the federal government to maintain Indian homeowners’ toilets and indoor
plumbing”). This argument is a red herring. 	It is true that “sanitation facilities” include a wide
swath of facilities and services, ranging from community-wide water supply and sewer treatment
plants to domestic appurtenances within individual homes. 	See 	42 U.S.C. § 2004a(a)(1); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1638e(d); 	see also 	H.R. Rep. No. 94-1026, at 102, 	reprinted in 	1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2740.
However, the statutes do not mandate that IHS serve as an “on-call plumber” to Indian residences
all across the nation. Simply put, given their permissive grant of authority to contract or transfer,
the statutes vest IHS with the discretion to determine when it will retain the responsibility of
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operating and maintaining any particular sanitation facilities. 	This discretion thus prevents the
absurd results that Defendants argue would arise.
Lastly, Defendants argue that 	the Court should consider Congress’s explicit authorization
for IHS to “provide ongoing maintenance of dumps under the Indian Lands Open Dump Cleanup
Act” (the “Dump Act”) as evidence that Congress knows how to authorize routine operation and
maintenance programs and chose not to do so for sanitation facilities. Dkt. No. 29-1 at 33-34; 	see
25 U.S.C. § 3904. 	The Court agrees that the Dump Act authorizes IHS to provide ongoing
maintenance for dumps, but finds that this undercuts Defendants’ argument because the text of the
Dump Act is quite similar to the text of the IHCIA. 	Compare 	25 U.S.C. § 3904(b)(1)-(2) (“[T]he
Director shall . . . provide financial and technical assistance to the Indian tribal government . . . to
carry out the activities necessary to (1) close such dumps; and (2) provide for postclosure
maintenance of such dumps.”) 	with 	25 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(2)(C) (“The Secretary, acting through the
Service, is authorized to provide under section 2004a of Title 42—operation and maintenance
assistance for . . . tribal sanitation facilities when necessary to avoid a health hazard or to protect
the Federal investment in sanitation facilities.”). 	Here, Defendants admit that the Dump Act
authorizes IHS 	itself 	to provide for postclosure maintenance. Dkt. No. 29-1 at 34. Thus, contrary
to Defendants’ argument, this 	interpretation lends support to the conclusion that the similar
language in the IHCIA should be interpreted to authorize IHS to operate and maintain sanitation
facilities.
In sum, because the Court finds that the plain language of the SFCA and IHCIA authorizes
IHS to operate and maintain sanitation facilities, Plaintiff properly sought to include the Sanitation
Facilities Program in their Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement.
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B. 	Ambiguity in the Statutes
Because the Court holds that the SFCA and the IHCIA are unambiguous regarding the
scope of IHS’s authority as to sanitation facilities, further analysis is unnecessary. But even if the
Court were to find that the statutes are ambiguous, it would still find in Plaintiff’s favor.
In addition to making arguments concerning the relevant statutory language, Defendants
argue that legislative history subsequent to the passage of the SFCA supports their interpretation
of the statutes. 	See 	Dkt. No. 29-1 at 29-31.7 	Namely, Defendants argue that because Congress has
appropriated SFCA funds through bills that provide only for the 	construction 	of Indian Health
Facilities, that is the extent of IHS’s authority. 	Id. 	The Court finds Defendants’ argument
unpersuasive.
Congressional appropriations that 	“emphasize[ ] that IHS’s role 	is to construct sanitation
facilities before turning them over to tribes for operation[,]” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 30, are not
authoritative as to the full meaning or scope of either the SFCA or IHCIA. 	See, e.g., 	Bormann v.
AT & T Comms., Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that recent congressional
appropriations bills were “not an authoritative interpretation” of federal statute’s meaning when it
was enacted). Thus, while Congress may not have allocated specific funding for IHS to operate
and maintain tribal sanitation facilities, that choice is not necessarily coterminous with any
statute’s grant of authority to IHS, and by itself does 	not prove or create a lack of such authority.
See Maine Cmty. Health Options, 	590 U.S. at 312 (stating that “Congress can create obligations”
for an agency “without contemporaneous funding sources”); 	see also Auburn Hous. Auth. v.
7 	A court only considers authoritative legislative history—assuming such history exists—“where
there is an open question as to the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute, or where a statute is
silent on an issue of fundamental importance to its correct application.” 	United States v. Gayle,
342 F.3d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases stating that Congress may amend
or repeal a statute via appropriations bill, but such an implication is disfavored absent clear
communication of its 	intent 	to do so). 	In 	fact, 	Defendants’ cited authority only 	offers
Congressional policy guidance rather than any interpretive guidance as to the meaning or scope of
the statutes: “IHS 	should 	continue its practice of turning these [sanitation] facilities over to the
tribes for operation and maintenance upon completion of construction.” 	See 	Dkt. No. 29-1 at 30
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-158, at 107 (1993) (emphasis added)). Therefore, the Court finds that
the legislative history cited by Defendants does not show that IHS lacks the authority to operate
and maintain sanitation facilities.
Moreover, as to any ambiguity in the text of the statutes, for the reasons articulated above,
Defendants’ arguments fail to account for obstacles in 	the text that weigh against their reading of
the statutes. Given that Plaintiff has put forth a reasonable reading of the text, and in keeping with
its obligation to construe ambiguous statutes integrated under the ISDEAA “liberally in favor” of
the tribe, 	see Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 93-94; 	see also 	25 U.S.C. § 5392(f), the Court finds that any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of finding that IHS is authorized to operate and maintain
sanitation facilities. 	See, e.g., 	Maniilaq II, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 254-55 (granting summary judgment
in favor of tribe where relevant statute and regulations governing the amount of compensation due
under 25 U.S.C. § 5324(l) (“Section 105(l)”) leases was ambiguous); 	see also 	Navajo Health
Found.—Sage Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Burwell, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1226, 1232 (D. N.M. 2015)
(granting summary judgment after applying Indian law canon of construction where statute was
ambiguous).
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C. 	Defendants’ Partial Rejection of Plaintiff’s Final Offer
The Court next considers whether IHS has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that it has properly rejected Plaintiff’s Final Offer pursuant to 	Section 5837(c). The ISDEAA sets
out four grounds on which IHS may reject a final offer, and IHS must invoke one or more of those
grounds when it rejects an offer. 25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). Here, Defendants argue that
IHS properly rejected Plaintiff’s Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement under the first
and second criteria set forth in the ISDEAA, namely that the Proposed Amendment (i) “exceeds
the applicable funding level to which the Indian tribe is entitled,” and (ii) implicates “an inherent
Federal function that cannot legally be delegated to an Indian tribe.” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 35-36 (citing
25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(A)(i-ii)).
As to the first criterion, Defendants argue that 	by using the words “construction project” in
its Proposed Amendment, Plaintiff proposes to add its previously allocated funds for construction
“project” activities to the Funding Agreement, which is limited to funding for construction
“programs.” Dkt. No. 29-1 at 36. 	Defendants also argue that the functional benefits of adding a
PFSA to a funding agreement, “such as the ability to redesign programs, access to Federal Tort
Claims Act coverage, entering into ISDEAA Section 105(l) leases, and others[,]” count toward
calculating whether a funding agreement exceeds the applicable funding level to which the Tribe
is entitled. 	Id.; 	see also id. 	at 37 (explaining that Section 105(l) requires IHS to lease compact
program facilities upon request by a tribe). During oral argument, Defendants also cited Federal
employee health benefits as a relevant future benefit. Finally, Defendants argue that the Proposed
Amendment’s retroactive effective date of June 12, 2024 also “could entitle the Tribe to funding”
in excess of its entitlement. 	Id. 	at 38-39. 	In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the Proposed
Amendment does not request any additional funding for the Sanitation Facilities Program, and that
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speculation as to future funding requests does not satisfy the rejection criteria. Dkt. No. 25-1 at
27-28; 	see also 	Dkt. No. 26 at 26-28.8
On the face of the Proposed Amendment, Plaintiff does not request federal funding for the
Sanitation Facilities Program, and Defendants appear to acknowledge as much in their rejection
letter. 	See 	Dkt. No. 26 at 17 (“The Tribe’s final offer suggests an expectation of additional
funding”); 	id. 	(“[e]ven if the Tribe does not currently explicitly seek specific amounts of additional
IHS funding via either Secretarial amount funds or contract support costs, it may seek to do so in
the future.”). Defendants also do not provide any evidence or legal authority indicating whether
or how Plaintiff’s proposed language regarding construction projects would result in an actual
“amount of funds” beyond the level to 	which Plaintiff is entitled. 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 5387(c)(1)(A)(i)
(stipulating that rejection of a final offer is proper when IHS presents a specific finding that the
“amount of funds proposed in the final offer” exceeds amount to which the tribe is entitled). While
it is true, as Defendants argue, that construction “projects” for sanitation facilities are currently
funded under a separate statutory agreement and Plaintiff has already received its full allocation
for construction “programs,” 	see 	Dkt. No. 26 at 95-97, 105-109, 	creating a new sanitation facilities
“program” through a Title V compact does not by itself constitute a request for additional funds.9
8 	During oral argument, Plaintiff asserted that it plans to use third party revenues from already-
existing PFSAs to fund the Sanitation Facilities Program. The inclusion of the Sanitation Facilities
Program in the Funding Agreement would facilitate the redesignation of funds from existing
programs to the Sanitation Facilities Program. Third party revenues are not considered as part of
the amount of funds requested in a funding agreement. 	Fort McDermitt Paiute & Shoshone Tribe
v. Becerra, 6 F.4th 6, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (explaining that the ISDEAA explicitly treats third party
revenues such as Medicare or Medicaid income 	as “supplemental funding to 	that negotiated in the
[Title V] funding agreement”) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5388(j)) (“Fort McDermitt II”).
9 	To the extent that Plaintiff imprecisely used 	the term “construction project” in the Proposed
Amendment, the Court understands that term to refer to construction within the Sanitation
Facilities Program, and thus the use of that term does not implicate funds acquired via any separate
construction project agreements. 	See 	Dkt. No. 26 at 26-27; 25 U.S.C. §§ 5304(a), (m), 5381(a)(1)-
(2) (differentiating between Title V construction programs and construction projects).
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Furthermore, in 	Fort McDermitt I, the court noted that while it was unusual for a tribe to
propose including a new program in their funding agreement that the government had previously
never run, never funded, and would not fund going forward, the IHS could not reject it on the
ground that the proposal exceeded the amount to which the tribe was entitled, given that the tribe
did not propose any funding for the program. 	2018 WL 4637009, at *4. The 	Fort McDermitt I
court specifically noted that “[p]otential tort liability—a risk of future expenditures that may or
may not come to pass—is not a particular ‘amount of funds.’” 	Id. 	Therefore, it found FTCA
liability irrelevant to the question of funding that is now before the Court. 	Id. 	The Court agrees.
Additionally, considering that Plaintiff has not requested a Section 105(l) lease as part of the
Funding Agreement, such leases are also “future expenditures that may or may not come to pass,”
and Defendants’ argument for rejection fails on that ground as well. 	See 	25 U.S.C. § 5324(l); 	cf.
Maniilaq I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 238-39 (holding that tribes may incorporate a Section 105(l) lease in
an ISDEAA funding agreement). Finally, the Court also finds that the ability to redesign programs
within a Title V compact and the provision of Federal employee health benefits are speculative
future expenditures that do not satisfy the rejection criteria.
As the holding in 	Fort McDermitt I 	suggests, the structure of the ISDEAA is such that a
tribe seeking to include a program under a Title V compact may, and in some cases must, do so
without requesting any accompanying funds. 	See 	2018 WL 4637009, at *4. 	Indeed, under an
ISDEAA compact, tribes are entitled to the funding amount IHS “would have 	otherwise provided
for the operation of the programs or portions thereof for the period covered by the contract.” 	Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Kennedy, No. 18-cv-02360, 2025 WL 2377968, at *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1)). Additionally, IHS must also provide for
“contract support costs,” which are “‘reasonable costs’ borne by the tribe that would not be
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incurred if the federal government 	directly operated the program,” 	see id. 	(citing 25 U.S.C.
§ 5325(a)(2)(A)), and costs associated with support activities provided by “resources other than
those under contract,” 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(2)(B). 	However, “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision in [the ISDEAA], the provision of funds [pursuant to the ISDEAA] . . . is subject to the
availability of appropriations[.]” 	25 U.S.C. § 5325(b). Therefore, where, as here, there have been
no appropriations for a program, the maximum amount a tribe could negotiate to fund that program
would be zero dollars. And where, as here, the tribe accordingly does not request any funding as
part of their final offer to include an unappropriated program in an ISDEAA funding agreement, it
cannot be said that the amount of funds proposed in the final offer exceeds the applicable funding
level to which the Tribe is entitled.
For these reasons, Defendants’ argument concerning the effect of the retroactive date also
fails. 	Because Plaintiff does not request any additional funding as part of the Proposed
Amendment, the date on which it goes into effect does not affect the amount of funds received by
Plaintiff and thus does not entitle the Tribe to funding in excess of its entitlement.
Finally, as to the second criterion, Defendants’ argument fails under the plain language of
the standard for rejection: that “the program, 	function, service, or activity (or portion thereof) 	that
is the subject of the final offer 	is an inherent Federal function that cannot legally be delegated to
an Indian tribe[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 	5387(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). In their rejection letter and in
their briefing, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff is seeking to assume the inherently federal
function of operation and maintenance of sanitation facilities—nor could they, as this argument
would be contrary to their primary argument that IHS is 	not 	authorized to operate or maintain
sanitation facilities. 	Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is seeking to “assume the federal
function of determining what programs fall under the statutory authority of the IHS.” 	Dkt. No.
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29-1 at 37-38; 	see also 	Dkt. No. 26 at 18 (partially rejecting the proposed funding agreement in
part because “the Tribe seeks to create a new 	program authorization for the IHS to administer,
which is an inherent Federal function that cannot 	be delegated”). That argument is improper under
the statute, which requires Defendants to provide evidence that the Sanitation Facilities Program
included in the Final Offer is an inherently federal function. 	See also 	25 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(4) (“The
term ‘inherent Federal functions’ means those Federal functions which cannot legally be delegated
to Indian tribes.”).
In sum, Defendants have failed to carry their burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that IHS properly rejected Plaintiff’s Final Offer.
* * *
For all of the above reasons, the Court grants 	Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and
denies Defendants’ cross-motion for the same.
D. 	Remedy
With the merits decided, the Court turns to determining an appropriate remedy. Under the
ISDEAA, 	this 	Court 	“may 	order 	appropriate 	relief 	including 	money 	damages, 	injunctive
relief . . . or mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States, or any agency
thereof, to perform a duty provided under this chapter or regulations promulgated hereunder[.]”
25 U.S.C. § 5331(a). Plaintiff asks the Court to compel IHS to accept the Final Offer and execute
the Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement, including an effective date of June 12, 2024.
Dkt. No. 25-1 at 29-30.10
10 	Because the ISDEAA specifically provides for injunctive and mandamus relief, Plaintiff need
not demonstrate that the equities weigh in its favor to gain the relief it seeks. 	Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Burwell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 534, 545 (D.D.C. 2014); 	see also Susanville, 2008 WL 58951, at
*10-11 (holding that plaintiff seeking equitable injunction under the ISDEAA need not satisfy the
traditional requirements of equitable relief).
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Considering the record and its conclusions above, the Court finds that injunctive relief
requiring IHS to accept Plaintiff’s Final Offer and amend the Funding Agreement accordingly is
the appropriate remedy. The Court has rejected, as a matter of law, 	Defendants’ justifications for
partially rejecting Plaintiff’s 	Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement. Also, because the
parties have already engaged in lengthy and unfruitful negotiations, 	see 	Dkt. No. 26 at 1-30, 111-
54, the Court finds that further negotiations would serve little purpose, especially because the
gravamen of the parties’ dispute concerns statutory authority, which the Court has decided, and not
a specific amount of funding. The Court therefore 	orders IHS to accept Plaintiff’s Final Offer.
As to the effective date, the ISDEAA provides that “[t]he effective date of a compact shall
be the date of the approval and execution by the Indian tribe or another date agreed upon by the
parties[.]” 	25 U.S.C. § 5384(d). 	Because the 	Proposed Amendment to the Funding Agreement
would have been effective in full on August 8, 2024 had IHS not partially rejected it, the Court
deems those portions of the Proposed Amendment that IHS rejected—namely Sections 4(b)(8),
4(b)(20)(a)-(e), and 4(d)(13)-(19)—effective as of August 8, 2024. 	See 	Dkt. No. 26 at 1, 16.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS 	that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 25, is 	GRANTED; and
the Court further
ORDERS 	that Defendants’ cross-motion for 	summary judgment, Dkt. No. 29, is 	DENIED;
and the Court further
ORDERS 	that 	Defendants 	accept 	Plaintiff’s 	Final 	Offer 	regarding 	its 	Proposed
Amendment to the Funding Agreement; and the Court further
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ORDERS 	that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in accordance with this order;
and the Court further
ORDERS 	that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 8:24-cv-01479-AMN-PJE Document 35 Filed 03/31/26 Page 28 of 28