Baker v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
CHELSEA B.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	8:24-cv-01038
(ML)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
SCHNEIDER & PALCSIK 	MARK A. SCHNEIDER, ESQ.
Counsel for the Plaintiff
57 Court Street
Plattsburgh, New York 12901
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	KATHRYN POLLACK, ESQ.
Counsel for the Defendant 	Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review
of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard
1 	This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under
that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally,
as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Case 8:24-cv-01038-ML Document 28 Filed 03/19/26 Page 1 of 18

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in connection with those motions on March 16, 2026, during a telephone conference conducted
on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision. This Court SO ORDERED
that Plaintiff’s Complaint at Dkt. No. 1 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This Court set forth
its reasoning and analysis on the record.
After due deliberation, and based upon the Court’s oral bench decision, which has been
transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is
ORDERED as follows:
1) 	Plaintiff’s Complaint at Dkt. No. 1 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
2) 	The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this
determination, DISMISSING Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice in its entirety and closing
this case.
Dated: March 19, 2026
Binghamton, New York
____________________________________
Miroslav Lovric
United States Magistrate Judge
Northern District of New York
Case 8:24-cv-01038-ML Document 28 Filed 03/19/26 Page 2 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------x
CHELSEA B.,
Plaintiff,
-v- 24-CV-1038
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION TRANSCRIPT
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC
March 16, 2026
15 Henry Street, Binghamton, NY 13901
For the Plaintiff:
SCHNEIDER & PALCSIK
57 Court Street
Plattsburgh, New York 12901
BY: MARK A. SCHNEIDER, ESQ.
For the Defendant:
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
BY: KATHRYN S. POLLACK, ESQ.
Hannah F. Cavanaugh, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
Official United States Court Reporter
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261-7367
(315) 234-8545
Case 8:24-cv-01038-ML Document 28 Filed 03/19/26 Page 3 of 18

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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
2
(The Court and all parties present by video. Time
noted: 2:45 p.m.)
THE COURT: The Court's going to commence its
analysis, reasoning, and decision as follows: First, the Court
notes that plaintiff commenced this proceeding pursuant to Title
42 U.S. Code 405(g) to challenge the adverse determination by
the Commissioner of Social Security finding that she was not
disabled at the relevant times and, therefore, ineligible for
the benefits that she sought.
Procedurally, the Court notes as follows: Plaintiff
applied for Title XVI benefits on January 28th of 2021, alleging
an onset date of January 1st of 2008.
Administrative Law Judge Asad M. Ba-Yunus conducted a
hearing on May 16, 2022, to address plaintiff's application for
benefits, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on
June 20th of 2022. That decision became the final determination
of the agency on May 9th of 2023, when the Appeals Council
denied plaintiff's request for review.
On May 18th of 2023, plaintiff filed a Complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
challenging the Commissioner's final decision, and that's found
at Docket No. 8:23-CV-600, and that was before Magistrate Judge
Stewart. On October 23rd of 2023, the parties stipulated that
the decision of the Appeals Council be vacated and remanded for
further administrative proceedings, which was so ordered by
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
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Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart.
On November 29th of 2023, the Appeals Council
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Judge Stewart's
order. Accordingly, ALJ Ba-Yunus conducted a new telephonic
hearing on May 23rd of 2024.
ALJ Ba-Yunus issued a new unfavorable decision on
August 14th of 2024.
This action was commenced on August 23rd of 2024,
nine days after ALJ Ba-Yunus' disability determination.
The Court first turns to the threshold issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Title 42, United
States Code, Section 405(g), an individual must obtain a "final
decision of the Commissioner" before a federal court can review
Social Security benefits determinations. The term "final
decision" is not defined in the Social Security Act, but has
been clarified by the Commissioner through a series of
regulations.
In a case like this, where a court has previously
remanded for further administrative proceedings, the ALJ's new
disability determination becomes "the final decision of the
Social Security Administration" unless the Appeals Council
assumes jurisdiction of the case in one of two ways: First --
in the first way, in response to written exceptions filed by the
applicant within 30 days of receipt of the ALJ's decision; or
two, the second way, by the Appeals Council proactively
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
4
exercising jurisdiction over the ALJ's decision within 60 days.
As the notice provided with ALJ Ba-Yunus' August 14,
2014, decision -- I should say August 14th of 2024, so I want to
correct that -- that's ALJ's decision of August 14, 2024, that
decision explained if the claimant does not file written
exceptions and the Appeals Council does not exercise its review
powers on its own, the ALJ's decision becomes final on the 61st
day following its issuance.
The Appeals Council does not provide notice that it
is declining jurisdiction. Rather, a claimant who elects not to
file written exceptions must simply wait for the 60 days to
allow the Appeals Council an opportunity to assert jurisdiction.
Once that waiting period has expired, the claimant has 60 days
to file a complaint in federal court.
Because plaintiff's counsel filed a complaint nine
days after ALJ Ba-Yunus' disability determination, this Court
issued a text order on February 9th of 2026, directing the
parties to brief the discrete issue of whether this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint.
The Court now turns to the parties' supplemental
briefs on subject matter jurisdiction and exhaustion. On
February 10, 2026, plaintiff's counsel filed a two-page letter
brief on the issue, raising the following points in that letter:
First, plaintiff articulated that plaintiff did not file any
exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and the Appeals Council did
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
5
not assert its jurisdiction before or after the Complaint was
filed. Plaintiff in that letter also contends that even after
the Complaint was filed, the Appeals Council could have
exercised its authority and "deprived this Court of
jurisdiction."
Next, plaintiff articulates in that letter that the
Commissioner did not file a motion to dismiss the Complaint as
premature.
Plaintiff also contends the matter has been fully
briefed and there's no prejudice to the Commissioner if this
Court decides it on the merits.
Plaintiff then contends equitable tolling should
apply, and plaintiff's letter brief simply mentions equitable
tolling, but does not explain how plaintiff satisfies the three
requirements.
Plaintiff also in that letter articulates the Social
Security Act must be liberally applied to be protective of
individuals like the plaintiff, and "the interest of justice and
judicial economy" support this Court exercising jurisdiction
over the Complaint.
Plaintiff also articulates specifically at page 2 --
and quoting directly from page 2 of plaintiff's letter brief,
"In a national Lexis search, plaintiff's undersigned attorney
find[s] no reported cases where the district court refused
jurisdiction because the plaintiff filed the complaint prior to
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
6
60 days after the ALJ's decision when there was no exception
pending at the Appeals Council." Plaintiff goes on to
articulate, "Even if there were such a decision, equitable
tolling should apply. This undersigned has several times" --
and I'm quoting now from the page 2 letter, "This undersigned
has several times in the past filed the complaint prior to the
60 days and this court has never denied jurisdiction."
Next, on February 17th of 2026, the Commissioner
filed a two-page letter brief on the issue, raising the
following points: Defendant articulated in that letter,
plaintiff's complaint was filed nine days after the ALJ's
decision, and within the 60-day period allowed for the Appeals
Council to assume jurisdiction. "As such, Plaintiff's complaint
was prematurely filed," defendant articulated.
Defendant went on to state, after plaintiff filed her
Complaint, the Appeals Council prepared the certified
administrative record.
The defendant continued in that letter, the
Commissioner directs the court's attention to the case of Gray
v. Astrue. That's found at 10-CV-3175. That is a 2012 WL
570064 case. That's District of South Carolina, issued
January 31, 2012, and the Commissioner cites that as persuasive
authority. Defendant articulates in Gray, the magistrate judge
resolved a prematurely filed case on the merits because the
60-day time period ultimately passed without the Commissioner
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
7
moving to dismiss or otherwise objecting.
And in connection with the letter filed by the
defendant and the articulating of the Gray case, this Court
notes that the Gray case provides minimal analysis, and the
facts are distinguishable. The Gray plaintiff filed a complaint
47 days after the ALJ's decision, and the Gray court treated
this as an oversight rather than a deliberate tactic. Here, in
our case, counsel for plaintiff appears to have made a practice
of prematurely and intentionally filing complaints in federal
court prior to administrative exhaustion. Counsel for Plaintiff
admits as much in his February 10, 2026, two-page letter brief.
The Court also notes that in cases in the Northern District of
New York at the following dockets, Docket No. 26-CV-209, Docket
No. 25-CV-117, Docket No. 24-CV-1352, Docket No. 23-CV-1233, and
lastly, at Docket No. 23-CV-654, counsel for plaintiff has
prematurely filed complaints before administrative exhaustion.
In the case of Docket No. 23-CV-654 that I mentioned a few
moments ago, counsel for plaintiff filed the complaint in
federal court on the same day that the ALJ issued their
decision.
In citing Gray, counsel for defendant seems to be
avoiding a concrete statement on waiver of the exhaustion
requirements and leaving it up to the Court. However, even if
the Commissioner made an explicit waiver of the exhaustion
requirements, there is authority for the Court to disregard it,
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
8
given the broader impact on judicial efficiency. The
Commissioner has discretion to waive the exhaustion
requirements, but cases may arise where "deference to the
agency's judgment is inappropriate." See, case Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 United States 319, at page 330. And that is a
U.S. Supreme Court case, 1976. This was the principle behind
equitable tolling. However, the same rationale would apply to
overruling a waiver in this case, given the broader policy
implications of approving a plaintiff ignoring the final
decision requirement. In addition, the Commissioner can provide
other administrative relief when the case is dismissed. See, in
Sech v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2024 WL 333067, at page
1. That's a Second Circuit January 25, 2024, case. Therein,
Magistrate Judge Baxter dismissed plaintiff's late complaint as
untimely. The Commissioner waited until the matter was appealed
to the Second Circuit before granting administrative permission
to file a late complaint, and the matter was remanded to the
district court.
In this case, plaintiff requested ten days to file a
reply brief if the Commissioner opposed her position and "has a
supporting precedential decision from the Second Circuit (or any
Circuit)." Although the Commissioner's brief -- and by brief,
the Court means the letter brief, did not meet this criteria,
this Court granted plaintiff an opportunity to file a reply.
On February 23rd of 2026, plaintiff filed a
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
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supplemental brief to discuss a recent Second Circuit decision
relevant to the merits of this case, but plaintiff provided no
further argument or support regarding the exhaustion issue and
subject matter jurisdiction.
Lastly, on March 10, 2026, at Docket No. 26, the
Commissioner filed a letter brief responding to plaintiff's
arguments on the merits.
And then lastly, as noted earlier, the -- on
March 16, 2026, at Docket No. 27, plaintiff filed correspondence
advising this Court of a favorable disability determination
issued on January 26th of 2026, commencing from the date of
plaintiff's more recent SSI application of September 19th of
2024.
The Court will begin its analysis as follows: The
parties both recognize that plaintiff's complaint was filed
prematurely.
Based on the parties' briefs and this Court's
research, the narrow issue presented in this case appears to be
one of first impression in the Northern District of New York and
in the Second Circuit. And the issue is -- that is, whether the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over a prematurely filed
complaint challenging an ALJ's disability determination issued
in response to an earlier judicial remand, where plaintiff never
filed written exceptions and the Appeals Council did not
otherwise attempt to assert jurisdiction.
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
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However, the general principles applicable to
sovereign immunity, subject matter jurisdiction, exhaustion,
waiver of administrative remedies, and equitable tolling are
well-established in Social Security Disability cases. Thus,
this Court draws upon the relevant United States Supreme Court
precedent in Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, a 2019 Supreme
Court case, also, case of Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, a 2000
U.S. Supreme Court case, Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, a 1984
Supreme Court case, also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, a
1977 Supreme Court case, and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
a 1976 U.S. Supreme Court case, and then, additionally, relevant
Second Circuit precedent in case of Iwachiw v. Massanari, that's
125 F. App'x 330, a Second Circuit 2005 case, and, also, lastly,
Abbey v. Sullivan, at 978 F.2d 37, a Second Circuit 1992 case.
Following that precedent leads this Court to conclude
that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint at Docket No. 1
without prejudice is both required and appropriate.
This Court notes that paragraph 14 of plaintiff's
complaint asserts that ALJ Ba-Yunus' August 14, 2024, disability
determination "is a final decision of the Commissioner for
purposes of review by this Court." This statement was
inaccurate at the time it was made. As the parties agree, there
was no final decision of the Commissioner when the Complaint was
filed on August 23rd of 2024.
To varying degrees, both parties' briefs suggest that
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
11
the eventual expiration of the 60-day period for the Appeals
Council to assert jurisdiction waives or cures the defect in the
prematurely filed Complaint. This Court rejects this legal
interpretation as unsupported by statute or case law. The
exhaustion requirement is a condition on the waiver of sovereign
immunity and must be strictly construed. Such "waivers of
sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally expressed' in
statutory text, and simply cannot the implied." The few court
to consider similar arguments have rejected them. See case of
Martin v. Astrue at 07-CV-928. That is a District Judge Gary L.
Sharpe case, along with Magistrate Judge Lowe. That's found at
2008 WL 314524, a Northern District of New York, February 4,
2008, case. And therein, filing -- therein, the case stands for
filing complaints seven days after an ALJ's decision "did not
give the Appeals Council an opportunity to sua sponte assume
jurisdiction of the case." See, also, case of Linsky v. Astrue,
at 09-3720 SI. That's found at 2010 WL 3184485, at page 2.
That's a Northern District of California, August 11, 2010, case
standing for the proposition and finding argument that "the
decision of the ALJ on remand is automatically the final
decision unless and until the Appeals Council accepts
jurisdiction" ignores the "plain text of the applicable
regulations." This Court finds this line of cases more
compelling than the limited analysis set forth in the Gray case.
Likewise, this Court rejects the suggestion that this
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
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case, which is fully briefed, has proceeded too far to be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. This argument ignores the
rule that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party
or the Court at any time. It also ignores previous decisions in
this court, which have resolved questions of subject matter
jurisdiction in Social Security Disability cases after the
Administrative Transcript has been filed. See case Louisiana S.
v. Commissioner of Social Security. That's found at 20-CV-130.
And that is a Chief Judge Sannes and Magistrate Judge Hummel
case. That's found at 2021 WL 91691, a Northern District of New
York, March 20, 2021, case standing for the proposition
requesting supplemental briefing on subject matter jurisdiction
after filing of Administrative Transcript and briefing on the
merits; see, also, case of Jaquish v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 16-CV-399. That is a Judge Suddaby decision, 2017 WL
3917019, a Northern District of New York, September 6, 2017,
case. And, therein, articulating that although neither party
briefed the issue, the court dismissed plaintiff's SSI appeal
for failure to exhaust before addressing the merits of
plaintiff's fully exhausted DIB appeal.
This Court also rejects plaintiff's assertion that
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because "there will
be no prejudice to the Commissioner" by overlooking the
premature filing and issuing a decision on the merits.
Exhaustion requirements serve the dual purpose of protecting
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
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administrative agency authority and promoting judicial
efficiency. Both the Commissioner and the courts would be
harmed by an approach that rendered the statutory and regulatory
exhaustion requirements a nullity and incentivized plaintiffs to
immediately file their complaint in order to step ahead of
litigants who complied with the exhaustion requirements in an
already overcrowded federal docket. That is especially true in
cases like this, where the relevant exhaustion requirement is
merely waiting for 60 days with the hope that the Appeals
Council will decline to act.
The statement from plaintiff's counsel that he has
ignored the final decision requirement in similar cases without
consequences reinforces this point. This Court's cursory review
finds that plaintiff's counsel has filed at least five such
complaints since 2023, including one complaint filed on the same
date as the ALJ's disability determination. Judicial approval
of such litigation tactics would only encourage the strategic
avoidance of exhaustion requirements.
Plaintiff raises the prospect of equitable tolling,
but no extraordinary circumstances exist that would justify such
relief. Applying the traditional three factor test, this Court
finds that: One, plaintiff's claim is not collateral to a
demand for benefits, it is the demand for benefits itself. Two,
there's no indication that exhaustion would have been futile.
Indeed, exhaustion merely required waiting for 60 days to see
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
14
whether the Appeals Council asserted its authority to review.
And three, there's no irreparable harm to plaintiff. Courts
have generally found irreparable harm -- courts have generally
not found -- excuse me, not found irreparable harm where
plaintiff may file a new application for SSI benefits. In
addition, because dismissal is without prejudice, plaintiff may
be able to obtain an extension of time from the Appeals Council
to file a new complaint even though the statute of limitations
has expired. See case of Sech v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 2024 WL 333067, at page 1. That's a Second Circuit,
January 25, 2024, case.
Finally, this Court rejects the characterization by
plaintiff's counsel that this decision involves the Court
"refusing" or "denying" jurisdiction. This Court is merely
applying the parameters for subject matter jurisdiction
established by Congress. While the Social Security Act should
be liberally applied, it is well-established that "strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration
of the law."
Therefore, based on all of this, and as a result,
based on these findings, it is so ordered that plaintiff's
Complaint, Docket No. 1, is dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
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CHELSEA B. v. SOCIAL SECURITY
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
(315) 234-8545
15
(Time noted: 3:11 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
I, HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR,
NYRCR, Official U.S. Court Reporter, in and for the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, DO
HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United
States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript
of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the
above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in
conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of
the United States.
Dated this 18th day of March, 2026.
s/ Hannah F. Cavanaugh______________________
HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR
Official U.S. Court Reporter
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