Heintz v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________
RICHARD H., II,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 6:24-CV-1146
(PJE)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
The Law Offices of 	STEVEN R. DOLSON, ESQ
Steven R. Dolson, PLLC
6320 Fly Road, Suite 201
East Syracuse, New York 13057
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Richard H., II2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
review 	of 	a 	decision 	by 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	the 	Social 	Security 	Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). See
1 Parties consented to direct review of this matter by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. L.R. 72.2(b), L.R. 72.3(b), and General Order 18. See Dkt. No. 3.
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
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Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff moved for the Commissioner’s decision to be reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. See Dkt. No. 11. 	The Commissioner moved for the decision to
be affirmed. 	See Dkt. No. 16.3 	For the following reasons, plaintiff’s cross-motion is
denied, the Commissioner’s cross-motion is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision is
affirmed.4
I. Background
On May 4, 2022, plaintiff filed a Title II application for DIB, alleging a disability onset
date of November 10, 2020. 	See T. at 212-165 (See Dkt. No. 8-5)6. 	On September 1,
2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claim. 	See id. at 95-
100 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). Plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the SSA denied on March
10, 2023. See id. at 112-20 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). 	Plaintiff appealed and requested a
hearing. See id. 121-22 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). On November 9, 2023, a hearing was held
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jeremy Eldred. See id. 35-55 (See Dkt. No. 8-
2). On December 14, 2023, the ALJ issued a partially-favorable decision. See id. 17-27
(See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	On 	July 	24, 	2024, 	the 	Appeals 	Council 	affirmed 	the 	ALJ’s
determination, and the decision became final. See id. 1-6 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Plaintiff
commenced this action on September 20, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once an
issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement
on the pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 	This case was reassigned on September 18, 2026. See Dkt. No. 17.
5 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 8. Citations to
the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refer to the pagination located at the header of the documents, generated by the Court’s
electronic filing program.
6 Due to the administrative transcript being docketed in many separate parts, in addition to the record
citation, the Court will include the specific docket cite for factual citations.
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A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
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finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
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If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first noted that
plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2020, the
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alleged onset date of disability.” T. at 19 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step two, the ALJ found
that
[s]ince the alleged onset date of disability, December 1, 2020, the claimant
has had the following “severe” impairments: degenerative changes of the
lumbar spine and obesity. 	The following additional impairments became
“severe” after August 19, 2021, the established onset date of disability:
tenosynovitis of the right ring finger and right long finger, left cubital tunnel
syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine, and stenosis of
the cervical spine.
Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step three, the ALJ determined, “[s]ince December 1, 2020, the
claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 20 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Before reaching step four, the ALJ divided plaintiff’s disability claim into two time
periods. 	The ALJ concluded, “prior to August 19, 2021, the date the claimant became
disabled,” plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform the full range
of sedentary work7 as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a).” T. at 21 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The
ALJ also concluded that since August 19, 2021, plaintiff retained the RFC to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), except he can
lift and/or carry a maximum total of less than ten pounds occasionally, can
sit for a maximum total of less than six hours in an eight-hour workday, and
can stand and/or walk for a maximum total of less than two hours in an
eight-hour workday.
7 Sedentary work is defined as
involv[ing] lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying
articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as
one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties. 	Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required
occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
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Id. at 24 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step four, the ALJ determined,“[s]ince December 1, 2020,
the claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work.” Id. at 26 (See Dkt. No.
8-2).
Before reaching step five, the ALJ noted:
[p]rior to August 19, 2021, transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because applying the Medical-Vocational Rules
directly supports a finding of “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills. Beginning on August 19, 2021, the claimant has not
been able to transfer job skills to other occupations within his [RFC].
T. at 26 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step five, the ALJ determined that (1) “[p]rior to August 19,
2021, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
the claimant could have performed,” id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2); and (2) “[b]eginning on August
19, 2021, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are not jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.” Id. at 27 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The ALJ concluded
that plaintiff “was not disabled prior to August 19, 2021, but became disabled on that date
and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-
2).
IV. Discussion
A. Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination for the period prior to August 19,
2021, is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in not considering
his bending and stooping limitations. See Dkt. No. 11 at 4-7. Plaintiff contends that for
the period prior to August 19, 2021, the ALJ did not (1) consider how “utilizing a back
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brace [] would logically hinder [his] ability to engage in stooping activity[,]” or (2) “give any
reasoning for not adopting any of the medical source statements concerning [his] ability
to stoop [or] bend.” 	Id. at 7. 	Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ improperly “utiliz[ed] the
medical vocational guideline directly rather than using it as a framework for decision
making with citation to authority that shows that the non-exertional limitations have a
minimal impact on the occupational base,” in violation of Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
96-9p. Id.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. See Dkt. No. 16 at 6-13. The Commissioner contends that plaintiff’s arguments
regarding bending and stooping must fail because this Court has already determined that
“a sedentary RFC, . . . by definition entails no bending or stooping.” 	Id. at 6 (quoting
James L. E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 758 F. Supp. 3d 5, 28 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing SSR
83-10, 1983 WL 31251 at *5)). The Commissioner claims that plaintiff’s reliance on SSR
96-9p is misplaced because it “explains [that] a limitation to occasional stooping would
‘only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary work[,]’” and plaintiff
has not claimed “that he cannot occasionally stoop (or even specified what level of
stopping he can supposedly perform).” 	Id. at 6-7 (first quoting SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL
37418, at *8; then citing Dkt. No. 11 at 6-7). Alternatively, the Commissioner argues that
the plaintiff’s claims constitute a disagreement with the weight of the evidence and it is
improper for the Court to reweigh the evidence. See id. at 7-13.
B. RFC
“RFC describes what a claimant is capable of doing despite his or her impairments,
considering all relevant evidence, which consists of physical limitations, symptoms, and
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other limitations beyond the symptoms.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (quoting
Malcolm M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-986 (CFH), 2019 WL 187725, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2019) (first citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y.
1999), then citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945))). “[A]n RFC finding is administrative
in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Id. (quoting
Curry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2))). “In assessing RFC, the ALJ’s findings must specify
the functions plaintiff is capable of performing; conclusory statements regarding plaintiff’s
capabilities are not sufficient.” 	Id. (quoting Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (citations
omitted)).
“In making the RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all relevant medical and
other evidence, including any statements about what the claimant can still do provided by
any medical sources.” 	Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c)). 	“[T]he ALJ’s conclusion [need] not perfectly correspond
with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his [or her] decision, [and] he [or she
i]s entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s
consistent with the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). 	“The Court ‘defer[s] to the Commissioner’s resolution
of conflicting evidence[.]’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir.
2018) (summary order) (internal citation omitted)). “Therefore, even if a plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ’s assessment of opinion evidence and can point to evidence in the record to
support his or her position, whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
[plaintiff’s] view is not the question; rather, [the Court] must decide whether substantial
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evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Id. (quoting Elizabeth P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-891 (CFH), 2022 WL 507367, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ must not ignore evidence or cherry pick
only the evidence from medical sources that support a particular conclusion and ignore
the contrary evidence, but [t]he Court will not reweigh the evidence that was before the
ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting April B. v. Saul, No. 8:18-CV-682 (DJS), 2019 WL 4736243, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
1. Period Before August 19, 2021
As recounted above, the ALJ found that prior to August 19, 2021, plaintiff had the
RFC “to perform the full range of sedentary work.” 	T. at 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(a), 416.967(a)). 	Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to account for his bending
and stooping limitations. See Dkt. No. 11 at 4-7.
For SSA purposes, stooping is defined as “bending the body downward and
forward by bending the spine at the waist.”8 SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7. 	“By its
very nature, work performed primarily in a seated position entails no significant stooping.”
SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251 at *5. Moreover, “[i]f a person can stoop occasionally (from
very little up to one-third of the time) in order to lift objects, the sedentary and light
occupational base is virtually intact.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 at *7, see also SSR 96-
9p, 1996 WL 374185 at *8 (noting that a claimant’s “restriction to occasional stooping
should, by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary
work”); Davis v. Astrue, No. 09 CIV. 4006 (KBF), 2013 WL 3388951, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July
8 SSR 85-15 addresses the postural impairments of stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, but does
not consider bending. 	See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7. 	SSR 85-15 provides that “[s]tooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling are progressively more strenuous forms of bending parts of the body,
with crawling as a form of locomotion involving bending.” Id.
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8, 2013) (concluding that “the inability to bend on a repetitive basis is not inconsistent with
a residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work.”) (additional citations
omitted). “In other words, an RFC to perform ‘sedentary work’ implicitly – if not explicitly
– includes a mild-moderate limitation in bending/stooping.” Caridad H. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 5:18-CV-893 (TWD), 2019 WL 3253228 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019).
In support of his alleged inability to stoop or bend, plaintiff claims that he had a
spinal deformity, underwent spinal fusion surgery, and was prescribed a lumbosacral
orthosis back brace post-surgery.9 	Dkt. No. 11 at 5-6 (citing T. at 360, 673, 713) (See
Dkt. No. 8-7). Plaintiff also cites to state agency consultative medical examiner Gilbert
Jenouri, M.D.’s opinion that plaintiff has a “moderate restriction” in bending, and the prior
administrative medical finding (“PAMF”) of J. Meyer, M.D. that he could frequently stoop.
T. at 63, 366 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-3, 8-7).
The Court concludes that plaintiff’s arguments lack merit. 	See Reyes v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 21 Civ. 372 (AEK), 2022 WL 4482543 at * 16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022)
(quoting SSR 96-9P, 1996 WL 374185, at *8 (“A complete inability to stoop would
significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the
individual is disabled would usually apply, but restriction to occasional stooping should,
by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary work.”). 	As
an initial matter, plaintiff’s arguments are factually incorrect. 	The ALJ did consider
plaintiff’s November 2020 spinal fusion surgery and the opinions of Drs. Jenouri and
Meyer. 	See T. at 21-23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Similarly, plaintiff does not reconcile his
9 The Court notes that on November 24, 2020, plaintiff was advised to continue using a lumbosacral orthosis
back brace, but it is unclear whether this assistive device was prescribed or ordered. See T. at 711-14
(See Dkt. No. 8-7).
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alleged spinal deformity or temporary use of a back brace with his purported inability to
bend or stoop. See Dkt. No. 11 at 5-6. The medical records plaintiff cites to support this
assertion list his medical symptoms and diagnoses, but the medical providers do not
translate those findings into limitations, including any limitation in his ability to bend or
stoop. See id. (citing T. at 360, 673, 713, 720) (See Dkt. No. 8-7).
Further, the evidence the ALJ cites supports a finding that plaintiff was not
significantly limited in his ability to bend or stoop. The ALJ found that plaintiff experienced
“several months of modest improvement” in both his “pain level and ability to function” in
the months following his November 2020 spinal fusion surgery.10 T. at 21 (See Dkt. No.
8-2). The ALJ also discussed a May 24, 2021, consultative physical examination report
that stated that, although plaintiff “had an antalgic gait, . . . decreased range of motion in
the lumbar spine, . . . and reduced range of motion in his hips,” plaintiff “was in no acute
distress, used no assistive devices, needed no help changing for the examination or
getting on and off of the examination table, rose from a chair without difficulty, . . . had no
sensory deficits, had 5/5 strength, and had no muscle atrophy.” Id. (citing T. at 364-68)
(See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-7).
10 More specifically, the ALJ noted:
treatment records dated December 21, 2020, state that the claimant was doing well overall,
despite occasional pain with increased activity (Exhibit 5F, page 48). In March 2021, the
claimant reported lower back pain with increased activity, but otherwise felt much better
since surgery (Exhibit 5F, page 56). At that time, the claimant had “no major complaints”
(Exhibit 5F, page 56). On examination, the claimant exhibited no acute distress, normal
spinal alignment, a normal gait, grossly intact sensation, 2+ deep tendon reflexes, and
grossly intact motor strength (Exhibit 5F, page 58). It was noted that the claimant was
doing well and continuing to improve (Exhibit 5F, page 59). On June 3, 2021, it was noted
that the claimant had been doing more activities, such as raking (Exhibit 5F, page 60).
T. at 21 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
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Further, the ALJ analyzed the opinions of Drs. Jenouri, Meyer, Brauer, and
Lawrence. 	See T. at 22-23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Dr. Jenouri opined that plaintiff “had
moderate restrictions for . . . bending.” T. at 22 (citing T. at 366) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-
7). 	The ALJ concluded that Dr. Jenouri’s opinion was persuasive for the period prior to
August 19, 2021, because it is supported by Dr. Jenouri’s own examination of plaintiff and
consistent with RPAC Carangelo’s opinion and the medical evidence dated between
December 1, 2020, to August 19, 2021. 	See id. at 23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Dr. Meyer
opined that plaintiff could “frequently” stoop. Id. at 22 (citing T. at 63) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-
2, 8-3). Dr. Brauer and Dr. Lawrence opined that plaintiff could “occasionally” stoop and
crouch. 	Id. at 22-23 (citing T. at 79, 90) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-3). 	The ALJ determined
that these opinions are “partially persuasive as they relate to the period before August 19,
2021[,]” because they are “supported by a narrative rationale, and . . . highly consistent
with one another[,] and somewhat consistent with the medical source statement issued
by Dr. Jenouri.” 	Id. at 23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The ALJ further explained that “these
opinions seem optimistic even for the period prior to August 19, 2021, given that the
claimant underwent back surgery in November 2020 and was in need of a reasonable
recovery period thereafter,” and were inconsistent with RPAC Carangelo’s opinion. 	Id.
(See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Additionally, the ALJ relied upon a December 21, 2020, treatment record from
Alexander Carangelo, RPAC, who opined plaintiff could only lift ten-to-fifteen pounds. T.
at 23 (citing T. at 716) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-7). RPAC Carangelo’s opinion did not identify
any other limitations, including limitations in bending or stooping. See id. at 716 (See Dkt.
No. 8-7). 	The ALJ found RPAC Carangelo’s opinion to be supported by his own
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examination 	and 	plaintiff’s 	reported 	improvement 	post-spinal 	fusion 	surgery 	and
consistent with Dr. Jenouri’s opinion. T. at 23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
“[P]laintiff's argument[] amount[s] to a disagreement with how the ALJ weighed the
evidence, which is within [the ALJ’s] province to do.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at
*1 (quoting Nichole K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-858 (EAW), 2024 WL
3022592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2024)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“Krull’s disagreement
is with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence, but the deferential standard of review prevents
us from reweighing it.”); Tina W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-15 (MAD), 2023
WL 157952, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F.
App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“It is not the Court’s function to reweigh the
evidence on appeal, only to ‘decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
decision.’”)). There is some evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff was limited in
engaging in repetitive stooping, but as sedentary work does not require repetitive
stooping, the ALJ’s failure to reference plaintiff’s spine deformity or temporary use of a
back brace in the context of his ability to stoop or bend amounts to harmless error. See
Debra Lanette P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1634 (CFH), 2022 WL 1063169,
at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2022) (citing Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 2010)
(explaining that where there is “no reasonable likelihood that [the ALJ's] consideration of
[a] . . . doctor's [ ] report would have changed the ALJ's determination . . . remand for
consideration of the improperly excluded report is unnecessary[ ]”).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
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ORDERED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 11) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED,
and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision & Order on
all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
Dated: March 18, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 6:24-cv-01146-PJE Document 18 Filed 03/18/26 Page 15 of 15