Nichols v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
ASHLEY N.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	6:23-CV-982
(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on August 11, 2023, seeking review of
the Commissioner’s determination denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits.
Dkt. No. 1. 	On June 11, 2024, the Court remanded the matter to the Social Security
Administration for further proceedings by virtue of a stipulation between the parties. Dkt.
Nos. 19-20. 	An award of attorney’s fees was previously entered pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Dkt. No. 22. Upon review of the matter on remand, the
Administrative Law Judge issued a favorable decision awarding Plaintiff benefits. Dkt.
No. 23, ¶ 6. Plaintiff’s counsel has now filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 23. Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorney’s fees
in the amount of $25,832.75, of which he would remit to Plaintiff the sum previously
awarded under the EAJA. Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 8.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
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II. DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). This section “calls for court review of such arrangements as
an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.”
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The court “must give due deference to
the intent of the parties, but it ought not blindly approve every fee request made pursuant
to a contingent agreement.” Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1990).
“[A] requested fee based on a contingent fee arrangement should be enforced
unless the court finds it to be unreasonable.” Id. at 370. In determining whether a fee is
reasonable, a court should consider whether the attorney is responsible for a delay in the
proceedings, as well as “whether there has been fraud or overreaching in making the
agreement, and whether the requested amount is so large as to be a windfall to the
attorney.” 	Id. at 372; see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 808. 	In determining
whether an award would constitute a windfall, the Second Circuit has identified a number
of relevant factors including the ability and expertise of counsel, the nature and length of
counsel’s relationship with the client, the satisfaction of the claimant, and the uncertainty
of the outcome of the case. Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 854-56 (2d Cir. 2022); see
also Porter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2009 WL 2045688, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009)
(identifying three related considerations). 	If the court finds the fee is unreasonable, the
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court “may reduce the fee provided it states the reasons for and the amounts of the
deductions.” Id. at *2.
Here, the contingency fee agreement provides in pertinent part that any fee award
under section 406(b) would not exceed 25% of all past due benefits. Dkt. No. 23-2. The
amount requested does not exceed the 25% cap, and there is no evidence of fraud or
overreaching.
Counsel seeks $25,832.75 in attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 23. Counsel notes a total
of 24.3 hours expended on this matter at the federal court level. 	Dkt. No. 23-3. 	This
results in a de facto hourly rate of slightly over $1,063. Id. Though high, this amount is
within the range awarded as attorney’s fees in this type of case. See Tammy K. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 1567523, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019)(citing cases); Eric K. v.
Berryhill, 2019 WL 1025791, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019) (finding de facto hourly rate
of $1,500 “is not out of line with the corresponding hourly rate of attorney’s fees approved
by district courts within the Second Circuit.”). Counsel prepared and filed a persuasive
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings which ultimately secured a remand. See Dkt. No.
12. In addition, Plaintiff has been awarded significant benefits as a result of the litigation.
See Dkt. No. 23-2. Finally, in reviewing counsel’s time log, it generally appears to reflect
properly recorded and appropriate attorney work. 	Dkt. No. 23-3. 	Defendant does not
contest the timeliness of the Motion or oppose the application. Dkt. No. 24.
III. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
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ORDERED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Attorney’s 	Fees 	(Dkt. 	No. 	23) 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Attorney Antonowicz is awarded the sum of $25,832.75 as fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), to be paid from the amount withheld by the Commissioner
of Social Security from the past due benefits awarded to Plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED, that Attorney Antonowicz is directed to remit to Plaintiff any sum
that was previously awarded and received as fees pursuant to the EAJA; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order
upon the parties to this action in accordance with the Local Rules.
Dated: February 9, 2026
Albany, New York
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