Hastings v. Onondaga County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SARAH HASTINGS,
Plaintiff,
5:26-CV-191
v. 	(MAD/DJS)
ONONDAGA COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SARAH HASTINGS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Newark, New Jersey 07106
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
Plaintiff pro se filed her Complaint in this Court on February 2, 2026. Dkt. No. 1,
Compl. Plaintiff has also filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt.
No. 2, which this Court has granted by separate order.
I. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
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relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Complaint provides only a brief recitation of facts. 	It alleges that Plaintiff
warned Family Court and Child Protective Services staff of the abuse of her child by the
child’s father. Compl. at p. 1. It further alleges that these warnings were ignored and that
Plaintiff was falsely accused of being mentally unstable. Id. Plaintiff also claims that her
child was exposed to foreseeable harms from the child’s father, who was ultimately
convicted and imprisoned. Id. The Complaint purports to be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and asserts causes of action for violation of procedural and substantive due process,
fabrication of evidence, and municipal liability. Id. at pp. 1-2.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. State Action
“Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives
a person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’”
K & A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Health, 189 F.3d 273,
280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)). “A plaintiff
pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to
show state action.” 	Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).
The Complaint names Cheryl Jones, who is identified as the attorney for the child,
as a Defendant. Compl. at p. 1. The law is clear, however, that an attorney for a child in
New York Family Court proceedings is not a state actor. Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d
961, 964 (2d. Cir. 2015) (law guardian not a state actor); Parent v. New York, 786 F. Supp.
2d 516, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 485 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2012) (“although
appointed by the state, an attorney for the children or law guardian is not a state actor
because he or she must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the
clients they represent.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Jones is subject to dismissal.
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B. Proper Parties
The Complaint also names Onondaga County Child Protective Service as a party.
Compl. at p. 1. 	However, a “county child protective services unit . . . has no separate
legal identity apart of the municipality itself.” 	Mulqueen v. Herkimer Cnty. Child
Protective Servs., 2023 WL 4931679, at *6 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 756833 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024); see also Licata v.
Kaplan, 2017 WL 6379606, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017). Claims against this agency,
therefore, are also subject to dismissal.
C. Municipal Liability
Onondaga County is named as a Defendant. Compl. at p. 1. This claim appears
to be brought pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). See Compl. at p. 2. It is well-settled that § 1983 claims may be brought against
“municipalities and other local government units.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690. 	To demonstrate Monell liability,
a plaintiff must allege a violation of constitutional rights by employees of
the municipality and ‘(1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom . . .
that 	caused 	his 	injuries 	beyond 	merely 	employing 	the 	misbehaving
officer[s]; and (2) a causal connection - an affirmative link - between the
policy and the deprivation of his constitutional rights.’
Werkheiser v. Cnty. of Broome, 655 F. Supp. 3d 88, 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting
Harper v. City of N.Y., 424 F. App’x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). 	Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges no policy or custom or action by a
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policymaking authority that could provide a basis for liability and thus the claim against
the County should be dismissed at this point as insufficiently pled.
D. Merits
“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” 	Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 1994). 	Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to specifically articulate the personal
involvement of any of the individuals named as Defendants. 	Without such allegations,
Plaintiff has failed to allege their personal involvement in a violation of his constitutional
rights and dismissal is warranted. 	See, e.g., McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934
(2d Cir. 1977). That is a basis dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.
In addition, to the extent Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants failed to
“enforce protections” or prevent abuses by the child’s father, the Complaint at this stage
of proceedings fails to allege a cause of action. 	“The Constitution does not ordinarily
require the State to protect citizens from the harmful acts of private persons.” Hamlin ex
rel. Hamlin v. City of Peekskill Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) and DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); see also Dees v. Zurlo,
2024 WL 1053237, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2024), report and recommendation
adopted, 2024 WL 2291701 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024), aff’d sub nom. Dees v. Knox, 2025
WL 485019 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 201 (2025).
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E. Rule 8
Given the recommendations noted above, it is worth noting that a court’s initial
review of a complaint under § 1915(e) must encompass the applicable standards of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . .
. ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a). 	The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being
asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” 	Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations and internal alterations omitted). 	Moreover, Rule 10 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an
earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a
separate transaction or occurrence – and each defense other than a denial –
must be stated in a separate count or defense.
“The purpose of Rule 10 is to provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a
particular paragraph in a prior pleading.” 	Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).
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A complaint that fails to comply with basic pleading requirements presents too
heavy a burden for defendants to craft a defense “and provides no meaningful basis for
the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] claims,” and may properly be
dismissed. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The brevity of the
Complaint’s factual allegations here are inconsistent with these notice requirements.
Plaintiff does not provide notice of when the complaints she references were made, or to
whom specifically they were reported, or how each Defendant violated her rights
specifically. As noted above, that lack of detail provides a substantive basis for dismissal
of the Complaint.
F. Leave to Amend
Given its lack of clarity, the Complaint is clearly subject to dismissal. 	A court
should avoid dismissal of complaints filed by individuals proceeding pro se without first
granting leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication
that a valid claim might be stated.” 	Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir.
1991). 	Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, but that
Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend.
The Court advises Plaintiff that should she be permitted to amend her Complaint,
any amended pleading she submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace
in its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially
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numbered paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. Thus,
if Plaintiff claims that her civil and/or constitutional rights were violated by more than
one defendant, or on more than one occasion, she should include a corresponding number
of paragraphs in her amended complaint for each such allegation, with each paragraph
specifying (i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date, including the year, on which
such misconduct occurred; (iii) the names of each and every individual who participated
in such misconduct; (iv) where appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct
occurred; and, (v) the nexus between such misconduct and Plaintiff’s civil and/or
constitutional rights.
Plaintiff is further cautioned that no portion of her prior Complaint shall be
incorporated into her amended complaint by reference. 	Any amended complaint
submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims she intends to assert against the
defendants and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between the Plaintiff
and the defendants which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court
has jurisdiction. 	If Plaintiff is alleging that the named defendant violated a law, she
should specifically refer to such law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED as set forth
above; and it is
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ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: March 3, 2026
Albany, New York
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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