Chavous et al v. M&T Bank et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TREVON CHAVOUS and PRISCILLA
CHAVOUS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
M&T BANK, KATHERINE ZHENG, SUPREME
ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.
5:25-cv-01247 (AMN/MJK)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
TREVON CHAVOUS
PRISCILLA CHAVOUS
139 Maple Ter.
Syracuse, New York 13210
Plaintiffs pro se
HODGSON RUSS LLP 	CARMINE CASTELLANO,
605 Third Avenue – Suite 2300 	ESQ.
New York, New York 10158
Attorneys for Defendants M&T Bank
and Katherine Zheng
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 2025, plaintiffs Trevon Chavous and Priscilla Chavous (“Plaintiffs”)
commenced this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Onondaga,
bringing various claims against defendants M&T Bank (“M&T”), Katherine Zheng (“Zheng”)
(together, “Defendants”), Supreme Associates International (“Supreme Associates”),1 and White
1 Service upon Supreme Associates has failed twice. Dkt. Nos. 46, 57.
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Harbor Group. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1. On September 9, 2025, Defendant M&T, with Defendant
Zheng’s consent, timely removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Id. at
¶¶ 3, 6. 	After Plaintiffs were served with the Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 13, Plaintiffs filed
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. Nos. 16-17, which United States Magistrate
Judge Mitchell J. Katz granted on September 18, 2025, 	Dkt. No. 20. 	On September 22, 2025
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as of right. Dkt. No. 23 (“Amended Complaint”).
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. No. 35 (the “Motion”). 	Plaintiffs responded, Dkt.
No. 36, and Defendants replied, Dkt. No. 39. 	For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the
Motion.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Plaintiffs are individuals residing in the State of New York. Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 1. Defendant
M&T Bank is a banking corporation doing business in New York. Id. at ¶ 2. Defendant Katherine
Zheng is alleged to be an employee of Defendant M&T Bank. 	Id. at ¶ 3. 	Plaintiffs allege that
Supreme Associates is the entity that sold them the property at issue in this suit. 	Id. at ¶ 4.
Plaintiffs allege that White Harbor Group is the insurance company “that issued and later canceled
an insurance policy on the subject property.” Id. at ¶ 5.
B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs’ allegations arise out of a mortgage they received through Defendant M&T Bank,
represented by its employee Defendant Zheng. Dkt. No. 23 at ¶¶ 10-26. On or about April 25,
2025, Plaintiffs closed on said mortgage for the purchase of real property located at 215 W. Beard
Street, Syracuse, NY 13205 (the “Property”). 	Id. at ¶ 10. 	Plaintiffs allege that throughout the
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transaction they “relied heavily on the representations of Defendants.” 	Id. at ¶ 11. 	Plaintiffs
specifically allege that Defendant Zheng told Plaintiffs that they had to purchase a one-unit
property despite being “originally approved for a $140,000 mortgage loan for a two-unit property.”
Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Zheng knew that the Property was unsafe, “yet
pushed Plaintiffs to close by stating they could lose both the house and the loan.” Id. at ¶ 15.
After closing, Plaintiff allege that they “never received required [Truth in Lending Act]
disclosures, including notice of rescission rights, accurate APR, or itemized closing costs.” Id. at
¶ 18. 	Plaintiffs also allege that the Property was staged to appear habitable, but they later
discovered that it contained “severe hazards, including a damaged roof, asbestos, structural
instability, concealed water damage, mold, rodent infestations, defective mechanicals, and overall
uninhabitable conditions.” Id. at ¶ 16. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Supreme Associates had
previously entered into an encroachment agreement with non-party Dream Realty regarding the
Property, which was not identified in the Property’s appraisal. Id. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiffs further allege that because of the unsafe conditions, “White Harbor Group
canceled insurance coverage” and the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority (“NYSERDA”) “closed out Plaintiffs’ insulation and energy upgrade application.” Id.
at ¶¶ 21-22. 	Plaintiffs allege that they “sent a [qualified written request (“QWR”)]” and Debt
Validation Request to Defendants on July 11, 2025, as well as a Notice of Rescission on July 29,
2025. Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff’s Legal Claims
The Amended Complaint lists fourteen causes of action: (i) fraudulent misrepresentation
against all defendants as to “the condition of the Property, bedroom count, mortgage eligibility,
insurance availability, and [Truth in Lending Act] disclosures”; (ii) violations of the Truth in
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Lending Act (“TILA”) against Defendants for failure to provide required disclosures; (iii)
predatory lending by Defendants in violation of Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(“HOEPA”); (iv) lack of standing against Defendant M&T; (v) “Quiet Title” pursuant to New
York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) against Defendant M&T Bank and
Supreme Associates; (vi) injunctive relief against all four defendants; (vii) unjust enrichment
against Defendant M&T Bank and Supreme Associates; (viii) failure to provide closing documents
under 	the 	TILA, 	HOEPA, 	and 	Real 	Estate 	Settlement 	Procedures 	Act 	(“RESPA”); 	(ix)
misrepresentation of property value against all four defendants; (x) “insurance cancellation
damages” against White Harbor Group; (xi) loss of New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority program funding against M&T Bank and Supreme Associates; (xii) failure
to report negative impacts on credit against all defendants; (xiii) 	predatory lending against
Defendants under the Dodd-Frank Act; and (xiv) “Predatory Lending – Explicit High-Cost/Unsafe
Loan Practices” against Defendants. Id. at 3-5.
C. Procedural History
Prior to commencing this action (“Chavous II”) in state court, Plaintiffs filed a separate
action in this Court alleging claims largely based on the same set of events. See Case No. 5:25-
cv-00562-AMN-MJK (“Chavous I”), Dkt. Nos. 1, 8. After this Court dismissed both the complaint
and amended complaint in that action with leave to amend, Chavous I, Dkt. No. 10, Plaintiffs
submitted a notice of voluntary dismissal on August 7, 2025, Chavous I, Dkt. No. 19, which the
Court approved, Chavous I, Dkt. No. 20.
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III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is
properly granted “when the court lacks statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate it.”
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Vill. of Union Springs, 293 F. Supp. 2d 183, 187 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (citing Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 2002)). To resolve such a motion, the
court “accepts as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1997)).
B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) tests the legal sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief.
Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). In considering legal sufficiency, a court
must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
pleader’s favor. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This
presumption, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted). Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are
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“plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. 	“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed,” id. at 570.
C. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend its pleading
once as a matter of course “no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one
to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21
days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A)-(B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When a cross-motion for leave to
file an amended complaint is made in response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), leave
to amend will be denied as futile only if the proposed new claim cannot withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, i.e., if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no
set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123
(2d Cir. 1991). When assessing futility, the court employs a standard comparable to that utilized
in assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d
104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that “leave to amend will be denied as futile only if the proposed
new claim cannot withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Voluntary Dismissal of White Harbor Group
On November 7, 2025, Plaintiffs responded to Magistrate Judge Katz’s order directing
them to clarify whether they wished to proceed with litigation against defendants Supreme
Associates and White Harbor Group. 	See Dkt. No. 49. 	In their response, Plaintiffs sought to
voluntarily dismiss White Harbor Group pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)
because “this party’s involvement was limited to a single, now resolved insurance matter.” Dkt.
No. 50 at 1.2 The Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s request and accordingly dismisses White Harbor
Group from this action. The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for “insurance
cancellation damages” against White Harbor Group.
B. 12(b)(1)
Turning to Defendants’ Motion, Defendants first argue that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed as moot their previous action
predicated on the same events. Dkt. No. 35 at 4-5. The Court disagrees.
“A case is moot, and accordingly federal courts have no jurisdiction over the litigation,
when ‘the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Fox v. Bd. of Trustees of State
Univ. of N.Y., 42 F. 3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994). But when a plaintiff dismisses an action by filing
a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer, “the dismissal is without
prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B); cf. Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169 F.R.D. 11
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Because a dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits
for purposes of res judicata, it would be highly anomalous for a court to enter a dismissal with
2 Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system
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prejudice where . . . it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims
asserted against the adverse parties in question.”).
In Chavous I, Plaintiffs stated that “circumstances have changed such that there is no longer
a live controversy requiring judicial resolution,” Chavous I, Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 2. 	Plaintiffs also
asserted that “the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction under Article III.” 	Id. at ¶ 4.
Plaintiff’s notice of dismissal, however, did not request dismissal with prejudice, see id., and the
Court gave no indication that leave to amend would be futile, see generally Chavous I, Docket
Sheet. Thus, the Court entered Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal in the previous case pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(A) without prejudice. 	See Chavous I, Dkt. No. 20. 	The Court also finds that while
Plaintiffs have sued some of the same Defendants here as in the previous case, Plaintiffs have also
raised various new claims against them. Compare Chavous I, Dkt. No. 1 at 7-9 with Chavous II,
Dkt. No. 23. Therefore, and considering also Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court denies Defendants’
Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
C. 12(b)(6)
The Court agrees with Defendants, however, that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim as to each
of their causes of action. The Court considers each of Plaintiffs’ claims in turn.
1. 	Statutory Claims
a. 	TILA Violation
Pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges that
Defendants “failed to provide required disclosures, including notice of rescission rights, accurate
APR, and itemized closing costs.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs, however, do not invoke any specific TILA
provision nor do they provide further factual allegations explaining how Defendants violated
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TILA. See generally id. Plaintiffs also fail to allege any harm resulting from Defendants’ alleged
violation.
For their part, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s allegations are false and submit a closing
disclosure (“Closing Disclosure”), signed by Plaintiffs, demonstrating as much. Dkt. No. 35-1 at
12-13; Dkt. No. 35-3 at 1-5. Because the Amended Complaint alleges a lack of closing documents,
the Court finds that the Closing Disclosure is integral to the Amended Complaint and considers
the Closing Disclosure for purposes of the Motion. See Glob. Network Commc’ns v. City of New
York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Furthermore, the Court finds that the Closing Disclosure
demonstrates that Plaintiffs did in fact receive the required disclosures in contravention of their
claim under the TILA. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second cause of action.
b. 	HOEPA Violation
In their third cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) and “related Dodd-Frank provisions”, alleging
that “Defendants engaged in high-cost loan practices, predatory lending, and deceptive loan
structuring.” Dkt. No. 23 at 3. But Plaintiffs fail to provide further details alleging whether or
how the loan at issue is a high-cost loan or how it is otherwise covered by HOEPA. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1602(bb), 1639c (defining “high-cost mortgage” and setting minimum standards for residential
mortgage loans, respectively). Plaintiffs also do not specifically allege how Defendants acted or
failed to act in violation of HOEPA. See generally Dkt. No. 23. For these reasons, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under HOEPA and dismisses their third cause of action.
c. 	Failure to Provide Closing Documents
Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action alleges that Defendant M&T “failed to provide the
promissory note [ ] and other critical closing documents [ ], in violation of TILA, [Real Estate
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Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)], and HOEPA. 	Dkt. No. 23 at 4. 	Plaintiffs specifically
cite to TILA, “15 U.S.C. § 1635” and RESPA, “12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.”, and contend that the
omission of a promissory note “calls into question the enforceability of the mortgage and preserves
Plaintiffs’ rights to rescind or challenge the loan.” Dkt. No. 23-1 at 16. As in their second and
third causes of action, Plaintiffs fail to make factual allegations sufficient to state a claim under
the cited statutes. 	Additionally, the TILA provision to which Plaintiffs cite does not refer to
promissory notes, closing documents, or any rights specifically associated therewith. 	See 15
U.S.C. § 1635. To the extent that Plaintiffs are alleging that Defendants failed to disclose certain
rights because they did not provide certain closing documents, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did
in fact receive, and sign, the relevant closing documents. Dkt. No. 35-3 at 1-5; see supra Section
IV.C.1.A.
As to RESPA, the Court interprets Plaintiffs’ claim to allege that Defendant M&T failed
to respond to Plaintiffs’ purported Qualified Written Request (“QWR”). See Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 24;
Dkt. No. 23-1 at 39-44. 	Under RESPA, a QWR is written correspondence that identifies a
borrower’s account and “includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the
extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding
other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). After reviewing Plaintiffs’
submission, however, the Court finds that the letter that Plaintiffs allege that they sent to Defendant
M&T fails to qualify as a QWR under the terms of the statute. 	See Dkt. No. 23-1 at 39-44.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not explain whether Defendant M&T had a designated QWR address
and whether they sent their letter to that address. See Mack v. ResCorp. Borrower Claims Trust,
678 Fed. App’x 10, 14-15 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that because plaintiff sent letter to “General
Inquiries” address instead of designated address for QWRs, loan servicer’s RESPA duties were
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never triggered); Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc., 756 F.3d 178, 181 (“[F]ailure to send [request] to the
designated address, does not trigger the servicer’s duties under RESPA.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to provide
closing documents.3
d. 	Fair Credit Reporting Act
Plaintiffs’ twelfth cause of action, brought against all defendants, states that “[d]efendants’
failure to properly report or respond caused negative credit impacts.” Id. at 4. To the extent that
Plaintiff is alleging a claim pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Court finds
that Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege such a claim. To state a claim under FCRA, a plaintiff must
show that “(1) the [credit information] furnisher received notice of a credit dispute from a credit
reporting agency, and (2) the furnisher thereafter acted in willful or negligent noncompliance with
the statute.” 	Markovskaya v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that any defendant received notice of a credit dispute from a
credit reporting agency but instead merely allege that one of their credit scores was negatively
impacted. See Dkt. No. 23-1 at 114-17 (printouts of credit reports). Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to
allege a claim under FCRA and the Court dismisses their twelfth cause of action against
Defendants.
3 Even if Plaintiffs’ letter is a proper QWR, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants failed to respond
runs counter to Defendants’ submission. Defendants submit documents that appear to be responses
to Plaintiffs’ letter dated July 7, 2025, with supporting enclosures. Dkt. No. 39-2 at 1-59. Given
that Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not respond to their QWR and that Plaintiffs’ claim is
predicated on a lack of closing documents, the Court finds that Defendants’ submissions are
integral to the Amended Complaint and considers them.
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e. 	RPAPL Quiet Title
Pursuant to the RPAPL, Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action seeks “a declaration voiding the
mortgage lien due to fraud, statutory violations, misrepresentation, and request to quiet title.” Id.
at 3. A plaintiff bringing a quiet title claim under RPAPL Article 15 must allege: “(i) the nature
of the plaintiff’s interest in the real property and the source of this interest; (ii) that the defendant
claims or appears to claim an interest in the property adverse to the plaintiff’s interest, and the
nature of the defendant’s interest; (iii) whether any defendant is known or unknown and whether
any defendant is incompetent; and (iv) whether all interested parties are named and whether the
judgment will or might affect other persons not ascertained at the commencement of the action.”
Barberan v. Nationpoint, 706 F. Supp. 2d 408, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing N.Y. Real Prop. Acts.
Law § 1515(1) (McKinney 2022)). Because a quiet title action concerns competing claims to real
property, it is essential that the plaintiff states that a defendant has an adverse interest in the real
property at issue. Id. (see N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1515(1)(b) (McKinney 2022)).
Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to meet any of these elements. 	Plaintiffs allege “fraud,
statutory violations, misrepresentations,” but without factual allegations detailing any defendant’s
actions, these are bald conclusions. See Dkt. No. 23 at 3. And even if they were not conclusory,
such allegations do not constitute the elements of a claim to quiet title. 	As such, the Court
accordingly dismisses Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action as to Defendants.
f. 	Predatory Lending
Plaintiffs’ thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action allege that Defendants engaged in
further forms of predatory lending in violation of “Dodd-Frank and federal consumer protection
statutes”. Id. at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants knowingly engaged in abusive,
unfair, and deceptive acts” and “knowingly issued an unsafe, unaffordable loan, misrepresented
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terms, and failed to provide disclosures.” 	The Court finds these allegations to be vague and
conclusory, and as to the disclosures, counter to documentation integral to the Amended
Complaint. See Dkt. No. 35-3 at 1-5. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims as to
predatory lending.
2. 	Common Law Claims
a. 	Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges that Defendants M&T and Zheng, as well as
Supreme Associates, “misrepresented the condition of the Property, bedroom count, mortgage
eligibility, insurance availability, and TILA disclosures” and further that “Plaintiffs relied on these
misrepresentations to their detriment, suffering financial harm, emotional distress, and credit
damage.” 	Dkt. No. 23 at 3. 	The Court construes this cause of action as one for fraudulent
misrepresentation under New York state common law.
“Under New York law, to state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege a
representation of material fact, the falsity of the representation, knowledge by the party making
the representation that it was false when made, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and resulting
injury.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 291 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations marks
and citation omitted).
In federal court, a common law fraud claim is also subject to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which requires that a claim for fraud “state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud.” 	The Second Circuit has explained that, in order to comply with Rule 9(b),
“the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2)
identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the
statements were fraudulent.” Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993)
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(citation omitted). These requirements mirror the level of specificity required to plead fraud under
New York law. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Roopak Enters., Ltd., 608 N.Y.S.2d 445, 446 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994). 	In addition, the Second Circuit requires plaintiffs “‘to plead the factual basis
which gives rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.’” United States ex rel. Tessler v. City
of New York, 712 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting O'Brien v. Nat’l Prop. Analysts Partners,
936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to plead their misrepresentation claim with the
requisite specificity. The Court agrees. In conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants
misrepresented” certain issues but do not identify any specific statements or speakers, where or
when any allegedly fraudulent statements were made, or why any such statements were false. In
their response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Zheng “unilaterally reclassified [the Property] as a
one-unit home” despite Plaintiffs being approved for a loan on a two-unit property. Dkt. No. 36
at 2. Plaintiffs fail, however, to explain how this act constitutes fraud or why it would be relevant
to their decision to purchase the Property. Plaintiffs also allege that certain defective conditions
on the Property “were concealed or misrepresented” but do not specify who made such
representations, what specifically was said, or why Plaintiffs were justified in relying on such
representations. See id.
As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
and dismisses their first cause of action as to Defendants.
b. 	Misrepresentation of Property Value
In their ninth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that the “appraisals (Exhibits K-M) and
property advertising (Exhibit R) were false and misleading, causing Plaintiffs to overpay.” Dkt.
No. 23 at 4. 	As before, Plaintiffs fail to plead this allegation with the requisite specificity.
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Moreover, as Defendants assert, the exhibits to which Plaintiffs cite do not implicate any of the
defendants named in this action. Instead, Exhibits K-M to the Amended Complaint are appraisals
conducted by third parties, Dkt. No. 23-1 at 55-82, and Exhibit R is a listing from Zillow.com, id.
at 95-96. For these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action as to Defendants.
c. 	Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant M&T and Supreme Associates “were unjustly enriched by
collecting payments and profiting from a defective mortgage transaction.” 	Dkt. No. 23 at 3.
“While an unjust enrichment claim may be premised on deceptive conduct, ‘unjust enrichment is
not a catchall cause of action to be used when others fail [and an] unjust enrichment claim is not
available where it simply duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contract or tort claim.’” Mancuso
v. RFA Brands, LLC, 454 F. Supp. 3d 197, 208 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation omitted). 	Here, the
Court incorporates its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims alleging a defective mortgage transaction.
Because unjust enrichment cannot be used as a catchall where other claims predicated on the same
alleged conduct fail, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment as to Defendant
M&T. See, e.g., Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, 790 (N.Y. 2012) (dismissing
unjust enrichment claim in part because it could not remedy otherwise defective claims).
3. 	Lack of Standing, Injunctive Relief, and “NYSERDA Program
Closure”
Stylized as a claim for “Lack of Standing/Defective Mortgage,” Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of
action alleges that Defendant M&T lacked “lawful standing to enforce the mortgage due to
origination defects, false pretenses, fraud, and failure to properly execute and sign the loan.” Dkt.
No. 23 at 3. However, lack of standing is an affirmative defense that a defendant raises against a
plaintiff.
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Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action brings a claim against all defendants for “Injunctive Relief”
seeking “temporary and permanent injunctions restraining [d]efendants from foreclosure, lis
pendens filings, or enforcing the mortgage during this action.” 	Id. 	But injunctive relief is a
remedy, not its own cause of action. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Mark I Mktg. Corp., 893 F.
Supp. 285, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“There is no ‘injunctive’ cause of action under New York or
federal law.”).
And Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action, “NYSERDA Program Closure/Regulatory Harm,”
alleges that unsafe conditions on the Property led the New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority to close out Plaintiff’s insulation and energy upgrade application, leading
to “financial and opportunity loss.” Dkt. No. 23 at 4; see id. at ¶ 22. Here, however, Plaintiffs
allege no wrongful actions that led to the closeout and thus fail to state a claim.
Because none of these allegations constitute a legally cognizable cause of action, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs’ fourth, sixth, and eleventh causes of action against Defendants.
D. Supreme Associates
Finally, the Court acknowledges that Supreme Associates, against whom Plaintiffs still
wish to proceed, see Dkt. No. 50, has yet to be served in this matter, see Dkt. Nos. 52, 53, 57
(returning unexecuted reissued summons as to Supreme Associates because Plaintiffs failed to
provide complete mailing address). Pursuant to Rule 4(m), that fact alone would be a sufficient
basis on which to dismiss the claims against Supreme Associates. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(providing that a court must dismiss an action against defendants if they have not been served
within 90 days, except for good cause shown); see also Dimperio v. Onondaga Cty., No. 9:13-CV-
1202, 2015 WL 5603507, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (stating that a pro se plaintiff who
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fails to act after notification that the U.S. Marshals Service could not serve a particular defendant
risks dismissal).
But even if Plaintiffs had effected timely service on Supreme Associates, the Court
incorporates its previous determinations and finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against
Supreme Associates. 	See supra Sections IV.C.1.d-e; IV.C.2.a-c; IV.C.3. 	Therefore, the Court
also dismisses Plaintiff’s first, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action
against Supreme Associates for failure to state a claim. Cf. Cioce v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 02
CIV. 3604, 2003 WL 21750052, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2003), aff’d, 128 F. App’x 181 (2d
Cir. 2005) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims on the merits after concluding dismissal under Rule 4(m)
was also appropriate).
E. Leave to Amend
In their response to the Motion, Plaintiffs request leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). 	Dkt. No. 36 at 5. 	Defendants, citing Plaintiffs’ multiple previous
complaints in both Chavous I and Chavous II, assert that the Court should not grant Plaintiffs
another opportunity to replead. Dkt. No. 35-1 at 19; Dkt. No. 39 at 13-14.
“While, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘leave to amend
shall be freely given when justice so requires, it is within the sound discretion of the district court
to grant or deny leave to amend . . . for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or
undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 447
(2d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2018)).
“Moreover, a district court is under ‘no obligation’ to grant leave to amend when the plaintiff
offers merely ‘conclusory assertion[s]’ that amendment would cure a complaint’s deficiencies and
‘fail[s] to disclose what additional allegations [he] would make which might lead to a different
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result.’” Abe v. New York Univ., No. 14-cv-9323, 2016 WL 1275661, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2016) (Sullivan, J.) (alterations in original) (first quoting Horoshko v. Citibank, N.A., 373 F.3d
248, 249 (2d Cir. 2004); and then citing Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53-54 (2d Cir.
1999)). “Repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” warrants denial
of leave to amend. Dluhos v. Floating and Abandoned Vessel, Known as New York, 162 F.3d 63,
69 (2d Cir. 1998).
Here, Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Motion fails address how leave to amend would cure the
Amended Complaint’s deficiencies. Furthermore, over the course of this action, Plaintiffs have
submitted or attempted to submit five complaints, all of which are substantively similar and fail to
address persistent deficiencies. See Dkt. Nos. 2, 11-3, 23, 28-1, 54. And Plaintiffs’ most recent
submission, styled as a “Second Amended Complaint” and submitted without the Court’s leave,
Dkt. No. 54, is an exact copy of the Amended Complaint, despite the Motion including integral
documents explicitly disproving factual allegations central to many of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Dkt.
Nos. 35-3, 35-5 (Closing Disclosures and notarized Mortgage signed by Plaintiffs). 	The Court
therefore finds that granting leave to amend is inappropriate and denies Plaintiffs’ Rule 15(a)(2)
request.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that pursuant to Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, Dkt. No. 50, the claim against
White Harbor Group be DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion, Dkt. No. 35, be GRANTED in its entirety; and the
Court further
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ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 23, be DISMISSED without
leave to amend; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: May 18, 2026
Albany, New York
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