Jarvis v. Petricola et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
HOLLY JARVIS,
Plaintiff,
5:25-CV-1166
v. 	(ECC/DJS)
OFFICER PETRICOLA, SERGEANT SENENKO,
SYRACUSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
SYRACUSE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
DIVISION,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
HOLLY JARVIS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Syracuse, New York 13207
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Complaint was filed on August 26, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff sought leave
to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted. 	Dkt. Nos. 2 & 5. 	On September 4,
2025, the undersigned issued a Report-Recommendation and Order, which recommended
dismissal 	of 	the 	Complaint, 	though 	with 	leave 	to 	amend. 	Dkt. 	No. 	6, 	Report-
Recommendation. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 7,
but also filed an Amended Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 8, Am. Compl. 	The District Court,
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finding that the Amended Complaint was filed as of right under F ED . R. CIV . P. 15,
referred the Amended Complaint to the undersigned for review. 	Dkt. No. 10. 	For the
reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Amended Complaint be
dismissed.
The legal standard for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was set forth in detail in the
Court’s prior Report and Recommendation, Report-Recommendation at pp. 2-4, and will
not be set forth in full again. Generally stated, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a
plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that – . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Amended Complaint contains three causes of action, all brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 	Am. Compl. at
pp. 6-7. Named as Defendants are two law enforcement officers with the Syracuse Police
Department. 	Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.1 Plaintiff alleges that she was the victim of misconduct and
harassment, id. at ¶ 10, and that she provided the Syracuse Police Department with
“detailed information necessary to investigate, including the suspect’s license plate
1 Though originally named as Defendants, the Syracuse Police Department and its Internal Affairs Division were
not named in the Amended Complaint and claims against those entities should be dismissed.
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number, her workplace, and times when the suspect could be located.” Id. at ¶ 11. She
further alleges, however, that Syracuse Police “refused to act on Plaintiff’s complaint.”
Id. at ¶ 13. She claims that this failure is related to the fact that she had previously filed
a lawsuit against the Syracuse Police Department. Id. at ¶ 9.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint asserts three causes of action: 1) retaliation, 2) violation
of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, and 3)
supervisory liability. Am. Compl. at pp. 6-7.
A. Retaliation
The Second Circuit has described the elements of a First Amendment
retaliation 	claim 	in 	several 	ways, 	depending 	on 	the 	factual 	context.
Generally speaking, however, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) his speech
or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took
an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection
between this adverse action and the protected speech.
B.A. on behalf of M.G., Jr. v. City of Schenectady Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 3d 515, 525-
26 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	Under this standard,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed.
The Amended Complaint specifically claims that the retaliatory conduct alleged
involved the “refus[al] to act on her complaint, ignoring her calls, and failing to
investigate.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 22. This related to Plaintiff’s claims of criminal conduct
directed at her. 	Id. at ¶ 11 (noting Plaintiff had provided information regarding the
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“suspect”). To state a retaliation claim Plaintiff must allege, inter alia, “that the defendant
took adverse action against” him. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Defendants’ alleged failure to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints of criminal activity
cannot be considered ‘adverse action’ against her.” 	Coleman v. Sutkowy, 2016 WL
6952152, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2016) (citing Porter v. Goord, 2009 WL 2180580, *7
(W.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009)); see also Young Am.’s Found. v. Stenger, 2025 WL 874840,
at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025).
Nor does the Amended Complaint allege the requisite casual connection. 	“To
satisfy the third prong, the plaintiff must establish a [causal] connection between the filing
of [her] lawsuits and the retaliatory event.” 	Toliver v. City of New York, 2013 WL
6476791, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL
549402 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2014). 	Plaintiff contends that the failure to investigate was
connected to her previous filing of a lawsuit. Am. Compl. at ¶ 9. She claims only that
the lawsuit placed the Syracuse Police Department and its supervisors on notice of
protected activity. 	Id. 	No further details regarding that lawsuit are provided, however.
She does not identify when or where it was filed, the parties to the action, the nature of
the claims, or anything related to the disposition of the matter. 	Nor does the Amended
Complaint specifically allege in any way that either of the Defendants named here were
either a party to or aware of this litigation. Such bare bones allegations are too conclusory
to support a claim. “[C]laims of this nature must be ‘supported by specific and detailed
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factual allegations,’ and ‘not stated in wholly conclusory terms.’” Hernandez v. Arnone,
2017 WL 1234098, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Friedl v. City of N.Y., 210
F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2000)).
For these reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim be
dismissed.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Amended Complaint also asserts claims under the Fourteenth Amendment;
specifically that Plaintiff was denied equal protection because she was treated “differently
than other complainants” and that the failure to investigate denied her due process. Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 26-28. Neither is a basis for relief and so Plaintiff’s second cause of action
should be dismissed.
“Although 	the 	Constitution 	does 	not 	provide 	an 	affirmative 	right 	to 	an
investigation, ‘it does prohibit the government from treating individuals unequally when
determining which claims to investigate.’” Barkai v. Ruppert, 2021 WL 3621359, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2021) (quoting Lopez v. City of N.Y., 186 F. Supp. 3d 304, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Such a selective treatment claim requires the Plaintiff to establish both
that:
(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively
treated, and (2) the selective treatment was motivated by an intention to
discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, such as race or
religion, to punish or inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a
malicious or bad faith intent to injure the person.
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FSK Drug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1992). Plaintiff offers only a purely
conclusory assertion that other complainants were treated differently, and makes no
allegation at all that the purported failure to investigate was based on an impermissible
classification or basis. 	Such allegations are insufficient and dismissal of this claim is
appropriate.
Nor 	can 	Plaintiff 	establish 	a 	due 	process 	claim. 	The 	original 	Report-
Recommendation noted the purported alleged failure to investigate did not give rise to a
constitutional claim.
The claim that Defendants failed to investigate her criminal complaint “fails
to state a federal civil rights claim as a matter of law.” 	McCullough v.
Syracuse Police Dep’t, 2015 WL 5057472, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015),
report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5062370 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2015). “[I]t is well-established in this Circuit that there is no cognizable
claim arising under Section 1983 for an alleged failure to investigate.”
Cornish v. Town of Bloomfield, 2023 WL 9698029, at *7 (D. Conn. Dec.
15, 2023) (citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); see
also McCaffrey v. City of New York, 2013 WL 494025, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
7, 2013) (“a ‘failure to investigate’ is not independently cognizable as a
stand-alone claim.”).
Report-Recommendation at p. 5. Courts have consistently adhered to the view that “there
is no constitutional violation where the government refuses to investigate a crime.”
Ehlers v. C.I.A., 2015 WL 3637431, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2015) (citing cases).
“Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of [her] due process rights based
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on Defendants’ alleged failure to investigate.” Alan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 716 F. Supp.
3d 67, 71 (W.D.N.Y. 2024)
The Court, therefore, recommends that this claim be dismissed as to the individual
Defendants as well.
C. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff’s final claim alleges that Defendant Sisenko knew of misconduct on the
part of Defendant Petricola and disregarded it in violation of Plaintiff’s rights. 	Am.
Comp. at ¶¶ 30-31. 	This claim is specifically identified as one for “Supervisory
Liability.” Id. at p. 7.
“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” 	Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)).
A supervisory official “may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations
merely because he held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74
(2d Cir. 1996). Despite this rule, the Second Circuit for some time held that a supervisory
official could be held liable under circumstances related to that supervisory role that did
not involve their direct action. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995). Colon
set forth five theories of liability that could apply to supervisory officials. Id. at 873. The
Supreme 	Court’s 	decision 	in 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662 	(2009), 	however,
“engendered conflict within our Circuit about the continuing vitality of the supervisory
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liability test set forth in Colon.” 	Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 205 n.14 (2d Cir.
2012). The conflict remained unresolved until the Second Circuit’s decision in Tangreti
v. Bachmann, which concluded that “after Iqbal, there is no special rule for supervisory
liability. 	Instead, a plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’”
983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Tangreti
requires that Plaintiff allege and establish that Defendants violated his rights “by [their]
own conduct, not by reason of [their] supervision of others who committed the violation.”
983 F.3d at 619.
Under that standard, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Sisenko is liable for the
failure to take corrective action regarding “the misconduct of his subordinates,” Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 30-31, fails to state a claim and should be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: December 5, 2025
Albany, New York
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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