Carney v. Bisignano

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________________________________
Rebecca Valarie C.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 5:25-CV-862
(AJB/MJK)
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
Justin M. Goldstein, Esq., for Plaintiff
Kathryn Pollack Esq., Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To the Honorable Anthony J. Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Rebecca C. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.
1.). Rebecca C. did not consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge.
(Dkt. 4). So, the Honorable Anthony J. Brindisi, U.S. District Judge,
referred this matter to the Court for Report and Recommendation. Both
1 This Report-Recommendation will identify the plaintiff using only her first name
and last initial to protect her privacy.
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parties filed briefs (Dkts. 15, 23, 26) which the Court treats as motions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order 18.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 16, 2021, Rebecca C. filed an application for Title XVI
supplemental social security income benefits, alleging disability
beginning February 14, 2018. (T. 126). The Social Security
Administration denied the claim initially on November 12, 2021, and
again upon reconsideration on March 25, 2022. (Id.). Rebecca C.
requested a hearing five days later. (Id.) On December 22, 2022,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Gretchen Greisler held a hearing. (T.
35-58). At the hearing, Matthew Nutting represented Rebecca C. (T.
37). Both Rebecca C. and a Vocational Expert testified. (T. 35-58). On
July 10, 2023, ALJ Greisler issued an unfavorable decision. (T. 126-
138).
The Appeals Council reversed and remanded that decision. (T.
146-48). The Appeals Council determined that “[t]he hearing decision
did not adequately consider [Rebecca C.’s] mental and cognitive
impairments.” (T. 146). Specifically, “the decision did not adequately
consider whether [Rebecca C.] has an intellectual disability [(“ID”)] at
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steps 2 and 3.” (Id.). “[T]here was no[] discussion of ID at step 2, and the
IQ testing and score were not discussed at step 3 in the paragraph “B”
criteria, nor was Listing 12.05 considered (Findings 2 and 3).” (Id.).
Thus, on remand, the Appeals Council directed ALJ Greisler to give
“further consideration . . . to the severity of . . . [Rebecca C.’s] ID at
steps 2 and 3.” (Id.). The Appeals Councils also found that “[t]he
hearing decision does not contain an adequate evaluation of opinion
evidence in assessing [Rebecca C.’s] residual functional capacity.” (T.
147).
After the case was remanded, ALJ Greisler held another hearing
on September 18, 2024. (T. 59-80). Matthew Nutting again represented
Rebecca C. and a Vocational Expert, Margaret Heck, also testified. (T.
59-80). On October 2, 2024, ALJ Greisler again issued an unfavorable
decision. (T. 10-23). But this time, the Appeals Council denied Rebecca
C.’s appeal. (T. 1-3). Rebecca C. timely appealed the agency’s decision.
(Dkt. 1).
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II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. Disability Standards
To be considered disabled, plaintiffs seeking disability insurance
or supplemental security income benefits must establish that they are
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months …” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, plaintiffs’
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of s
uch severity that [they are] not only unable to do [their]
previous work but cannot, considering [their] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
[they] live[], or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
[them], or whether [they] would be hired if [they] applied for
work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920, to evaluate disability insurance and
supplemental security income disability claims.
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
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has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience …
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
disability at the first four steps. See Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418
(2d Cir. 2013). If they establish that their impairment prevents them
from performing their past work, the burden then shifts to the
Commissioner to prove the final step. Id.
B. Scope of Review
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and
whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42
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U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
record. Id. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every
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conflicting shred of medical testimony[.]”). But ALJs cannot “‘pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).
III. FACTS
The record includes Rebecca C.’s medical and mental health
treatment records, which the parties are familiar with. The Court will
refer to the pertinent records and the hearing testimony in its analysis
of the parties’ claims as appropriate.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step One of the five-step-sequential analysis, ALJ Greisler
determined that Rebecca C. has “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 16, 2021, the application date.” (T. 12) (cleaned up).
At Step Two, ALJ Greisler concluded that Rebecca C. has “the
following severe impairments: obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, obesity,
rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, early hip degenerative joint disease,
right knee disorder (mild arthrosis), intellectual disorder, anxiety, and
depression.” (T. 12) (cleaned up). At the same step, ALJ Greisler found
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Rebecca C.’s “hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux (GERD), and
history of substance abuse” non-severe impairments. (T. 13.).
At Step Three, ALJ Greisler determined that Rebecca C. “does not
have an impairment, or combination of impairments, that medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart. P, Appendix. 1.” (T. 13) (internal citations omitted).
Next, ALJ Greisler discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 15).
“To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must result
in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad area of
functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b)
(cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning are: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting
with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4)
adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Greisler found that Rebecca C. did not meet the
“Paragraph B” criteria because she determined that Rebecca C. had
only moderate limitations in all four areas of mental functioning. (T.
15).
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ALJ Greisler also considered the “paragraph C” criteria. (T. 15-
16). The “paragraph C” criteria require a documented medical history of
the existence of the disorder over a period of at least two years, with
evidence of both (a) medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing
and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder;
and (b) marginal adjustment, that is, minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in environment or to demands that are not already part of daily
life. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(c). Here, ALJ
Greisler noted that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met. (T. 15-16.).
After this, ALJ Greisler determined that Rebecca C. had the
residual function capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the
claimant can stand and walk for up to a cumulative four hours
in a workday. The claimant can occasionally stoop, balance,
crouch, crawl, kneel and climb stairs and ramps, but cannot
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds or work at unprotected
heights. The claimant can perform simple tasks at a
consistent, goal-oriented pace, but not at a fast production
rate pace such that would be experienced in assembly line
type of work. The claimant can engage in occasional
interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public after
learning job tasks from an informational or demonstrational
lesson. The claimant can make simple decisions and tolerate
occasional work changes. The claimant cannot tolerate
concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants or extreme
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heat. The claimant requires a five minute change in position
after standing or walking for one hour but retains ability to
remain on task.
(T. 16).
To make this finding, ALJ Greisler considered “the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s)” pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c.” (Id.).
At Step Four, ALJ Greisler reasoned that Rebecca C. has no past
relevant work, was within the “younger individual age 18-49, on the
date the application was filed, but has since changed age categories to
an individual closely approaching advanced age,” and “has a limited
education.” (T. 29) (cleaned up).
Finally, at Step Five, ALJ Greisler concluded that “considering”
Rebecca C.’s “age, education, work experience, and” RFC, Rebecca C. “is
capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.” (T. 23). Accordingly, ALJ
Greisler determined that Rebecca C. is not disabled as defined by the
Social Security Act. (Id.).
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V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
On appeal, Rebecca C. argues that ALJ Greisler erred by (1) not
addressing her cane use in the RFC and; (2) not complying with the
Appeals Council’s remand order. (Pl. Br. at pgs. 7-17).2 The
Commissioner challenges both argument. (Def. Br. at pgs. 5-13).
VI. DISCUSSION
The Court recommends that the District Court reverse and
remand ALJ Greisler’s decision. In Section VI.A., the Court finds that
ALJ Greisler did not consider Rebecca C.’s cane use in the RFC and that
is error. In Section VI.B., the Court finds that ALJ Greisler did not
comply with the Appeals Council’s remand order.
A. ALJ Greisler did not consider Rebecca C.’s cane use.
ALJ Greisler erred when she failed to consider Rebecca C.’s cane
use. ALJs must consider a claimant’s cane use in the RFC. But here,
ALJ Greisler did not incorporate Rebecca C.’s cane use into the RFC. In
consequence, the District Court should reverse and remand ALJ
Greisler’s decision.
2 (Pl. Br.) refers to Plaintiffs Brief, Dkt. 15, and (Def. Br.) refers to Defendants
Brief, Dkt. 23.
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ALJs must consider a claimant’s cane use in the RFC. “When use
of a hand-held assistive device is medically required, the ALJ must
consider its impact on the claimant’s RFC. Failure to do so warrants
remand.” Scott v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-00468, 2018 WL 4442882, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018). “To find that a hand-held assistive device is
medically required, there must be medical documentation establishing
the need for a hand-held assistive device to aid in walking or standing,
and describing the circumstances for which it is needed . . . The
adjudicator must always consider the particular facts of a case.” SSR
96-9P, 1996 WL 374185.
ALJ Greisler did not incorporate Rebecca C.’s cane use into the
RFC. In her decision, ALJ Greisler claimed that “the record fails to
reflect a documented need for an assistive device[.]” (T. 13). But
Jianghong Yu, M.D. prescribed Rebecca C. the cane she requested. (T.
1048-9). In fact, at the hearing, Rebecca C. confirmed that her doctor
prescribed her a cane. (T. 66). But when performing her analysis, ALJ
Greisler wrote that Rebbeca C. “indicated that she was prescribed a
cane by her rheumatologist.” (T. 17) (emphasis added). Rebecca C. did
not indicate, and the record does not indicate, that a doctor prescribed
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Rebecca C. a cane. The record confirms this fact. (T. 66, 1049). ALJ
Greisler’s failure to address the cane prescription is error. Frankly,
“[t]he ALJ’s mischaracterization of the record related to” Rebecca C.’s
cane use “supports the conclusion that remand of this matter is
required.” Rowe v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-00208, 2018 WL 4233702, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2018); see also Charles F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
19-CV-1664, 2021 WL 963585, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021)
(reversing the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ “neither used the medical
records and opinions to evaluate whether Charles still needed a cane
nor incorporated Charles’s use of a cane into the RFC.”). This error
provides the District Court with an independent ground to reverse and
remand ALJ Greisler’s decision.
The Commissioner’s arguments on appeal should fail. The
Commissioner argues that ALJ Greisler considered the cane because
she cited records that acknowledge Rebecca C. requested a cane and
that Rebecca C. was prescribed a cane. (Def. Br. at pg. 12). The
Commissioner also argues that Rebecca C.’s cane use was temporary
(Id.). But those post hoc rationalizations, which the District Court
cannot accept, are not enough. See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d
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Cir. 1999) (noting that courts “may not accept ... post hoc
rationalizations for agency action”). If ALJ Greisler “considered whether
a cane was medically necessary and decided that it was not, [her]
conclusion and reasoning are missing.” Charles F., 2021 WL 963585 at
*4. And because ALJ Greisler “did not make an explicit finding about
[Rebecca C.’s] use of a cane, this Court does not know whether [she]
failed to consider the evidence about a cane; found that a cane was not
medically necessary; found that a cane was medically necessary but did
not impact [Rebecca C.’s] RFC; or reached some other conclusion.” Id.
As a result, the District Court should reject the Commissioner’s
arguments.
* * *
In the end, ALJ Greisler’s failure to assess Rebecca C.’s cane use
impacted the RFC analysis, and that error is not harmless. See Vanever
v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-1034, 2018 WL 4266058 at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2018) (finding the ALJ’s failure to incorporate the plaintiff’s assistive
device into the RFC not harmless). So for the reasons stated above—
that ALJ Greisler failed to consider Rebecca C.’s cane use—this Court
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recommends the District Court reverse and remand ALJ Greisler’s
decision.
B. ALJ Greisler did not properly incorporate the Appeals
Council’s remand order in her second decision.
The District Court should reverse and remand ALJ Greisler’s
decision. ALJs are required to take any action that the Appeals Council
orders. An ALJ’s failure to comply with Appeals Council’s remand order
requires the District Court to reverse and remand the ALJ’s decision.
Here, viewing the Paragraph B analysis narrowly or expansively, the
Court finds that ALJ Greisler ignored the Appeals Council’s remand
order. In consequence, the Court recommends the District Court reverse
and remand ALJ Greisler’s decision.
ALJs are “required to take any action that is ordered by the
Appeals Council.” Tracy v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-00980, 2017 WL 279556,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017).“Accordingly, an ALJ’s failure to comply
with the Appeals Council’s order constitutes legal error and necessitates
a remand.” Annemarie P. v. Dudek, No. 23-CV-1415 (MJK), 2025 WL
814772, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025) (cleaned up).
The Appeals Council ordered ALJ Greisler to consider Rebecca
C.’s IQ score in the Paragraph B analysis. When remanding ALJ
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Greisler’s original decision, the Appeals Council noted the following:
“the [ALJ’s] decision did not adequate[ly] consider whether [Rebecca C.]
has an intellectual disability at steps 2 and 3. Specifically . . . the IQ
testing and score were not discussed at step 3 in the paragraph “B”
criteria, nor was Listing 12.05 considered (Findings 2 and 3).” (T. 146)
(emphasis added). The Appeals Council continued: Rebecca C.’s full IQ
test score of 64 “appear[s] to be reasonably valid” so “consideration
should be given to relevant evidence in determining the degree to which
medically determination impairments affect the four areas of mental
functioning.” (Id.) (emphasis added).
ALJ Greisler ignored the Appeals Council’s remand order.
Examining the Paragraph B analysis, this Court can find no evidence
that ALJ Greisler considered Rebecca C.’s IQ scores. See (T. 15). To
make that clear, the Court examines ALJ Greisler’s Paragraph B
analysis and finds that substantial evidence does not support her
conclusions.
Dr. Shapiro found Rebecca C. “appears permanently disabled” and
“her condition is not expected to improve, and” she “is unable to
participate in any activities.” (T. 861). Coming to this conclusion, Dr.
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Shapiro noted that Rebecca C. is very limited in her abilities to perform
complex tasks independently, regularly attend to a routine and
maintain a schedule, and use public transportation, and is moderately
limited in maintaining attention and concentration for roles and tasks.
(T. 860). In this context, very limited means “unable to function 75% or
more of the time” and moderately limited means “unable to function
50% of the time.” (Id.). Dr. Shapiro also noted that Rebecca C. has
difficulty adequately communicating with others, her community skills
are impaired, she is lacking self-direction, her academic skills are
impaired, and her home living, leisure, and work skills are impaired. (T.
859).
Taking a narrow approach—i.e. Rebecca C.’s scores themselves
and the conclusion from those scores needed to be included in the
Paragraph B analysis—the Court finds that ALJ Greisler did not
discuss Rebecca C.’s IQ scores. ALJ Greisler, seeming to either not
account for or discount the IQ scores, noted that Rebecca C.’s “mental
status examinations throughout the record note normal memory,”
Rebecca C. “had been described as cooperative through the record,” she
“testified that she is able to read and do everyday math,” and her
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“mental status examination throughout the record show normal mood,
normal insight, normal judgment, and no suicidal ideations.” (T. 15)
(cleaned up). But Rebecca C.’s Verbal Compression Index (70),
Perceptual Reasoning Index (71), Working Memory Index (63),
Processing Speed Index (74), Skills Domain Score (69), Daily Living
Skills Score (60), Socialization Skill Score (65), and Adapative Behavior
Composite Score (65), and Full-Scale IQ (64), indicate significant
cognitive limitation. See (T. 859); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 309 fn. 5 (2002) (“. . . an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is
typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function
prong of the mental retardation definition.”); accord Lard v. Saul, No.
19-CV-1829, 2020 WL 6827901, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2020) (“the
claimant’s score of 65 on this IQ test strengthens other evidence in the
record that the claimant’s IQ score is in the disabled range, including a
2003 test on which the claimant scored a full-scale IQ of 63.”). Neither
the test scores nor any conclusion that can be drawn from those test
scores are included in ALJ Greisler’s Paragraph B analysis.
Taking a broader view—i.e. ALJ Greisler included the IQ scores in
her Paragraph B analysis by referencing Dr. Shapiro’s notes—the Court
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finds that ALJ Greisler improperly engaged in opinion substitution.
“[I]t is impermissible for an ALJ to interpret[] raw medical data and
substitute [their] own opinion for that of a medical source. . ..” Heaman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-1459 (TWD), 2018 WL 11468023, at
*9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018). ALJs, however, are allowed to resolve
conflicts in the medical record. Id. But here, ALJ Greisler is not
resolving conflicts in the medical record. She is determining that Dr.
Shapiro’s IQ test findings are not disabling because Rebecca C. can do
everyday math, is cordial when meeting her doctors, and has normal
mental status examines. (T. 15). But none of these findings negate
Rebecca C.’s IQ test scores. To start, “[t]he fact that [Rebecca C.] was
described as pleasant and cooperative . . . does not negate the severity
of her mental impairments . . ..” Callahan v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-
06245, 2018 WL 1616058, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2018). Next, an
individual can have disabling IQ scores and normal mental status
exams. See, e.g., Meadows v. Colvin, No. CV 14-28563, 2016 WL 829170,
at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 8, 2016), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 14-CV-28563, 2016 WL 830058 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 3, 2016) (reversing
and remanding the ALJ’s decision where the “[c]laimant had a normal
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mental status exam” and their “[i]ntellectual assessment revealed a
full[-]scale IQ score of 69 and reading, spelling, and math abilities at a
third, second, and fifth grade level respectively.”); Lard v. Saul, 2020
WL 6827901, at *3-4, 11 (reversing the ALJ’s decision where the
claimant had a full-scale IQ score of 72 but was described as
cooperative, normal and stable). Taking ALJ Greisler’s logic to its
furthest conclusion, an individual with a full-scale IQ score under 70
cannot be disabled unless they are either suicidal, homicidal, or
hallucinating. See, e.g., (T. 597) (mental status exams examine, among
other things, if the claimant has suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation,
and hallucinations). That cannot be so. Finally, the term “everyday
math” is undefined. So Rebecca C.’s testimony that she can perform
“everyday math” says nothing about what she can actually do. At
bottom, ALJ Greisler impermissibly engaged in opinion substitution
when performing the Paragraph B analysis. That was error.
* * *
All in all, ALJ Greisler did not comply with the Appeals Council’s
remand order. Failure to comply with the Appeals Council’s remand
order is error and requires remand. Here, the Appeals Council ordered
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ALJ Greisler to consider Rebecca C.’s test scores. Taking either a
narrow or broad view, the Court finds that ALJ Greisler failed to
comply with the Appeals Council’s remand order. So this Court
recommends the District Court reverse and remand ALJ Greisler’s
decision.
VII CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
RECOMMENDED, that the District Court GRANT Rebecca C.’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 15) because ALJ Greisler
did not consider Rebecca C.’s cane use, and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the District Court GRANT Rebecca C.’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 15) because ALJ Greisler
did not comply with the Appeals Council remand order, and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the District Court DENY the
Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 23), and it
is further
RECOMMENDED, that the decision of the Commissioner be
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c),
the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the
foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.
Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Dated: May 8, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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