Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
LISA MARIE J.,
Plaintiff,
5:25-CV-123
v. 	(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt.
Nos. 11 & 13, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 	Dkt. No. 12.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
granted and Defendant’s Motion is denied.
I. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through
December 31, 2018. 	Dkt. No. 8, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”) at p. 2866. 	Next, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 11, 2016, the
alleged onset date. Id. The ALJ next found:
Since the alleged onset date of disability, August 11, 2016, the claimant
has had the following severe impairments: obesity, lumbar stenosis and
degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy, degenerative changes of the
cervical spine with radiculopathy, degenerative changes of the thoracic
spine, history of total right hip arthroplasty with subsequent infection and
revision, osteoarthritis of the left hip, hearing loss, history of left shoulder
injury, 	status-post 	bilateral 	carpal 	tunnel 	release, 	chronic 	fatigue
syndrome, fibromyalgia, bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, dependent personality disorder, borderline personality disorder,
post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder 	(PTSD), 	history 	of 	attention 	deficit
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General
Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 5 & General Order 18.
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hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and premenstrual dysphoric disorder (20
CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
Id. 	Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §
404, Subpart P, App. 1. 	Tr. at p. 2867. 	With respect to residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work with these
limitations:
she should not work at unprotected heights or work in close proximity to
dangerous machinery or moving mechanical parts of equipment. The
claimant should not climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, balance as defined
in the SCO, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can occasionally climb ramps
and stairs. The claimant can occasionally but not repetitively stoop. She
can 	frequently 	reach, 	handle, 	finger, 	and 	feel. 	The 	claimant 	can
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. She can use
judgment to make simple work-related decisions. 	The claimant should
work in a job with occasional changes in the routine work setting. 	She
cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate such as an
assembly line or perform work which requires hourly quotas. The claimant
should have occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, and no
public contact. She should use a cane for ambulation but retains the ability
to carry small objects with her free hand. The claimant should change
positions during ordinary breaks and lunch hour. In addition, she should
be able to stand for two minutes at hour intervals. The claimant can stay
on task at the workstation during the position change.
Tr. at p. 2869. Plaintiff was found to have no past relevant work. Tr. at p. 2880. The
ALJ then found that based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC she
could perform several jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy prior
to August 25, 2024, but not after. 	Tr. at pp. 2880-2881. 	Accordingly, the ALJ found
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that Plaintiff was disabled for some, but not all the relevant time period. Tr. at pp. 2881-
2282.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d
Cir. 1987). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere
scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
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the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process asks:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination
of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on
a “residual functional capacity” assessment, whether the claimant can
perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and
(5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy
that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). 	“If at any step a finding of
disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.”
Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Evaluation of Medical Evidence
Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of the prior administrative medical
findings (“PAMF”) of Dr. Haus and the medical opinion offered by social worker Sarah
Bowers. Dkt. No. 11, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 12-16.
1. Dr. Haus
The ALJ considered Dr. Haus’ PAMF and find it “generally persuasive.” Tr. at
p. 2875. Plaintiff raises several issues with the ALJ’s finding, including that she failed
to address the supportability of Dr. Haus’ findings. 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 12-13.
The Commissioner concedes that “the ALJ’s opinion analysis does not explicitly address
supportability.” Dkt. No. 12, Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 7. He argues, however, that the
ALJ’s rationale can sufficiently be gleaned from the record and that any error is in any
event harmless. 	Id. at pp. 7-9. 	The Court disagrees with those submissions and
concludes that the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.
Supportability and consistency are “[t]he most important factors,” 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(a), in evaluating medical opinions under current Social Security regulations.
“[S]upportability” means that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
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opinions 	or 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	will 	be.” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§
404.1520c(c)(1). 	“In analyzing the supportability factor, ‘the ALJ must conduct an
inquiry confined to the medical source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical
source supported and explained their opinion.’” James v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL
305068, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2026) (quoting Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 30
(S.D.N.Y. 2022)).
The ALJ did not address the supportability of Dr. Haus’ findings at all. Tr. at p.
2875. Defendant suggests that because the ALJ expressly noted in her analysis of the
other PAMFs that each was supported either by the medical evidence or a sufficient
explanation and Dr. Haus reviewed the same medical records as the others, that
supportability can be gleaned from the record. 	Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 7. 	On the
contrary, the Court finds that this is a greater reason for finding the conclusion
unsupported by the record. The Commissioner’s citation regarding the ALJ’s handling
of the other PAMFs highlights that she was aware of her obligation to discuss
supportability and makes the failure to do so with respect to Dr. Haus more glaring. It
also raises a significant question as to why the ALJ would not have done so. “Although
an ALJ’s assessment of supportability need not be overburdensome, a clear explanation
of how supportability was assessed is necessary.” Philip B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024
WL 5454787, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,
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2025 WL 540372 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025) (internal citation omitted). The Court will
not presume that the ALJ’s unexplained silence under these circumstances means that
she reached the same conclusion regarding Dr. Haus as she did the other PAMFs. That
is especially true given the more detailed consideration the ALJ gave to each of those
findings when compared to that of Dr. Haus, Tr. at pp. 2874-2875, and the fact that the
ALJ did not afford the same weight to each of those opinions. While each, according to
the Commissioner, considered the same evidence, the ALJ found the opinions of Drs.
Periakaruppan, Dickerson, and Juriga only “partially persuasive,” id., and the opinion
of Dr. Haus, the only one not properly evaluated, “generally persuasive.” Tr. at p. 2875.
This makes it impossible to say that the ALJ’s proper analysis of Haus’ opinion can be
gleaned from the record.
Nor can the Court say the error is harmless. Defendant suggests that the error is
harmless because the ultimate RFC finding accommodated the findings of Dr. Haus, if
not imposing a more restrictive RFC. Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 8-9. This Court has
previously recognized that an error can be harmless when the ALJ’s consideration of
specific limitations in an opinion nonetheless resulted in a more restrictive RFC. 	See
Christopher Q. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 528787, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026),
report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 527010 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2026). This
case presents a slightly different circumstance, however, because elsewhere in her
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opinion the ALJ evaluates the opinion of Nurse Practitioner Zhang in light of her prior
evaluation of the Haus opinion. 	Tr. at p. 2878. 	It appears from the record that NP
Zhang’s opinion is found not persuasive in part because of its lack of consistency with
Dr. Haus’ opinion. Given the finding that the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Haus’ opinion,
the Court cannot be certain that this finding did not also improperly influence the
evaluation of NP Zhang’s opinion. Id. “The ALJ is required to provide rationale in the
written decision sufficient to allow this Court to conduct an adequate review of [her]
findings.” Shanaye S.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 1988672, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
May 6, 2019) (citing cases). 	On this record, the Court does not believe the error
identified with respect to Dr. Haus’ opinion was harmless. 	Accordingly, remand is
required. See Towanda B. o/b/o A.N.B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 3209275, at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Towanda
B. on behalf of A.N.B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 3206463 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,
2025).
2. Ms. Bowers
Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion of Ms. Bowers. Pl.’s
Mem. of Law at pp. 14-16. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred factually
in concluding that Ms. Bowers’s opinion “is not supported by a function assessment.”
Tr. at p. 2877. A review of the opinion, in fact, shows that Bowers specifically opined
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that Plaintiff “has . . . demonstrated difficulty managing anxiety related to completing
tasks and has pronounced difficulty in most social situations, particularly those which
require her to deviate from a rigid social script. 	Her symptoms routinely impair her
ability to follow through on tasks.” 	Tr. at p. 1892. 	This clearly sought to identify
functional limitations Plaintiff was, in Ms. Bowers’ opinion, experiencing. 	The
Commissioner offers a number of reasons why this opinion should not have been found
persuasive, Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 10-14, but most of those reasons were not
discussed by the ALJ. See Tr. at p. 2877. This Court’s “determination cannot properly
be based on the Commissioner’s post hoc rationalizations.” Beth Marie N. v. Comm’r
of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	2023 	WL 	6065309, 	at 	*6 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	9, 	2023), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6065945 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023). “The Court
will not assume the ALJ’s determination was based on a rationale [s]he did not express.”
Laureen P. v. Saul, 2020 WL 1044012, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2020). 	Further review
and explanation of this opinion by the ALJ, therefore, is warranted. On remand, the ALJ
should re-evaluate the opinion from Ms. Bowers and provide a fulsome explanation for
what weight, if any, should be given to that opinion.
B. Vocational Expert Testimony
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly support her evaluation of the
vocational expert’s testimony. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 16-20. Specifically, Plaintiff
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argues that the record shows that the VE did not understand the hypothetical posed
during the hearing and that the VE’s testimony is unsupported as a result. Id. In light
of the necessity for a remand “it may be necessary for Defendant to re-evaluate the Step
Five determination after re-evaluating the RFC.” Jacqueline H. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL
1243619, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019). Accordingly, the Court need not address this
question on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion denying Plaintiff disability benefits is
REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four for further
proceedings; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
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Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: March 6, 2026
Albany, New York
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