USA v. Aguilar-Garcia

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
-v- 	5:25-CR-492 (AJB)
MARVIN WOTSBELI AGUILAR-GARCIA,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2025, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Jonathan
Adamowich swore out a criminal complaint that charged defendant Marvin Wotsbeli Aguilar-Gar-
cia (“defendant”) with assaulting a federal officer during an immigration arrest. See Dkt. No. 1.
Although the United States of America (“the Government”) managed to indict defendant on the
same charge, Dkt. No. 10, the prosecution was dropped in the lead up to trial, see Dkt. No. 83, and
defendant was released, Dkt. No. 84. The case was closed on February 12, 2026. See id.
On July 29, 2026, proposed-intervenor Advance Publications, Inc. (“Advance”), newspa-
per publisher of The Post Standard and its website, Syracuse.com, sought to intervene in this mat-
ter to request unsealing of (1) the Government’s letter requesting dismissal of the case (at Dkt.
Nos. 81, 83); and (2) the pre-trial motions, related documents, and this Court’s Order (at Dkt. Nos.
31, 48, 53, 62, 64, 70-72, 77, 80). Dkt. No. 85 (“Advance Letter”). Advance also sought to ensure
that (3) certain documents (at Dkt. Nos. 22, 41, 60) were posted on the public docket. Id.
On July 30, 2026, the Court ordered briefing from defendant and the Government. Dkt.
No. 87. Thereafter, defendant submitted a letter brief stating that he had no objection to the request
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 1 of 21

- 2 -
to unseal, with the exception of one minor set of redactions. Dkt. No. 90. The Government, for
its part, sought an extension of time, Dkt. No. 89, and then opposed in substantial part. Dkt. No.
95 (“Gov’t Opp.”). There, the Government explained that it did not object to the Court posting
the three missing docket entries to the public docket, or to the public filing of a redacted version
of the Government’s letter seeking leave to dismiss. Id. However, the Government objected to
unsealing of the currently sealed docket entries. Id. at 3. Advance has replied. Dkt. No. 96.
The motion will be considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.
II. 	BACKGROUND1
On December 18, 2025, the Government obtained from a federal grand jury a one-count
indictment charging defendant Marvin Wotsbeli Aguilar-Garcia (“defendant”) with assaulting a
federal officer:
On or about December 15, 2025, in Lewis County in the Northern
District of New York, the defendant MARVIN WOTSBELI
AGUILAR-GARCIA, knowingly and intentionally did forcibly as-
sault, resist, oppose, impede, and interfere with any person desig-
nated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114, that is a Border Patrol Agent, while the
agent was engaged in official duties, and inflicted bodily injury, in
that AGUILAR-GARCIA thew [sic] a book at the agent during a
traffic stop, striking the agent near the eye and causing injury, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 111(a)(1) & (b).
Dkt. No. 10 (emphases in original). Trial was set for February 17, 2026. Dkt. No. 18.
On January 29, 2026, the Government presented a proposed superseding indictment to the
same grand jury. See Dkt. No. 48. According to the Government, the proposed superseding in-
dictment was identical to the original indictment in all respects except that it alleged defendant
1 Certain matters discussed in this opinion were the subject of sealing requests based on a protective order to which
defendant consented. See Dkt. No. 59. Other matters were the subject of ex parte sealing requests governing disclo-
sure of certain grand jury matters, see Dkt. No. 42, and potential impeachment information about prospective law
enforcement witnesses, see Dkt. No. 60. For reasons explained infra, these matters are being discussed in this opinion,
which has been filed as a publicly available docket entry.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 2 of 21

- 3 -
“threw an object at the agent during a traffic stop” rather than alleging that defendant “thew [sic]
a book at the agent during a traffic stop.” Id.
The grand jury returned a “no true bill.” The no bill was reported to the Court and, with
the Court’s approval, disclosed to defendant. 	Out of an abundance of caution, the Government
framed its request to disclose this information to defendant as a petition to disclose a “grand jury
matter” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with that
framing, the Government proposed—and the Court approved—a protective order limiting disclo-
sure. Accordingly, any filings discussing or referencing the fact of the “no true bill,” along with
any references to the grand jury’s consideration of the proposed superseding indictment, have been
filed as sealed. 	See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 45, 48, 53, 62, 64. 	Certain of these sealed filings include
transcripts of testimony given before the grand jury and filings quoting or discussing that testi-
mony. See Dkt. Nos. 53, 62, 64, 80.
On February 7, 2026, ten days before trial, the Government also disclosed to defendant
certain material pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 105 (1972). 	Dkt. No. 70. 	That
material concerned U.S. Border Patrol Agent Trevor Baize—the agent whom defendant was ac-
cused of injuring with a book or an object during the December 15, 2025, traffic stop—and, in
particular, his membership in the “I’m 10-15” Facebook group and other aspects of his social me-
dia history. See id.2 According to the Government’s disclosure, Agent Baize joined the group in
approximately 2018 and remained a member until the group closed in 2019. Id.
2 The “I’m 10-15” Facebook group was a private Facebook group created in 2016 for current and former U.S. Border
Patrol agents. According to reporting by ProPublica, the group had approximately 9,500 members nationwide and
described itself as a forum for both “funny” and “serious” discussion concerning Border Patrol work; the name “10-
15” refers to a Border Patrol code for “aliens in custody.” ProPublica reported that posts within the group included
derogatory comments about migrants and members of Congress, as well as jokes and memes concerning migrant
deaths. See generally A.C. Thompson, Inside the Secret Border Patrol Facebook Group Where Agents Joke About
Migrant Deaths and Post Sexist Memes, PROPUBLICA (July 1, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/secret-bor-
der-patrol-facebook-group-agents-joke-about-migrant-deaths-post-sexist-memes.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 3 of 21

- 4 -
During that period, Agent Baize reported that he had re-shared posts or stories created by
other users on twelve or fewer occasions and added his own commentary concerning law enforce-
ment use-of-force policies and his views concerning the appropriate use of force. 	Dkt. No. 70.
Agent Baize also disclosed that he re-shared approximately twenty other posts or memes in the
group without adding commentary. See id. According to Agent Baize, those posts generally ex-
pressed support for Border Patrol or immigration enforcement. Id. Agent Baize further stated that
he could not rule out the possibility that he had re-shared a post or meme employing a derogatory
term for migrants, although he did not believe that he had done so. Id.
The Government’s February 7 disclosure also identified several posts from Agent Baize’s
personal Facebook account. See Dkt. No. 70. In December 2023, Agent Baize shared an image
of a T-shirt stating, “Wanna make everything electric? Start with the border wall.” Id. In January
2026, he re-shared a post concerning the shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis and, in an ex-
change with another Facebook user, expressed the view that Pretti had “fought” and “violently
resisted” law enforcement while armed, and that Pretti’s own actions had caused his death. Id.
The Government’s February 7 disclosure also included information concerning the mem-
bership of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jordan Bastedo—who participated in the pursuit of defendant
following the traffic stop and later observed Agent Baize’s alleged injury—and Supervisory Bor-
der Patrol Agent Kajoya Daniels, another prospective Government witness, in the “I’m 10-15”
group. See Dkt. No. 70. Agent Bastedo reported that he joined the group in approximately 2016
but never posted or otherwise participated in it. Id. According to Agent Bastedo, he left the group
in approximately September 2018 because he believed the “tenor” of the posts and comments was
becoming “inappropriate.” Id.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 4 of 21

- 5 -
Agent Daniels similarly reported that he had been a member of the group. Dkt. No. 70.
Agent Daniels did not recall whether he had posted or otherwise participated in the group, but
stated that his usual practice was not to comment, post, or otherwise engage on social media, and
that he did not believe he departed from that practice while a member. Id. Agent Daniels further
reported that, in 2019, he encountered a post containing derogatory references to Congresswoman
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, commented that the post should be removed and that the participants
should act more professionally, and thereafter left the group. Id.
After disclosing this Giglio material to the defense, the Government moved in limine to
preclude defendant from introducing the foregoing social media materials at trial. 	Dkt. No. 70.
Defendant opposed. Dkt. No. 71. That briefing, including the social media materials attached to
the Government’s motion, was filed under seal (pursuant to a protective order) on February 11,
2026. Dkt. Nos. 70, 71. The Court ordered supplemental briefing, Dkt. No. 72, but the indictment
was dismissed on the Government’s motion the next day. Dkt. No. 83.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Advance has requested unsealing of (1) the Government’s letter requesting dismissal of the
case (at Dkt. Nos. 81, 83); and (2) the pre-trial motions, related documents, and this Court’s Order
(at Dkt. Nos. 31, 48, 53, 62, 64, 70-72, 77, 80). Dkt. No. 85. Advance has also sought to ensure
that (3) certain documents (at Dkt. Nos. 22, 41, 60) were posted on the public docket. Id.
At the outset, the Government acknowledges that Advance, as a media organization, has
standing to intervene in this criminal matter to enforce the public’s right of access. See Gov’t Opp.
at 7 (citing United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Adams, 2025
WL 1226635, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2025)). The Court agrees. Accordingly, Advance will
be designated as an intervenor for that purpose.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 5 of 21

- 6 -
On the merits, the Government agrees that certain missing docket entries should be publicly
reflected on the docket, and that a redacted version of its letter seeking dismissal may be filed
publicly. See Gov’t Opp. But the Government otherwise opposes unsealing. See id.
A. Intervenor’s Unsealing Request
As a threshold matter, the Government contends that Advance should not be permitted
access to the sealed materials in question before the Court has ruled on the motion to unseal. Gov.
Opp. At 7. In the Government’s view, permitting Advance to access these materials prior to un-
sealing runs the risk of undermining the interests that the Government seeks to protect. Id. at 7–
8. For instance, the Government points out that the protective orders governing disclosure of cer-
tain materials bound the parties but did not expressly restrict an intervenor’s ability to disseminate
them. Id. Thus, according to the Government, while Advance is entitled to intervene and litigate
its request for access, it is not entitled to obtain an unrestricted “first look” at the sealed materials
before the Court determines whether they should remain partially or completely sealed. Id. at 8.
After considering the matter, the Court agrees with the Government: Advance is not enti-
tled to a “first look” at the sealed materials. 	But under these circumstances, the Government’s
objection is procedural rather than substantive. The Court has reviewed the materials and deter-
mined, for the reasons set forth below, which portions may be disclosed and which must remain
sealed or redacted.
1. Giglio Materials
First, as to the Giglio materials, the Government argues that continued sealing is warranted
by the agents’ privacy interests and by concern that public disclosure could chill future self-report-
ing of potentially impeaching information by law enforcement witnesses. Gov’t Opp. at 28–36.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 6 of 21

- 7 -
Neither concern is insubstantial. But the Government has not justified continued compre-
hensive sealing of the Giglio materials in question. Courts “recognize a general right to inspect
and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” 	Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 	This common law right of public access,
which “is said to predate the Constitution,” United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.
1995) (“Amodeo I”), derives from the public’s interest in “keep[ing] a watchful eye on the work-
ings of public agencies” and in monitoring the operation of the courts. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; see
also United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”).
The common law analysis proceeds in several steps. 	First, the Court must determine
whether the material at issue constitutes a “judicial document.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onon-
daga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). A document qualifies as a judicial document where it is
“relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Amodeo
I, 44 F.3d at 145. Put differently, a filing is a judicial document where it “would reasonably have
the tendency to influence a district court’s ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory
powers,” regardless of whether the document ultimately affected the Court’s decision. Brown v.
Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Distinct from the common law right of access is a First Amendment right of public access
to criminal proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
The Second Circuit has recognized two related approaches for determining whether that right at-
taches. Under the “experience and logic” approach, courts ask whether the type of proceeding or
document at issue has historically been open to the press and general public and whether public
access “plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pelligrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 7 of 21

- 8 -
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). Alternatively, a First Amendment right may attach where
access to the document is “derived from or [is] a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the
relevant proceedings.” Newsday LLC v. Cnty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
The Government does not dispute that Docket Numbers 70 and 71 are “judicial docu-
ments.” Those filings asked the Court to decide whether defendant could use the disclosed “I’m
10-15” Facebook group and other social media evidence to impeach certain Government witnesses
at trial. A common law presumption of access therefore attaches to this material. See Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 119. So does a First Amendment right of qualified access. See United States v. Silver,
No. 2016 WL 1572993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 2016) (reasoning that the First Amendment right
of access applies to motion in limine practice, which has “historically been open to the press and
general public”) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120).
For documents that qualify as judicial in nature, the next step is to determine the weight of
the common law presumption of access. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. “The weight of the pre-
sumption is a function of (1) ‘the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial
power’ and (2) ‘the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.’”
Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (quot-
ing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119–20); see also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. Materials that “directly
affect an adjudication” and play a substantial role in determining litigants’ substantive rights re-
ceive a strong presumption of access, whereas materials having only a limited or ancillary role in
the exercise of judicial power receive a weaker presumption. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50; see
also Brown, 929 F.3d at 50.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 8 of 21

- 9 -
As to the common law access balancing, a presumption of public access applies to the
motion in limine and related filings. The strength of the presumption “derive[s] from the role those
documents played in determining litigants’ substantive rights—conduct at the heart of Article III—
and from the need for public monitoring of that conduct.” 	Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. 	When
“documents are usually filed with the court and are generally available, the weight of the presump-
tion is stronger than [when] filing with the court is unusual or is generally under seal.” Id. at 1050.
Although motions in limine enjoy a lighter presumption than material introduced at trial or
dispositive motions, see Brown, 929 F.3d at 50, the filings here called directly upon the Court to
determine whether the defense could impeach certain Government witnesses with evidence bear-
ing on potential bias and credibility. 	And because no evidentiary hearing was held, the motion
papers themselves constituted the sole means by which the Court was asked to exercise that au-
thority.
Here, the public has a legitimate interest in “knowing the grounds on which government
conduct in obtaining evidence is challenged[.]” In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
1987) (internal citations omitted). That interest is particularly substantial where, as here, the evi-
dentiary dispute was presented entirely through written submissions. See In re Pub. Def. Serv. for
D.C., 607 F. Supp. 3d 11, 23 (D.D.C. 2022) (stating the public’s interest in documents related to a
motion to suppress is especially high, because a suppression hearing “resembles a bench trial” and
“the conduct of law enforcement officers is at issue”); Silver, 2016 WL 1572993, at *5 (“Because
motions in limine, which are usually publicly available, have an important role in determining
litigants’ rights to a fair trial and because the public has a legitimate interest in monitoring a court’s
power to decide evidentiary questions, a strong presumption of access applies to the Motion in
Limine and related documents.”).
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 9 of 21

- 10 -
And, as relevant here, “[t]he press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial pro-
cesses to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.” Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 839 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the common law
presumption of access carries meaningful heft. See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 210 (3d
Cir. 2007) (affirming unsealing of FBI agent’s personnel records and related Brady/Giglio filings
because “the process by which the government investigates and prosecutes its citizens is an im-
portant matter of public concern”).
Against that backdrop, the Government principally invokes the privacy interests of the in-
dividual agents identified in the materials and the institutional interest in encouraging law enforce-
ment witnesses to continue self-reporting information that may bear on their credibility. 	Gov’t
Opp. at 28–36. While those interests are legitimate, they do not justify wholesale sealing of the
filings on the present record.
As to the question of privacy, the Second Circuit has instructed courts to “consider the
degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public . . . [f]inan-
cial records of a wholly owned business, family affairs, illnesses, embarrassing conduct with no
public ramifications, and similar matters will weigh more heavily against access than conduct af-
fecting a substantial portion of the public.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. “The nature and degree
of injury must also be weighed.” 	Id. 	In addition, courts must consider “the sensitivity of the
information and the subject,” “the reliability of the information,” and whether “there is a fair op-
portunity for the subject to respond to any accusations contained therein.” Id.
A review of the materials at issue in light of these privacy considerations confirms that the
subject matter does not involve merely “private” matters or “embarrassing conduct.” 	The “I’m
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 10 of 21

- 11 -
10-15” group drew national scrutiny because posts attributed to its members included racist and
misogynistic material, derogatory commentary about migrants, and jokes concerning migrant
deaths. See United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, 2026 WL 1759521, at *2 (D.N.M. June 18, 2026).
Conduct or speech by law enforcement officers reflecting potential bias have obvious public ram-
ifications where those officers exercise governmental authority and appear as witnesses in criminal
prosecutions.
Thus, although the Court does not equate membership in the group with endorsement of its
content, the subject matter of the disclosures falls materially closer to the “conduct affecting a
substantial portion of the public” side of the balance than to the purely private matters ordinarily
entitled to greater privacy protection. See Fenico v. City of Philadelphia, 70 F.4th 151, 153 (3d
Cir. 2023) (recognizing in the First Amendment context that officers’ social media posts celebrat-
ing police violence could render their credibility suspect in criminal proceedings and undermine
public confidence in policing).
That said, the Government is correct that the privacy interests are not identical as to each
agent. According to the Government’s account, Agents Bastedo and Daniels did not engage in the
conduct that gave rise to the group’s notoriety—Bastedo reported that he never posted in the group
and left when its tenor became inappropriate; Daniels reported that he objected to an offensive
post and thereafter departed. Gov’t Opp. at 30; Dkt. No. 70. Their membership therefore cannot
fairly be treated as any evidence that they adopted the views expressed by other members.
But this argument carries less force as to Agent Baize. 	The Government acknowledges
that Baize’s active participation in “I’m 10-15,” as well as personal social media posts that alleg-
edly bear on his views concerning immigrants as a group, more closely resemble “conduct
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 11 of 21

- 12 -
affecting a substantial portion of the public” than traditionally private matters. Gov’t Opp. at 32
(citing Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051).
The Court agrees. These materials do not concern “[f]inancial records of a wholly owned
business, family affairs, illnesses, embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications,” or the like.
Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. Rather, they concern conduct potentially bearing on the credibility
of a law enforcement witness in a criminal prosecution involving immigration enforcement.
This logic also applies to Agent’s Baize’s personal Facebook activity. Though the fact that
the posts appeared on a personal social media account weighs to some degree in favor of privacy,
the subject matter is not analogous to traditionally private information. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at
1051. Rather, to the extent the posts bear on Baize’s attitudes toward migrants or the use of force,
they, too, have public ramifications.
Nor does the Government’s concern about chilling future self-reporting warrant sealing the
filings in their entirety. 	The Government argues that disclosure could discourage agents from
voluntarily identifying potentially impeaching information in future cases. Gov’t Opp. at 33–36.
The Government has not shown, however, that disclosure of these particular judicial documents
would create a sufficiently concrete risk to outweigh the presumption of access that attaches to
these materials. Were such a generalized concern sufficient, materials concerning potential Giglio
information could remain sealed in virtually every case in which the Government represented that
disclosure might affect future reporting.
The same conclusion about these materials follows under the First Amendment analysis.
Where, as here, the First Amendment right of access applies, sealing is permitted only if “specific,
on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 12 of 21

- 13 -
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (quoting In re N.Y. Times
Co., 828 F.2d at 116). Generalized concerns are insufficient. 	Id.
The Government’s interests in protecting legitimate privacy concerns and preserving can-
dor in internal disclosure processes may, in an appropriate case, qualify as such higher values. But
those interests do not support withholding from public view the entirety of filings submitted for
resolution of an evidentiary dispute. Instead, the Court must identify the interests that would be
harmed by disclosure and consider whether redaction or another less restrictive alternative would
adequately protect those interests. See In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116.
In other words, not every piece of information contained in the Giglio filings must be dis-
closed without limitation. 	The Government invokes safety concerns, citing recent incidents of
threats, “doxxing,” and harassment directed at federal immigration officers. Gov’t Opp. at 32–34.
Again, those concerns are serious, but the Government has not identified a particularized threat
arising from disclosure of these filings that would justify wholesale sealing.
Thus, to the extent the filings contain personal identifying information unrelated to the
agents’ identities, or collateral information identifying private third parties, targeted redaction pro-
vides a less restrictive means of protecting that interest. See Fowler-Washington v. City of New
York, 2020 WL 5893817, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (distinguishing relevant police miscon-
duct records from officers’ “social security numbers, pension information, spousal identifying in-
formation, religious affiliations, home addresses, phone numbers, and photos,” which warranted
protection from disclosure); United States v. Lopez, 2022 WL 4134423, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 2022) (granting in part journalist’s motion to unseal filing concerning Giglio material related
to Government witnesses while requiring targeted redactions of sensitive information).
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 13 of 21

- 14 -
However, the Government has not demonstrated a sufficient privacy interest in the agents’
identities themselves to warrant complete redaction. 	Each of the three agents has already been
identified by name in public filings in this action. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 20, 21, 26 at 8 n.5; see also
M. Breidenbach, Assault with an owner’s manual: How a botched immigration bust in NY reveals
agents’ tactics, SYRACUSE . COM (May 12, 2026), https://www.syracuse.com/news/2026/05/assault-
with-an-owners-manual-how-a-botched-immigration-bust-in-ny-reveals-agents-tactics.html (dis-
cussing BPA Baize’s “I’m 10-15” membership).
Moreover, other courts have publicly identified officers by name under similar circum-
stances, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying Giglio materials remained sealed or subject
to in camera review. Cf. United States v. Rios-Diaz, 2021 WL 978758, at *1–5 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
16, 2021) (publicly identifying a Border Patrol agent whose membership in “I’m 10-15” had been
disclosed after the Government submitted a sealed ex parte application concerning potential officer
misconduct, while noting that portions of the Government’s submission remained under seal);
United States v. Bernal-Sanchez, 2023 WL 7179469, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (publicly iden-
tifying another Border Patrol agent while remanding for in camera review of his “I’m 10-15”
materials).
In sum, the Government has not carried its burden of showing that wholesale sealing is
warranted under either the common law or First Amendment framework. 	Accordingly, Docket
Numbers 70 and 71 will be unsealed subject to certain narrowly tailored redactions, which will be
explained infra.
2. Grand Jury Materials
Second, the Government argues that the materials revealing the existence of the grand
jury’s return of the “no bill,” as well as the grand jury transcripts and any of the parties’ filings
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 14 of 21

- 15 -
quoting or discussing those transcripts, must remain sealed under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e). Gov’t Opp. at 15–28.
Federal grand juries operate in secret. 	Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 399 (1959). To that end, Rule 6(e) “embodies a long established policy of the federal
courts to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” United States v. Interstate Dress Car-
riers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960). That secrecy extends not only to testimony given before
the grand jury, but also to documents and information that would reveal “what is said or what takes
place in the grand jury room.” Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d 234, 238 (2d
Cir. 1996) (explaining that Rule 6(e) protects information that would reveal the “nature [or] direc-
tion of the grand jury proceedings”).
Where Rule 6(e) applies, the common law right of access does not independently authorize
disclosure. See Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated March 2, 2015, 2016 WL 6126392, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016). The First
Amendment likewise does not supply a general right of access to grand jury proceedings or mate-
rials. See Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8–9; In re Newsday, 895 F.2d at 79. Instead, disclosure
is governed principally by the limited exceptions set forth in Rule 6(e)(3), together with the narrow
“special circumstances” doctrine recognized by the Second Circuit in In re Petition of Craig, 131
F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Craig”).
As a threshold matter, the Government contends that the fact that the grand jury declined
to return the proposed superseding indictment is itself a “matter occurring before the grand jury”
within the meaning of Rule 6(e). Gov’t Opp. at 15–17. According to the Government, a no bill is
the direct product of the grand jury’s deliberative process and necessarily reveals the result of those
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 15 of 21

- 16 -
deliberations. Id. The Government therefore maintains that the ordinary common law presump-
tion of access does not authorize disclosure of that information and that Rule 6(e) governs. Id.
Rule 6(e)’s shroud covers a broad range of “grand jury matters.” Rule 6(e)(2)(B) bars the
disclosure of “a matter occurring before the grand jury” by the grand jurors, interpreters, court
reporters, government attorneys, and others who would be involved in the proceedings. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 	“Rule 6(e)(6) provides that all records, orders, and subpoenas relating to
grand jury proceedings be sealed, not only actual grand jury materials; similarly, Rule 6(e)(5) re-
fers to matters affecting a grand jury proceeding, not only the proceedings themselves.” 	In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d at 237 (emphases in original).
But this conclusion does not end the inquiry. For instance, Rule 6(e)(3) lists out several
exceptions to the secrecy rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3). Beyond those enumerated exceptions,
the Second Circuit has recognized that district courts retain limited inherent authority to disclose
grand-jury materials where “special circumstances” justify departure from the ordinary rule of
secrecy. Craig, 131 F.3d at 102–03.
In determining whether special circumstances warrant disclosure, courts may consider,
among other things:
(i) the identity of the party seeking disclosure; (ii) whether the defendant to the
grand jury proceeding or the government opposes disclosure; (iii) why disclosure
is being sought; (iv) what specific information is sought; (v) how long ago the grand
jury proceedings occurred; (vi) the current status of the principals and their fami-
lies; (vii) the extent to which the desired material has previously been made public;
(viii) whether witnesses who might be affected remain alive; and (ix) the additional
need for maintaining secrecy in the particular case.
Id. at 106 (cleaned up).
To be sure, this disclosure authority is narrow. After all, Craig cautions district courts that
Rule 6(e) continues to govern “‘garden variety’ petitions for grand jury disclosure” and that the
“baseline presumption” remains against disclosure. Craig, 131 F.3d at 103–04. But Craig also
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 16 of 21

- 17 -
makes clear that, in appropriate cases, “historical or public interest alone could justify the release
of grand jury information.” Id. at 105.
The question is whether the unusual circumstances presented here justify limited disclosure
of the fact that the same grand jury that returned the original indictment later returned a “no true
bill.” That turns out to be a question without any directly governing precedent, at least as far as
the Court can tell. Reasoning by analogy, there are two provisions of Rule 6 that touch on issues
related to a “no true bill.”
First, Rule 6(f) requires a grand jury’s refusal to indict to be promptly reported to the mag-
istrate judge when a complaint or information is pending against the defendant. But that provision
does not squarely govern this case because defendant had already been indicted. 	Second, Rule
6(c) requires the foreperson to record the number of jurors concurring in an indictment and pro-
vides that the tally may not be made public absent court order. 	But that provision protects the
secrecy of the grand jury’s voting record, not merely its ultimate disposition.
After careful consideration in light of the governing law, the Court concludes that limited
unsealing is warranted: the fact of the grand jury’s return of the “no true bill” should not be a
secret. This limited unsealing is based on the Court’s conclusion that continued sealing of the fact
of the “no true bill” is no longer warranted under the circumstances presented here.
The grand jury’s deliberations and any other matters that led to that original result, such as
the transcripts and the tally sheet, must remain sealed under Rule 6. But defendant had already
been indicted on the same exact charge. The return of the original indictment is a public record.
Dkt. No. 10. 	The grand jury’s subsequent return of a ‘no true bill’ may likewise be disclosed
without revealing the substance of the grand jury’s proceedings.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 17 of 21

- 18 -
To be sure, the policies underlying grand jury secrecy do not dissipate after the particular
grand jury has completed its work. 	Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222,
(1979). 	Among other things, secrecy protects witnesses from retaliation or stigma, encourages
future witnesses to testify freely, protects the independence of grand jury deliberations, and shields
those who are investigated but not ultimately charged. See id. at 219 n.10, 222; United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958). That said, if the grand jury investigation
has concluded, “then most of the policies underlying the need for secrecy are no longer present.
Generally, the only reason that survives the conclusion of an investigation is the encouragement
of disclosures by those with knowledge of crime.” United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 663 (2d
Cir. 1978).
Here, defendant has been deported, Dkt. No. 90 at 4; the prosecution has ended; the grand
jury has concluded its deliberations on the proposed superseding instrument; and there is no risk
of witness tampering. 	Craig, 131 F.3d at 102. 	In short, unsealing the fact of the grand jury’s
return of the “no true bill” would not jeopardize the secrecy of the grand jury process.
Finally, the unsealing request is made by Advance, a news organization seeking to report
on a completed federal prosecution. Advance does not seek disclosure for use in collateral litiga-
tion or for a purely private purpose. Rather, it seeks information bearing on the course of a pros-
ecution which ended without trial after the Government unsuccessfully sought a superseding in-
dictment. Defendant’s counsel, too, supports Advance’s request. See Dkt. No. 90.
The public record already reflects the original charge against defendant and the Govern-
ment’s ultimate dismissal of the prosecution. What it does not presently disclose is the intervening
fact that the Government sought a superseding indictment broadening the alleged instrumentality
of the assault from a “book” to an “object,” and that the grand jury declined to return that
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 18 of 21

- 19 -
superseding indictment. The existence of the no bill therefore provides the necessary context for
understanding the course and outcome of a criminal case that has otherwise unfolded publicly.
See, e.g., N.D. Ill. L. Crim. R. 6.2.1 (requiring written report where twelve grand jurors fail to
concur in an indictment and directing filing of the report on the docket).
To be clear, the remainder of the grand jury’s work—including everything else related to
the proceeding—must remain sealed for all of the thoughtful reasons that have been repeatedly
articulated in our case law. 	Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 329 (2014) (“The grand jury
gets to say—without any review, oversight, or second-guessing—whether probable cause exists to
think that a person committed a crime.”). Although the circumstances of this case are sufficiently
unusual to warrant disclosure of the fact that the grand jury declined to return the proposed super-
seding indictment, they do not justify disclosure of the grand jury transcripts themselves.
This is because, unlike disclosure of the result alone, release of the transcripts would ex-
pose the very matters—what was said and what occurred before the grand jury—that Rule 6(e)
most directly protects. See Laws.’ Comm. for 9/11 Inquiry, Inc. v. Garland, 43 F.4th 276, 285–87
(2d Cir. 2022) (reaffirming Rule 6(e)’s general rule of grand jury secrecy); United States v. Max-
well, 794 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (declining to unseal grand jury transcripts and
exhibits under Rule 6(e) and Craig).
Although the grand jury is typically viewed as “an accusatory body under the (almost)
complete control of the prosecutor,” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir.
2000), it “belongs to no branch of the institutional Government,” and serves as a “kind of buffer
or referee between the Government and the people,” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47
(1992). Most of its work is secret, and rightly so. But the public interest in transparency is best
served by a limited disclosure of its return in this case: the fact of a “no true bill.”
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 19 of 21

- 20 -
B. Intervenor’s Request as to the Missing Docket Entries
Finally, Advance asks the Court to ensure that Docket Numbers 22, 41, and 60 are reflected
on the public docket. 	Advance Letter at 10–12. 	The Government does not oppose that request
and acknowledges that the absence of public docket entries for those filings was inadvertent. Gov’t
Opp. at 8–9. Accordingly, Advance’s request will be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Intervenor Advance Publications, Inc.’s Letter Motion, Dkt. No. 85, is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with this Decision and Order;
2. Docket Numbers 70 and 71 shall be unsealed subject to narrowly tailored redactions
necessary to protect personal identifying information;
3. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Government and
defendant shall confer and jointly submit proposed redacted versions of Docket Numbers 31, 48,
53, 62, 64, 70-72, 77, 80, 81, and 83 for public filing. If the parties contend that any portion of
those filings should remain sealed, they shall identify the specific material at issue and the basis
for continued sealing. The grand jury transcripts themselves, as well as any portions of the fil-
ings that describe the substance of the grand jury’s deliberations, must remain under seal or ap-
propriately redacted. In addition, permissible redactions may include personal identifying infor-
mation and collateral identifying information concerning private third parties who are unrelated
to this litigation;
4. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Government and
defendant shall submit proposed redacted versions of any filings that reference the no bill but
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 20 of 21

- 21 -
also contain grand jury material that remains protected by Rule 6(e), together with a proposal
identifying which docket entries (if any) may be unsealed in whole and which require redaction;
5. The Clerk of the Court shall create public docket entries reflecting the existence of
Docket Numbers 22, 41, and 60 and indicating that the corresponding documents were filed un-
der seal; and
6. The Government shall submit a proposed redacted version of its letter accompanying
its request for dismissal (Dkt. No. 83) within fourteen (14) days.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending letter motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2026
Utica, New York.
Case 5:25-cr-00492-AJB Document 99 Filed 10/08/26 Page 21 of 21