Sears v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
SEAN MICHAEL S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 5:24-CV-1551
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Olinsky Law Group 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
250 South Clinton Street- Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Sean Michael S.2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for social security income
1 Parties consented to direct review of this matter by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, L.R. 72.2(b), L.R. 72.3(b), and General Order 18. See Dkt. No. 5.
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 1 of 17

2
(“SSI”) benefits. See Dkt. No. 1. 	Plaintiff moved for the Commissioner’s decision to be
vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 	See Dkt. No. 13. 	The Commissioner
moved for the decision to be affirmed. 	See Dkt. No.14.3 	For the following reasons,
plaintiff’s cross-motion is granted, the Commissioner’s cross-motion is denied, and the
Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
I. Background
On July 7, 2022, plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI benefits, alleging a
disability onset date of June 25, 2021. 	See T. at 281-874 (See Dkt. No. 8-5)5. 	On
November 3, 2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claim.
See id. at 175-86 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). 	Plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the SSA
denied on April 12, 2023. 	See id. at 187-95 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). 	Plaintiff appealed and
requested a hearing. 	See id. at 198 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). 	On March 6, 2024, a hearing
was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jason Mastrangelo. See id. at 36-62
(See Dkt. No. 8-2). On March 29, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See id.
at 14-35 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). On November 20, 2024, the Appeals Council affirmed, and
the decision became final. 	See id. at 1-6 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Plaintiff commenced this
action on December 19, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 8. Citations
to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing program, located at
the page headers.
5 As the voluminous administrative transcript was uploaded to the Court’s docket in many separate parts,
in addition to the general record citation, the Court includes the specific docket cites for factual citations.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 2 of 17

3
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” 	Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 3 of 17

4
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 4 of 17

5
If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first noted that
plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 15, 2022, the
application date.” 	T. at 19. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff
“has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, neuropathy, and diabetic
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 5 of 17

6
retinopathy.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id.
at 21 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that through the date of last insured,
plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work6 as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to
hazards, machinery, and heights.” 	Id. at 21 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	In reaching the RFC
determination, the ALJ concluded that
[e]ven if [plaintiff] was limited to standing and walking 2 hours total in an 8-
hour work day, and required the use of a cane for ambulation, the impartial
vocational expert at [plaintiff’s] [h]earing testified that [plaintiff] could perform
work as a call center operator, charge account clerk, and bench worker, of
which there are nearly 20,000 total of these jobs in the national economy.
Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has no past relevant
work.” Id. at 29 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). Before reaching step five, the ALJ concluded that the
“[t]ransferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past
relevant work.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step five, the ALJ determined that “considering
the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in
6 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) provide that the physical exertion requirements for “light
work”
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this
category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting
most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered
capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or
she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of
fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 6 of 17

7
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Id. (See Dkt.
No. 8-2). The ALJ concluded that plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, since April 15, 2022, the date the application was filed.” Id. at 30
(See Dkt. No. 8-2).
IV. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence for two reasons. See Dkt. No. 13 at 6-14. First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s
rejection of his subjective reports of finger and hand limitations is not supported by
substantial evidence. 	See id. at 6-10. 	More specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s
reliance on grip strength testing “does not suffice to show that [he] had no manipulative
limitation[s] over the course of a regular work schedule.” Id. at 9 (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184, at *1). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not consider any treatment he received
for his upper extremities, and, although the ALJ noted his activities of daily living (“ADL”),
the ALJ did not discuss or provide meaningful analysis of his ADL in the context of his
manipulative limitations. 	See id. 9-10. 	Plaintiff also contends that the jobs the ALJ
provided at Step Five all “required frequent handling.” Id. at 10.
Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Dr. Lorensen and Dr.
Figueroa’s opinions are not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 10-14. Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Lorensen’s opinion and did not explain which
evidence was consistent with Dr. Lorensen and Dr. Figueroa’s opinions. 	See id. at 12-
14. Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Figueroa did not explain the findings that supported her
opinion. See id. at 13.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 7 of 17

8
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and should be affirmed. 	See Dkt. No. 14 at 8-18. 	The Commissioner argues
that, prior to October 2022, plaintiff’s examination reports indicate that he suffered from
numbness, neuropathy, and limitations in his feet; not in his hands or upper extremities.
See id. at 7-8. 	The Commissioner states that, although plaintiff complained to Dr.
Lorensen and Dr. Figueroa of difficulty using his arms and hands, Dr. Lorensen found that
plaintiff “had intact hand and finger dexterity, 5/5 grip strength, and no trouble using either
hand to zip, button, or tie a bow,” as well as no limitations using his hands or arms. Id. at
8 (citing T. at 23, 576). The Commissioner notes that “Dr. Figueroa’s examination showed
Plaintiff had some trouble with abduction of the left finger and thumb along with ‘clumsy’
use of the left hand for zippering and buttoning[,]” but the Commissioner argues that “the
exam also showed Plaintiff had a full range of motion in the fingers and 5/5 grip strength
bilaterally along with easy right finger to right thumb abduction and smooth use of the
right hand for zippering and buttoning.” 	Id. at 8 (citing T. at 24, 702). 	Similarly, the
Commissioner notes that the ALJ considered plaintiff’s “wide-ranging” ADL and the prior
administrative medical findings (“PAMFs”) of record. Id. at 9-10. The Commissioner also
claims that plaintiff’s arguments as to the ALJ’s rejection of his subjective complaints
amount to a disagreement with the weight of the evidence. See id. at 12.
As to Dr. Lorensen and Dr. Figueroa’s opinions, the Commissioner argues that the
ALJ 	properly 	determined 	that 	(1) 	Dr. 	Lorensen’s 	opinion 	was 	supported 	by 	her
examination of plaintiff and plaintiff’s reported medical history, see id. at 14-15 (citing T.
at 754); (2) Dr. Lorensen’s opinion was consistent with the other medical examinations of
record and plaintiff’s ability to perform ADL, id. at 15-16 (citing T. at 383, 398, 406, 453,
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 8 of 17

9
469, 472, 479, 535-36, 575, 587, 700-01, 761-62, 909-10); (3) Dr. Figueroa’s opinion was
supported by her examination of plaintiff, see id. at 17; and (4) “Dr. Figueroa’s opinion of
severe limitations in walking and standing were ‘not consistent with the other evidence of
record that indicated only modest findings.’” Id. at 17.
C. Medical Opinions
Under the current standard, an ALJ need “not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) [‘PAMFs’], including those from [a claimant's] medical sources.” 	20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (internal citation omitted). Rather medical opinions and PAMFs are
evaluated based on their “persuasiveness.” Id. In evaluating the “persuasiveness” of a
medical opinion or PAMF, an ALJ is to “consider” the following factors: (1) supportability;
(2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) “other
factors.” Id. §§ 416.920c(a); 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). “However, in many cases, the ALJ only
need ‘explain’ how the supportability and consistency factors were considered, as they
are ‘the most important factors.’” Brian K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-26 (CFH),
2025 WL 18718, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)-(3) (stating that an ALJ “is not required to” explain the
remaining factors unless the ALJ determines that “two or more medical opinions or
[PAMFs] about the same issue are both equally well-supported [ ] and consistent with the
record [ ] but are not exactly the same”).
For 	the 	“supportability” 	analysis, 	“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs], the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 9 of 17

10
[PAMFs] will be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see also Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting
Carmen M. v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6532 (MJR), 2021 WL 5410550, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2021)) (noting that “[t]he supportability analysis focuses on ‘how well
a 	medical 	source 	supported 	their 	opinion(s) 	with 	objective 	medical 	evidence and
supporting explanations’”). 	With regard to the “consistency” analysis, “[t]he more
consistent a medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs] is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)
or [PAMFs] will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see also Kathleen A., 2022 WL 673824,
at *5 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G. v. Comm’r of the Soc.
Sec., No. 20-CV-1011 (FJS), 2021 WL 5232722, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2021)) (“In the
consistency analysis, an ALJ must look outside the medical opinion itself to ‘evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,’ and will find the medical
opinion more persuasive the more consistent it is with these external sources.”).
“ALJs are not required to state on the record every reason justifying a decision and
[are] not required to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted.” 	Brian K., 2025
WL 18718, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2947-CV, 2022 WL
17933217 at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, they must articulate how persuasive they
found the medical opinions and PAMFs.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)). “If the ALJ
fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency factors,’ or bases ‘[the]
explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is required.’” Id. (quoting Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4630 (LJL/BCM), 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 10 of 17

11
Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Andrew G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020
WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2021
WL 134945 (Jan. 14, 2021))); see also Jennifer A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-
1167 (MAD), 2023 WL 8654215, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (quoting Eric G. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1314 (MAD), 2023 WL 3004780, *4, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2023)) (“The ALJ need not specifically write the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ to
meet the articulation requirements in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c; it is enough
that the ALJ applied the proper legal analysis.”).
1. Dr. Lorensen
Dr. Lorensen is a state consultative medical examiner who examined plaintiff on
October 28, 2022. See T. at 574-77 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). During his examination, plaintiff
reported that he suffered from diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, and a stroke in 1992 that
left “the left side of his body . . . paralyzed as a consequence.” Id. at 574 (See Dkt. No.
8-7).7 Dr. Lorensen’s examination of the plaintiff revealed the following. Under fine motor
activity of the hands, “Hand and finger dexterity intact. Grip strength 5/5 bilaterally. The
right hand could zip and button without a problem. 	The left hand could zip and button
without a problem. 	Both hands could tie a bow together without a problem.” 	Id. at 576
(See Dkt. No. 8-7). For plaintiff’s upper extremities, “Strength 5/5 in proximal and distal
muscles. [Deep tendon reflexes (“DTRs”)] physiological and equal. Muscle tone normal.
Finger-to-nose testing normal. 	Rapid alternating movements normal on the right. 	Mild
abnormality noted on the left. No tremors. No muscle atrophy.” Id. at 576 (See Dkt. No.
8-7). 	Dr. Lorensen diagnosed plaintiff with Type 1 diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, and a
7 The Court notes that Dr. Lorensen stated, “As he is talking to me, he is waving his left arm and moving
his left leg around.” Id.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 11 of 17

12
history of stroke. See id. (See Dkt. No. 8-7). Dr. Lorensen opined that plaintiff had “[n]o
gross limitations noted for sitting, standing, walking, use of the upper extremities, or use
of the hands.” Id. at 577.
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion was persuasive. See T. at 26 (See
Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The ALJ explained that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion was “supported by
examination findings and personal observation. 	Dr. Lorensen was able to review the
claimant’s medical history and observe and exam [sic] the claimant. Based on this, the
doctor found only mild limitations. 	This is consistent with the other evidence of record
that shows only modest findings.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The ALJ also found that plaintiff
“indicated an ability to perform various ADLs.” Id. (citing T. at 699-703) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-
2, 8-7).
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Lorensen’s opinion, as to
plaintiff’s hand and finger limitations, is not supported by substantial evidence for several
reasons. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). 	First, the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr.
Lorensen “found only mild limitations” is unsupported by the ALJ’s decision itself. T. at 26
(See Dkt. No. 8-2); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). It is unclear how the ALJ concluded
Dr. Lorensen “found only mild limitations” when earlier in the same paragraph, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Lorensen opined “[n]o gross limitations noted for sitting, standing, walking,
use of the upper extremities, or use of the hand.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). Since the ALJ
does not define "mild" or "gross" or explain the criteria for determining the severity of each
in the context of the plaintiff’s hand and finger limitations, judicial review is frustrated
because the Court cannot determine what standard the ALJ is applying to Dr. Lorensen’s
opinion regarding the plaintiff’s limitations. See Powell v. Astrue, No. 3:09-CV-1082 (FJS),
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 12 of 17

13
2010 WL 4004935, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 3:09-CV-1082 (FJS/GHL), 2010 WL 3999258 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010) (remanding
where the ALJ failed to define the term “simple tasks”).
Second, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion “is consistent with the other
evidence of record that shows only modest findings.” 	T. at 26 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Yet,
the ALJ does not define “modest findings” or identify the evidence that established
“modest findings” concerning plaintiff’s hand and finger limitations. See id. at 21-28 (See
Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The ALJ’s decision notes that plaintiff (1) reported to Dr. Freeman in
November 2023 that he suffered from “hand pain that was ongoing for the prior few
months” and “[h]is pain was the worst in his knuckles and PIP joints and lasted for more
than an hour in the morning,” 	and (2) complained of numbness in his left hand in
December 2023. 	T. at 25 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	However, the ALJ does not discuss how
these symptoms translate into hand or finger limitations or explain how this evidence is
consistent with Dr. Lorensen’s opinion of “modest findings”. T. at 26 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Similarly, elsewhere in the hearing decision, the ALJ listed the results of Dr. Figueroa’s
consultative examination report, but rejected the part of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion indicating
that plaintiff had “severe limitations in several areas of function,” including hand and finger
limitations, because this part of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion was “not consistent with the other
evidence of record that indicated only modest findings.” T. at 24, 27 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
It is unclear from the decision what evidence is consistent with Dr. Lorensen’s opinion that
plaintiff suffered from modest hand and finger limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2).
Third, it is unclear how the ALJ’s statement that plaintiff “indicated an ability to
perform various ADLs” supports Dr. Lorensen’s opinion or is indicative of plaintiff’s ability
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 13 of 17

14
to perform light work. T. at 26 (citing T. at 699-703) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-7); see 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). 	Plaintiff reported to Dr. Lorensen that he (1) “cooks two to three
times per week”; (2) “shops twice per month”; (3) “showers and dresses daily”;
(4) “watches TV”; and (5) “does online social media activities and socializes.” T. at 575
(See Dkt. No. 8-7). In support of this statement, the ALJ cites Dr. Figeuroa’s consultative
examination report. See T. at 26 (citing T. at 699-702) (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-7). As noted,
plaintiff reported to Dr. Figueroa that he “cooks two to three times per week, cleans daily,
does laundry once per week, shops once per week, and showers and dresses every day.”
T. at 700-01 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). 	Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Figueroa that he “watches
TV, socializes with friends, and plays video games.” Id. at 701 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). Yet,
Dr. Lorensen and Dr. Figueroa did not opine on plaintiff’s ADLs. See T. 574-77, 699-703
(See Dkt. No. 8-7). Plaintiff’s claimed ADLs are his subjective reports without any further
analysis, and the ALJ does not explain how plaintiff’s ADLs support his ability to perform
light work or maintain regular employment. 	Similarly, the ALJ did not reconcile why he
accepted plaintiff’s subjective reports of ADLs but rejected plaintiff’s subjective reports of
his symptomology and limitations. Compare T. at 26, with T. at 22 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
“[W]hile an ALJ may properly consider these activities when assessing the intensity
and persistence of symptoms . . . the ALJ here appeared to place disproportionate weight
on [P]laintiff’s activities of daily living, none of which equate to the ability to perform
substantial gainful activity.” 	Alexandria S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:22-CV-20
(MAD/DJS), 	2023 	WL 	2863323, 	at 	*4 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Feb. 	3, 	2023), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 6:22-CV-20 (MAD/DJS), 2023 WL 2583212 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
21, 2023) (first citing Tenesha G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1070 (DNH), 2022
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 14 of 17

15
WL 35998, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022); then quoting David F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 3:21-CV-315 (SALM), 2021 WL 5937670, at *9 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2021)
(quoting Berg v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1042 (SALM), 2016 WL 53823, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan.
5, 2016))) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Munoz v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-2496 (KAM), 2021 WL 4264814, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021)
(quoting Bigler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-3568 (AMD), 2020 WL 5819901, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting Vasquez v. Barnhart, No. 02-CV-6751, 2004 WL
725322, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004))) (“[A] finding that a claimant is capable of
undertaking basic activities of daily life cannot stand in for a determination of whether that
person is capable of maintaining employment, at least where there is no evidence that
the claimant engaged in any of these activities for sustained periods comparable to those
required to hold a sedentary job.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Second Circuit has “stated on numerous occasions that ‘a claimant need not
be an invalid to be found disabled’ under the Social Security Act.” 	Alexandria S., 2023
WL 2863323, at *4 (quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1988))); Moss v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-731
(GHW/MHD), 2014 WL 4631884, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“It is well-settled in the
Second Circuit that the capacity to care for oneself does not, in itself, contradict a claim
of disability as people should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in
order to care for themselves.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “There are
critical differences between activities of daily living (which one can do at his own pace
when he is able) and keeping a full time job.” Id. (quoting David F., 2021 WL 5937670, at
*9 (quoting Moss, 2014 WL 4631884, at *33)). “[A]n ALJ should take into account whether
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 15 of 17

16
any evidence of daily activities shows that the claimant engage[d] in any of these activities
for sustained periods comparable to those required to hold . . . a job.” Id. (quoting Kelly
W. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-948 (JCH), 2021 WL 4237190, at *10 (D. Conn. Sept. 17,
2021) (quoting Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 81))). Without any further explanation, it is unclear
how plaintiff’s subjective reports of his ADL support the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Lorensen’s
opinion.
As the Court finds reason for remand, it does not reach plaintiff’s remaining
arguments, which the ALJ may choose consider on remand. See Devra B. B. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-643 (BKS), 2021 WL 4168529, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021)
(“Because the Court has determined that remand is required, the Court does not reach
Plaintiff's remaining arguments.”); Shields v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2088 (FB), 2012 WL
1865505, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (“In light of the decision to remand this case with
instructions to consider new evidence on Shields's cardiac condition, it is not necessary
to address this argument.”); Mary S. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-1095 (RMS), 2022 WL
4074536, at *17 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2022) (quoting Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 914 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[S]ince the ‘case must return to the agency either
way for the reasons already given . . . the Commissioner will have the opportunity on
remand to obviate th[ese] dispute[s] altogether by’ addressing the remaining arguments
on remand.”); Annunziato v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-606 (JAM), 2019 WL 156934, at *4 (D.
Conn. Jan. 10, 2019) (“The ALJ shall also consider plaintiff's remaining arguments on
remand.”).
If necessary, on remand, the ALJ should reevaluate the supportability and
consistency factors as they apply to Dr. Figueroa’s opinion because the ALJ utilizes Dr.
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 16 of 17

17
Lorensen and Dr. Figueroa’s opinions to support his supportability and consistency
analysis of each opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2); Brian K., 2025 WL 18718,
at *4 (quoting Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (quoting Andrew G., 2020 WL 5848776,
at *5)).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 14) is DENIED; and
it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and the matter
REMANDED for further proceedings; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision & Order on
all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	March 11, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 5:24-cv-01551-PJE Document 16 Filed 03/11/26 Page 17 of 17