McCarthy v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
LARA JEANETTE M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 5:24-CV-1365
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(AMN/PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Hiller Comerford Injury & Disability Law 	JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
6000 North Bailey Avenue- Suite 1a 	MARY ELLEN GILL, ESQ.
Amherst, New York 14226
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER1
Lara Jeanette M.2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation and in accordance with General
Order 18 and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(e).
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 18

2
income (“SSI”) benefits. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff moves for the Commissioner’s decision
to be vacated, and, in the alternative, remanded for further proceedings. 	See Dkt. No.
13. The Commissioner moves for the decision to be affirmed. See Dkt. No. 15.3 Plaintiff
filed a reply. 	See Dkt. No. 16. 	For the following reasons, it is recommended that the
Commissioner’s cross-motion be granted, plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied, and the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
I. Background
On December 27, 2022, plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI benefits,
alleging a disability onset date of December 30, 2021. 	See T. at 165-74.4 On May 25,
2023, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 73-81.
On May 29, 2023, plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the SSA denied on July 7, 2023.
See id. at 82-90. Plaintiff appealed and requested a hearing. See id. at 91. On May 7,
2024, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary Jane Pelton.
See id. at 32-46. 	On May 17, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See id. at
12-31. 	On September 18, 2024, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination
and the decision became final. See id. at 1-6. Plaintiff timely commenced this action on
November 12, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 9. Citations
to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing and case management
program, located at the header of each page.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 18

3
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” 	Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 18

4
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 18

5
If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first determined that
plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 28, 2022, the
application date.” T. at 17. At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has the following
severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, history
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 18

6
of right shoulder fracture with a partial supraspinatus cuff tear/impingement, adhesive
capsulitis of the left shoulder, fibromyalgia, and obesity.” 	Id. 	At step three, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 19
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. 	The claimant can occasionally climb
ramps or stairs. 	She can occasionally balance as defined by the SCO,
occasionally stoop, kneel, or crouch, but never crawl. The claimant should
avoid exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous
moving machinery.
T. at 20.5 At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has no past relevant work.” Id.
at 24. At step five, the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” 	Id. at 25. 	Ultimately,
the ALJ concluded that plaintiff “claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, since November 28, 2022, the date the application was filed.” Id. at
26.
5 Light work is defined as
lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category
when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the
time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially
all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also
do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity
or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 18

7
IV. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Tarala’s medical opinion. 	See Dkt. No.
13-1 at 9-13. More specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide any rationale
or explanation for rejecting all of Dr. Tarala’s stated limitations. Id. at 11 (quoting T. at 24).
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ cited only four pages of the record, for mild degenerative
findings of the lumbar spine and a normal nerve conduction study. 	While this arguably
addressed limitations associated with Plaintiff’s lumbar complaints, it does not address
her cervical or shoulder complaints.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to consider
her treatment records documenting consistent reports of cervical spine, neck, and
shoulder pain, as well as abnormal results of physical examinations and imaging studies.
See id. at 12.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Exhibit 16F in rejecting Dr. Tarala’s
opinion is misplaced. See Dkt. No. 13-1 at 12-13. Plaintiff acknowledges that Exhibit 16F
contains a report documenting a normal nerve conduction study, but plaintiff contends
that “the conclusion was not that [her] symptoms were unsubstantiated – but that they
were resulting from fibromyalgia,” a condition for which that Dr. Tarala provided treatment.
Id.
The 	Commissioner 	argues 	that 	the ALJ’s 	determination 	was 	supported 	by
substantial 	evidence and 	should 	be 	affirmed. 	See 	generally 	Dkt. 	No. 	15. 	The
Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ (1) “found that some physical limitations were
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 18

8
warranted in the RFC finding as Plaintiff reported trouble with lifting, standing, reaching,
walking, and sitting due to fibromyalgia, arthritis (in her back), and shoulder trouble”;
(2) “noted that imaging of Plaintiff’s shoulder showed she had a near full-thickness rotator
cuff tear[,] . . . [and] some examinations from the relevant period showed tenderness
and/or a limited range of motion of the spine and right shoulder”; and (3) noted that plaintiff
“complained of some gait trouble.” Dkt. No. 15 at 7 (citing T. at 20-22). Nevertheless, the
Commissioner argues that “the ALJ reasonably concluded that, although the record
supported some of her complaints, Plaintiff’s ‘symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this
decision.’” Id. at 8 (quoting T. at 21).
Concerning Dr. Tarala’s medical opinion, the Commissioner argues that Dr.
Tarala’s opinion was not supported by objective evidence and was inconsistent with the
other evidence of record. See Dkt. No. 15 at 7, 11.6 The Commissioner explains that “Dr.
Tarala cited no objective medical findings in support of his overly restrictive opinion . . .
And Dr. Tarala’s own medical examinations – which the ALJ had earlier considered during
a detailed discussion of the medical evidence ([T]. [at] 21-22) – showed Plaintiff had full
strength in the arms and legs with no cognitive limitations noted.” Dkt. No. 15 at 12 (citing
T. at 414, 418-19, 810-11, 818, 852-54).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to “individually reject[]
each and every aspect of Dr. Tarala’s opinion[,] . . . ‘to state on the record every reason
justifying a decision[,] or discuss every piece of evidence submitted.’” Id. at 13 (quoting
6 The undersigned notes that the Commissioner raises many arguments explaining why the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence, however, for the purposes of this matter, the undersigned will only
address those arguments that are responsive to plaintiff’s arguments. See generally Dkt. No. 15.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 18

9
Gauda v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-594, 2024 WL 886595, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2024)
(summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448)). The Commissioner also argues that
plaintiff conflates the supportability and consistency factors, and her argument generally
amounts to a disagreement with the weight of the evidence. See id. at 14-16.
Concerning plaintiff’s EMG testing results, the Commissioner argues that plaintiff
“misrepresents both the relevance of the EMG testing and [] Dr. Tarala’s opinion” because
“Plaintiff’s spine-related complaints were the cause of Plaintiff’s nerve pain, not her
fibromyalgia . . . And Dr. Tarala explicitly cited to Plaintiff’s diagnosis of degenerative disc
disease in support of his opinion.” Id. at 15 (citing T. at 852, 904).
B. Medical Opinions
“For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017,” an ALJ need “not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) [‘PAMFs’], including those from [a claimant's] medical
sources.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (internal citation omitted). 	Rather, medical opinions
and PAMFs are evaluated based on their “persuasiveness.” 	Id. 	In evaluating the
“persuasiveness” of a medical opinion or PAMF, an ALJ is to “consider” the following
factors: 	(1) 	supportability; 	(2) 	consistency; 	(3) 	relationship 	with 	the 	claimant;
(4) specialization; and (5) “other factors.” 	Id. §§ 416.920c(a); 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
“However, in many cases, the ALJ only need ‘explain’ how the supportability and
consistency factors were considered, as they are ‘the most important factors.’” Brian K.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-26 (CFH), 2025 WL 18718, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)-(3)
(stating that an ALJ “is not required to” explain the remaining factors unless the ALJ
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 18

10
determines that “two or more medical opinions or [PAMFs] about the same issue are both
equally well-supported [ ] and consistent with the record [ ] but are not exactly the same”).
For the “supportability” factor, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs], the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs]
will be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see also Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting Carmen M.
v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6532 (MJR), 2021 WL 5410550, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 19, 2021)) (noting that “[t]he supportability analysis focuses on ‘how well a medical
source 	supported their 	opinion(s) 	with objective 	medical evidence and 	supporting
explanations’”). With regard to the “consistency” factor, “[t]he more consistent a medical
opinion(s) or [PAMFs] is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs] will be.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see also Kathleen A., 2022 WL 673824, at *5 (first quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G. v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-1011
(FJS), 2021 WL 5232722, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2021)) (“In the consistency analysis, an
ALJ must look outside the medical opinion itself to ‘evidence from other medical sources
and nonmedical sources in the claim,’ and will find the medical opinion more persuasive
the more consistent it is with these external sources.”).
“ALJs are not required to state on the record every reason justifying a decision and
[are] not required to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted.” 	Brian K., 2025
WL 18718, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2947-CV, 2022 WL
17933217 at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448))
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 18

11
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, they must articulate how persuasive they
found the medical opinions and PAMFs.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)). “If the ALJ
fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency factors,’ or bases ‘[the]
explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is required.’” Id. (quoting Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4630 (LJL/BCM), 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Andrew G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020
WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2021
WL 134945 (Jan. 14, 2021))); see also Jennifer A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-
1167 (MAD), 2023 WL 8654215, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (quoting Eric G. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1314 (MAD), 2023 WL 3004780, *4, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2023)) (“The ALJ need not specifically write the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ to
meet the articulation requirements in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c; it is enough
that the ALJ applied the proper legal analysis.”)
C. Analysis
1. James Tarala, M.D.
a. Medical Opinion
Dr. Tarala is one of plaintiff’s treatment providers. 	See T. at 24. 	He submitted a
medical source statement on plaintiff’s behalf dated March 14, 2024. 	See T. at 852-54.
Dr. Tarala noted that he had been treating plaintiff every six weeks for the prior three
months. 	See id. at 852. 	Dr. Tarala diagnosed plaintiff with the following conditions:
generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, depression disorder, fibromyalgia, and
degenerative disc disorder (“DDD”). See id. at 852.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 11 of 18

12
Dr. Tarala reached the following opinions regarding plaintiff’s physical limitations.
Plaintiff was able to walk one city block “without rest or severe pain,” sit for thirty minutes
at a time, stand for fifteen minutes at a time, and “sit and stand/walk” for a total of four
hours during an eight-hour workday. T. at 852. Plaintiff required “a job that permits shifting
positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff needed to take
unscheduled five-minute breaks from work every two hours. See id. at 853. Plaintiff had
the physical ability to occasionally lift objects less than ten pounds and rarely lift objects
weighing ten pounds. See id. She cannot lift anything heavier than ten pounds. See id.
Plaintiff had the ability to occasionally look down, turn her head left or right, and look up.
See id. Similarly, plaintiff has the ability to frequently hold her head in a “static position.”
Id. 	Plaintiff also had the ability to occasionally twist, stoop or bend, crouch, and climb
stairs, as well as the ability to rarely climb ladders. See id. Plaintiff could grasp, turn, or
twist objects with her hands; occasionally perform fine manipulations with her fingers; and
occasionally reach over her head. 	See id. at 853-54. 	Finally, Dr. Tarala opined that
plaintiff was likely to miss four days of work per month due to her impairments or the need
for treatment, and plaintiff’s pain or other symptoms would frequently “interfere with [her]
attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks.” Id. at 854.
b. Analysis
The ALJ noted the limitations listed by Dr. Tarala above, but concluded that Dr.
Tarala’s opinion was unpersuasive because “[i]t is not supported by the majority of
objective medical findings of record and is not consistent with State agency findings or
internal consultative examination (see Exhibit B7F at 17 showing mild degenerative
findings in the lumbar spine and Exhibit B16F showing a normal nerve conduction study).”
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 12 of 18

13
T. at 24. 	The ALJ explained that plaintiff’s “allegations regarding the severity of her
symptoms are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record” because
records from 2022 indicated that plaintiff “experienced mostly mild to moderate symptoms
from her impairments, which were effectively managed with conservative treatment,” “[i]n
2023, the claimant’s symptoms and impairments continued to be effectively managed,”
and “[r]ecords from 2024 indicate that the claimant continued to experience mostly mild
to moderate symptoms from her impairments, which continued to be effectively managed
with conservative treatment.” T. at 21-22 (citing T. at 277-79, 316-17, 390-92, 426, 483,
548-50, 572-78, 650-51, 714-15, 848, 892, 895-96, 902-03).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Dkt. No. 15 at 5-14. The undersigned agrees. First, the undersigned will
address the ALJ’s supportability analysis of Dr. Tarala’s opinion. 	The record contains
many of Dr. Tarala’s treatment records documenting plaintiff’s reports of pain and physical
limitations, as well as records from other specialists to whom Dr. Tarala referred plaintiff.
See generally Dkt. No. 9. 	However, Dr. Tarala does not cite any evidence upon which
his opinion is based or proffer any explanation as to how he concluded plaintiff suffered
from the limitations listed above. See T. at 852-54. Stated another way, there is nothing
in Dr. Tarala’s opinion to determine how he reached his conclusions. 	See Kathleen A.,
2022 WL 673824, at *4 (quoting Carmen M., 2021 WL 5410550, at *4). 	Without that
additional evidence or explanation, there is nothing in Dr. Tarala’s opinion itself that calls
into question the ALJ’s treatment of his opinion. See T. at 24, 852-54.
Plaintiff argues that she consistently suffered from cervical spine, neck, and
shoulder pain; “had abnormal physical exam results associated with those complaints”;
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 13 of 18

14
and “[i]maging showed abnormalities in Plaintiff’s shoulders and cervical spine.” Dkt. No.
13-1 at 12 (citing T. 279, 281, 312-313, 411, 414, 419, 432-33, 548-50, 635, 653-54, 707-
08, 714-15, 718-19, 721, 774, 803, 806, 843, 892, 894-96, 902-08, 916, 914). However,
Dr. Tarala’s opinion does not cite or reference this information, and plaintiff’s argument
does not refute the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Tarala’s opinion. 	Plaintiff ignores the ALJ’s
discussion of her pain, limitations, and treatment records, including records from Dr.
Tarala elsewhere in the decision. 	See T. at 21-22. 	As such, “plaintiff's argument[]
amount[s] to a disagreement with how the ALJ weighed the evidence, which is within [the
ALJ’s] province to do.” Joseph J. B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH),
2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (quoting
Nichole K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-858 (EAW), 2024 WL 3022592, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Krull v. Colvin, 669
F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“Krull’s disagreement is with the ALJ’s
weighing of the evidence, but the deferential standard of review prevents us from
reweighing it.”); Tina W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-15 (MAD), 2023 WL 157952,
at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59
(2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“It is not the Court’s function to reweigh the evidence on
appeal, only to ‘decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.’”)).
Plaintiff’s argument also constitutes a “post-hoc rationalization [that] cannot serve
as a substitute” for the support Dr. Tarala failed to articulate in his opinion. 	Wagner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 509, 516 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); see also Dana Marie M.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-CV-0458 (GLS/CFH), 2022 WL 2314560, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 14 of 18

15
June 28, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:21-CV-0458 (GLS/CFH),
2022 WL 22210128 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2022) (citing Tammie S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-1021 (ML), 2022 WL 356754, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2022) (“Post hoc
explanations do not constitute substantial evidence.”)); Jackson v. Kijakazi, 588 F. Supp.
3d 558, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation omitted) (“It is not sufficient to cite to ‘some objective
medical evidence in the record’ and simply conclude that an opinion is [supported by and]
‘consistent with other evidence in the file’ rendering it ‘persuasive.’”). 	Accordingly, the
undersigned concludes that the ALJ did not err in her assessment of the supportability of
Dr. Tarala’s medical opinion.
Next the undersigned addresses the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Tarala’s opinion as
inconsistent with “a normal nerve conduction study.” 	T. at 24 (citing T. at 650-51).
Although plaintiff frames this argument under the supportability prong, the ALJ’s decision
analyzes Dr. Tarala’s opinion under the consistency prong. Compare Dkt. No. 13-1 at 12-
13, with T. at 24.
In September 2023, plaintiff underwent a nerve conduction study.” 	T. at 650-51.
The examiner noted that plaintiff suffered from fibromyalgia, neck and low back pain that
“[s]ometimes radiated [to her] upper right extremity,” and “weakness in her hands.” Id. at
650. 	Under “Physical Exam,” the examiner stated, “Cervical range of motion limited
bilaterally. Motor exam is normal reflexes are brisk at the knee 1 at the biceps and triceps
and ankle. 	Normal sensory exam.” 	Id. 	The examiner concluded that the study was
“normal” and there was “[n]o evidence of acute or chronic denervation in the cervical or
lumbar level” and “no evidence of large fiber radiculopathy.” 	Id. 	The examiner opined
that plaintiff’s symptoms “are due to fibromyalgia,” but “minor cervical or lumbosacral
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 15 of 18

16
rotation cannot be rule[d] out.” 	Id. 	The examiner recommended that plaintiff undergo
further clinical and radiographic testing. See id.
As stated supra, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that Dr. Tarala’s
opinion was inconsistent with the normal nerve conduction study. 	See Dkt. No. 13-1 at
12-13 (citing T. at 24, 852). Plaintiff contends that, “while the nerve conduction study was
negative, the conclusion was not that Plaintiff’s symptoms were unsubstantiated – but
that they were resulting from fibromyalgia, not findings that would be apparent in a nerve
conduction study.” 	Dkt. No. 13-1 at 13. 	Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ’s citation of this
exam to reject Dr. Tarala’s opinion, where Dr. Tarala treated Plaintiff for conditions
including fibromyalgia . . . was error.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The undersigned disagrees. Plaintiff appears to misconstrue the ALJ’s conclusion
regarding her fibromyalgia and conflates the supportability and consistency factors. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2); Melissa W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-891
(JGW), 2025 WL 1929917, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2025) (citing Rosario v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec, 20 Civ. 7749, 2022 WL 819810, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022)) (“Supportability
focuses on the fit between a medical opinion offered by the source and the underlying
evidence presented by the source to support that opinion, while consistency focuses on
how well a medical source opinion is supported by the entire record.”). The ALJ did not
reject plaintiff’s fibromyalgia diagnosis or conclude that she does not suffer from any
symptomology therefrom. Similarly, the ALJ did not conclude that plaintiff did not receive
fibromyalgia treatment from Dr. Tarala. 	Rather, the ALJ concluded that the severity of
plaintiff’s limitations listed in Dr. Tarala’s medical source statement were inconsistent with
the limitations described by the nerve conduction examiner and the results of the nerve
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 16 of 18

17
conduction examination. See T. at 24; 850-52. Although plaintiff claims that her symptoms
are the result of fibromyalgia and “not findings that would be apparent in a nerve
conduction study,” she offers no evidence or support for this conclusion in the record or
elsewhere. Dkt. No. 13-1 at 13. Therefore, undersigned concludes that the ALJ did not
err in her assessment of the consistency of Dr. Tarala’s medical opinion as it relates to
the September 2023 nerve conduction examination.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied,
the Commissioner’s cross-motion be granted, and the ALJ’s decision affirmed because
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371,
at *1; Melissa W., 2025 WL 1929917, at *9; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 13) be DENIED; and it is
further
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	the 	Commissioner’s 	cross-motion 	(Dkt. 	No. 	15) 	be
GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order
on all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall
be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 17 of 18

18
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Dated: February 26, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 5:24-cv-01365-AMN-PJE Document 17 Filed 02/25/26 Page 18 of 18