Brubach v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
KIMBERLY ANN B.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 5:24-CV-01321
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Olinsky Law Group 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
250 South Clinton Street- Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Kimberly Ann B.2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision from the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability
1 Parties consented to direct review of this matter by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, L.R. 72.2(b), L.R. 72.3(b), and General Order 18. See Dkt. No. 5.
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
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insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). 	See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff moved for the Commissioner’s decision to be vacated and remanded for further
proceedings. See Dkt. No. 14. The Commissioner moved for the decision to be affirmed.
See Dkt. No.17.3 	Plaintiff filed a reply. 	See Dkt. No. 18. 	For the following reasons,
plaintiff’s cross-motion is granted, the Commissioner’s cross-motion is denied, and the
Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
I. Background
On April 15, 2022, plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI, alleging a disability
onset date of January 28, 2021. See T. at 242-48.4 On June 23, 2022, plaintiff filed Title
II and Title XVIII applications for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of January 9, 2019.
See id. at 249-55. 	On November 23, 2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
denied plaintiff’s claims. 	See id. at 161-66. 	Plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the
SSA denied on January 10, 2023. See id. at 167-76. Plaintiff appealed and requested a
hearing. See id. at 177-78. On January 9, 2024, a hearing was held before Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jennifer Smith. See id. at 34-60. During the hearing, plaintiff amended
her disability onset date to February 2, 2021. See id. at 37-38. On January 19, 2024, the
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. 	See id. at 12-33. 	On September 12, 2024, the
Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination, and the decision became final. 	See
id. at 1-6. Plaintiff commenced the instant action on October 30, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 9. Citations
to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing and case management
program located at the header of each page.
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II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” 	Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
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standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
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First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ determined that plaintiff “meets the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through March 31, 2024.” 	T. at 17. Applying the five-step disability
sequential evaluation, the ALJ first noted that plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial
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gainful activity since February 2, 2021, the amended alleged onset date.” Id. At step two,
the ALJ found that plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative
disc disease, asthma, allergic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, type II diabetes, and overactive
bladder.” 	Id. at 18. 	At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 19.
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to
to perform light work5 as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),
except the claimant should not work at unprotected heights or work in close
proximity 	to 	dangerous 	machinery 	or 	moving 	mechanical 	parts 	of
equipment; claimant should not climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, balance
as defined in the [Selected Characteristics of Occupations (“SCO”)], kneel,
crouch, and crawl; claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and
stoop; the claimant should have no concentrated exposure to respiratory
irritants such as dust, odors, fumes and gases, wetness, extreme hot and
cold temperatures, and humidity; claimant is unable to perform work that is
done outdoors and work that is done with animals; claimant should change
positions during ordinary breaks and lunch hour; and claimant should be
allowed to go to the bathroom four times a day in addition to ordinary breaks
and lunch hour, and each bathroom break should last no longer than five
minutes.
5 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) provide that the physical exertion requirements for “light
work”
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this
category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting
most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered
capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or
she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of
fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).
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Id. at 19. 	At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “is unable to perform any past
relevant work.” 	Id. at 26. 	Before reaching step five, the ALJ concluded that the
“[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability, because using
the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not
disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.” Id. at 27. At step five,
the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering [plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.” 	Id. 	The ALJ concluded that plaintiff “has not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 2, 2021[,]
through the date of this decision.” Id. at 28.
IV. Discussion
A. Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence for two reasons. 	See Dkt. No. 14 at 14-21. 	First plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to “provide a valid rationale for rejecting [her] testimony in accordance with 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929[,] and SSR 16-3p.” Id. at 14-19. Plaintiff contends that the
evidence of record supports her subjective reports of symptoms and limitations. See id.
at 16-18. 	Second, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in rejecting Rita Figueroa M.D.’s
medical opinion because the limitations described by Dr. Figueroa are consistent with the
other evidence of record. 	See id. at 19-21. 	Plaintiff asserts that although Dr. Figueroa
only examined her one time, the ALJ should have relied on Dr. Figueroa’s opinion
concerning pulmonary irritants because “the ALJ disregarded the opinions of the state
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agency medical consultants regarding environmental limitations.” 	Id. at 20 (citing T at
26).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and should be affirmed. 	See Dkt. No. 17 at 8-15. 	The Commissioner argues
that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by the opinions of Dr. Rosenthal and Dr.
Schmidt-DeYoung and the state agency medical consultative examiners, as well as
plaintiff’s lumbar spine imaging and unremarkable physical examination reports. See id.
at 8-9. 	In response to plaintiff’s arguments, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ
“determined that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure” to pulmonary irritants even
though “[p]laintiff’s allergy and asthma medical sources consistently observed that her
examination findings were unremarkable.” Id. at 10 (citing T. at 19, 484, 492, 497, 658).
Similarly, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Figueroa’s opinion
because plaintiff reported to Dr. Figueroa that her condition was controlled by medication,
and “symptoms that can be reasonably controlled by medication are not disabling.” 	Id.
(citing Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983)).
As to plaintiff’s testimony, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ “carefully
review[ed] the evidence of record . . . [and] determined that Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding the intensity, persistence, and functional limitations of her back pain were not
entirely consistent with the evidence of record.” 	Dkt. No. 17 at 12 (citing T. at 25). The
Commissioner 	contends 	that 	“[s]ince 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	of 	disabling 	back 	pain
suggested a greater restriction than demonstrated by the objective medical evidence
alone, the ALJ properly considered other factors regarding Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling
back pain, including the type of medication she took for pain and the observations of
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medical sources.” 	Id. at 13 (citing T. at 20-25). 	Finally, the Commissioner argues that
plaintiff is asking the Court to reweigh the evidence in her favor. See id. at 14-15.
In reply, plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s arguments amount to a post-hoc
rationalization because “[t]he ALJ does not emphasize or even cite to taking over-the-
counter medications as a reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.” 	Dkt. No. 18 at 1.
Similarly, plaintiff states that the Commissioner’s reliance on her imaging studies and
back examinations ignores other favorable evidence demonstrating back limitations. See
id. at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 14 at 16-18). 	Finally, plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s
“assertion that Dr. Figueroa’s examination did not support her opinion is contrary to the
ALJ’s own findings,” and “the ALJ does not indicate why Dr. Figueroa’s pulmonary
limitation was rejected based on the consistency factor analysis.” Id. at 4.
B. RFC Determination
“RFC describes what a claimant is capable of doing despite his or her impairments,
considering all relevant evidence, which consists of physical limitations, symptoms, and
other limitations beyond the symptoms.” 	Joseph J. B., at *8 (quoting Malcolm M. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-986 (CFH), 2019 WL 187725, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
2019) (first citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), then citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945))). 	“[A]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not
medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting Curry v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2))). 	“In assessing RFC, the ALJ’s findings must specify the
functions plaintiff is capable of performing; conclusory statements regarding plaintiff’s
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capabilities are not sufficient.” 	Id. (quoting Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (citations
omitted)).
“In making the RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all relevant medical and
other evidence, including any statements about what the claimant can still do provided by
any medical sources.” 	Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c)). 	“[T]he ALJ’s conclusion [need] not perfectly correspond
with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his [or her] decision, [and] he [or she
i]s entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s
consistent with the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). 	“The Court ‘defer[s] to the Commissioner’s resolution
of conflicting evidence[.]’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir.
2018) (summary order) (internal citation omitted)). “Therefore, even if a plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ’s assessment of opinion evidence and can point to evidence in the record to
support his or her position, whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
[plaintiff’s] view is not the question; rather, [the Court] must decide whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Id. (quoting Elizabeth P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-891 (CFH), 2022 WL 507367, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ must not ignore evidence or cherry pick
only the evidence from medical sources that support a particular conclusion and ignore
the contrary evidence, but [t]he Court will not reweigh the evidence that was before the
ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting April B. v. Saul, No. 8:18-CV-682 (DJS), 2019 WL 4736243, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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1. Plaintiff’s Testimony
The ALJ noted that plaintiff testified that she cannot work because she suffers from:
sharp shooting pain, and cannot bend down; that she has lower back pain
that shoots into her leg; that she is allergic to more things; that she has a
learning disability, and is at a fifth-grade reading level; that she had a lot of
help in college, and it took her six years to complete three years of college;
that she has an overactive bladder, and has to go every 20 to 30 minutes;
that it does not take her long when she has to go; that she still has to go
every 45 to 60 minutes with her medications; that she is diabetic, and is
constantly looking at her sugar levels; that she constantly needs to sit/stand;
that she needs to elevate her feet; that laying down for too long makes her
stiff, and she gets a sharp pain; that pelvic exercises have not made her
bladder any stronger; and that it is hard for her to sit in a regular chair,
because it hurts her back after 20 minutes, and she has to have her feet
reclined and stretched out.
T. at 24. 	The ALJ concluded that “the claimant’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; for the reasons explained
in this decision, however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record.” Id. at 25.
Yet, the ALJ did not explain how she concluded that plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of her symptoms were not
consistent with the evidence of record. 	The evidence the ALJ discussed both supports
and refutes plaintiff’s claims regarding her symptomology and claimed limitations, and it
is, therefore, unclear the evidence on which the ALJ relied to form her conclusion. 	See
T. at 20-24. 	For example, the ALJ notes a January 25, 2021, unremarkable physical
examination, but in the next paragraph, the ALJ discusses a March 2, 2021, treatment
record documenting “mildly antalgic gait, tenderness to palpation of her lumbosacral
spine, a restricted and painful lumbosacral spine range of motion; and a positive flip test
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bilaterally.” 	Id. at 20. 	Similarly, the ALJ lists a November 2, 2022, consultative internal
medicine examination report documenting back pain, limited range of motion, and mobility
difficulties, and in the next paragraph, notes other treatment records dated March 10,
2023, April 	20, 	2023, 	May 	2, 	2023, 	and August 	20, 	2023, 	documenting 	normal
musculoskeletal examinations. See id. at 21.
“The ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his]
conclusion to enable a meaningful review.” 	Alexandria S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
6:22-CV-0020 (MAD/DJS), 2023 WL 2863323, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 6:22-CV-0020 (MAD/DJS), 2023 WL 2583212 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 2023) (quoting Pamela P. v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-575 (DJS), 2020 WL 2561106, at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Without this additional
analysis, it is unclear what, if any, inconsistency exists involving plaintiff’s testimony,
frustrating judicial review. See Cartwright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-6543 (FPG),
2020 WL 3263447, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020) (quoting Arias v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-
1614, 2012 WL 6705873, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (“[W]here there is conflicting
evidence, the ALJ must acknowledge the conflict and explain why ‘the conflicting
[evidence] is being disregarded.’ Because the ALJ did not do so, further administrative
proceedings are necessary.”)).
C. Medical Opinions
Under the current standard, an ALJ need “not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) [‘PAMFs’], including those from [a claimant's] medical sources.” 	20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (internal citation omitted). Rather, medical opinions and PAMFs are
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evaluated based on their “persuasiveness.” Id. In evaluating the “persuasiveness” of a
medical opinion or PAMF, an ALJ is to “consider” the following factors: (1) supportability;
(2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) “other
factors.” Id. §§ 416.920c(a); 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). “However, in many cases, the ALJ only
need ‘explain’ how the supportability and consistency factors were considered, as they
are ‘the most important factors.’” Brian K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-26 (CFH),
2025 WL 18718, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)-(3) (stating that an ALJ “is not required to” explain the
remaining factors unless the ALJ determines that “two or more medical opinions or
[PAMFs] about the same issue are both equally well-supported [ ] and consistent with the
record [ ] but are not exactly the same”).
For 	the 	“supportability” 	analysis, 	“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs], the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
[PAMFs] will be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see also Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting
Carmen M. v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6532 (MJR), 2021 WL 5410550, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2021)) (noting that “[t]he supportability analysis focuses on ‘how well
a 	medical 	source 	supported 	their 	opinion(s) 	with 	objective 	medical 	evidence and
supporting explanations’”). 	With regard to the “consistency” analysis, “[t]he more
consistent a medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs] is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)
or [PAMFs] will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see also Kathleen A., 2022 WL 673824,
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at *5 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G. v. Comm’r of the Soc.
Sec., No. 20-CV-1011 (FJS), 2021 WL 5232722, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2021)) (“In the
consistency analysis, an ALJ must look outside the medical opinion itself to ‘evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,’ and will find the medical
opinion more persuasive the more consistent it is with these external sources.”).
“ALJs are not required to state on the record every reason justifying a decision and
[are] not required to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted.” 	Brian K., 2025
WL 18718, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2947-CV, 2022 WL
17933217 at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, they must articulate how persuasive they
found the medical opinions and PAMFs.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)). “If the ALJ
fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency factors,’ or bases ‘[the]
explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is required.’” Id. (quoting Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4630 (LJL/BCM), 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Andrew G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020
WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2021
WL 134945 (Jan. 14, 2021))); see also Jennifer A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-
1167 (MAD), 2023 WL 8654215, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (quoting Eric G. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1314 (MAD), 2023 WL 3004780, *4, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2023)) (“The ALJ need not specifically write the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ to
meet the articulation requirements in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c; it is enough
that the ALJ applied the proper legal analysis.”)
a. Dr. Figueroa
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Dr. Figueroa is a state agency medical consultant who examined plaintiff on
November 9, 2022. 	See T. at 544-48. 	Dr. Figueroa noted that plaintiff reported “lower
back pain when walking on heels and toes in left lower back. 	Squat 25% and reports
lower back pain.” 	Id. at 545. Diagnostic testing revealed the following: “[c]ervical spine
shows flexion 50 degrees, extension 60 degrees, lateral flexion 25 degrees each, and
cervical rotation 40 degrees each. 	Right knee positive for crepitations . . . 	[straight leg
raise] positive on left leg at 85 degrees and it was not confirmed in sitting position.” Id. at
546. 	Dr. Figueroa diagnosed plaintiff with chronic low back pain, degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine, positive inflammatory arthritis i.e. psoriatic arthritis, and
asthma. 	See id. at 547. 	Dr. Figueroa opined that plaintiff has “moderate [limitation] for
heavy lifting and carrying. 	Moderate to severe limitation for kneeling, squatting, and
crawling. She will have moderate limitation for bending, walking, standing, and twisting.
She should avoid exposure to pulmonary irritants.” Id.
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Figueroa’s opinion was less persuasive because Dr.
Figueroa’s opinion was only supported by her single examination of plaintiff and was
not consistent with the imaging of the claimant’s lumbosacral spine, which
did not contain any positive findings (Exhibit B6F). The assessment of the
claimant by Dr. Figueroa is also not consistent with the musculoskeletal
exam of the claimant that was performed by her primary care physician on
May 2, 2023, when the claimant was found to have a normal range of motion
(Exhibit B8F). In addition, the assessment of the claimant by Dr. Figueroa
is inconsistent with the opinions that were subsequently rendered by Dr.
Rosenthal and Dr. Schmidt-Deyoung (Exhibits B3A, B4A, B7A, B8A).
T. at 26. The ALJ concluded that “ the opinions of Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Schmidt-Deyoung
are more persuasive than the opinion by Dr. Figueroa, because Dr. Rosenthal and Dr.
Schmidt-Deyoung, as opposed to Dr. Figueroa, also had the opportunity to review the
other evidence of record.” Id.
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The Court concludes that the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion is not
supported by substantial evidence, and the Court will address the evidence the ALJ relied
upon individually. First, the lumbosacral spine X-ray report annexed to Exhibit B6F states,
“The height of the vertebral bodies and intervertebral disc spaces appear to be well
maintained. There is no acute fracture or subluxation. Impression: No acute fracture or
subluxation.” 	T. at 548. 	However, the ALJ did not explain how the x-ray report is
inconsistent with Dr. Figueroa’s opinion itself. 	The x-ray report contains a diagnostic
finding without any application to plaintiff’s reported symptoms or limitations or any further
reference to Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. See Leslie H. L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
3:21-CV-0150 (SALM), 2021 WL 5937649, at *6 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2021) (quoting
Theresa W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-0704 (LJV), 2021 WL 4324421, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021)) (“Where the treatment notes available ‘generally contain bare
medical findings and do not address or illuminate how [plaintiff's] impairments affect [his]
physical ability to perform work-related functions[,]’ such notes are not sufficient to support
an RFC.”).
Second, the ALJ does not provide any reasoning for rejecting Dr. Figueroa’s
opinion that plaintiff should avoid exposure to pulmonary irritants. See T. at 26. The ALJ
notes Dr. Figueroa’s opinion regarding pulmonary irritants, but the entirety of the ALJ’s
analysis addresses plaintiff’s back and range-of-motion limitations. See id.; see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
Third, the ALJ cites a May 2, 2023, treatment record noting that plaintiff had normal
range of motion and “exhibit[ed] no edema or tenderness.” T. at 625. Although the ALJ
characterizes this treatment record as a “musculoskeletal exam,” the Court notes that on
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May 2, 2023, plaintiff sought treatment for “an acute sinus infection.” 	Id. at 624. 	It is
unclear the extent to which plaintiff’s musculoskeletal system was examined that day. It
appears that plaintiff’s range of motion was recorded at that moment in time and not in
relation to any of her musculoskeletal conditions. 	Further, the ALJ does not explain or
connect plaintiff’s normal range of motion to Dr. Figueroa’s opinion that plaintiff was
limited in heavy lifting and carrying, kneeling, squatting, crawling, bending, walking,
standing, and twisting. 	See id. at 547. 	Like stated supra, the ALJ does not create a
“logical bridge” between the evidence and her conclusions. 	Alexandria S., 2023 WL
2863323 (quoting Pamela P., 2020 WL 2561106, at *4)).
Fourth, the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Schmidt-Deyoung’s opinions
to reject Dr. Figueroa’s opinion as to plaintiff’s postural limitations is circular and illogical.
See T. at 25-26. Elsewhere in the decision, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Rosenthal and Dr.
Schmidt-Deyoung’s opinions, as they relate to postural limitations, were inconsistent with
the other evidence of record. See id. More specifically, the ALJ concluded that:
the determination by Dr. Rosenthal that the claimant had no postural
limitations and could tolerate unlimited exposure to fumes, odors, dusts,
gases, and poor ventilation constitutes an overly optimistic estimate of the
claimant’s physical ability to perform work-related activities. 	Similarly, the
determination by Dr. Schmidt-Deyoung that the claimant could frequently
engage in all postural activities and could tolerate unlimited exposure to
hazards such as machinery and heights also constitutes an overly optimistic
estimate of the claimant’s physical ability to perform work-related activities.
These portions of the assessments of the claimant by Dr. Rosenthal and Dr.
Schmidt-Deyoung are also inconsistent with all of the information that is now
in the record, including the claimant’s sworn testimony at the hearing, which
supports the placement of greater nonexertional limitations on the claimant.
Id. It is unclear – due to a lack of explanation – how the ALJ could rely on Dr. Rosenthal
and Dr. Schmidt-Deyoung’s postural limitation opinions in one section of the decision and
reject them in another. Based on the foregoing, it is unclear upon what evidence the ALJ
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relied in rejecting Dr. Figeuroa’s opinion. 	See Brian K., 2025 WL 18718, at *4 (quoting
Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (quoting Andrew G., 2020 WL 5848776)).
As the Court finds reason to remand based on the above arguments, it will not
address plaintiff’s remaining arguments, which the ALJ may consider on remand. 	See
Devra B. B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-643 (BKS), 2021 WL 4168529, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021) (“Because the Court has determined that remand is required,
the Court does not reach Plaintiff's remaining arguments.”); Shields v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-
2088 (FB), 2012 WL 1865505, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (“In light of the decision to
remand this case with instructions to consider new evidence on Shields's cardiac
condition, it is not necessary to address this argument.”); Mary S. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-
CV-1095 (RMS), 2022 WL 4074536, at *17 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2022) (quoting Lockwood
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 914 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[S]ince the ‘case must
return to the agency either way for the reasons already given . . . the Commissioner will
have the opportunity on remand to obviate th[ese] dispute[s] altogether by’ addressing
the remaining arguments on remand.”); Annunziato v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-606 (JAM),
2019 WL 156934, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2019) (“The ALJ shall also consider plaintiff's
remaining arguments on remand.”).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 17) is DENIED; and
it is further
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ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and the matter
REMANDED for further proceedings; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision & Order on
all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	March 4, 2026
Albany, New York
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