Raucci v. Amberger et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TANYA RAUCCI,
Plaintiff,
1:26-CV-1077
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
ERIC AMBERGER and JENNIFER LIUZZI,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
TANYA RAUCCI
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Schenectady, New York 12309
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Tanya Raucci
(“Plaintiff”). 	Dkt. No. 1, Compl. 	The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but
Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has
been granted. 	The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review
pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Eric
Amberger 	(“Amberger”), 	the 	“IOA 	assessor,” 	and 	Jennifer 	Luizzi 	(“Luizzi,” 	and
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 1 of 10

- 2 -
collectively with Amberger, “Defendants”), the “[s]r. real property clerk.” Compl. at pp.
1-3 & 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “violated [her] constitutional rights while acting
under color of law.” 	Id. at p. 6. 	The remaining factual allegations contained in the
Complaint are sparse and difficult to decipher, and state in pertinent part:
I was only shown my rights after my father passed away in November 2019
and honorable judge Mark Powers allowed me to receive relief from my
father’s account.
Which then inadvertently recognized me as being permanently disabled
through the Social Security Administration of New York by 2023.
The assessors office of Niskyuna [sic] New York were then forced to
provide me with the proper exemption forms they are obliged to provide at
purchase of home in September 2011, to calculate appropriate amount
required for someone who is disabled and does not file federal taxes.
Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff seeks $155,000 in compensatory damages and $490,000 in punitive
damages from each Defendant. 	Id. 	Attached to the Complaint are copies of Town of
Niskayuna property tax bills and receipts from 2012 to 2024. Dkt. No. 1-1.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that – . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 2 of 10

- 3 -
from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 	Thus, even if a plaintiff meets the
financial criteria to commence an action in forma pauperis, it is the court’s responsibility
to determine whether the plaintiff may properly maintain the complaint filed in this
District before the court may permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action in forma
pauperis. See id.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 3 of 10

- 4 -
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rules 8 and 10
The Complaint is subject to dismissal because it is insufficiently pled. Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain:
(1) 	a 	short 	and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	grounds 	for 	the 	court’s
jurisdiction . . . ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a). 	The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being
asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 4 of 10

- 5 -
30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an
earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a
separate transaction or occurrence – and each defense other than a denial –
must be stated in a separate count or defense.
“The purpose of Rule 10 is to provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a
particular paragraph in a prior pleading.” 	Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). A complaint that fails to comply with basic
pleading requirements presents too heavy a burden for defendants to craft a defense,
“provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s]
claims,” and may properly be dismissed. 	Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
Here, 	the 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	aforementioned 	pleading
requirements and thus does not provide the notice to Defendants that Rules 8 and 10
require. 	The Complaint does not contain numbered paragraphs. 	See generally Compl.
Further, no cause of action is specifically set forth in the Complaint. 	See generally id.
While the Complaint references Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights, id. at p. 6, it is not clear how Plaintiff alleges those rights were violated. 	See
generally id. 	Additionally, the Complaint names Amberger and Luizzi as Defendants,
see id. at pp. 1-2 & 6, but provides no factual support explaining the connection between
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 5 of 10

- 6 -
the Defendants and the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights. See generally
id. As a result, the Complaint does not provide Defendants with fair notice of the claims
being asserted against them by Plaintiff so as to permit them to assess the sufficiency of
the Complaint and give them the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense, and
dismissal of the Complaint is recommended.
B. Individual Liability
The Complaint is also subject to dismissal on the basis that it does not establish
the individual liability of either of the Defendants. “To establish a defendant’s individual
liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” 	Gammons v. Cody, 2026 WL
500625, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL
498720 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2026) (quoting Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129 (2d Cir.
2023)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Specifically, a plaintiff must plead and prove
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th at 129) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	“The mere identification of an individual as a party is not
enough to state their personal involvement.” 	Id. (citations omitted). 	“[A] section 1983
plaintiff must allege a tangible connection between the acts of the defendant and the
injuries suffered.” Myers v. Saxton, 2022 WL 20208558, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022)
(quotations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 6 of 10

- 7 -
Here, Defendants are named in the Complaint and are alleged to have “violated
[Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” 	Compl. at p. 6. 	However, no facts are provided to
support this conclusory assertion, see generally id., which is “insufficient to establish a
plausible claim of personal involvement for individual liability in a suit brought under §
1983.” 	Wilson v. Santiago, 2020 WL 5947322, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 2020) (citation
omitted). Because the Complaint contains no factual allegations of wrongdoing by either
of the Defendants, dismissal of the Complaint based on lack of personal involvement is
recommended.
C. Tax Injunction Act
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the real property tax assessments
imposed by the Town of Niskayuna, that claim should be dismissed as barred by the Tax
Injunction Act (“TIA”). “A federal court has an ongoing obligation to ensure that it has
jurisdiction to hear claims brought to court.” 	Cedrone v. City of Fulton, NY, 2025 WL
3165856, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2025), report and recommendation modified on other
grounds and adopted, 2025 WL 2972625 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2025) (citation omitted).
“The [TIA] provides that ‘[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341).
“When applicable, the [TIA] deprives district courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” 	Id.
(citation omitted). 	“This is due in large part to the fact that ‘the [TIA] was first and
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 7 of 10

- 8 -
foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with
so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.’” Id. (quoting Arkansas v. Farm
Credit Servs. of Cent. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997)). “The [TIA], with its roots in
equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of
a State to administer its own fiscal operations, limits federal court jurisdiction, even when,
as here, the claims are premised on the federal Constitution.” Id. (quotations and internal
quotation marks omitted). 	“By virtue of the Act, federal courts are precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over state and local tax assessments regardless of the type of relief
sought.” 	Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The bar established by
the TIA deprives the Court of jurisdiction over all due process and equal protection
claims.” Id. (citations omitted). That the Complaint seeks purely monetary damages does
not change this analysis. Id. at n.4. Plaintiff’s Complaint, therefore, should be dismissed.
D. Amendment
Based on the foregoing, the Complaint is clearly subject to dismissal. “[A] court
should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend
at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.’” 	Bruce v. Tompkins Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart,
2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698,
704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). 	Courts have 	held that a claim barred by the TIA “is
‘substantive,’” and have thus “decline[d] to grant leave to amend these claims.” Cedrone
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 8 of 10

- 9 -
v. City of Fulton, NY, 2025 WL 2972625, at *4 & n.1 (citing, inter alia, Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). 	To the extent this claim challenges only
Plaintiff’s tax assessment, the Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed
without prejudice and without leave to amend. See id. at *6. If Plaintiff purports to assert
some other claim, leave to amend may be appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED as
set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 9 of 10

- 10 -
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: June 10, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 1:26-cv-01077-GTS-DJS Document 6 Filed 06/10/26 Page 10 of 10