Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant 1 et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SEALED PLAINTIFF,
Plaintiff,
1:26-CV-536
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
SEALED DEFENDANT 1, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SEALED PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ballston Spa, NY 12020
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a Complaint filed by Plaintiff. 	Dkt. No. 1,
Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That motion has been granted. Plaintiff has also
filed a motion to proceed under a pseudonym. Dkt. No. 3. The matter has been referred
to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	a 	“Black 	man” 	with 	“documented
disabilities” that “substantially limit one or more major life activities.” Compl. at ¶¶ 6-8.
The Complaint asserts claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), the Civil Rights Act, and
various federal civil rights statues, as well as several New York state statutes, including
the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Real Property Law, and New York
Mental Hygiene Law. 	Id. at ¶¶ 1 & 88. 	The Complaint seeks both monetary and
injunctive relief. Id. at pp. 14-16.
The Complaint is brought against six Defendants. Id. at pp. 3-4. Sealed Defendant
1 is alleged to be a “nonprofit corporation” that “operates multiple housing and
supportive-services programs for homeless and/or mentally disabled individuals” with the
financial support of both federal and state funding. Id. at ¶¶ 11-14. Sealed Defendant 2
is alleged to be “the landlord of the residential facility referred to . . . as Location 2, which
provides permanent supportive housing.” Id. at ¶ 16. Sealed Defendants 3 through 6 are
alleged to be “employees or agents” of Sealed Defendants 1 and/or 2. Id. at ¶¶ 17-21.1
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff became eligible for placement in the facility
operated by Sealed Defendants 1 and/or 2, and resided at Sealed Defendant 1’s facility
1 Plaintiff has filed a notice in camera that identifies the names of each of the parties. Dkt. No. 6; Text Entry dated
April 6, 2026.
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from approximately March 27, 2025, to September 23, 2025. 	Id. at ¶¶ 25 & 27. 	The
Complaint alleges that, “[i]n April 2025, Plaintiff was assigned a roommate,” and “[o]n
or about May 16, 2025, that roommate began directing overt racial harassment and threats
at Plaintiff, including repeated use of racial slurs.” Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. “Plaintiff asked the
roommate to stop, but the roommate refused.” Id. at ¶ 32. On May 16, 2025, “Plaintiff
promptly called” Sealed Defendant 3, who “did not answer,” and thereafter called Sealed
Defendant 1’s “24-hour on-call number and reported the harassment.” 	Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.
Plaintiff complains that Sealed Defendant 1 “did not remove the roommate until May 19,
2025, three days after Plaintiff’s initial report, and the roommate was transferred rather
than terminated from the program.” Id. at ¶ 38.
Thereafter, the Complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in a pattern of
retaliatory and discriminatory behavior toward him. 	First, the Complaint alleges that,
“[f]rom May 19, 2025, through September 23, 2025, Plaintiff remained alone in the two-
bedroom . . . apartment and was not assigned another roommate.” 	Id. at ¶ 40. 	The
Complaint also alleges that Sealed Defendant 3 “began pressuring Plaintiff during
mandatory twice-weekly meetings to leave . . . and find another place to live,” even
though 	“Plaintiff 	had 	only 	been 	[there] 	about 	two 	months” 	and 	was 	told 	“[a]t
intake . . . that Plaintiff could remain . . . for up to one year.” Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 & 44. “As
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a result of that pressure,” the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff felt forced to seek
alternative housing before he was ready.” Id. at ¶ 49.
Second, the Complaint takes issue with Sealed Defendant 1’s placement of
Plaintiff at Location 2 rather than his requested and preferred placement at Location 1.
Id. at ¶¶ 66 & 69. Plaintiff explains that he “preferred Location 1 because it was near his
existing area, had public transportation, and was more diverse than Location 2,” id. at ¶
67, and that “Location 2 had a very small Black population, was overwhelmingly white,
and had no public transportation.” Id. at ¶ 68. Plaintiff claims that “this placement further
isolated him and was part of the same retaliatory and discriminatory pattern.” Id. at ¶ 70.
Third, the Complaint asserts that, when Plaintiff moved to Location 2 on or about
September 23, 2025, he signed a written residential lease, but was not provided a copy of
that lease until January 23, 2026. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72 & 76. The Complaint also alleges that
Plaintiff was not provided with proof of payment of Plaintiff’s rent at Location 2, which
was “paid by DSS directly” to Sealed Defendants 1 and/or 2 from October 1, 2025,
through February 2026, which “caused [Plaintiff] anxiety about housing stability.” Id. at
¶¶ 77-79.
Finally, the Complaint references financial conflicts of interest existing at Sealed
Defendant 1’s facility, id. at pp. 8-9, and also alleges that Sealed Defendant 5 “attempted
to pressure Plaintiff to apply again for public assistance benefits he was already receiving
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through DSS” and “insisted he had to obtain renter’s insurance, even though Plaintiff’s
lease . . . did not require renter’s insurance as a condition of tenancy.” Id. at ¶¶ 81 & 83.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
2 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the ADA, RA, FHA, and Civil Rights Act
The ADA and RA both prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. 	The
ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
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advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a). Similarly, the RA provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a).
“Because the ADA and RA’s statutory language is nearly identical, courts treat
those claims identically.” Ramrattan v. New York, 2025 WL 2549075, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
July 9, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ramrattan v. Guzman, 2025
WL 2315310 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
272 (2d Cir. 2003)). To establish a violation under the ADA and the RA, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) defendant “is an entity subject to the acts”; (2) plaintiff is a “qualified
individual[] with a disability”; and (3) plaintiff was “denied the opportunity to participate
in or benefit from [defendant’s] services, programs, or activities or [defendant] otherwise
discriminated against” plaintiff because of plaintiff’s disability. 	Id. (quoting Wright v.
New York State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Similar to the ADA and RA, the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination, but
rather than limiting that prohibition to discrimination based on disability like the ADA
and RA do, the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based “on the ground of race,
color, or national origin.” 	Smith v. Davis, 2024 WL 2880751, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2126729 (N.D.N.Y. May 13,
2024). To that end, the Civil Rights Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive the pleading
stage for a claim pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must, at minimum, show
“that the discrimination was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’ for the defendant’s
actions.” 	Davis v. Malloy, 2018 WL 5793786, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 2018) (quoting
Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Finally, the FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing,” Avila v. Acacia
Network, Inc., 2024 WL 1659456, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2024) (quoting Gladstone,
Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
whether based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability.”
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (f)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned
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up). Similar to the pleading requirement when stating a claim pursuant to the Civil Rights
Act, to survive the pleading stage for a claim pursuant to the FHA, a plaintiff must, at
minimum, show that his or her disability or race was at least a motivating factor with
regard to his or her allegations of discrimination. Id.
Here, the Complaint makes only three conclusory references to any alleged
discrimination by Defendants. First, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s placement at
Location 2 rather than his requested and preferred placement at Location 1, Compl. at ¶¶
65-66 & 69, “further isolated him and was part of the same retaliatory and discriminatory
pattern.” 	Id. at ¶ 70. 	Second, when discussing Sealed Defendant 5’s “attempt[] to
pressure Plaintiff to apply again for public assistance benefits he was already receiving
through DSS” and insistence that Plaintiff “had to obtain renter’s insurance, even though
Plaintiff’s lease . . . did not require renter’s insurance as a condition of tenancy,” id. at ¶¶
81 & 83, the Complaint asserts that Sealed Defendant 5’s “conduct was intended to create
a pretext for removal from Location 2 and to impose an additional financial burden based
on Plaintiff’s race and/or disability.” Id. at ¶ 86. Finally, the Complaint generally asserts
that “[t]he conduct described” therein “included discrimination, retaliation, denial of fair
housing 	opportunity, 	interference 	with 	housing 	placement, 	coercion, 	and 	unequal
treatment on the basis of race and disability.” Id. at ¶ 89.
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However, the Complaint does not provide sufficient factual detail to support the
aforementioned conclusory assertions that Defendants intentionally discriminated against
Plaintiff, see generally Compl., and thereby fails to satisfy the pleading standards
necessary to state claims pursuant to the ADA, RA, FHA, and the Civil Rights Act. See,
e.g., Avila v. Acacia Network, Inc., 2024 WL 4108012, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024),
appeal 	dismissed 	(Dec. 	26, 	2024) 	(dismissing 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	of 	disability
discrimination under the FHA, RA, and ADA because plaintiff’s allegations were
“conclusory and without factual support, and therefore do not satisfy the pleading
requirements to state a claim of disability discrimination”); Morris v. Martin, 2016 WL
4059209, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 21, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016
WL 4098611 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016) (citing Straker v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 333
F. Supp. 2d 91, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[C]onclusory 	allegations, unsupported by facts
will be rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”)).
For purposes of the ADA and RA, Plaintiff has neither alleged that he was
excluded from any of Defendants’ services because of his disability, nor that any benefits
were provided to some but denied to him because of his disability. See Forziano v. Indep.
Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 613 F. App’x 15, 18 (2d Cir. 2015). 	Likewise, for
purposes of the FHA and the Civil Rights Act, no facts are alleged evidencing that either
Plaintiff’s disability or his race was a motivating factor for any of the acts taken by
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Defendants. See Avila v. Acacia Network, Inc., 2024 WL 1659456, at *4; Davis v. Malloy,
2018 WL 5793786, at *4.
It remains unclear to the Court how any of the acts taken by Defendants that are
discussed in the Complaint are relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants discriminated
against him, whether based on his disabilities or his race. 	Plaintiff notes his race when
he discusses racial slurs made by his roommate and his own motivations for wanting to
be placed at a different location, but fails to build a logical bridge between Defendants’
actions and any alleged discrimination on the part of Defendants. 	The Court is simply
left to guess as to what relevance Plaintiff’s race and disabilities have to any acts taken
by Defendants that are mentioned in the Complaint. Nor does the Complaint sufficiently
identify these claims to permit the Court or Defendants to identify which statutes apply
to the factual allegations.
In addition, an independent basis exists for dismissal to the extent that Plaintiff
brings claims pursuant to the ADA, RA, and Civil Rights Act against the individual
Defendants—namely, Sealed Defendants 3, 4, 5, and 6. Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the
ADA and the RA should be dismissed because neither statute provides for individual
liability. Dees v. Zurlo, 2024 WL 2291701, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024), aff’d sub
nom. Dees v. Knox, 2025 WL 485019 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 201
(2025). 	Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act should also be
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“dismissed with prejudice” because “Title VI does not provide for individual liability.”
Smith v. Davis, 2024 WL 2880751, at *5 (quotation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
B. State Action
“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not
private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must
first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights . . . is thus required to
show state action.” 	Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003).
“State action requires both the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State and
the involvement of a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” 	Meadows v.
United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted).
Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. Compl. at ¶¶ 1 & 88. However, the Complaint
has not alleged any state action on the part of any of the Defendants. 	See generally id.
Further, the Complaint does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants
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were engaged in a joint action with the State or its agents. 	See generally id. 	While the
Complaint alleges that Sealed Defendant 1 “receives substantial federal and state
funding,” id. at ¶ 13, “[t]he fact that an entity receives public funds does not turn private
action into state action.” Davenport v. Urb. Home Ownership Corp., 2026 WL 836698,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026). “Plaintiff provides no facts suggesting that Defendants,
who appear to be administrators of federally subsidized housing” and their employees,
“acted under color of state law.” Id. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 be dismissed for failure to
allege state action.
C. State Law Claims
Having established that Plaintiff’s federal claims are subject to dismissal, the only
remaining claims that Plaintiff seeks to pursue are state law claims pursuant to various
New York state statutes, including the New York State Human Rights Law, New York
Real Property Law, and New York Mental Hygiene Law. Compl. at ¶¶ 1 & 88. However,
“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson,
587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019) (quotations omitted). 	Jurisdiction in federal court generally
exists only when diversity of citizenship is present. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “To have complete
diversity, ‘each plaintiff’s citizenship must be different from the citizenship of each
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defendant.’” 	Johnson v. Glob. Promotion & Pub. Corp., 2013 WL 828744, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (quoting Hallingby v. Hallingby, 574 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Sealed Defendants 1 and 2 are
residents of New York. 	Compl. at pp. 2-4. 	As a result, there is a lack of complete
diversity, and no diversity jurisdiction exists in this case. 	See Butler v. Geico Gen. Ins.
Co., 2019 WL 330591, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 652197 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).
While a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
if certain conditions are met, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court may decline to do so where
it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 	28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction.” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Here, having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that Plaintiff may be asserting.
D. Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym
Also presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed under
Pseudonym. 	Dkt. No. 3. 	Plaintiff maintains that “public revelation of [his] identity
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presents a substantial, non-speculative risk of severe psychological harm, stigma,
renewed racial hostility, and deterrence from seeking further mental-health treatment or
legal redress.” Id. at p. 2.
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he title of the
complaint must name all the parties.” FED . R. CIV . P. 10( A ). “A party seeking to proceed
under pseudonym bears a heavy burden, and will only be allowed to do so if private
interests outweigh the countervailing public interest in full disclosure.” Doe v. Colgate
Univ., 2016 WL 1448829, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016) (citation omitted). The Second
Circuit has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in balancing a plaintiff’s
interest in anonymity against the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice against
defendants. 	Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008).
Those factors are as follows:
(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and [of
a] personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory
physical or mental harm to the ... party [seeking to proceed anonymously]
or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) whether identification
presents other harms and the likely severity of those harms, including
whether the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the
disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity; (4) whether the plaintiff is particularly
vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in light of his
age; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that
of private parties; (6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the
plaintiff to press his claims anonymously, whether the nature of that
prejudice (if any) differs at any particular stage of the litigation, and
whether any prejudice can be mitigated by the district court; (7) whether
the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential; (8) whether the
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public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to
disclose his identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the
issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in
knowing the litigants’ identities; and (10) whether there are any alternative
mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff.
Id. at 190 (quotations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) (alterations in
original). Application of these factors to the particular facts of a case “is left to the sound
discretion of the district court.” 	N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Doe Nos. 1-5, 2012 WL
5899331, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (citing Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,
537 F.3d at 190)). “However, the bar to proceed in Court anonymously is high.” Doe v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2023 WL 7000939, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023) (citing cases).
1. Factor 1: Matters of Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature
The first factor concerns “whether the litigation involves matters that are highly
sensitive and [of a] personal nature.” 	Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at
190 (quotation, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
Plaintiff argues that the Complaint involves allegations of a highly sensitive and highly
personal 	nature, 	including 	discussion 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	medical 	issues 	and 	housing
vulnerability. Dkt. No. 3 at p. 5.
“Although many people understandably want to keep their medical conditions and
treatment confidential, ‘[t]he fact that a case involves a medical issue is not a sufficient
reason for allowing the use of a fictitious name.’” 	Doe v. M&T Bank Corp., 2022 WL
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1114950, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2022) (quoting Rankin v. N.Y. Pub. Libr., 1999 WL
1084224, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1999)) (citation omitted).
Much of the Complaint concerns purported violations of federal statutory law and
asserts that Defendants have engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. 	See
generally Compl. Such claims, though often involving sensitive topics, are not claims of
a uniquely personal interest, and would, if true, be matters of significant public interest.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants “discriminated against h[im] because of h[is]
race . . . is not necessarily a highly sensitive matter requiring anonymity.” Doe v. Related
Companies, LLP, 2022 WL 4357615, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022) (quotation, internal
quotation marks, and citations omitted).
Likewise, “[d]isability is not typically considered highly sensitive, and in any
event must be pleaded - and hence disclosed - in every disability discrimination lawsuit.”
Chestnut Hill NY, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 2023 WL 8108645, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
2023) (quoting Doe v. Black Diamond Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 2023 WL 2648017, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The
facts alleged in the Complaint also “do not present exceptional circumstances that in and
of themselves justify overriding the constitutional presumption of openness” and “are not
especially intimate compared to other ADA [and Civil Rights Act] cases in which
plaintiffs have proceeded under their own names.” 	Rives v. SUNY Downstate Coll. of
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Med., 2020 WL 4481641, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2020) (quotation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing cases).
This factor, therefore, does not weigh in favor of granting the Motion.
2. Factors 2, 3, and 7: Resulting Harm, Severity of the Harm, and Confidentiality
Factors two and three focus on the harm that identification would cause Plaintiff.
The relevant inquiry for these factors is “whether disclosure of the plaintiff’s name in the
course of the lawsuit would ‘uniquely’ cause harm and ‘how grave the resultant harm
would prove to be.’” 	Doe 1 v. Branca USA, Inc., 2022 WL 2713543, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 13, 2022) (quoting Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)).
“[P]laintiff must establish with sufficient specificity the incremental injury that would
result from disclosure of h[is] identity.” 	Doe v. Freydin, 2021 WL 4991731, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021) (citing cases). 	Conclusory statements regarding harm are of
“limited utility.” Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
Where a plaintiff claims that disclosure will harm his or her mental health, courts
in the Second Circuit look for corroboration from medical professionals that detail the
risk to plaintiff. 	See, e.g., Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d 90, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(“Without corroboration from medical professionals . . . [plaintiff’s] general allegation of
potential trauma is ‘mere speculation’ about a risk of psychological injury that cannot
support her motion to proceed under a pseudonym.”); Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40,
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43-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting anonymity on reconsideration after plaintiff presented
“specific evidence [from a medical expert] predicting that revelation of [plaintiff’s]
identity w[ould] likely cause psychological and emotional pain so intense that it would
threaten her stability, her safety, and even her life”); Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 161
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding plaintiff failed to demonstrate risk of injury where letter from
plaintiff’s therapist failed to establish a link between public disclosure of plaintiff’s name
and psychological risk to plaintiff).
Here, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions that denying his Motion “would
heighten his reasonable fear of renewed racial hostility and community stigma” and
“exacerbate [his] anxiety [about housing stability] and undermine his recovery.” 	Dkt.
No. 3 at p. 6. 	Plaintiff’s claims are made generally and without medical corroboration,
and he has not identified any particularized harm that would result from publicly
disclosing his identity. 	See generally id. 	Plaintiff’s assertions are also made “without
citing any evidence to support that fear of harm from the general public.” Doe v. Skyline
Auto. Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 	Further, as Plaintiff admits,
Defendants already know his identity, Dkt. No. 3 at p. 3, and so it is unclear how
proceeding anonymously would ameliorate any alleged fear of retaliation that Plaintiff
has. Factors two and three, therefore, weigh against granting the Motion.
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The seventh factor, which “inquires as to the status of a plaintiff’s confidentiality
thus far in the litigation.” Doe v. Skyline Auto. Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 407. Here, thus
far, Plaintiff has sought to protect his anonymity and there is no indication that he has
publicly disclosed this lawsuit elsewhere. This factor thus weighs marginally in favor of
Plaintiff.
3. Factor 4: Vulnerability
The fourth factor requires courts to determine “whether the plaintiff is particularly
vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in light of his age.” 	Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at 190 (citations omitted). Age is a critical factor
in making this determination because “courts have been readier to protect the privacy
interest of minors in legal proceedings than of adults.” Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d
at 530 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, “[i]f a plaintiff is
not a child, this factor weighs against a finding for anonymity.” Id. (quotation and internal
quotation marks omitted). 	Because Plaintiff is an adult and “provides no evidence that
h[is] age makes h[im] particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure,” the
fourth factor weighs against allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously in this matter.
Doe v. Skyline Auto. Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
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4. Factors 5, 8, and 9: Public Interest
Factors five, eight, and nine all relate to the public’s interest in knowing Plaintiff’s
identity and all weigh against Plaintiff proceeding anonymously.
The fifth factor considers “whether the suit . . . challeng[es] the actions of the
government or that of private parties.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at
190 (citation omitted). Here, all named Defendants are private parties. This factor does
not favor Plaintiff. “When a lawsuit challenges governmental actions, actors, or policies,
the plaintiff has a strong interest in proceeding anonymously.” 	Doe v. Rensselaer
Polytechnic Inst., 2019 WL 13472598, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2019) (quoting Doe #1
v. Syracuse Univ., 2018 WL 7079489, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2028285 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020)) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This action between private parties does not bring
about the considerations that would be applicable in a suit against government entities.
“The eighth factor weighs whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered
by revelation of the plaintiff’s identity.” 	Doe v. Leonelli, 2022 WL 2003635, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022). 	“There is also a public interest in the accused being able to
publicly confront an accuser, a right that would be undermined by Plaintiff’s anonymity.”
Doe v. Combs, 2024 WL 863705, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2024) (citing Doe 1 v. Branca
USA, Inc., 2022 WL 2713543, at *2)). The public also has a strong interest in knowing
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the underlying facts of a litigation, including the identities of litigants. See, e.g., Doe v.
Leonelli, 2022 WL 2003635, at *4 (“[T]he public has a significant interest in open judicial
proceedings and the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by transparency,
including exposure of the parties’ identities.”). 	Further, “[t]he issues presented in this
case – the safe housing of individuals with disabilities – is one of clear public
importance.” 	Chestnut Hill NY, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 2023 WL 8108645, at *3.
Nothing in Plaintiff’s submission overcomes these presumptions.
“The ninth factor looks to whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues
presented, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities.”
Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 532. This action does not involve a purely legal issue,
but likely will involve significant factual disputes. 	The allegations here are factual in
nature, involving “particular actions and incidents.” 	Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d
at 	98 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	Thus, 	“open
proceedings . . . benefit the public as well as the parties and also serve the judicial interest
in accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication.” N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Doe Nos. 1-
5, 2012 WL 5899331, at *8. 	Accordingly, the public interest factors weigh against
anonymity in this action.
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5. Factor 6: Prejudice to Defendants
Factor six requires the Court to analyze the prejudice Defendants would face if
Plaintiff is permitted to proceed anonymously. 	“Courts will examine the reputational
damage to defendants, difficulties conducting discovery, and fundamental fairness of
proceeding anonymously.” Doe v. Townes, 2020 WL 2395159, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
2020) (citation omitted).
Here, accepting as true Plaintiff’s assertion that “Defendants will know or can
readily learn Plaintiff’s identity through service of the Complaint and through discovery,”
Dkt. No. 3 at p. 8, the Court finds that “allowing Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym
would not likely impede Defendants’ ability to investigate Plaintiff’s allegations or to
conduct initial discovery.” 	Roe v. Does 1-11, 2020 WL 6152174, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
14, 2020). “But courts have also considered the later stages of a case and recognized the
danger that cross-examination of an anonymous plaintiff could be compromised and the
risk that a jury would not be able to properly assess the credibility of a plaintiff proceeding
under a pseudonym.” 	Id. (citing Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. at 225).
“Allowing a plaintiff to proceed anonymously may also hamper witnesses coming
forward of their own volition to either bolster or refute a plaintiff’s allegations.” 	Id.
(citing Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. at 225).
This factor thus is neutral or weighs marginally against Plaintiff.
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6. Factor 10: Alternative Mechanisms
Finally, factor ten “examines whether there are other mechanisms, including
sealing, redaction of documents, protective orders and confidentiality agreements, that
could protect the plaintiff’s confidentiality.” 	Doe v. Combs, 2024 WL 863705, at *5.
Here, should this matter proceed to discovery, the use of confidentiality stipulations and
protective orders should amply address the concerns raised by Plaintiff regarding
confidentiality of his medical and mental health information. Thus, the tenth factor also
weighs against Plaintiff’s anonymity.
Considering the relevant factors in their totality, Plaintiff has not carried the “high”
burden he carries on this Motion to overcome the presumption that he should be named
in the Complaint. Doe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2023 WL 7000939, at *2. The Motion,
therefore, is denied.
E. Leave to Amend
“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Because Plaintiff may be able
to allege additional facts to state a valid claim against the Defendants pursuant to the
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FHA, as well as against Sealed Defendants 1 and 2 pursuant to the ADA, RA, and the
Civil Rights Act, the Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, but that
Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend these claims. The Court does not, however,
make the same finding with regard to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to federal civil rights
statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment given the absence of state action, as well as
Plaintiff’s claims against Sealed Defendants 3-6 pursuant to the ADA, RA, and Civil
Rights Act given that individual liability is unavailable. 	See supra at pp. 6-13. 	“[A]n
opportunity to amend is not required where ‘the problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes of
action is substantive’ such that ‘better pleading will not cure it.’” 	Davis v. Cap. City
Rescue Mission, 2013 WL 6062325, at *2 (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original). Because there is no indication that Defendants are
state actors such that Plaintiff could raise claims pursuant to federal civil rights statutes
and the Fourteenth Amendment, and because the ADA, RA, and Civil Rights Act do not
provide for individual liability against Defendants 3-6, the Court recommends that these
claims be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
The Court advises Plaintiff that, should he be permitted to amend his Complaint,
any amended pleading he submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace in
its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially numbered
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paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. 	Plaintiff is further
cautioned that no portion of his prior Complaint shall be incorporated into his amended
complaint by reference. Any amended complaint submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all
claims he intends to assert and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between
Plaintiff and Defendants that Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court
has jurisdiction. 	If Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated a law, he should
specifically refer to such law. 	Given that the Court has denied Plaintiff’s Motion to
Proceed under Pseudonym, see supra at pp. 14-15, any amended complaint submitted by
Plaintiff should specifically identify himself by name as well as each and every Defendant
he intends to sue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED as set forth
above; and it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (Dkt. No. 3) is
DENIED; and is further
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)3 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: May 18, 2026
Albany, New York
3 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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