Martin v. Bricker et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
DARNELL R. HICKS,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	1:25-CV-1598 (Lead)
(MAD/MJK)
TROOPER D.M. BRICKER #996, TROOPER
JOHN DOE #5640, TROOPER J.C. JENNINGS
#3510, and NEW YORK STATE POLICE –
ZONE 2,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
SHAKENA MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	1:25-CV-1599 (Member)
(MAD/MJK)
TROOPER D.M. BRICKER #996, TROOPER
#5640, and TROOPER J.C. JENNINGS BADGE
#3510,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
DARNELL R. HICKS
Kingston, New York
Plaintiff, pro se
SHAKENA MARTIN
Kingston, New York
Plaintiff, pro se
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER
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On November 13, 2025, two pro se complaints were filed in the Northern District of New
York: one by Plaintiff Darnell Hicks and one by Plaintiff Shakena Martin. They both moved to
proceed in forma pauperis. The complaints detail nearly identical factual situations, stemming
from a traffic stop on November 7, 2025. In sum and substance, Plaintiff Hicks was pulled over
by New York State Troopers for alleged traffic violations and Plaintiff Martin, his girlfriend,
stopped at the scene to observe and electronically record the interaction. Plaintiffs were both
allegedly issued citations or traffic tickets and all parties then drove away from the scene.
Through their separate complaints, Plaintiffs have filed claims for violations of their
constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
On January 12, 2026, Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz issued a single Order & Report-
Recommendation in both cases. See Dkt. No. 5.1 Magistrate Judge Katz first granted Plaintiffs'
IFP motions. See id. at 4. He then recommended that the Court consolidate the two cases
because the complaints raise nearly identical legal claims with common issues of law and fact.
See id. at 6. Magistrate Judge Katz also recommended that the complaints be dismissed for
failure to state the following claims: illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment, illegal search
under the Fourth Amendment, retaliation under the First Amendment, municipal liability under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), fabricated evidence under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and New York Civil Rights law § 79-n. See id. at 7-20. Magistrate
Judge Katz recommended that Plaintiffs be permitted to amend their complaints. See id. at 20.
Neither Plaintiff filed objections to the Order & Report-Recommendation.
1 Throughout this decision, the Court will refer to the filing number for the Order & Report-
Recommendation filed in Hicks v. Trooper D.M. Bricker, 1:25-CV-1598, as the first filed case.
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When a party declines to file objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation,
the district court reviews the report-recommendation for clear error. See Hamilton v. Colvin, 8 F.
Supp. 3d 232, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th
349, 359 (2d Cir. 2025). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
With no objections before the Court, it will review the Order & Report-Recommendation
for only clear error.
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Katz's recommendation to
consolidate the two cases. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs' complaints raise similar legal claims
stemming from the same set of facts. As such, consolidation is prudent. Should Plaintiffs amend
their complaints, they should do so in a single complaint which should be filed in case number
1:25-CV-1598, the lead case. The Court cautions Plaintiffs that one pro se individual is not
permitted to bring a lawsuit on behalf of another pro se individual. Any amended pleading must
be a complete pleading, which cannot refer to a prior filing. An amended pleading supersedes and
replaces all prior pleadings.
As to the merits of the claims brought by Plaintiffs Hicks and Martin, Magistrate Judge
Katz correctly concluded that they failed to state any claims. As to the Fourth Amendment
claims, Plaintiffs have not alleged an illegal search or seizure. Based on the allegations in their
complaints, Martin was neither seized nor searched, as she stopped her vehicle on the side of the
road after Hicks had been pulled over. No part of her person or vehicle was allegedly searched.
As to Hicks, Magistrate Judge Katz accurately recited and applied the law that there can be no
Fourth Amendment violation when there is alleged probable cause for a stop and/or search. See
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Dkt. No. 5 at 7-13. Plaintiff Hicks alleges that he was driving over the speed limit and that
despite being stopped for tinted windows, his "front windows were down and fully visible." Dkt.
No. 1 at 2.
It is well settled that "[a] traffic stop is reasonable if the stopping officer has 'probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or is
otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.'" United States v. Leeper, 577
F. Supp. 3d 48, 60 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir.
2017)). "Even a 'minor' traffic violation meets this standard and provides probable cause for a
stop." Id. (quoting United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994)); see, e.g., United
States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[A]n 'objectively reasonable' police officer
would have suspected the windows were tinted in violation of § 375(12–a)(b) of the Vehicle &
Traffic Law. Accordingly, we conclude that probable cause existed to stop the car"); United
States v. Foreste, 780 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[B]oth the Massachusetts and the Vermont
stop were reasonable in duration and scope. Trooper Loiselle properly stopped Foreste and
Cesar's vehicle for speeding").
Likewise, "once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a police officer's looking through the
windows into the vehicle from outside, even when shining a flashlight to illuminate the inside of
the vehicle, does not constitute a 'search' of the vehicle within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 369 (2d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). And,
"'once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may
order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, n.6 (1977)).
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Accordingly, the Court finds no error in Magistrate Judge Katz's analysis and conclusions
regarding Plaintiffs' alleged Fourth Amendment claims. The same conclusion is appropriate as to
Plaintiff Martin's state law illegal search claim. See Dkt. No. 5 at n.2.
As to the retaliation claims, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Katz that neither
Plaintiff stated such a claim. See Dkt. No. 5 at 13-15. "The existence of probable cause will . . .
defeat a First Amendment claim that is premised on the allegation that defendants prosecuted a
plaintiff out of a retaliatory motive, in an attempt to silence [him or] her." Fabrikant v. French,
691 F.3d 193, 215 (2d Cir. 2012). As Magistrate Judge Katz stated, Plaintiff Martin does not
explain what ticket she was issued and how it was retaliatory nor does Plaintiff Hicks allege a
lack of probable cause for the issuance of his traffic tickets. See Dkt. No. 5 at 13-15. There is no
clear error in the conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to state a First Amendment claim.
As to municipal liability, Plaintiff Hicks alleges only "Monell – Failure to Train and
Supervise." Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Magistrate Judge Katz appropriately recited the law and correctly
concluded that Plaintiff Hicks failed to state such a claim. See Dkt. No. 5 at 16-17. Plaintiff
Hicks provided no factual allegations concerning a failure to train theory of liability. Neither did
Plaintiff Martin. "To properly plead a Monell claim based upon a theory of failure to train or
supervise, a plaintiff must identify a specific deficiency in the [municipality's] training program
and establish that said deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, such that it actually
caused the constitutional deprivation." Forrest v. Cnty. of Greene, 676 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77
(N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Alwan v. City of New York, 311 F. Supp. 3d 570, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2018))
(quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff Hicks's reference to Monell does not meet that standard.
Magistrate Judge Katz next recommended dismissal of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process fabrication of evidence claims. See Dkt. No. 5 at 18-19. Magistrate Judge Katz
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accurately discussed the applicable law and concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations are too sparse
and vague to state such a claim. See id. Without any allegations that Plaintiff Hicks' tickets were
false, i.e., that he was not speeding and did not have tinted windows, or more specific allegations
as to what Plaintiff Martin's ticket was for, the Court cannot permit a fabricated evidence claim to
proceed. Cf. Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2023) ("Barnes met his
pleading obligation to present more than conclusory allegations that the officers fabricated the
drug sale account. He alleged that he was talking to a friend when the Defendant Officers
arrested him; that the Defendant Officers knowingly lied to the prosecutor in relaying that they
witnessed Barnes sell drugs").
In her complaint, Plaintiff Martin references New York Civil Rights Law § 79-n.
Magistrate Judge Katz correctly stated that § 79-n "prevents individuals from harassing or calling
police officers on other persons, based on statutorily protected classifications, when the individual
who harasses or calls the police has no reason to suspect a violation of New York's criminal law."
Dkt. No. 5 at 19; see also Kuiken v. Cnty. of Hamilton, 669 F. Supp. 3d 119, 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)
("New York Civil Rights Law § 79-n is a relatively new law, and, as such, there is little guidance
as to its applicability. . . . Nevertheless, the legislative history of the statute indicates that it
applies only to bias-related violence or intimidation"). There is no clear error in Magistrate Judge
Katz's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff Martin's claim for failure to sufficiently allege
harassing and discriminatory conduct.
Finally, Magistrate Judge Katz was correct in recommending that Plaintiffs be permitted
to amend their complaints. See Dkt. No. 5 at 20. "[P]ro se litigants should be afforded at least
one pre-dismissal opportunity to amend 'when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.'" Mitchell v. New York, No. 23-705, 2024 WL
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319106, *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2024) (quoting Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d
Cir. 2013)). Amendment does not appear futile and leave to amend is appropriate.
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Katz's Order & Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 5 in
1:25-CV-1598 and Dkt. No. 6 in 1:25-CV-1599) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set
forth herein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' complaints (Dkt. No. 1 in 1:25-CV-1598 and Dkt. No. 1 in 1:25-
CV-1599) are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave amend within thirty (30) days of
the date of this Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall consolidate cases No. 1:25-CV-1598 and No.
1:25-CV-1599; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall designate case No. 1:25-CV-1598 as the lead
case and case No. 1:25-CV-1599 as the member case; and the Court further
ORDERS that all future filings should be made in the lead case, only; therefore, should
Plaintiffs amend their complaint, such amendment should filed as a single amended complaint in
the lead case; and the Court further
ORDERS that, if Plaintiffs fail to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of
this Order, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close the cases,
without further order of this Court; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court file this Order in both dockets, No. 1:25-CV-1598
and No. 1:25-CV-1599; and the Court further
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ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiffs in
accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2026
Albany, New York
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