Claros et al v. Marvin's Refrigeration Corp. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MAURICIO CLAROS, DAMARIS MUNOZ,
NELSON MUNOZ, CRISTIAN MUNOZ, and
MAURO CLAROS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARVIN’S REFRIGERATION CORP.,
MARVIN TREJOS, and GRELY MORENO
GONZALEZ,
Defendants.
1:24-cv-1197
(ECC/PJE)
Maureen Hussain, Esq., for Plaintiffs
Regina E. Faul, Esq., for Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Mauricio Claros, Damaris Munoz, and their sons Nelson Munoz, Cristian Munoz, and
Mauro Claros (collectively Plaintiffs) brought this action against Marvin’s Refrigeration Corp.
(Marvin’s), Marvin Trejos, and Grely Moreno Gonzalez (collectively Defendants) alleging claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., the civil remedies portion of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), and New
York law. 	Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
September 16, 2025 Memorandum-Decision and Order (the Decision), granting in part and
denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 37. The motion for reconsideration is
fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 37-1, 40. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied.
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I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Local Rule 60.1 provides that a party may file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen
days from the date a judgment, order, or decree is entered. 	N.D.N.Y. L.R. 60.1. 	As a general
matter, “reconsideration is warranted where the moving party can show the court ‘overlooked’
facts or controlling law that ‘might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.’” Zhang v. Ichiban Grp., LLC, No. 17-cv-00148, 2022 WL 813956, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
17, 2022) (quoting Hum. Elecs., Inc. v. Emerson Radio Corp., 375 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (N.D.N.Y.
2004)); see also Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The standards
governing motions for reconsideration are necessarily strict to prevent litigants from rehashing the
same issues that have already been carefully considered by the district court in the prior ruling.”
Graber v. Cayuga Home for Child., No. 5:24-cv-468, 2025 WL 330492, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2025) (citing Navigators Ins. Co. v. Goyard, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 3d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)); see
also Analytical Survs. Inc. v. Tonga Partners L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[S]uch a
motion ‘is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing
a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple[.]’”).
“In this district, there are only three circumstances under which a court will grant a motion
for reconsideration: ‘(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’” Wright v.
Martin, Harding & Mazzotti, LLP, No. 1:22-cv-515 (MAD/ML), 2024 WL 2399906, at *2
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(N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2024) (citing Lewis v. Martinez, No. 9:15-cv-55, 2019 WL 2105562, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2019)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Although Defendants do not articulate which of the three permissible grounds for
reconsideration support their motion, they appear to rely on the need to correct a clear error of law
(given that they do not identify an intervening change of controlling law or newly available
evidence). 	Defendants argue that the Decision “did not fully consider the dispositive impact of
Plaintiffs’ failure to allege sufficient facts.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (Def. Mem.) at 5,
Dkt. No. 37-1.1 	Specifically, Defendants argue that (1) the Amended Complaint contains
“contradictions that preclude the inferences drawn by the Court and that render Plaintiffs’
entitlement to relief implausible,” id. at 6-8, (2) Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead facts alleging
Defendants “intended to cause serious harm” under the TVPRA, id. at 8-12, (3) the Court
“misinterpreted the pleading requirements” for liability for labor trafficking under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1590, id. at 12-13, and (4) the Court “misstated Plaintiffs’ allegations” regarding the New York
labor trafficking claim under New York Penal Law § 135.35, id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs respond that
Defendants have not established a permissible basis for reconsideration, and instead seek to
“relitigate issues that were already decided, and—in any event—that the challenged portions of
the [Decision] were correct.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law (Pl. Mem.) at 3-4, Dkt. No. 40.
As Plaintiffs point out, the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are not
contradictory when all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor as required when
deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d
1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the ECF
system.
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67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020); Pl. Mem. at 4-5. Viewing Plaintiffs’ plausible, nonconclusory allegations
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, there is no clear error, and the Court
will not reconsider the Decision on this ground.
In addition, the Court did not commit clear error in evaluating Plaintiffs’ claim for forced
labor liability under the relevant portion of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Defendants argue that
§ 1589 requires that an employer intend to cause serious harm to an employee. 	The authorities
that Defendants cite do not support their position. The scienter required by § 1589(a) is that an
employer “knowingly” coerce labor through certain means. See United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th
536, 561 (2d Cir. 2022). For a claim under § 1589(a)(4), the labor must be obtained “by means of
any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the [employee] to believe” that the employee will
suffer serious harm if they do not work, while for a claim under § 1589(a)(2), the labor must be
obtained “by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm.” Neither subsection requires that
an employer intend to actually cause serious harm to an employee.
Moreover, the Decision concluded that Plaintiffs alleged threats of serious financial harm
through factual allegations of an alleged debt and Defendant Trejos’s repeated threats to make
Plaintiffs “pay” if they left. 	Decision at 7-9. 	The Decision determined that the allegations
regarding Plaintiffs’ isolation and living conditions lent plausibility to Plaintiffs’ claim that they
found threats to enforce the “debt” sufficiently coercive that they would “compel a reasonable
person in [the victim’s] position to remain in [the employer’s] employ, against [their] will . . . in
order to avoid such threats of harm, when [they] otherwise would have left.” Zhong, 26 F.4th at
561 (quotation omitted). 	Further, Plaintiffs did, in fact, allege a threat that was inferentially
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connected with the alleged debt. Accordingly, because Defendants have failed to establish clear
error, the Court will not reconsider the Decision on this ground.
Further, the Court did not clearly err in interpreting the requirements for liability for labor
trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1590. 	As articulated by the Second Circuit in Adia v. Grandeur
Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2019), and quoted by this Court in the Decision and by
Defendants in prior briefing, see Dkt. No. 28-1 at 11,“‘[I]f a defendant violates [§]1589, he also
violates [§] 1590,’ so long as the defendant obtains the victim’s forced labor.” 	In other words, if
a defendant violates § 1589, he or she also violates § 1590, so long as he or she knowingly
“recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means” the person whose labor is
coerced. 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a). Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Defendants “obtain[ed] by any
means” Plaintiffs for labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 	As pointed out by Plaintiffs, the
Decision was not based on implausible or conclusory allegations, but was instead based on portions
of the Amended Complaint asserting at least one of the required grounds of “recruit[ing],
harbor[ing], transport[ing], provid[ing], or obtain[ing]” Plaintiffs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
Accordingly, the Court will not reconsider the Decision on this ground.
Finally, the Court did not misstate Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to their New York labor
trafficking claim. Plaintiffs were not required to use the word “fraud” to assert this claim. Instead,
as stated in the Decision, Plaintiffs avoided legal conclusions and alleged specific facts that, when
viewed as true and with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor, are sufficient to show at
this early stage of the litigation that Defendants “compel[led] or induc[ed] another to engage in
labor . . . by means of intentionally . . . requiring that the labor be performed to retire, repay, or
service a real or purported debt,” and that Defendants caused “by a systematic ongoing course of
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conduct with intent to defraud.” 	N.Y. Penal Law § 135.35. 	Therefore, Defendants did not
establish clear error on this argument.
Given that Defendants failed to establish clear error on any ground, any intervening change
of controlling law, or any newly available evidence, the motion for reconsideration is denied in its
entirety.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, Dkt. No. 37, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 20, 2026
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