Balash v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
In re:
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Chapter 13
Case No. 25-11042-1-pgr
Debtor.
_______________________________________
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Plaintiff, 	Adv. Pr. No. 25-90026-1-pgr
v.
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION1, et al.,
Defendants
_________________________________________
1 not in its individual capacity but solely as owner trustee for RCF2 Acquisition Trust (“U.S. Bank”).
Signed this 15 day of January, 2026.
Patrick G. Radel
_______________________________
United States Bankruptcy Judge
So Ordered.
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APPEARANCES:
ANNA THERESA BALASH 	ANNA THERESA BALASH
Debtor
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP 	ELLIS M. OSTER. SR., ESQ.
Attorneys for Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
New York, New York 10022
ANDREA E. CELLI-TRUSTEE 	BONNIE BAKER, ESQ.
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
7 Southwoods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING SPS’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
1. 	Anna Theresa Balash (“Debtor”) filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 13
of the United States Bankruptcy Code (25-11042, Docket No. 1) pro se on
September 11, 2025.
2. 	On November 3, 2025, Debtor filed this Adversary Proceeding against six
Defendants, including Select Portfolio Servicing(“SPS”). (Docket No. 1)
3. 	In this Complaint, Debtor asserts three2 causes of action: violations of the
Foreign 	Agents 	Registration 	Act 	(“FARA”); 	violations 	of 	the 	Fair 	Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); and asks that this Court to quiet title and
remove 	an 	allegedly 	invalid 	lien 	from 	615 	State 	Street, 	Hudson, 	NY
(“Property”) obtained from an allegedly fraudulent mortgage. (Complaint at 16,
18, & 24).
2 The Complaint contains Counts One, Two, and Four but no Count Three.
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4. 	On December 3, 2025, SPS filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 9).
5. 	Debtor filed opposition to the motion (Docket No. 17) and SPS filed a reply
(Docket No. 21).
6. 	The Court held a hearing to consider the motion on January 8, 2026.
7. 	Debtor appeared pro se, Bonnie Baker, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Chapter
13 Trustee, and Ellis M. Oster Sr., Esq. appeared on behalf of SPS.
8. 	For the reasons outlined below, SPS’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
9. 	Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable in
adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b).
10. Rule 12(b)(6) empowers the bankruptcy court to dismiss a complaint that
“fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
11. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all
factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.
2006).
12. A Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if “the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of h[er] claim which would entitle h[er] to
relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
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Pleading Standards of Rule 8
13. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable in adversary
proceedings by Rule 7008 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
14. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
15. “The purpose of the statement is to provide fair notice of the claim and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Enron Corp. v. Granite Constr. Co. (In re Enron
Corp.), No. 01-16034 AJG, 2006 WL 2400369, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 11,
2006) (cleaned up) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
16. A plaintiff is obligated to provide grounds for the entitlement to the relief
sought in the complaint, which “requires more than labels and conclusions.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
17. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ubriaco v. Martino (In re Martino), 429 B.R. 66,
70 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).
18. Thus, “a complaint should generally contain some allegations as to what each
defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s
action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes
the defendant violated.” Id. at 70–71 (internal quotation omitted).
19. Debtor’s Complaint contains only one sentence related to SPS and makes no
factual or legal allegations against SPS. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 6) (“Upon information
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and belief, defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, is a domestic with a principal
place of business located at 3217 S. Decker Lake Drive, Salt Lake City, UT
84119.”).
20. Thus, Debtor’s Complaint does not meet the requirements of Rule 8(a) and
should be dismissed.
21. However, because the Plaintiff is pro se, the Court will construe the Complaint
liberally “so as to do justice.” Martino, 429 B.R. at 71; Rule 8(f).
22. At the hearing held on January 8, 2026, Debtor, when questioned about the
allegations against SPS, indicated that she intended for all of the allegations
in the Complaint to apply to each Defendant independently. As such, the Court
will analyze the allegations as if they had been pleaded against SPS.
Violations of the FARA
23. Construed liberally, Count 	One 	of 	Debtor’s 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	SPS
violated FARA by failing to register as a foreign agent. (Docket No. 1 at 16–
17).
24. Debtor’s FARA claim lacks any chance of success as there is no private right
of action to enforce a FARA violation. Gong v. Sarnoff, No. 23-CV-343 (LJL),
2023 WL 5372473, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) (“[E]very court to have
considered the issue, in this Circuit and elsewhere, has held that no private
right of action can be implied in FARA.”); Henry v. Washington, No. 3:22-CV-5673-
DGE, 	2022 	WL 	9491957, 	at 	*2 	(W.D. 	Wash. 	Sept. 	16, 	2022), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-05673-DGE, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 14, 2022) (“[T] here is no private cause of action provided for in the act such
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that Plaintiff could sue for a violation of it.”); Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co.,
No. 16 CIV. 6127 (ER), 2017 WL 3175609, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (“[N]o
language in [the] statute or its legislative history suggests that Congress
intended 	to 	establish 	cause 	of 	action 	in 	any 	entity 	other 	than 	Federal
Government.”).
25. Additionally, in the Complaint, Debtor alleges that SPS is “domestic” with a
principal place of business in Utah. 	(Docket No. 1 at 5). 	Thus, FARA is
inapplicable to SPS.
26. As such, Count One of Debtor’s Complaint must be dismissed as to SPS.
Violations of the FDCPA
27. Count Two of Debtor’s Complaint alleges violations of the FDCPA.
28. While the Complaint is not clear as to what conduct SPS is alleged to have
done, the Complaint does state that “[t]he Bank Defendants . . . willfully
commenced a foreclosure debt collection action in the State Court by[] relying
on improper paperwork when the foreclosure case was commenced as well as
through the life of the case and ignored various attempts to bring the debt
current.” (Docket No. 1 at 22).
29. The Complaint goes on to state: “Defendants stole my property with their
illegal Foreclosure.”3 (Id.)
3 The Court notes that Debtor was not a signatory on the note or mortgage nor a Defendant in the Foreclosure action.
(Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C). Debtor’s late husband, Yiannakis C. Ioannides, was executed the note and mortgage and
was the sole Defendant in the Foreclosure action. Id.
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30. Thus, it seems clear that Debtor is seeking to prosecute violations of the
FDCPA occurring before and during the foreclosure action. Id.
31. “Claims under the FDCPA are subject to a one-year statute of limitations from
the date a violation occurs.” Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 22-1528-CV,
2023 WL 6380061, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2023).
32. The foreclosure action on the Property began on February 12, 2012. 	(Docket
No. 9, Ex. B). A decision and order granting a judgment of foreclosure and sale
was 	entered 	on 	January 	23, 	2018. 	(Id.) 	The 	Property 	was 	ultimately
transferred to U.S. Bank, on December 5, 2023. (Id., Ex. C)
33. Thus, based upon the allegations set forth in the Complaint, the latest that a
FDCPA violation could have occurred in connection with the foreclosure is
December 2023. 	For a claim to have been timely under the FDCPA, it must
have been brought no later than December 2024. As this adversary proceeding
was filed on November 3, 2025, any claim for a violation under the FDCPA
arising out of the foreclosure sale is time barred.
34. Debtor also alleges that “continuing to pursue eviction proceedings when a full
accounting per GAAP has not been provided is a violation of the FDCPA ....”
(Docket No. 1 at 10).
35. There are no allegations that SPS is evicting Debtor. (See Docket 9, Exs. A–C
showing that U.S. Bank is the owner of the Property); see also Docket No. 6,
Ex. M) (copy of Hudson City Court’s 14 Day Notice & Warrant of Eviction
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indicating that the petitioner on the eviction is “US Bank Trust National
Association....”).
36. As such, Count Two of the Complaint must be dismissed as to SPS.
Declaratory Relief seeking to quiet title and/or invalidate U.S. Bank’s
lien
37. Count Two asks the Court to “quiet title” and “have the lien removed and the
sale 	that 	took 	place 	set 	aside,” 	while 	Count 	Four 	asks 	that
the Invalid Lien . . . be removed from the property, along with any rights
alleged by Third Party.” (Docket No. 1 at 23–24).
38. There are no allegations in the Complaint indicating that SPS holds a lien
against the Property. (See Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C).
39. A Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale in favor of U.S. Bank was entered on
January 23, 2018, and a Referee’s Deed conveyed the Property to U.S. Bank on
December 5, 2023. (Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C).
40. However, even if SPS were the lienholder, “Second Circuit law is clear that a
federal court, other than the Supreme Court, may not review a state court
judgment even when the federal court litigant argues that the state court
judgment is void.” Buckskin Realty Inc. v. Windmont Homeowners Ass’n (In re
Buckskin Realty Inc.), No. 1-13-40083-NHL, 2016 WL 5360750, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016).
41. While Debtor argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to bankruptcy
courts, this Court is bound by the law of the Second Circuit. Vossbrinck v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To the extent
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[Plaintiff] asks the federal court to grant him title to his property because the
foreclosure 	judgment 	was 	obtained 	fraudulently, 	Rooker–Feldman 	bars
[Plaintiff’s] claim.”).
42. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over a case if the relief requested would result in the reversal or
modification of a state court judgment. Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th
Cir. 1995)); see also Holmes v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Holmes), No.
19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020)
(“Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . precludes federal district courts from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments.”); see also Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983). 	It also “bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court determinations.”
Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482–83 n.16).
43. “[T]here is no fraud exception to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.” 	Holmes v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing (In re Holmes), No. 19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576,
at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020); see also Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have never recognized a blanket fraud exception to Rooker–
Feldman.”).
44. Finally, a nonborrower does not have standing to challenge a foreclosure.
Jones v. Kaufman, No. 25-CV-4407 (CS), 2025 WL 1755122, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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June 24, 2025)(“A plaintiff who does not own the property subject to foreclosure
does not have standing to challenge that foreclosure.”); see also NDF1, LLC v.
Cunningham, No. 24-CV-00002 (NCM) (JAM), 2025 WL 3295069, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (same).
45. Thus, Count Four, and any similar relief requested in Count Two, must also
be dismissed as to SPS.
For the reasons stated above, SPS’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in its
entirety.
The Clerk of Court is requested to transmit a copy of this Order to the Debtor by
first class mail, postage prepaid.
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