Giardina v. Knickerbocker Group, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SABRINA GIARDINA,
Plaintiff,
-against-
KNICKERBOCKER GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
24-CV-6647 (JMA)(SIL)
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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court in this employment disability discrimination case
is Defendant Knickerbocker Group, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “Knickerbocker”) motion
to dismiss Plaintiff Sabrina Giardina’s (“Plaintiff” or “Giardina”) Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	See
Docket Entry (“DE”) [35].
By way of a Complaint dated September 20, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this
action 	seeking 	damages 	for: 	associational 	discrimination 	under 	the 	American
Disability Act (“ADA”) and New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”);
retaliation pursuant to the ADA and NYSHRL; and negligent supervision and
training. 	See 	DE 	[1]. 	Plaintiff 	amended 	the 	Complaint 	on 	April 	28, 	2025,
withdrawing her NYSHRL associational discrimination and negligent supervision
and training causes of action. 	See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), DE [24].
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 11, 2025, which Plaintiff
opposes. See DEs [35]-[39]. On October 21, 2025, Judge Azrack referred Defendant’s
motion to this Court for a Report and Recommendation. 	For the reasons set forth
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herein, the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant’s motion be denied in its
entirety.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.
A. Relevant Facts
Plaintiff and her husband, Michael Giardina (“Michael”), are former employees
of Knickerbocker, a limited liability company with its principal place of business in
Oyster Bay, New York. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 23, 35. 	The nature of Knickerbocker’s
business is unclear. Plaintiff Giardina began working for Defendant in July 2011 as
a part-time house assistant and was promoted to head house manager in September
2011. 	Id. at ¶ 12. 	As head house manager, Giardina’s responsibilities included
mobilizing the staff to satisfy the personal needs of James Dolan (“Dolan”), Plaintiff’s
direct supervisor, and Dolan’s family, as well as hiring and firing supporting
employees. 	Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 15. 	At an unspecified time, Dolan allegedly directed
Giardina to refrain from hiring anyone with a disability. Id. at ¶ 15. While Plaintiff
was concerned that Dolan’s directive was illegal, she felt that she was unable to file
an internal complaint because Knickerbocker did not employ human resource
personnel at the time she sought make a report. Id. at ¶17.
Michael started working for Defendant in 2008 as an assistant property
manager. Id. at ¶11. In August 2020, Michael sustained severe spinal and shoulder
injuries while removing a tree as part of his job responsibilities. 	Id. at ¶ 19. 	The
accident substantially impaired his mobility. Id. After seeking medical attention for
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his injuries Plaintiff’s husband was placed on bedrest for 72 days, resulting in him
filing for worker’s compensation. 	Id. ¶ 20. 	Once a doctor provided Michael with
clearance to perform light duty responsibilities, he returned to work. 	Id. at ¶ 21.
After his return, an unspecified employee warned Plaintiff that Dolan’s wife, Kristin
(together with Dolan, the “Dolans”) planned to “retire” Michael because he is “always
in so much pain.” Id. at ¶ 22. In October 2021, just one month after Plaintiff received
the warning, Michael’s employment was terminated and the Dolans claimed that they
had phased out his position. Id. at ¶ 23.
After Michael’s termination Giardina observed that Knickerbocker employees
began treating her differently. Id. at ¶ 25. Routine communication between Plaintiff
and her staff ceased. Id. For example, prior to Michael’s termination, Giardina was
kept fully abreast of Dolan’s daily schedule so she could assign staff to assist him with
various tasks. 	Id. at ¶ 27. 	But after Michael was fired the staff withheld Dolan’s
schedule, making it increasingly difficult for Plaintiff to perform her responsibilities.
Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27. Further, vendor presence on the Dolans’ property typically required
Giardina’s 	approval. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	31. 	After 	Michael’s 	termination 	however,
Knickerbocker’s staff allowed vendors onto the property without her knowledge. Id.
Giardina was convinced that she was being set up to fail. Id. At an unspecified time
after Michael was fired, an unnamed Knickerbocker staff member told Plaintiff that
Dolan 	directed 	his 	employees 	to 	avoid communicating 	with 	her 	following 	her
husband’s termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
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On January 5, 2022, Giardina sent an email to the Dolans expressing her
concern with being excluded from work-related communications since Michael’s
termination (the “Email”). Id. at ¶ 34 & Decl. of Kenneth A. Novioff, DE [35], Ex. A
(email complaining “I was unincluded [sic] from meetings, emails and text messages
that were pertinent to my job. . . . I started asking why I was not being included in
meetings that I normally would have been a part of. . . . 	I wasn’t sure if you were
waiting for me to leave the position to make it easier on you[.]”). 	Plaintiff viewed
these changes as discriminatory due to her association with her disabled husband.
Am. Compl. ¶ 34. On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff was terminated due to her January
5 Email. Id. at ¶ 35. During their January 7, 2022 termination conversation, Dolan
told Giardina that “there was a period we couldn’t talk to you because we didn’t finish
our agreement with [Michael].” Id.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 20, 2024, and amended her
Complaint on April 28, 2025. See DEs [1],[24]. In the Amended Complaint, Giardina
alleges three causes of action for: (i) associational discrimination under the ADA; (ii)
retaliation pursuant to the ADA; 	and (iii) retaliation under the NYSHRL. 	See
generally Am. Compl. 	Plaintiff seeks punitive and exemplary damages, legal costs
and attorneys’ fees. See id. Demand for Relief ¶ c. Defendant moves to dismiss the
Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 	On October 21, 2025, the district
judge referred Defendant’s motion to this Court for a Report and Recommendation.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
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In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1960 (2007)). 	A claim is considered plausible on its face “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949. In deciding a motion to dismiss, a “[c]ourt must accept all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.”
Medina v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-0797 (VEC), 2021 WL 1700323, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2009)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court’s
consideration is limited to:
(1) the factual allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true;
(2) documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated .
. . by reference; (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken; and
(4) 	documents 	upon 	whose 	terms 	and 	effect 	the 	complaint 	relies
heavily, i.e., documents that are “integral” to the complaint.
Applied Energetics, Inc. v. Gusrae Kaplan Nusbaum PLLC, No. 21-CV-382 (DF), 2022
WL 956119, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Calcutti v. SBU, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 488,
498 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal citation omitted)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In the instant motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s (i) associational
disability discrimination and her (ii) retaliation causes of actions fail to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. See generally Defendant Knickerbocker Group LLC’s
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Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, DE [36] (“Def.’s Mem.
Law”). Applying the standards outlined above, and for the reasons set forth herein,
the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant’s motion be denied.
A. Incorporation Into the Amended Complaint by Reference
As an initial matter, Defendant attaches a copy of Plaintiff’s Email to its
motion and asserts that it is incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference.
See DE [35-1]. 	The Court agrees. 	The email is the alleged protected activity that
serves as the linchpin for her retaliation causes of action. 	See Cypress Creek
Intermediaries, Inc. v. Westport Ins. Corp., No. 22-CV-3649 (ER), 2023 WL 1779641,
at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023) (“A document is incorporated when it is referenced in the
complaint or when its terms and effects are relied upon heavily such that it may be
considered 	‘integral’ 	to 	the 	pleadings.”). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Email 	is 	properly
considered on a motion to dismiss.
B. Associational Disability Discrimination Under the ADA
In the Amended Complaint, Giardina pleads that “Defendant discriminated
against [her] because of her association with a person known to have a disability in
violation of the law [i.e., Michael],” and that she was fired as a result. See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 39, 40.
Discrimination against an individual on the basis of a disability includes
“excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to [her] because of the known
disability of [another person] with whom the . . . 	individual is known to have a
relationship 	or 	association.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12112(b)(4). 	To 	state 	a 	claim 	for
associational discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:
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1) that she was qualified for the job at the time of an adverse
employment action; 2) that she was subjected to adverse employment
action; 3) that she was known at the time to have a relative or
associate with a disability; and 4) that the adverse employment action
occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the
disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the
employer's decision.
Kelleher v. Fred A. Cook, Inc., 939 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Graziadio v.
Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2016)). 	With regard to the fourth
element the Second Circuit recognizes three scenarios that give rise to a “reasonable
inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in
the employer’s decision:”
1) “expense,” in which an employee suffers adverse action because of
his association with a disabled individual covered by the employer's
insurance, which the employer believes (rightly or wrongly) will be
costly; 2) “disability by association,” in which the employer fears that
the employee may contract or is genetically predisposed to develop
the disability of the person with whom he is associated; and 3)
“distraction,” in which the employer fears that the employee will be
inattentive at work due to the disability of the disabled person.
Reid v. Metro One Loss Prevention Servs. Grp. (Guard Div. NY), Inc., No. 2:23-CV-
6303 (NJC) (ARL), 2025 WL 2533377, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2025) (quoting
Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 432). For the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss an
associational 	disability 	discrimination 	claim, 	the 	Court 	should, 	“examine 	the
complaint 	to determine 	whether it 	contains 	at least 	minimal 	support 	for the
proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” See Imhof v.
New York City Hous. Auth., No. 23 CV 1880 (JPC), 2024 WL 3376084, at 8* (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 2024) (quoting Kelleher, 939 F.3d at 470). 	Applying these standards the
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Court recommends Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s associational disability
discrimination cause of action be denied.
Knickerbocker does not dispute that Plaintiff adequately pled the first element
of an associational disability discrimination cause of action, i.e. her qualification for
the job. 	See generally Def.’s Mem. Law. 	The Amended Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff was well-qualified for her position, she received a promotion within three
months of working for the Dolans, and had an “exceptional performance” record. Am.
Compl. ¶ 12.
With respect to the second prong, Plaintiff states that she experienced two
adverse employment actions following her husband’s termination: (1) that she was
excluded 	from 	staff 	communications 	and 	meetings 	where 	her 	attendance 	was
necessary to adequately perform her job responsibilities and (2) her termination. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-31, 37. Defendant argues that neither alleged action is sufficient
to sustain her associational disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff does not
assert experiencing any adverse action when her husband was both employed and
disabled; exclusion from communications does not constitute an adverse employment
action; and the Amended Complaint fails to include facts suggesting that Plaintiff’s
termination is related to her husband’s disability. See Def.’s Mem. Law at 8-11.
Under the ADA “[t]o qualify as an adverse employment action, the employer’s
action toward the plaintiff must be materially adverse with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment.” Davis v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235
(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	It “must be ‘more
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disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’” 	Id.
(citing Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.2004))
(stating that materially adverse changes include “termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits [and] significantly diminished material responsibilities”).
Initially, Plaintiff’s exclusion from staff communications that were necessary
for her to perform duties qualifies as an adverse employment action. See Duplan v.
City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 625 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We have previously recognized
significantly diminished material responsibilities as the sort of employment action
sufficiently disadvantageous to constitute an adverse employment action”); Smith v.
City of New York, No. 1:23-CV-8229 (JLR) (RWL), 2025 WL 1983047, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
June 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2022534 (S.D.N.Y. July
18, 	2025), 	reconsideration 	denied,; 	2025 WL 	2200074 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	1, 	2025)
(concluding that “[a]n employer’s rendering an employee unable to carry out their job
duties would in all likelihood be considered an adverse employment action.”). 	Like,
Giardina’s 	exclusion 	from 	employee 	communications, 	her 	termination 	also
constitutes an adverse employment action. 	See Shider v. Allied Universal Sec. Co.,
No. 21-CV-6425 (LDH) (LB), 2023 WL 2652280, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023)
(“Termination of employment is a quintessential adverse employment action for the
purpose of an ADA claim.”). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s pleadings satisfy the second
prong.
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With regard to the third prong, Giardina alleges that her husband’s injuries
qualify him as an individual with a disability under the ADA. 	See Am. Compl. ¶ 7.
42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A) defines an individual with a disability as a person with “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” See id. Michael suffered shoulder and spinal injuries which substantially
impaired his mobility and resulted in his doctor placing him on bedrest for 72 days,
and required that he be provided accommodations upon his return to work. See Am.
Compl. 	¶¶ 7, 19, 20. 	Spinal and back injuries limiting mobility may constitute a
disability under the ADA. See Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d
62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing the district court’s judgment that plaintiff was not
disabled as defined under the ADA where she sustained a back injury and was unable
to sit for long periods.). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff adequately alleges that her husband
has a disability as defined by the ADA.
With respect to the fourth prong, Giardina pleads that her adverse action is
directly related to her husband’s disability—an employee told Plaintiff that Dolan
directed 	the 	staff 	to 	avoid 	communication 	with 	her 	following 	her 	husband’s
termination. 	See Am. Compl. ¶ 32. 	Further, she alleges that the day she was
terminated Dolan admitted to her that “there was a period that [I and the staff]
couldn’t talk to you because we didn’t finish our agreement with [Michael]” and that
at an earlier date Dolan directed Plaintiff to refrain from hiring disabled job
candidates. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 35. These allegations are sufficient to create an
inference that the Dolans believed Giardina’s attention to her husband’s disability
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was a distraction, and/or that he was concerned about the healthcare-related costs,
and Michael’s disability was the determining factor in Plaintiff’s termination. 	See
Kelleher, 939 F.3d at 470 (holding that the complaint satisfies the fourth element of
an 	associational 	discrimination 	where 	plaintiff’s 	employer 	told 	him 	that 	“his
problems at home were not the company’s problems” and plaintiff was effectively
demoted after missing a day of work to care for his daughter). Accordingly, Plaintiff
sufficiently pleads her associational discrimination claim, and the Court recommends
that Defendant’s motion to dismiss this cause of action be denied.
C. Retaliation pursuant to the ADA and the NYSHRL
Giardina asserts that Defendant retaliated against her because of her Email
where she opposed what she reasonably believed was discriminatory conduct in
violation of ADA and the NYSHRL. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 43, 46. 	The elements of an
ADA retaliation claim are that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the
decisionmaker knew about the protected activity, (3) an adverse employment action
was taken against the plaintiff, and (4) a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. 	Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th
111, 125 (2d Cir. 2023). While many courts treat the ADA and NYSHRL retaliation
claims identically, others recognize that the state law claim is more “more generous.”
See Nofal v. IMCMV Times Square LLC, 22-CV-3104 (DEH), 2024 WL 1138928, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2024). 	Thus, if Giardina’s claims satisfy the pleading
standards under the ADA, they necessarily satisfy the NYSHRL as well.
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Plaintiff pleads that she was fired just two days after emailing the Dolans to
complain 	about 	her 	frustration 	over 	being 	excluded 	from 	work-related
communications after her husband’s termination, see Ex. A, and was advised by a
coworker that this was because of his disability. 	Am. Compl. ¶ 32. 	On the day of
Plaintiff’s termination, Dolan acknowledged the accusations Plaintiff made in her
Email stating, “there was a period we couldn’t talk to you because we didn’t finish
our agreement with [Michael].” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35. The short timing between the
email and the firing is sufficient to support an inference of causation. See Giscombe
v. New York City Dep’t. of Educ., 39 F. Supp. 3d 396, 402 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2014)
(citing Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2011) (“While we have not ‘drawn
a bright line’ defining the maximum time period that can give rise to an inference of
causation, six weeks fits comfortably within any line we might draw.”) Accordingly,
the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads Plaintiff’s retaliation causes of action
pursuant to the ADA and the NYSHRL, and the Court respectfully recommends that
Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that Defendant’s
motion to dismiss be denied in its entirety.
V. 	OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on all parties by
electronic 	filing 	on 	the 	date 	below. 	Any 	objections 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days, that is by
01/22/2026. See 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d).
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Failure to file objections within the specified period waives the right to appeal 	the
District Court’s order. 	See Ferrer v. Woliver, No. 05-3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2
(2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v.
Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York 	/s/ Steven I. Locke
January 8, 2026 	Steven I. Locke
United States Magistrate Judge
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