McGregor et al v. Suffolk County, New York et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MICHAEL MCGREGOR, ZACHARY GIAMBALVO,
PAUL FELICE, MATTHEW OLIVIERI, EDWARD
NEWMAN, and DARK STORM INDUSTRIES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
-against-
Civil Action
No. 23-1130 (GRB) (ARL)
SUFFOLK COUNTY, New York, Police Commissioner
RODNEY HARRISON, in his Official Capacity and Individually,
MICHAEL KOMOROWSKI, Individually,
Defendants,
LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General
of the State of New York,
Intervenor.
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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
Cases interpreting the Second Amendment can require consideration of complex
questions. This case, however, is straightforward. While the plaintiffs challenge the
constitutionality of a state firearm statute, they neglected to file their claims against Suffolk
County and its law enforcement personnel in the proper court.
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment by (i) plaintiffs Michael
McGregor, Zachary Giambalvo, Paul Felice, Matthew Olivieri, Edward Newman, and Dark
Storm Industries, LLC (“DSI”) challenging the facial constitutionality of the state statute, Docket
Entry (“DE”) 91; (ii) Attorney General Letitia James (“the State”), who has intervened for the
purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality, DE 94; and (iii) Suffolk County, former
Suffolk County Police Commissioner Rodney Harrison, and Suffolk County Police Lieutenant
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
12/22/2025 10:56 am
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Michael Komorowski (“County Defendants”) defending Suffolk County’s implementation of the
statute, DE 101-7. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants summary judgment for the State
and the County Defendants and denies summary judgment for plaintiffs.
Background
The factual background and procedural history of this matter are set forth in an earlier
decision denying plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, McGregor v. Suffolk Cnty., New York,
690 F. Supp. 3d 147, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2023), appeal withdrawn, No. 23-1297, 2023 WL 10408195
(2d Cir. Oct. 10, 2023) (“McGregor I”), which is incorporated herein. In sum, plaintiffs brought
suit against state and local officials, raising facial and as-applied challenges to New York Senate
Bill 9458, (“the Rifle Bill”), which, inter alia, (i) requires an individual to obtain a
semiautomatic rifle license or receive an endorsement on an existing pistol license to purchase a
semiautomatic rifle, N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1); (ii) mandates that semiautomatic rifle owners
register their rifle on their license before taking possession, N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(9); and
(iii) allows licensing officers to consider an applicant’s “character, temperament and judgment”
in determining whether to grant a license, N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1)(b).
The New York State Legislature enacted the Rifle Bill in June 2022 “in response to a
tragic mass shooting in which a lone wolf shooter motivated by white supremacist ideology used
a recently purchased semiautomatic rifle to kill ten people and wound three others in a
supermarket in Buffalo, New York.” DE 94-1 at 7. The shooter was able to fire his semi-
automatic rifle, a Bushmaster XM-15, approximately 60 times within two minutes. See Office of
the New York State Attorney General, Investigative Report on the role of online platforms in the
tragic mass shooting in Buffalo on May 14, 2022, October 18, 2022, at 9-10. Because New York
did not have a licensing requirement for persons wishing to purchase semi-automatic rifles prior
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to June 2022, the Rifle Bill was intended “to close loopholes that directly address the gaps in our
laws exposed by these horrific shootings in Buffalo … and around the country.” DE 94-1 at 7-8
(quoting Statement of Senate Majority Leader Stewart-Cousins, N.Y. State Senate Stenographic
Record, Regular Session at 5365:21-5366:12 (June 2, 2022)).
Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief, contending that (i) the Rifle Bill facially
violates the Second Amendment and (ii) the County Defendants violated the Second Amendment
in implementing the Rifle Bill. In their as-applied challenge against the County Defendants,
plaintiffs argue that Suffolk County’s Pistol License Bureau (“PLB”) did not comply with the
Rifle Bill, thus abridging plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. By refusing to issue
semiautomatic rifle licenses or semiautomatic rifle endorsements to New York State pistol
licenses, the PLB effectively foreclosed Suffolk County residents from purchasing
semiautomatic rifles between September 2022 and September 2023.1
While the underlying facts are not in dispute, the County Defendants disagree that the
PLB violated the Rifle Bill. Instead, they argue that the PLB “made [semiautomatic rifles]
available to law-abiding citizens” despite the fact that the PLB’s “outmoded computer system”
rendered printing separate semiautomatic rifle licenses impossible. DE 101-7 at 19. Because
“[t]he computer company PLB had been using no longer existed, and PLB’s efforts to upgrade
its system with a computer that could print a separate [semiautomatic rifle] license were
unsuccessful,” the PLB developed a workaround. Id. Reasoning that the requirements for
obtaining a semiautomatic rifle and pistol license were identical, the PLB allowed firearms
1 Plaintiff Giambalvo also seeks “prospective relief against the enforcement of the Rifle Bill
because he has submitted to the state’s licensing scheme, the discretionary eligibility factors for
which are the same for pistols and [semiautomatic rifles].” DE 101-22 at 6. However, as
discussed in this Opinion, Giambalvo’s alleged harm is traceable to the state statute, not the
County’s enforcement.
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dealers to transfer a semiautomatic rifle to a buyer once the PLB notated the back of the buyer’s
pistol license with the rifle’s make, manufacturer, and serial number, and the buyer presented a
PLB-issued purchase order to the dealer. Id. at 19-20.
Beginning in September 2023, following commencement of this lawsuit, the PLB
endorsed the back of pistol licenses. DE 47 ¶ 120. Starting in October 2024, the PLB accepted
applications for a semiautomatic rifle license. DE 79 at 2. Suffolk County residents purchasing
semiautomatic rifles can do so either via an endorsement to a valid New York State pistol license
or a properly issued semiautomatic rifle license.
Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
This motion for summary judgment is decided under the oft-repeated and well understood
standard for review of such matters, as discussed in Bartels v. Inc. Vill. of Lloyd Harbor, 97 F.
Supp. 3d 198, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Bartels v. Schwarz, 643 Fed. App’x. 54 (2d
Cir. 2016), which discussion is incorporated by reference herein.
Second Amendment Facial Challenge
“[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct . . . [and] the government must demonstrate that
the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2022). Courts must determine
whether the challenged regulation and purported historical tradition are “relevantly similar,” by
“apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.”
Id. at 28-29. The government must “identify a well-established and representative historical
analogue” but need not show “a historical twin.” Id. at 30.
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However, the Second Amendment is not “trapped in amber.” United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024). Just as “the reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to
those arms that were in existence at the founding … the Second Amendment permits more than
just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691-92. “Holding
otherwise would be as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to muskets and
sabers.” Id. at 692. “[C]ourts must be particularly attuned to the reality that the issues we face
today are different than those faced in medieval England, the Founding Era, the Antebellum Era,
and Reconstruction.” Antonyuk v. James, 120 F. 4th 941, 970 (2d Cir. 2024). “[C]ases
implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes may require a
more nuanced approach.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27. After all, the Second Amendment does not
provide “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
In this case, the “Second Amendment’s plain text covers” plaintiffs’ conduct of
purchasing and owning semiautomatic rifles and thus, “the Constitution presumptively protects
that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Accordingly, the State must “demonstrate that the
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. The
Court finds no genuine dispute of fact that the Rifle Bill comports with the United States’ history
of firearm regulation.
As explained by the State’s expert Robert Spitzer, states have imposed licensing
requirements on firearm usage dating back to the colonial era. Several examples are instructive.
In 1713, Philadelphia penalized “firing a Gun without license.” DE 70-5 ¶ 44. A 1721
Pennsylvania colonial statute outlawed firing “any gun or other fire arm” absent “the governor’s
special license.” Id. Prior to the Civil War, laws in South Carolina, New Hampshire, New York,
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Ohio, Connecticut, Illinois, and Indiana imposed licensing requirements on the discharge of
firearms within certain cities. Id. ¶ 45. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Louisiana,
New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Washington State, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming enacted similar laws after the Civil War. Id.
As handgun ownership increased in the nineteenth century, states began requiring
licenses to possess and carry such weapons. An 1871 Missouri law required obtaining “written
permission from the Mayor” before carrying a concealed handgun or “any other dangerous or
deadly weapon” in St. Louis. Id. ¶ 20. An 1885 New York state law barred carrying or
possessing “any pistol or other firearms of any kind” in a city absent a license, which would be
granted for up to one year and revoked “at the pleasure of the mayor.” Id. ¶ 28. Cities in
Illinois, West Virginia, Minnesota, Utah, Connecticut, and California enacted ordinances
requiring that residents obtain a license from the mayor or police commissioner prior to carrying
a concealed handgun. Id. ¶¶ 24-33. In many of these instances, license holders were required to
renew their licenses annually. Id. In 1892, the U.S. Congress passed a law for the District of
Columbia criminalizing concealed carry of “any deadly or dangerous weapons,” which included
pistols, absent permission by a judge of the police court. Id. ¶ 34.
Despite plaintiffs’ challenges to the good moral character requirement, see DE 91-2 at 22,
licensing regimes in which a local official undertakes “certain individualized, discretionary
determinations” regarding an applicant’s moral character are consistent with historical traditions
of firearm regulations, Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 987. Such assessments “do not necessarily
prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ from exercising their Second Amendment right.”
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). An 1871 Jersey City regulation
required a local court to determine whether a license applicant was “temperate, of adult age, and
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capable of exercising self-control” before granting a license for the concealed carry of a “gun,
pistol, cannon, or fowling piece2 or other fire-arms.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 21. An 1881 New York City law
stated that permits would be issued to “a proper and law abiding person,” while an 1898 Oregon
City law allowed magistrates to issue carry permits only if they believed it “necessary or prudent
to grant such permission.” Id. ¶ 17. In 1908, Virginia enacted a concealed carry permit law, in
which permits could be granted for one year “upon a written application and satisfactory proof of
the good character and necessity of the applicant.” Id. ¶ 40.
There is similarly ample historical evidence to support the Rifle Bill’s registration
provision, which requires that buyers of semiautomatic rifles amend their license to include the
newly acquired rifle. Such a requirement is analogous to state mandates that firearms dealers
record each sale for the state’s inspection. See DE 94-1 at 20. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, “at least 17 states required those who sold or otherwise transferred guns (mostly
handguns) or other weapons to others to record information about the buyer, with that
information to be maintained and subject to possible later examination.” DE 70-5 ¶ 50. Many of
these states modeled their statutes on an 1885 Illinois law, which required “[a]ll persons dealing
in deadly weapons” to “keep a register of all such weapons sold,” which would include the date
of sale, the name and age of the buyer, the price of the weapon, and its intended use. Id. ¶ 51.
The “register [was] to be kept open for inspection of the public.” Id. A 1911 New York law
required that sellers record such information at the time of purchase in addition to the firearm’s
“calibre, make, model, manufacturer’s number or other mark of identification.” Id. ¶ 53. The
buyer needed to present a permit before taking possession of the firearm. Id.
2 A fowling piece is “a shotgun for shooting birds or small animals,” which suggests that this
regulation extended to long guns. Fowling Piece, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fowling%20piece.
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Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, DE 95 at 10-13, there is historical support for imposing
licensing and registration requirements on long guns. In 1893, Florida made it “unlawful to
carry or own a Winchester or other repeating rifle without first taking out a license from the
County Commissioner,” who would record the licensee’s name, as well as the firearm’s
manufacturer, caliber, and number. DE 70-5 ¶ 35. By the 1920s and 1930s, when long guns
began to pose public safety problems, at least 36 states imposed restrictions on such guns,
including the Tommy gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle, and sawed-off shotguns, while 11
states restricted semiautomatic long guns. DE 94-1 at 17. During those two decades, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin extended licensing requirements to long guns, including
machine guns and automatic rifles. DE 70-5 ¶ 40.
While the State, through its expert, engages in substantial historical analysis, plaintiffs
respond with arguments devoid of evidence. The historical record is clear. From the colonial era
through the twentieth century, states consistently imposed licensing and registration
requirements on handguns and other dangerous weapons. Such regulations often required a
public official to make determinations about a buyer’s fitness to own and use a firearm. When
long guns began to pose safety threats, states enacted licensing regimes.
The evolution of firearm regulations is not surprising when one considers technological
advancements since the Founding when the most commonly owned firearms were muskets and
flintlock pistols, both of which could fire only about three rounds per minute. Christopher
Ingraham, What ‘arms’ looked like when the 2nd Amendment was written, THE WASHINGTON
POST, June 13, 2016. In contrast, the Buffalo shooter used a semiautomatic rifle to fire 60
rounds in two minutes. See supra Office of the New York State Attorney General. According to
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one historian, guns “were not nearly as threatening or lethal as those available today” and “were
so difficult to fire in the eighteenth century that the very idea of being accidentally killed by one
was itself hard to conceive.” Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest State of
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 110 (2000). Consequential advances in gun
technology demonstrate that “[t]he regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not … the
same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868.”
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27.
The historical tradition of firearm regulation “confirm[s] what common sense suggests:”
state and local authorities may implement licensing regimes to ensure that those bearing arms are
law-abiding, responsible citizens. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. Plaintiffs’ argument that the State
inappropriately cites regulations on handguns and automatic machine guns to justify regulating
semiautomatic rifles is unavailing.3 DE 95 at 18-20. While the Rifle Bill, which New York’s
legislature enacted in response to a horrific mass shooting, “is by no means identical to these
founding era regimes … it does not need to be” since it is “‘relevantly similar’ to those founding
era regimes in both how and why it burdens the Second Amendment right.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at
698 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). The record evidence and historical data show that the Rifle
Bill’s licensing, registration, and moral character requirements fit comfortably within three
hundred years of state firearm regulations.
Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion seeking to facially
invalidate the Rifle Bill and grants the State’s summary judgment motion.
3 Counsel’s assertions that the State engaged in a “near-sanctionable overinclusion of immaterial
and useless information,” the State’s analogy of semiautomatic rifles to Tommy Guns is “beyond
the pale,” and the State’s expert acted “deceitfully” are gratuitous. DE 95 at 17-19. While legal
arguments concerning the Second Amendment’s scope can understandably become contentious,
such ad hominem attacks do not help the Court resolve the issues at hand.
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The As-Applied Challenge Against the County Defendants
Plaintiffs challenge the PLB’s policy of not issuing semiautomatic rifle licenses or pistol
license endorsements between September 2022 and September 2023. See DE 101-22. They
concede that their claims for equitable relief are moot given that the PLB began endorsing pistol
licenses in September 2023 and issuing semiautomatic rifle licenses in October 2024. See id. at
13 (“While the County’s cessation of its policy has rendered Plaintiffs’ request for prospective
relief – the permanent injunction of the [p]olicy – moot, it does not affect Plaintiffs’ claims for
retrospective monetary damages for the past constitutional harms caused by the policy.”).
However, plaintiffs’ claims for damages arising out of the PLB’s policy between September
2022 and September 2023 are not moot. See Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109, 115 n.4 (2d Cir.
2001) (“We note that had the plaintiffs sought money damages in addition to their request for
injunctive relief, this controversy would not be moot.”).4
Plaintiffs Giambalvo and Felice5
Even though plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief are not moot, plaintiffs still must
satisfy Article III standing. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Hochul, No. 20-CV-3187, 2021 WL
4 Even without plaintiffs’ concession, the claims against the County Defendants for equitable
relief are moot. Because “federal courts may only decide live cases or controversies,” a suit
seeking injunctive relief “becomes moot when interim relief or events have eradicated the effects
of the defendant’s act or omission, and there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged
violation will recur.” Irish Lesbian and Gay Org v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1998).
Here, Suffolk County residents can now apply for a semiautomatic rifle license or endorsement
of an existing pistol license. This case does not fall under the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception to mootness. Van Wie, 267 F.3d at 114.
5 Plaintiffs concede that because Olivieri “relocated outside of New York State” he has “no
standing to challenge the Rifle Bill.” DE 101-21 ¶ 85. Plaintiffs are not clear as to whether
Olivieri lacks standing to sue solely for prospective relief or for both prospective and
retrospective relief. For the avoidance of doubt, the Court finds that Olivieri lacks standing to
sue not only for prospective relief, but also for retrospective relief, because he objected to
obtaining a semiautomatic rifle license out of a belief that the Rifle Bill lacked any historical
analogues. Id.; DE 81 at 4. This concern is not traceable to the PLB’s enforcement.
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5313713, at *2 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that an organization seeking nominal damages for past
alleged constitutional violations lacked constitutional standing). “To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must have ‘(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.’” Silva v. Farrish, 47 F.4th 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578
US. 330, 338 (2016)).
Giambalvo and Felice lack standing to sue the County Defendants, because they cannot
trace any alleged harm to the PLB’s implementation of the Rifle Bill. Plaintiffs concede that the
PLB denied Giambalvo’s application for a pistol license in September 2023 after he failed to
“submit the court disposition for each of his many arrests, despite being given ample time to do
so.” DE 101-21 ¶ 82. Neither side disputes that Giambalvo’s refusal to provide details about his
arrests would have also prevented him from obtaining a semiautomatic rifle license given that the
Rifle Bill’s standards for issuance of a semiautomatic rifle license are the same as those for a
pistol license. Id. ¶ 84. Thus, Giambalvo’s inability to obtain a pistol license—for the purpose
of receiving a semiautomatic rifle endorsement—is traceable to the Rifle Bill’s good character
provision, not the PLB’s policy from September 2022 to September 2023.
While plaintiffs provide few details about Felice’s application process, the record is clear
that his application was deficient and failed to comply with provisions in the Rifle Bill.6 See id.
6 Plaintiffs provided the Court with a copy of Felice v. Waring, Ind. No. 613381/2024, in which
the New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County denied the County’s motion to dismiss
Felice’s Article 78 petition. See DE 81. Felice had sought an order compelling the County to
accept his application for a semiautomatic rifle license after the PLB denied his pistol license for
failure to provide a doctor’s note and barred him from reapplying for two years. Following the
state court’s decision, the County (i) began accepting the state application for a semiautomatic
rifle license; and (ii) did not place a time bar on the ability of an applicant whose pistol or semi-
automatic license application had been denied from reapplying for a license. DE 79 at 2.
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¶ 80 (“PLB denied Giambalvo’s and Felice’s applications for a pistol license because they failed
to meet the eligibility requirements for a pistol license which are set forth in [the Rifle Bill].”).
Accordingly, it is undisputed that Giambalvo and Felice trace their alleged harm to the
enactment of the Rifle Bill rather than the PLB’s implementation. Thus, they lack standing to
sue the County Defendants over the PLB’s enforcement of the Rifle Bill.
Plaintiffs McGregor and Newman/DSI
McGregor may be able to show that the PLB’s policy from September 2022 to September
2023 precluded him from buying a semiautomatic rifle. If so, Newman and DSI could have
derivative standing. See Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186, 194 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Vendors and
those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their
operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or
function.”).7
Regardless of standing, McGregor, Newman, and DSI encounter a separate hurdle:
subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that in failing to issue semiautomatic rifle licenses or
pistol license endorsements between September 2022 and September 2023, the PLB did not
comply with the Rifle Bill. This alleged non-compliance, according to plaintiffs, constitutes a
Second Amendment violation. However, claims alleging violation of a state statute should have
been brought in New York state court pursuant to Article 78 of the New York State Practice Law
and Rules (“Article 78”).
7 Unlike here, where plaintiffs are suing for damages, Gazzola concerned a suit for injunctive
relief. The fact that plaintiffs can only sue the County Defendants for damages could suggest
that such third-party standing cases are not on point. However, because Newman and DSI sued
the County Defendants in the wrong court, their standing is not dispositive.
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“Article 78 provides a specific and exclusive remedy where a question raised by a party
goes to “whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by
error of law or was arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion
as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed.” Bldg. Indus. Elec. Contractors
Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-8002 (RPP), 2011 WL 3427138, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2011), aff'd, 678 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting CPLR § 7803(3)). As a district court in this
Circuit observed:
Proceedings under Article 78 can only be heard in the State Supreme Court. CPLR §
7804(b). A number of district courts have dismissed cases brought in federal court that
should have been brought to State Supreme Court as an Article 78 proceeding. See Brown
v. Tomcat Elec. Sec., Inc., No. 03 CV 5175(FB), 2007 WL 2461823 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 2007) (“New York law vests jurisdiction over Article 78 proceedings solely in the
state courts”); Blatch v. Hernandez, 360 F.Supp.2d 595, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“This
claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as New York State has
not empowered the federal courts to consider such claims.”); Cartegena v. City of New
York, 257 F.Supp.2d 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“State law does not permit Article 78
proceedings to be brought in federal court, and hence I conclude that I do not have the
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [plaintiff's] Article 78 claims.”); see
also Camacho v. Brandon, 56 F.Supp.2d 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Luchesi v. Carboni,
22 F.Supp.2d 256, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. “To determine whether Article 78 applies to a given dispute, a reviewing court must
‘examine the substance of the action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and
the relief sought.’” Id. (quoting Solnick v. Whelan, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229 (1980)). “An Article 78
proceeding is the proper vehicle to determine whether the law has been lawfully applied, or the
validity of certain government acts pursuant to a valid statute, rather than a vehicle for
challenging the validity of a statute itself.” Jones-Bey v. Stanislov, No. 23-CV-5599 (DEH),
2024 WL 3520636, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2024) (quoting Bldg. Indus. Elec. Contractors
Ass’n, 2011 WL 3427138, at *14).
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Here, plaintiffs allege that the County Defendants violated state law because the PLB
“would not issue licenses, as required by [the Rifle Bill] … or endorse existing pistol licenses to
reflect [semiautomatic rifle] authorization.” DE 101-22 at 6. The “constitutional harm”
according to plaintiffs, is premised on the County Defendants’ “circumvention of state law
between September 2022 and September 2023.” Id. at 14. Plaintiffs also note that the PLB’s
policy “foreclosed the people within the PLB jurisdiction from purchasing [semiautomatic
rifles]” within and outside of Suffolk County “because all [firearms dealers] throughout the state
were bound by state law not to transfer a [semiautomatic rifle] in the absence of an endorsed
pistol license.” Id. The County Defendants, meanwhile, argue that because the “eligibility,
application, and procedural requirements for purchasing and taking possession of a
[semiautomatic rifle] would be the same as the requirements for purchasing and taking
possession of a pistol,” its policy was a reasonable interpretation of the Rifle Bill in light of the
fact that the PLB was unable to print a separate semiautomatic rifle license. DE 101-7 at 19.
Such arguments would have been integral to an Article 78 proceeding, in which a state court
could assess whether the PLB’s enforcement of the Rifle Bill complied with the state law.8
The record establishes beyond dispute that plaintiffs’ core allegation against the County
Defendants is that they violated the Rifle Bill. “The Court therefore joins a number of other
8 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of McGregor,
Newman, and DSI against the County Defendants, it declines to assess the merits of the PLB’s
policy from September 2022 to September 2023. The Court has previously noted that
McGregor’s arguments regarding this policy “raise some concern,” McGregor I, 690 F. Supp. 3d
at 156, especially because the PLB’s inability to endorse existing pistol licenses or “print a
separate license for a [semiautomatic rifle]” seemed to disappear after plaintiffs filed this lawsuit,
DE 101-7 at 19. This is not the only instance of the PLB’s incompetence. Despite the County
Defendants’ “disingenuous” assertion that “[a] rifle can easily, quickly, and inexpensively be
added to an existing pistol license,” individuals generally had to “wait up to three years to obtain
a pistol license in Suffolk County.” McGregor I, 690 F. Supp. 3d at 156 n.10.
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district courts that have dismissed cases brought in federal court that should have been brought to
State Supreme Court as an Article 78 proceeding.” Jones-Bey, 2024 WL 3520636, at *4
(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate the claims of McGregor, Newman, and DSI against Suffolk County, Defendant
Harrison, and Defendant Komorowski.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment from
the State and the County Defendants and denies plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
December 22, 2025
/s/ Gary R. Brown
GARY R. BROWN
United States District Judge
Case 2:23-cv-01130-GRB-ARL Document 103 Filed 12/22/25 Page 15 of 15 PageID
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