Greene et al v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JAMIE GREENE, et al.
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM
v. 	AND ORDER
22-CV-3300-SJB-ST
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
AURHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment
on the limited question of whether Plaintiffs—employees of several New York rail
entities—are protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). For the reasons
explained below, the Court concludes that the statute’s protections do not extend to
these Plaintiffs, and Defendants’ motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs Jamie Greene, Lamell Armor, and Fabian Saugar initiated this case on
June 3, 2022, seeking to bring collective action claims under the FLSA and class action
claims under the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 2–3).
Greene, Armor, and Saugar, together with John Brennan and Arthur Bennett
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed their Amended Complaint against the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (“MTA”), Long Island Railroad (“LIRR”), Metro-North
Railroad (“MNR”), Staten Island Railway, MTA Construction and Development, MTA
Regional Bus Operations, MTA Bridges and Tunnels, and New York City Transit
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Authority (collectively, “Defendants”) on July 28, 2022. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 1).
The Amended Complaint alleges “underpayments and late payments of wages” by
Defendants, some linked to a payroll service outage, and some stemming from a
general failure to properly calculate overtime rates. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 10). Plaintiffs brought
four claims, each on behalf of the relevant class or collective, alleging: 1) late payments
of overtime wages in violation of the FLSA, brought by all Plaintiffs, (id. ¶¶ 91–102);
2) late payments in violation of the NYLL, brought by all Plaintiffs, (id. ¶¶ 103–10);
3) unpaid overtime in violation of the FLSA, brought by Plaintiffs Greene, Armor, and
Saugar, (id. ¶¶ 111–22); and 4) unpaid overtime in violation of the NYLL, brought by
Plaintiffs Greene, Armor, and Saugar, (id. ¶¶ 123–30).
Defendants first moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint in part, seeking to
dismiss all the NYLL claims and the FLSA claims brought by the LIRR employees,
Greene, Armor, and Saugar, and the MNR employee, Brennan.1 (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss dated Dec. 23, 2022, Dkt. No. 46 at 7–8). Magistrate Judge Tiscione
then issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that the motion be granted in full,
Greene v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 22-CV-3300, 2024 WL 1051166, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
2024), to which Plaintiffs objected, (Pls.’ Objs. dated Mar. 11, 2024, Dkt. No. 68). In
separate orders, Judge Azrack adopted the recommendation to dismiss the NYLL
overtime claims, Greene v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 22-CV-3300, 2024 WL 1343594, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2024), and separately adopted the recommendation to dismiss the
1 Defendants did not seek to dismiss the FLSA claims of non-rail workers, such as
Plaintiff Bennett, employed by a division of the New York City Transit Authority. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 31).
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NYLL late payment claims but overruled the recommendation that the rail workers’
FLSA claims be dismissed, Greene v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 22-CV-3300, 2024 WL
4235480, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2024) [hereinafter Greene I]. Defendants now seek
partial summary judgment on these claims.2 (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
dated Mar. 18, 2025 (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 86 at 1).
Judge Azrack’s decisions frame the issues currently before the Court. First, the
FLSA regulates maximum working hours and overtime pay, but exempts rail carrier
employees from coverage—specifically, as amended, the FLSA exempts “any employee
of an employer engaged in the operation of a rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV
of Title 49.” Greene I, 2024 WL 4235480, at *7 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2)). “Part A of
subtitle IV of Title 49” refers to the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
of 1995 (“ICCTA”). Id. The ICCTA is the successor to the Interstate Commerce Act
(“ICA”), the law which created the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to
regulate interstate rail carriers. Id. at *8. The ICCTA abolished the ICC and created the
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) in its place.3 Id. at *11. Judge Azrack found that
Defendants’ FLSA liability as to the rail worker Plaintiffs turned on two questions:
1) whether “the STB ha[s] jurisdiction, in some fashion, over Defendants under the
2 This case was reassigned from the Honorable Joan M. Azrack to the
undersigned on January 15, 2025.
3 Though the Second Circuit held in 1989 that MNR was exempt from the FLSA,
that was under the now-defunct ICC regime—the subsequent statutory landscape
changes led Judge Azrack to conclude that the Circuit’s 1989 decision was no longer
operative. Greene I, 2024 WL 4235480, at *12 (discussing Farley v. Metro -N. Commuter
R.R., 865 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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ICCTA,” and 2) “if the STB currently has jurisdiction over Defendants in some fashion,
is that jurisdiction sufficient to render Defendants ‘subject to [the ICCTA]’ and therefore
exempt from the FLSA’s maximum hour requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2).” Id.
at *12.
Defendants failed to meet their burden to show that they were exempt from the
FLSA in their motion to dismiss, citing only a few STB decisions that did not clearly
establish the basis for the STB’s jurisdiction or prove that the STB had jurisdiction at the
relevant times. Id. at *13. Accordingly, Judge Azrack directed the parties to complete
expedited fact discovery limited to this exemption issue, and then to proceed to
summary judgment briefing:
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment must address the
following questions: First, whether (and how) the STB currently exercises
jurisdiction over Defendants under the ICCTA. 	Defendants shall explain
and identify the specific statutory basis (or bases) for STB’s alleged
jurisdiction over Defendants. Defendants shall also provide the Court with
any relevant administrative and judicial decisions to support their claims,
as well as any evidence that may be necessary to establish the STB’s alleged
jurisdiction over Defendants. Second, if the STB has jurisdiction over only
limited and discrete aspects of Defendants’ operations under the ICCTA,
Defendants shall explain why they contend they are still “subject to [the
ICCTA]” 	and 	therefore 	exempt 	from 	the 	FLSA’s 	maximum 	hour
requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2). Otherwise put, the parties should
address whether STB’s limited exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants or
their operations is sufficient or insufficient to [] trigger the FLSA’s rail
carrier exemption.
Greene I, 2024 WL 4235480, at *14. Unfortunately, the parties’ summary judgment briefs
are not framed around these two questions, and they fail to explain what, if any,
additional discovery was completed. Despite this less than pellucid presentation, there
is sufficient record evidence to warrant granting of the motion.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, [the
Court] must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the
moving party.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion” in one of two ways. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). It may cite to portions of the record “including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, . . . admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Id. R. 56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, it may
show that “the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.” Id. R. 56(c)(1)(B); cf. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 924 (2d Cir. 1988).
In moving for summary judgment or answering such a motion, litigants are
required by the Local Rules to provide a statement (a Rule 56.1 statement) setting forth
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purported undisputed facts or, if controverting any fact, responding to each assertion.
See Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)–(b). In both instances, the party must support its position by
citing to admissible evidence from the record. Id. R. 56.1(d); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(requiring reliance on admissible evidence in the record in supporting or controverting
a purported material fact). “The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to streamline the
consideration of summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to
hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties.” Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
Where claims in opposing Rule 56.1 statements are “genuinely disputed,” the
Court will consider the evidentiary sources of the claims. Halberg v. United Behav.
Health, 408 F. Supp. 3d 118, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (adopting report and recommendation).
In evaluating the sources of claims made in dueling Rule 56.1 statements, the Court
cannot—as is true for the summary judgment motion as a whole—weigh evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d Cir.
1994). “Legal arguments are impermissible in any Rule 56.1 Statement and are to be
disregarded.” Taveras v. HRV Mgmt., Inc., No. 17-CV-5211, 2020 WL 1501777, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Lawrence v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-412, 2013 WL 4458755, at
*1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Both parties have submitted Local Rule 56.1 statements
and responses to each other’s statements that mix factual assertions with legal argument
and therefore fail to meet the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. The facts . . . are taken
from those assertions contained in the Local Rule 56.1 statements that comply with
Local Rule 56.1[.]” (citations omitted)). The court may not grant summary judgment
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based on a fact in a Rule 56.1 statement—even if undisputed—not supported by
admissible evidence. E.g., Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 142–43 (2d Cir.
2003) (vacating grant of summary judgment to defendants based on facts enumerated in
Rule 56.1 statement supported only by arguments in briefs rather than admissible
evidence). The Court must also disregard conclusory denials that lack citations to
admissible evidence. Rodriguez v. Schneider, No. 95-CV-4083, 1999 WL 459813, at *1 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (“Rule 56.1 statements are not argument. They should contain
factual assertions, with citation to the record. They should not contain conclusions[.]”),
aff’d, 56 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2003). Also, where the opposing party fails to
specifically controvert a numbered paragraph in the Rule 56.1 statement, the statement
by the moving party “will be deemed to be admitted.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c). The Court
also does not give any consideration to hearsay, speculation, or inadmissible evidence
in evaluating declarations or affidavits. Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128, 130 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[A] court is obliged not to consider inadmissible evidence at the summary
judgment stage[.]”); Crawford v. Dep’t of Investigation, No. 05-CV-5368, 2007 WL 2850512,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (“[A] non-moving party ‘must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial;’ he or she ‘may not rely on mere
conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence
showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.’” (quoting Woodman v.
WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2005))), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 139, 143 (2d Cir.
2009).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court finds the following facts relevant to its decision—drawn from the
pleadings, the parties’ respective Rule 56.1 statements, and supporting affidavits and
exhibits attached thereto—are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Unfortunately, the
parties mistake Rule 56.1 statements for opportunities to advance legal arguments. The
parties’ statements generally contain disputes over the meaning of various provisions
within contracts between rail entities, or summaries of STB decisions. Such items are
improper in a Rule 56.1 statement. As such, there are only a mere handful of facts that
the Court considers on this motion. They are as follows:
Greene, Armor, and Saugar were employed by LIRR, and Brennan was
employed by MNR. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement dated Mar. 18, 2025 (“Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 87 ¶ 1; Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. dated Apr. 18, 2025 (“Pls.’ 56.1
Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 90 ¶ 1).
MNR operates a commuter rail service pursuant to the passenger service rights it
acquired to the Harlem, Hudson, and New Haven Lines from Consolidated Rail
Corporation, (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2), and the Maybrook Line it
acquired from a private corporation, (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7; Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7). The
parties dispute the degree to which MNR retains and exercises control over all rail
operations on its tracks, including freight service operated by Conrail. (Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt.
¶¶ 3–4; Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. dated May 9, 2025, Dkt. No. 93 ¶¶ 3–4).
LIRR owns rail lines used for freight and passenger rail service in New York City
and Nassau and Suffolk counties, pursuant to a transfer from New York & Atlantic
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Railway (“NYAR”). (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9; Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9). NYAR has exclusive
rights to freight rail service on LIRR lines, but LIRR retains authority over maintenance
and operating rules, as well as some dispatching services. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 12;
Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 12).
DISCUSSION
This case is, at its core, a question of statutory interpretation. To resolve the issue
of whether the FLSA applies to these workers or not, the Court must determine whether
they fall within an exemption: “any employee of an employer engaged in the operation
of a rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV of Title 49.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2). Put
simply, the FLSA exempts rail carriers subject to the STB from its overtime provisions.
And federal law specifically defines what a rail carrier is, as well as the bounds of the
STB’s jurisdiction. Applying those precepts together, both MNR and LIRR fall within
the exemption, and thus the rail workers cannot assert FLSA claims. The Court
addresses Plaintiffs’ novel arguments to the contrary, including 1) that these railroads
are not rail carriers; 2) that the STB’s limited jurisdiction over certain MNR and LIRR
facilities means that they are not rail carriers; and 3) that the public transportation
exception to the STB’s jurisdiction (to which MNR and LIRR are entitled) means that the
FLSA does apply to these workers. Ultimately, these novel arguments are without any
basis in the statutory text and foreclosed by binding precedent from the Second Circuit.
I. 	Whether MNR and LIRR are Rail Carriers
Plaintiffs first contend that the LIRR and MNR are not employers “engaged in
the operation of a rail carrier,” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2), which, if true, would preclude
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them from taking advantage of the rail carrier exemption under the FLSA. As
explained below, both are rail carriers.
“[R]ail carrier” is not defined in the FLSA. The parties do not dispute that the
relevant definition is contained in the ICCTA: “a person providing common carrier
railroad transportation for compensation, but does not include street, suburban, or
interurban electric railways not operated as part of the general system of rail
transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5). It is undisputed that “MNR operates passenger
commuter rail service,” (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2). And “LIRR owns rail
lines used for freight and passenger commuter rail service . . . between Nassau and
Suffolk counties and New York City.” (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9; Pls.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9),
meaning both entities provide a form of “common carrier railroad transportation.”
See also Buffalo S. R.R. Inc. v. Vill. of Croton-on Hudson, 434 F. Supp. 2d 241, 250 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“Under the ICCTA, a ‘rail carrier’ is simply a ‘a person providing common
carrier railroad transportation for compensation, [excluding local mass transit
operations].’ Under the literal terms of that definition, BSOR is a rail carrier. . . . It
provides common carrier railroad transportation for compensation in Buffalo and its
environs. And it holds itself out as providing common carriage . . . in Westchester
County. Therefore, it is a rail carrier.” (citation omitted)).
To complement the statutory definition, the ICC developed a two-part test to
determine whether an entity is a rail carrier, which has since been applied by courts in
this District. See, e.g., Coastal Distrib., LLC v. Town of Babylon, No. 05-CV-2032, 2006 WL
270252, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006), aff’d as modified, 216 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 2007).
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That test is simply: “First, does the entity conduct rail operations? Second, does the
entity hold out that service to the public?” Id. (quotations omitted). Both entities meet
this separate test as well. There is no dispute that both conduct rail operations, and as
Plaintiffs acknowledge, “[b]oth LIRR and MNR . . . provide transportation to the
public,” (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. dated Apr. 18, 2025 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”),
Dkt. No. 89 at 2), meaning both entities fall within the ICC’s application of the statutory
definition.
Plaintiffs try to concoct a legal argument as to why this cannot be the case and
appear to conflate STB jurisdiction with the definition of “rail carrier.” Part of Plaintiffs’
argument is that the STB does not exercise jurisdiction over MNR or the LIRR as rail
carriers, because of the public transportation exception to STB jurisdiction, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(c)(2)(A), and thus neither entity is a rail carrier. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3–4, 8). But it
can cite no case or provision that renders the STB’s jurisdictional grant dispositive of an
entity’s rail carrier status.4
4 Plaintiffs repeatedly contend that “MNR is explicitly described, throughout
multiple filings before the STB, as a non-rail carrier.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 5). But MNR’s
self-described status in attorney declarations submitted to the STB in other cases and
contexts cannot control whether it falls within the statutory definition for the purposes
of the FLSA. Relatedly, the Court notes that the parties do not brief how this Court
should treat decisions by the ICC or STB. None of the cited agency decisions directly
address the questions at issue here, and this case does not involve direct enforcement or
review of agency decisions, including the ICC’s or STB’s interpretations of the statutes
at issue. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), is therefore not
implicated, and ICC or STB authority is at best informative, not binding. Cf. McLaughlin
Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 155 (2025) (“District courts are
not bound by the agency’s interpretation, but instead must determine the meaning of
the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate
respect to the agency’s interpretation.”).
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Plaintiffs—and Defendants in response—then engage in an extensive back and
forth about a 1995 ICC decision, Metro North Commuter Railroad Co.—Acquisition
Exemption—the Maybrook Line; Metro North Commuter Railroad Co.—Exemption—from 49
U.S.C. Subtitle IV, No. 32639, 1995 WL 11215 (I.C.C. Jan. 12, 1995) [hereinafter MNR 1995
Exemption]. There, the ICC said MNR “provides interstate commuter rail services in the
New York metropolitan area, but it does not provide common carrier freight service or
intercity rail passenger service as defined by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45
U.S.C. 561.” Id. at *1. Using this quotation, Plaintiffs contend that MNR does not
provide common carrier railroad transportation and, therefore, is not a “rail carrier.”
(Pls.’ Opp’n at 5). But as the quote illustrates, the ICC was interpreting the Rail
Passenger Service Act (“RPSA”), and in particular the definition of “intercity rail
passenger service” that the newly crafted Amtrak would assume. That provision has
since been amended and was eventually repealed in 1994; related provisions are now
codified at 49 USC § 24703. And as the parties concede, the relevant definition of “rail
carrier” is in the ICCTA. (Id. at 3 n.2). In short, an agency’s interpretation of a different
term in a now defunct statute has no bearing on whether the ICCTA definition covers
MNR.
Plaintiffs similarly contend that a 2015 STB decision found that the LIRR is not a
rail carrier. (Id. at 9). But the decision says that LIRR is a rail carrier. See Pinelawn
Cemetery—Petition for Declaratory Order, No. FD 35468, 2015 STB LEXIS 126, at *21 (S.T.B.
Apr. 20, 2015) (“The record shows that LIRR, a rail carrier[.]”). Indeed, the STB decision
analyzed whether LIRR abandoned a track—the “key consideration” being whether the
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entity “has continued to exhibit a fixed and continuing intent to hold out to provide
common carrier rail service to the public.” Id. at *28. The STB concluded that there was
sufficient evidence of LIRR’s intent to provide such service, and that it did not abandon
the track at issue. Id. at *28–*29.
II. 	STB Jurisdiction Over Defendants Under the ICCTA
Next, the Court addresses the first issue posed by Judge Azrack: the STB’s
jurisdiction over MNR and LIRR. The STB generally has jurisdiction over
“transportation by rail carrier that is . . . only by railroad.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1)(A).
Its jurisdiction applies to transportation between a place in “a State and a place in the
same or another State as part of the interstate rail network,” id. § 10501(a)(2)(A), subject
to the exception for public transportation provided by a local government authority, id.
§ 10501(c)(2)(A).
Defendants contend that because the STB has granted various regulatory
exemptions to MNR and LIRR, those railroads are subject to STB jurisdiction. (Defs.’
Mot. at 8). That is significant, since the STB can only grant exemptions to “a rail carrier
providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.” 49 U.S.C. § 10502(a).
1. 	MNR
Defendants cite two STB cases to establish jurisdiction over MNR. The first is an
ICC decision from 1982 exempting MNR’s acquisition of the Harlem, Hudson, and New
Haven Lines operating out of Grand Central. (Metro-N. Commuter R.R.—Exemption
From 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, No. 30063 (I.C.C. served Dec. 2, 1982), attached to Aff. of
Brian A. Bodansky in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. as Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 88-3). That
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decision explains the statutory basis for STB jurisdiction over MNR under 49 U.S.C.
§ 10505, (id. at 3), the ICC equivalent of the ICCTA’s jurisdictional grant, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10502. But it is also over 40 years old. See Greene I, 2024 WL 4235480, at *13
(“Moreover, these twenty-two year-old STB decisions do not establish, on their own,
that the LIRR is currently subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.”).
The second is the decision that Judge Azrack noted Defendants failed to bring to
the Court’s attention at the motion to dismiss stage, and thus that the Court did not
consider in Greene I. Id. at *13. In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.—Exemption—from
49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, No. FD 32639, 2023 WL 8118269, at *1 (S.T.B. Nov. 21, 2023), the
STB granted MNR’s request to partially revoke an exemption STB had granted MNR in
1995 over a rail line located in Dutchess and Putnam counties. That 1995 exemption
was granted in the first place because the STB had jurisdiction over MNR. See MNR
1995 Exemption, 1995 WL 11215, at *3. The 2023 revocation shows that the STB
continues to exercise jurisdiction over MNR under the ICCTA, as the ICC did under the
ICA.
2. 	LIRR
Defendants cite several STB cases to establish jurisdiction over LIRR. In Pinelawn
Cemetery—a dispute that resolved whether the STB had jurisdiction over a railroad yard
leased by the LIRR from a private entity—the STB concluded “that the Farmingdale
Yard is a railroad facility and that the facility and its excepted ancillary track are subject
to our jurisdiction.” 2015 STB LEXIS 126, at *20. Other STB decisions similarly provide
evidence of its continuing jurisdiction over LIRR. See Long Island R.R. Co.—
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Abandonment Exemption—in Queens Cnty., N.Y., No. AB 837, 2016 WL 270963, at *3
(S.T.B. Jan. 21, 2016) (“Under 49 U.S.C. § 10502, we exempt from the prior approval
requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 10903 the abandonment by LIRR of the above-described
segments of rail line[.]“); New York & Atl. Ry. Co.—Discontinuance of Serv. Exemption—in
Queens Cnty., N.Y., No. AB 1236X, 2016 WL 270960, at *3 (S.T.B. Jan. 21, 2016) (“Under
49 U.S.C. § 10502, we exempt from the prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 10903
the discontinuance of operations by NYA5 over the above-described segments of rail
line,” subject to certain employee protective conditions.). These three decisions, which
cite the STB’s general jurisdictional statute or its authorization to exempt rail carriers
subject to its jurisdiction as their authority, establish the STB’s jurisdiction over the
LIRR.
Plaintiffs contend that 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) creates an independent grant of
STB authority over actions by non-rail carriers—and if the STB has exercised its
jurisdiction under that provision, the employer is not a rail carrier. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3–4).
But the Second Circuit rejected such an interpretation. In New York & Atlantic Railway
Co. v. Surface Transportation Board, it resolved an appeal from a decision which
determined that STB lacked exclusive jurisdiction over a facility owned by NYAR and
operated by an independent transloading6 company. 635 F.3d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2011).
5 NYAR operated, but LIRR owned, the segments of the rail line at issue. New
York & Atl. Ry. Co.—Discontinuance of Serv. Exemption, 2016 WL 270960, at *1.
6 “Transloading is the practice of transferring a shipment from one mode of
transportation to another, i.e. from trucks to rail cars.” New York & Atl. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d
at 68 n.2.
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NYAR argued that “Section 10501(b)(2) constitutes an independent grant of
jurisdiction . . . even if the activities in question are not performed by or under the
control of a rail carrier.” Id. at 72. The Second Circuit rejected the argument: “We agree
with the STB’s reading of the statute . . . Both the courts and the STB thus consistently
find that to fall within the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction, the facility or activity must
satisfy both the ‘transportation’ and ‘rail carrier’ statutory requirements.” Id.
In summary, Defendants have presented sufficient agency case authority to
prove that MNR and LIRR are subject to the STB’s jurisdiction, which qualifies them for
the exemption from FLSA’s overtime provisions. Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition
are contrary to the plain reading of the statute and have already been rejected by the
Second Circuit.
III. 	Whether STB Jurisdiction is Sufficient for the FLSA Exemption
The final question remains whether the power the STB exercises over MNR and
LIRR is so limited that it disqualifies them from the FLSA exemption. Judge Azrack
noted that “[t]he plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2) appears to indicate that the
FLSA rail carrier exemption applies if any aspect of a defendant’s operation of a rail
carrier is subject to STB’s jurisdiction under the ICCTA,” Greene I, 2024 WL 4235480, at
*12 n.18, and the Court now draws that conclusion. The language of the FLSA
exception is clear, and it makes the employer’s status determinative. Under 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(2), the employer only has to be “engaged in the operation of a rail carrier
subject to [the ICCTA].” There is no threshold requirement for how much of the rail
carrier’s operations have to be governed by the STB.
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Plaintiffs’ only argument on this specific question is an appeal to the savings
clause of the ICCTA’s public transportation exception, which says that a local
government authority is still “subject to applicable laws of the United States related
to . . . employment.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(c)(3)(A)(iii). Plaintiffs do not dispute that both
MNR and LIRR, New York public benefit corporations that are subsidiaries of the MTA,
operate public transportation services under the authority of a local government. (Pls.’
Opp’n at 2, 10); see also 49 U.S.C. § 5302(11)(D) (including “a public corporation . . .
established under the laws of a State” within the definition of “local government
authority”). Plaintiffs argue that the savings clause means these railroads are subject to
the FLSA protections—and not the FLSA exemptions. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 12 (arguing that
the Court should read the savings clause to mean that “provisions of the [FLSA] itself”
apply, and not the FLSA exemption)). But that reading distorts the statutory text, since
both the protections and exemptions are all contained within the FLSA, so the savings
clause does not provide any interpretive assistance in determining whether the rail
carrier exemption applies. Cf. N.J. Transit Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Loc. 304 v. N.J.
Transit Corp., 806 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1986) (coming to the same conclusion as to the
ICA’s similar provision). Accordingly, the Court concludes that, since at least some of
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MNR and LIRR’s operations are subject to STB jurisdiction, they are exempt from
FLSA’s overtime provision. 7
CONCLUSION
Because MNR and LIRR are rail carriers subject to the STB’s jurisdiction,
sufficient to meet the requirements for the FLSA’s exemption from its overtime
provisions, Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is granted. Plaintiffs’
FLSA claims brought on behalf of MNR and LIRR employees are dismissed with
prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate MNR and LIRR from
the docket. The parties are directed to submit a joint proposed pretrial order by
February 23, 2026, consistent with the undersigned’s Individual Practices.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge
Date: 	January 22, 2026
Central Islip, New York
7 Though the Court finds that the FLSA’s overtime requirements do not apply to
these workers, the exemption exists, in part, because there are already other forces in
place to protect employees’ rights. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Mot. at 24 (discussing protections
under the Railway Labor Act and collective bargaining rights, among others)). And
employees of both MNR and LIRR appear to regularly invoke such protections. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., No. 18-CV-6152, 2019 WL 1863245, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2019) (addressing plaintiff’s allegation that MNR violated the
Railway Labor Act); Ass’n of Commuter Rail Emps. Loc. No. 9 v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.
Co., 600 F. Supp. 3d 367, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[T]he RLA . . . governs labor relations in
transportation industries including railroads.”); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (enforcing arbitration
award against LIRR for unpaid compensation), aff’d, 340 F. App’x 727 (2d Cir. 2009).
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