Zubko-Valva et al v. The County of Suffolk et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
JUSTYNA ZUBKO-VALVA, as Mother and
Natural Guardian of ANTHONY VALVA and
ANDREW VALVA, and as Administratrix of the
Estate of THOMAS VALVA, and JUSTYNA
ZUBKO-VALVA, individually,
Plaintiff,
- against -
THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
20-cv-2663 (BMC)
---------------------------------------------------------------X
COGAN, District Judge.
This case, which plaintiff brought after the death of her eight-year-old son, has now
settled. Before the Court are two dueling motions for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff, through her
current counsel (Bosworth), has filed a motion to cancel or disallow a charging lien asserted by
her former counsel (Norinsberg). Norinsberg has filed a cross-motion to fix and enforce the
charging lien. Because the Court finds that Norinsberg’s retainer agreement did not waive his
right to assert a charging lien, the Court grants Norinsberg’s motion and denies plaintiff’s
motion. Because both Norinsberg and Bosworth have rendered valuable legal services to
plaintiff, the Court awards each of them attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case, but to summarize, in January
2020, eight-year-old Thomas Valva froze to death in his father’s garage. Thomas’s father
Michael Valva and his father’s girlfriend Angela Pollina had locked him in the garage overnight
as a form of punishment. Indeed, Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina subjected Thomas, along with his
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
brothers Anthony and Andrew, to a slew of similar “punishments” in the years leading up to
Thomas’s death.
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against several institutional actors who interacted with her
and her family in the time period leading up to her son’s death. These institutional actors,
including multiple employees of Child Protective Services (“CPS”), awarded primary custody of
the children to Mr. Valva, rather than plaintiff, based on Mr. Valva’s (later disproven) allegations
that plaintiff was abusing the children. Plaintiff then provided overwhelming evidence that Mr.
Valva was abusing the children while they were in his custody, but the children were not
removed from his custody.
Plaintiff sought damages on behalf of herself individually, as the mother and natural
guardian of Anthony and Andrew, and as the administratrix of the estate of Thomas. After six
years of litigation, the matter settled for $9,000,000.00. The Court approved the settlement in
July 2026.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s current and former counsel turned their attention to the
question of which attorney (or attorneys) would get the fees for the work performed over the last
six years. The two interested attorneys here are Jon Norinsberg and Thomas Bosworth.
Norinsberg was plaintiff’s original attorney. He investigated, filed, and then litigated the case
for three and a half years. In 2023, there was an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship between Norinsberg and plaintiff. In November 2023, the Court allowed Norinsberg
to withdraw as plaintiff’s attorney and assert a charging lien.
The retainer agreement that governs Norinsberg and plaintiff’s relationship states in
relevant part:
JON L. NORINSBERG, ESQ., PLLC takes this matter subject to investigation. He
reserves the right to terminate this attorney-client relationship for any reason, at any time.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
If JON L. NORINSBERG, ESQ., PLLC terminates this relationship, there is no fee due
from the client.
In April 2024, Bosworth appeared in the action as plaintiff’s new attorney. He litigated
the case through additional discovery and settlement, including settlement approval, over about
two years.
LEGAL STANDARD
New York Judiciary Law § 475 allows an attorney to assert a lien upon his client’s cause
of action, which attaches to a verdict or settlement in the client’s favor “and the proceeds thereof
in whatever hands they may come.” “[T]he Second Circuit has long recognized that the lien
created by section 475 … is enforceable in federal courts in accordance with its interpretation in
New York courts.” See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442,
449 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). “As for the amount at which the charging lien should be
fixed, it is also well settled in New York that absent an express agreement between the attorney
and client to the contrary, a discharged attorney may recover the fair and reasonable value of the
services rendered, determined at the time of the discharge and computed on the basis of quantum
meruit.” Stair v. Calhoun, 722 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Norinsberg’s Entitlement to Fees
As a preliminary matter, Norinsberg argues that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the
lien. That is incorrect. “[I]t has long been established that … the attorney fee award belongs to
the client, not the attorney.” Vitalone v. City of New York, 395 F. Supp. 3d 316, 326 (S.D.N.Y.
2019). The proceeds of which Norinsberg seeks a share belong to the plaintiff, and if he
succeeds in enforcing his charging lien, he will be entitled to a considerable portion of plaintiff’s
settlement fund. The fact that this portion of the settlement fund will otherwise later be paid to
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Bosworth is irrelevant to the standing analysis.1 “[M]onetary harms readily qualify as concrete
injuries under Article III,” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 595 U.S. 413, 414 (2021), and plaintiff
therefore has standing to challenge Norinsberg’s charging lien against her settlement fund.
Turning to the retainer agreement between Norinsberg and plaintiff, the agreement states
that if Norinsberg withdraws, “there is no fee due from the client.” He withdrew. If Norinsberg
had sued plaintiff for his attorney’s fees upon withdrawal, he likely would have been
unsuccessful based on the plain language of the retainer agreement.
But that is not what Norinsberg has done. Norinsberg has asserted a charging lien on the
settlement fund. A charging lien is a creature of equity. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency,
140 F.3d at 448. Whether a charging lien can be enforced depends on whether the attorney
seeking the lien is an attorney of record in the relevant case, not whether there is a retainer
agreement in place. See id. at 450 (collecting cases). Although “the case law contemplates
circumstances in which an attorney can waive or forfeit his or her right to a charging lien, that
consequence only follows after ‘an attorney … without just cause neglects or refuses to proceed
with the prosecution of the case.’” Hampshire Grp. Ltd. v. Scott James Co., L.L.C., No. 14-cv-
2637, 2015 WL 5306232, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015) (quoting Koury v. United Tribes of
African News, Inc., No. 02-cv-0023, 2003 WL 21279441, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003)).
“Poor client relations, differences of opinion, or personality conflicts do not amount to
cause, which is shown by impropriety or misconduct on the part of the attorney.” Garcia v.
Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2006). In its order allowing Norinsberg to withdraw, the
Court found that “there [were] irreconcilable differences between the attorney and the client,”
1 Norinsberg argues alternatively that Bosworth is the real party in interest, and he too lacks standing. Currently, the
dispute is between the plaintiff and Norinsberg, although Bosworth obviously has a strong interest in how the
dispute is resolved. The Court thus declines to analyze the issue of Bosworth’s standing.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
including “sharp disagreements over case strategy, the scope of discovery, and the best way to
move forward in this case.” Nothing in the record suggests impropriety or misconduct by
Norinsberg. Norinsberg’s “permitted withdrawal as attorney of record does not affect [his]
entitlement to the statutory lien under Section 475.” Itar-Tass Russian News Agency, 140 F.3d
at 451.
A retainer agreement could of course alter the statutory regime set forth in Section 475, in
which case the matter would be a question of contract law. Plaintiff asserts that is precisely the
situation here. But if a contract is silent, then default statutory rights (like Section 475) apply.
Thus, the question is whether Norinsberg’s contract that says “no fee shall be due from client” if
Norinsberg withdraws can be interpreted fairly to overrule Norinsberg’s statutory right to assert a
charging lien. “[A] clear and unambiguous retainer agreement will be enforced according to its
terms,” Judd Bernstein, P.C. v. Long, 180 F. Supp. 3d 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), but the Court is
not persuaded that the language of the contract “clearly and unambiguously” covers this
scenario.
“Contracts should be viewed in the light in which they were made.” Postlewaite v.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 411 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). The retainer agreement’s purpose was to
govern Norinsberg’s representation of plaintiff in this case and payment therefor. Because
Norinsberg took the case on a contingency-fee basis, it is logical that the contract provides that
his withdrawal would not trigger a fee due from the client. But it would be completely illogical
for the agreement to allow a windfall to plaintiff or a subsequent attorney because Norinsberg
properly withdrew as plaintiff’s attorney based on irreconcilable differences. Although
ambiguous contract provisions “are generally to be construed against the drafter” (i.e.,
Norinsberg), First Am. Int’l Bank v. Cmty.’s Bank, No. 10-cv-3775, 2012 WL 4341740, at *7
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012) (quoting McCarthy v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 283 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
2002)), “[i]t is hornbook law that a contract should be interpreted so as not to render its terms
nonsensical,” InterDigital Commc’ns Corp. v. Nokia Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). The Court thus finds that the retainer agreement is not ambiguous as to this issue, and the
agreement did not waive Norinsberg’s right to assert a charging lien for the reasonable value of
services rendered.
Nor does Norinsberg’s conduct – including his withdrawal as plaintiff’s attorney –
indicate any waiver or forfeiture of his right to a charging lien. See Avaras v. Clarkstown
Central Sch. Dist., No. 15-cv-9679, 2021 WL 5745718, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2021) (“[T]he
right to enforce … a [Section 475] lien will be waived by any action inconsistent with an intent
to enforce the lien.” (quoting Pet. of Harley & Browne, 957 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
The Court found that Norinsberg had good cause to withdraw as plaintiff’s attorney.2 In fact,
Norinsberg’s conduct has been fully consistent with his intent to enforce the lien. Most
significantly, he asserted the charging lien at the time of his withdrawal.
Because the Court has found that the retainer agreement between plaintiff and Norinsberg
does not bar Norinsberg’s assertion of a charging lien, the default rules apply, and Norinsberg is
entitled to a quantum meruit portion of the fees.
II. 	Apportionment of Fees and Costs
Having determined that Norinsberg is entitled to some portion of the attorney’s fees, the
Court must determine how to apportion the fees between Norinsberg and Bosworth. “[T]he
proper method of fixing the sum of the lien is through a quantum meruit analysis, which requires
2 Bosworth should have some sympathy for this position. At one point, he also notified the Court of his intent to
withdraw due to “an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.” Dkt. No. 152. Instead of allowing
Bosworth to withdraw, Magistrate Judge Lindsay referred the parties to mediation, in which the matter finally
settled.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
‘ascertaining the reasonable value of the services rendered[.]’” Agence France Presse v. Morel,
No. 10-cv-2730, 2015 WL 13021413, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting Sequa Corp. v.
GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir. 1998)), aff’d, 645 F. App’x 86 (2d. Cir. 2016). “A
charging lien is equitable in nature, and the ‘overriding criterion for determining the amount of a
charging lien is that it be fair.’” Pettiford v. City of Yonkers, No. 14-cv-6271, 2020 WL
1331918, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (quoting Sutton v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 157,
161 (2d Cir. 2006)), aff’d, 833 F. App’x 893 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. Allegations of Misconduct
Plaintiff argues that Norinsberg is entitled to no quantum meruit fee due to “impropriety
and misconduct in handling this case.” Nothing in the record indicates that Norinsberg’s conduct
resembled the types of impropriety that have persuaded courts to deny a quantum meruit fee to
an otherwise deserving attorney. See, e.g., Garcia, 443 F.3d at 212 (affirming district court’s
decision that attorney was discharged for cause because his joint representation of multiple
criminal defendants was riddled with conflicts and misconduct); Holcombe v. Matsiborchuk, 747
F. App’x 875, 878 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s decision to extinguish attorney’s lien
because he “was hostile,” “used insults such as ‘stupid’ or ‘inept,’” and told his client to “transfer
her power of attorney because she was incapable of ‘functioning’ in the case”); In re Emanuel,
422 B.R. 443, 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying claim for quantum meruit attorney’s fees
because attorney “irrationally disregarded numerous state court orders directing him to turn over
his case files … resulting in prejudice to [his client]”), aff’d, 450 B.R. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Although Norinsberg’s failure to file timely claim notices against Suffolk County and
related defendants resulted in dismissal of certain state-law claims, he asserts that those claims
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
were duplicative of federal-law claims.3 Deputy County Attorney Susan Flynn, who supervised
Suffolk County’s defense, submitted a declaration in support of Norinsberg’s argument. Ms.
Flynn’s declaration states that dismissal of the state-law claims “did not materially affect the
County’s valuation of the case since multiple federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remained
pending.” Ms. Flynn is presumably an unbiased party in the fee dispute, so her declaration on
this point is persuasive.4
Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of the state-law claims was detrimental because she
sought $100,000 in punitive damages based on the state-law claims. Plaintiff insists that those
damages were forfeited when the claims were dismissed because “punitive damages are
unavailable against a municipality under Section 1983.” Gilead Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Town of
Cromwell, 112 F.4th 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 268 (1981)). This argument ignores the reality of this case. There were several
individual defendants also associated with Suffolk County who could have been held liable for
those damages under Section 1983 if the case had proceeded to trial, see Fact Concerts, 453 U.S.
at 269, and in any event, claims in these types of cases are often overlapping. To assume that
$100,000 in damages was forfeited is merely a guess, and even if it were true, this error would
not constitute the type of misconduct that deprives an attorney of any fee whatsoever.
3 Norinsberg further argues that his notices were actually timely because since the Court’s order dismissing the state-
law claims, New York courts have “uniformly held” that the 90-day notice-of-claim deadline had been tolled during
this period by Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order. See Finley v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 252 N.Y.S.3d 702, 705 (2nd
Dep’t 2026). The Court need not decide whether that tolling applied to litigation of state-law claims in federal
courts because the Court is persuaded that the dismissal of the state-law claims did not meaningfully impact the
settlement or possible recovery of plaintiff.
4 Plaintiff insists that discovery is needed on this issue because “where there are disputed issues of fact surrounding
a charging lien, discovery is warranted.” But plaintiff has not offered any evidence to dispute Norinsberg’s and
Flynn’s assessments that the value of the state-law claims against Suffolk County was de minimis. In other words,
there is no disputed issue of fact. The only evidence suggests that the state-law claims were not uniquely valuable,
and the Court therefore declines to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
B. Quantum Meruit
Having determined that any alleged impropriety is a non-factor, the Court must
“ascertain[] the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” by both Norinsberg and
Bosworth. Sequa Corp., 156 F.3d at 148. “Although a court is not bound by the parties’ retainer
agreement, it may still use such agreement as guidance in determining the reasonable value of
the services provided.” Stair, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 268-69. Further, the Court may consider “the
difficulty of the matter, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the time reasonably
expended on those services, the quality of performance by counsel, the qualifications of counsel,
the amount at issue, and the results obtained (to the extent known).” Sequa Corp., 156 F.3d at
148.
Here, both Norinsberg and Bosworth contracted with plaintiff for one-third of the total
amount recovered on a contingency-fee basis. Thus, the Court finds that the reasonable value of
the services provided to plaintiff was one-third of the total recovery, and the amount to split
between the two attorneys is $3,000,000.00. The Court also finds that both attorneys were well
qualified to represent plaintiff, and the difficulty of the matter and the amount at issue apply to
both attorneys with equal force. The Court therefore does not consider these factors in the
apportionment of fees.
Turning to the remaining factors, both attorneys contributed to the resolution of this case.
Norinsberg conducted all of the pre-filing investigation, which was complex and fact-intensive
given the many institutional actors involved in the tragedy. He also engaged in extensive
discovery, including written discovery, third-party subpoenas, document review, and preparing
for depositions. He opposed six separate motions to dismiss, hired and worked with four experts,
and prepared for mediation. He also developed the legal theories of plaintiff’s case. For
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
example, he developed a novel denial-of-fair-trial claim arising from CPS’s alleged fabrication
of evidence during the civil neglect proceeding against plaintiff. He also developed a Monell
claim against Suffolk County for failure to adequately train CPS employees on abuse reports
involving autistic children and litigated several governmental immunity defenses. Norinsberg
represents that he committed more than 2,000 hours to plaintiff’s case. The Court finds it is fair
for to say that his “efforts laid the groundwork for the $9 million settlement.”
Bosworth, on the other hand, attended several Court-ordered conferences, successfully
mediated the case, and secured approval of the infant compromise. The mediation was not
straightforward; there were three mediation sessions and many individual meetings with the
mediator. Although Norinsberg’s attorney-client relationship with plaintiff broke down during
the first mediation attempt, Bosworth was able to resolve the matter during the second round of
mediation. He also continued Norinsberg’s discovery efforts by conducting interviews,
reviewing documents, and engaging expert witnesses, among other things. Bosworth does not
quantify the number of hours he worked on the case, but because he took this case on a
contingency-fee basis, the Court understands that he may not have tracked his hours in detail.
See Almanzar v. Silver Star Props. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 3d 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“The very
purpose of a contractual contingency fee arrangement is to ensure recovery for an attorney
regardless of the number of hours actually expended by the attorney.”).
But without the ability to assess the time reasonably expended on Bosworth’s services,
the Court must weigh most heavily the nature and extent of the services, the quality of
performance, and the results obtained by each attorney. On the first two factors, the Court is
persuaded that Norinsberg’s efforts were more extensive and effective than Bosworth’s.
Norinsberg did the lion’s share of the work to prepare this case for settlement, and one of his
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID
#: <pageID>

11
adversaries, Ms. Flynn, attests that she is “not aware of substantial evidentiary development
occurring after successor counsel entered the case.” Bosworth, on the other hand, may have
done substantial work to get up to speed on the case, but that does not mean he advanced the case
beyond the context of mediation. And the main interaction he had with the Court – filing the
motion for approval of the infant compromise – was not of the highest quality. It took three
attempts for the Court to approve the petition. In terms of results, however, Bosworth did what
Norinsberg could not: he successfully settled the case.
The Court therefore finds that the reasonable value of the legal services rendered by
Norinsberg is approximately two-thirds of the contingency fee ($2,000,000.00), and the
reasonable value of the legal services rendered by Bosworth is approximately one-third of the
contingency fee ($1,000,000.00).
C. Costs
Norinsberg’s retainer agreement provides that plaintiff shall reimburse his costs from the
settlement fund. However, Bosworth has stipulated that he will pay any costs awarded to
Norinsberg from his portion of the fee. The Court therefore finds that Norinsberg’s costs
($76,948.86) shall be deducted from Bosworth’s portion of the fee.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID
#: <pageID>

12
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to cancel or disallow the lien [211] is
denied, and Norinsberg’s cross-motion to fix and enforce the lien [212] is granted.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 14, 2026
U.S.D.J.
Case 2:20-cv-02663-BMC-ARL Document 217 Filed 10/14/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID
#: <pageID>