Young v. Lugo et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JAMIE E. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
18-cv-04216 (JS) (JMW)
-against-
MARK LUGO, et al.,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Frederick K. Brewington
Albert Darnell Manuel, III
Cobia Malik Powell
Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington
556 Peninsula Boulevard
Hempstead, NY 11550
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Greg M. Mondelli
Amy E. Bedell
Carl A. Formicola
Jessica D. Klotz
Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP
1377 Motor Parkway, Suite 400
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Carl Goodman
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Jamie E. Young (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 and New York State law, against New York State parole officer Defendants Mark Lugo,
Orrison McLean, Alonzo Payton, Joseph Rehal, Ross Botwinick, Catherine Mencarelli (the
“State Defendants”), Suffolk County police officer Defendants Alberto Acevedo, Matthew
2/6/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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Spilotros, and John Does 1-4 (the “County Defendants”), and Dr. Carl Goodman and Nurse
Henry Hernandez (the “Medical Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See generally ECF No. 158.)
Before the Court on referral from the Honorable Joanna Seybert is Defendant Dr. Carl
Goodman’s (“Goodman”) motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 220) on all claims asserted
against him in the Corrected Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 158). For the reasons set
forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Goodman’s motion (ECF No. 220) be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are gleaned from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1(a) Statements and are
uncontested unless otherwise noted.1
1 The facts set forth above are taken from Goodman’s Rule 56.1 Statement (ECF No. 229-49)
and corresponding responses from Plaintiff (ECF No. 221-16). Unless otherwise noted, a
standalone citation to a party’s Rule 56.1 statement means that the Court has deemed the
underlying factual allegation undisputed. Any citation to a Rule 56.1 statement incorporates by
reference the documents cited in it. Where relevant, however, the Court may also cite directly to
an underlying document. The Court has deemed true undisputed facts averred in a party’s Rule
56.1 statement to which the opposing party cites no admissible evidence in rebuttal. See Stewart
v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., No. 18-CV-12297 (LJL), 2020 WL 6712267, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2020) (“‘[P]ursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 [the movant’s] statements are deemed to be
admitted where [the non-moving party] has failed to specifically controvert them with citations
to the record.’”) (quoting Knight v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 03-CV-2746 (DAB), 2007 WL
313435, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2007)); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dinow, No. 06-CV-3881
(TCP), 2012 WL 4498827, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Local Rule 56.1 requires . . .
that disputed facts be specifically controverted by admissible evidence. Mere denial of an
opposing party’s statement or denial by general reference to an exhibit or affidavit does not
specifically controvert anything.”). “Additionally, to the extent [a party’s] 56.1 statement
‘improperly interjects arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to facts asserted by [the
opposing party] without specifically controverting those facts,’ the Court has disregarded [such]
statement[s.]” McFarlane v. Harry’s Nurses Registry, No. 17-CV-06350 (PKC) (PK), 2020 WL
1643781, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020).
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A. Plaintiff’s Arrest for Parole Violation, Search at the Fifth Precinct
On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested by the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision for violating the terms of his parole by fraternizing
with a known parolee, Shati Roy. (ECF No. ECF No. 229-49 at ¶ 1; ECF No. 221-16 at ¶ 1.) A
warrant had previously been issued for plaintiff’s arrest in connection with Plaintiff’s violation of
his parole due to his fraternization with Shati Roy. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Parole Officer (“PO”) Lugo was
present for Plaintiff’s arrest, along with other parole officers. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff was taken into custody by PO Lugo and PO McClean
pursuant to his arrest for parole violation. (Id. at ¶ 4.) On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff was in the
parole vehicle for PO Lugo and PO McClean being transported to the Suffolk County Police
Department (“SCPD”) Fifth Precinct. (Id. at ¶ 5.) At the time of his arrest for a parole violation,
Plaintiff has multiple prior convictions, a history of cocaine abuse, and previously attended drug
rehabilitation. (See id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.)
During this December 14, 2017 ride in the backseat of PO Lugo and PO McClean’s
vehicle, Plaintiff “became fidgety in the back seat,” “continued to move around and his behavior
then became strange to officers,” and he was allegedly attempting to reach into his pants. (Id. at ¶
9) (citations omitted). The parties dispute whether PO Lugo witnessed Plaintiff placing his hands
down the back of his pants. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Indeed, PO Lugo testified that Plaintiff’s actions in the
vehicle on the way to the precinct were “not normal of somebody being transported with the way
he was moving, so it raised concerns that something may be wrong with [Plaintiff], that's why we
brought him in to search him.” (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Because of these movements and reaching into his pants, Plaintiff was brought into the
precinct to be searched. (Id. at ¶ 11.) At the precinct, PO Lugo and Detective Acevedo told
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Plaintiff to strip his clothes, bend over and squat, and subsequently performed a search of
plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff was asked to bend and squat when, upon doing so, PO Lugo
and Detective Acevedo believed they saw something in Plaintiff’s rectum that looked like “the
end of a balloon.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff testified that PO Lugo and Detective Acevedo noticed
hemorrhoids, started laughing, and called it “a bubble,” to which Plaintiff responded that it was
in fact a hemorrhoid (Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.) In addition to what appeared to be a balloon inside
Plaintiff’s rectum, the parties dispute whether drugs were also visible upon PO Lugo’s search,
but do not dispute that if Plaintiff did have drugs inside his body, and those drugs exploded, that
would be PO Lugo’s responsibility considering Plaintiff was in his custody. (See id. at ¶¶ 24-26.)
B. Transport to the Hospital
PO Lugo and PO Payton transported Plaintiff to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical
Center (“Hospital”) after the precinct before eventually bringing Plaintiff to the Suffolk County
Jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 32.) PO Lugo transported Plaintiff to the hospital upon the direction of his
supervisor, PO Mencarelli, namely because Plaintiff needed to be medically evaluated and
cleared for confinement before being transported to the Suffolk County Jail. (See id. at ¶¶ 27-28,
30.) PO McLean followed the transport of Plaintiff to the Hospital in a separate vehicle. (Id. at ¶
34.)
Once at the Hospital, Plaintiff refused requests made by PO Lugo to exit the vehicle,
firmly placing his feet below the seat so he could not be removed and curling into a fetal
position. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-40.) As PO Lugo and PO Payton attempted to remove Plaintiff from the
vehicle, Plaintiff struggled and started kicking and flailing his feet, kicking PO Lugo in the hand.
(Id. at ¶ 41.) During an altercation while Plaintiff was being administered the sedative, Plaintiff
kicked PO Lugo, later resulting in a broken wrist and thumb, and leading to PO Lugo filing a
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report for assault and obstruction charges against Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 160-162.) On March 21,
2019, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to a reduced charge, from assault and obstruction of
government administration to the class A misdemeanor crime of promoting prostitution in the
fourth degree, pursuant to Penal Law § 230.20. (Id. at ¶ 190.)
When inside the Hospital, Plaintiff was yelling that he did not want to be there, did not
want any treatment, and did not want to be seen. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Upon meeting with Nurse
Hernandez, Plaintiff answered only basic questions, refused to answer other questions, and
appeared agitated. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-51.) Plaintiff, remained in law enforcement custody the entire
time while at the Hospital and was placed in handcuffs, had a wrist chain on, and had his feet in
shackles. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43.) The parties do not dispute that at the time Plaintiff entered the
Hospital, he was a ward of the state. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff was taken into “Trauma 1” where
Suffolk Count Police Officers, parole officers like PO Lugo and PO Payton, and hospital officials
like Goodman and Nurse Hernandez were. (Id. at ¶¶ 55-56, 58-59, 65.) While being
wheelchaired into the room, Plaintiff testified was screaming and yelling to not touch him,
refusing treatment, and stating he did not want to be at the Hospital—refusing treatment at the
“top of his lungs.” (Id. at ¶¶ 62-63) (alteration omitted).
C. Plaintiff’s Interactions with Goodman
Goodman first observed Plaintiff as he was brought into the Hospital’s treatment area
with a number of uniformed and plain clothes officers with “a fair amount of commotion.” (Id. at
¶ 73.) Goodman observed Plaintiff to be extremely agitated and belligerent. (See id. at ¶ 76.) It
was because of this agitation that Goodman found it difficult to have a discussion with Plaintiff
and was limited in his ability to assess Plaintiff for medical stability, thereby inhibiting his ability
to perform physical examinations. (See id. at ¶¶ 79, 80.) Indeed, Goodman did not interact one-
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on-one with Plaintiff without law enforcement in the room, noting that his conversations
involved Plaintiff belligerently screaming with tremendous amounts of agitation. (See id. at ¶¶
82, 91.)
Goodman was told by law enforcement that Plaintiff had been banging his head in the
police vehicle, which, as the parties dispute, inferred to Goodman that there may have been some
psychological concerns. (Id. at ¶ 78.) Additionally, the parties do not dispute that law
enforcement officers told Goodman that they had searched Plaintiff, and that they believed that
he had a rectal foreign body, possibly contraband. (Id. at ¶ 84.) The law enforcement officers
communicated to Goodman “that they believed that the patient may have put a foreign body in
his rectum” and said “that they saw something protruding from his rectum” thinking it was a bag
of drugs. (Id. at ¶¶ 85, 86) Though Plaintiff denied placing anything in his rectum or swallowing
drugs, law enforcement requested “examination for foreign body” which Plaintiff refused
evaluation for. (Id. at ¶¶ 86, 95.) Though Goodman did not recall which officer provided him
with the information regarding the potential for drugs or foreign object in his rectum, Goodman
recalls there was a “cocaine/dope abuse” notation created by Nurse Hernandez as part of
Plaintiff’s triage note. (Id. at ¶¶ 87, 89.)
Goodman allegedly received conflicting information as to whether Plaintiff had a foreign
body in his rectum—on one hand, law enforcement provided the basis for Goodman to think
there was a foreign body in his rectum, which Plaintiff denied. (Id. at ¶¶ 107-109.) Nonetheless,
Goodman was concerned that Plaintiff might be under the influence of drugs, namely that
Plaintiff’s behavior was so agitated that although at times he was able to give me a reasonable
response, at other times he did not appear to be focusing and concerned about his well-being. (Id.
at ¶ 92.)
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Plaintiff testified that while in the Hospital room, PO Lugo, Goodman, Detective
Acevedo had a short “side bar” conversation that Plaintiff was unable to hear. (See id. at ¶¶ 96-
102.) Nurse Hernanez testified that when Goodman entered, he overheard law enforcement tell
Goodman that Plaintiff had drugs in his rectum. (Id. at ¶ 103.) After this “side bar,” Goodman
approached Plaintiff, told Plaintiff he would be getting put to sleep which Plaintiff responded
that Goodman “better not” touch Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 105.) Goodman relayed to Plaintiff that he
needed to validate the information presented from law enforcement to Goodman for Plaintiff’s
safety and benefit. (Id. at ¶ 110.) Indeed, Goodman testified, after being asked whether he
believed law enforcement over Plaintiff, that:
Before me was a patient who was agitated. I had law enforcement that was
providing me information. The consequences of not identifying a foreign body with
a potential illegal substance could be harmful, it’s not a matter of believing one over
the other. What I needed to believe was myself to make sure that Mr. Young whose
behavior at times was agitated, who had a potential dangerous foreign body in his
rectum wasn’t going to be discharged with any great degree of certainty that there
was a retained foreign body that could provide him harm. So it was in my best
medical judgment that I validate those concerns.
(Id. at ¶ 111.)
Based on these interactions, Goodman testified that he still had concerns about a foreign
body in his rectum and that he needed to consult hospital Counsel, Ms. Jessica Terranova, to
determine what the appropriate next steps were. (See id. at ¶¶ 92, 115.) In Goodman’s
conversation with Terranova, he explained that Plaintiff was refusing treatment, Plaintiff was in
law enforcement custody, Plaintiff was agitated and acting belligerently, and that law
enforcement was requesting that a search be conducted because they though Plaintiff placed
drugs in his rectum. (See id. at ¶¶ 117-120, 123.) Goodman also told Terranova that Plaintiff was
not consenting to treatment. (See id. at ¶ 124.) Not only did Terranova advise Goodman to have
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an informed discussion with the patient and to document it in his medical chart, but also that
Goodman should not do the search at the request of law enforcement but instead “do whatever
Goodman felt within his professional medical judgment was necessary for the care and treatment
of the patient.” (Id. at ¶¶ 125-127.)
The parties dispute whether Goodman exercised his better medical judgment which
included sedation and a rectal exam of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 128-129.) Despite Plaintiff’s non-
consent, Goodman proceeded with his treatment of Plaintiff as Goodman typically did in
circumstances where a patient who refuses treatment exhibits symptoms of excited delirium
syndrome, when they are acting irrationally, erratically, and/or are intoxicated. (Id. at ¶ 130.)
Goodman cited “excited delirium syndrome” as a reason for his unconsented treatment of
Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 221-16 at ¶ 130.) It is disputed whether Goodman received law
enforcement input on his medial decision making or whether his decision was based on his own,
independent medical decision. (See id. at ¶¶ 131-132; ECF No. 221-16 at ¶¶ 131-132.) The
parties similarly dispute whether Goodman performed an adequate assessment of a patient’s
decision-making capacity, like taking into account the potential harm of that decision, depending
on the situation in circumstances where, like here with Plaintiff, a patient refuses treatment. (See
id. at ¶¶ 112, 113.)
D. Goodman’s Examination of Plaintiff
After Goodman’s discussion with Terranova, Plaintiff was transferred from a wheelchair
to a gurney. (Id. at ¶¶ 134-135.) Though unclear as to whether Plaintiff was restrained by medical
staff at this point, he testified that he believed that Nurse Hernandez restrained him to hook him
up to a monitor and wrapped a blood pressure cuff on his arm. (See id. at ¶¶ 135-138, 140.)
Plaintiff, still agitated at this point, testified that “Jane Doe” gave him a Ketamine injection—
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later identified to be Goodman—into his arm in the disputed dosage of 400 mg, the weight
appropriate amount for administration to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 139, 147, 150.) The parties dispute
the purpose behind giving Plaintiff the sedative. Goodman argues that the purpose was to obtain
vital signs, perform imaging of Plaintiff’s rectal area, and so that a digital rectal exam could be
performed, whereas Plaintiff contends Goodman administered the sedative to enforce compliance
with the medical procedures upon Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶ 151.)
Plaintiff, while still sedated, received x-rays. (Id. at ¶ 159.) The parties dispute whether
Goodman was the administrator of the x-rays or whether a portable x-ray machine was brought
into the room. (See id. at ¶ 164.) Based on the results of the x-rays which were reviewed by
Goodman, there did not appear to be a foreign body present in Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 165-166.)
Goodman was aware of these results before he took the rectal examination of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶
167.) Goodman first performed an external examination of Plaintiff’s rectum, then performed a
rectal examination by inserting his lubricated, gloved index finger into Plaintiff’s rectum. (Id. at
¶¶ 169-170.) Once the finger was in the rectum, a 360-degree sweep was performed with the
finger to determine whether Goodman could palpate, or feel, any masses or foreign bodies. (See
id. at ¶ 171.) The examinations did not reveal to Goodman that Plaintiff had a foreign body in his
rectum, but did reveal that Plaintiff had hemorrhoids. (Id. at ¶¶ 175-176.) Nurse Hernandez
testified that Goodman’s decision to perform a rectal exam was appropriate under the
circumstances. (Id. at ¶¶ 173-174, 179.)
Following the rectal exam, Goodman created a “MD Note” at 11:05 PM where he noted
that Plaintiff understood the risks of not identifying foreign body containing illegal substances
and that Goodman consulted with Jessica Terranova and indicated that Plaintiff was in law
enforcement custody. (Id. at ¶¶ 180-181.) Goodman created yet another MD Note at 11:45 PM
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finding that Plaintiff was informed of the presence of hemorrhoids. (Id. at ¶ 182.) Plaintiff was
then discharged from the Hospital at 11:51 PM to the custody of law enforcement officers. (Id. at
¶¶ 184, 188.)
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
On a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2022). A genuine dispute
of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The initial burden
is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be
met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett¸ 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).
Once the movant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts and the nonmovant may defeat the
motion only by adducing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New York¸ 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
“The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable
inferences in her favor, but the non-movant must still do more than merely assert conclusions
that are unsupported by arguments or facts.” Sosa v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 406 F. Supp.
3d 266, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal citations omitted). The role of the court at the summary
judgment phase is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but only undertake an analysis to identify
whether triable issues of fact exist. See Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 167 (2d Cir. 2021).
That is, the court’s function is “issue-finding,” not “issue-resolution.” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Cap. Trucking Inc., 523 F. Supp.3d 661, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Gallo v. Prudential
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Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d. Cir. 1994)). Au fond, the court’s role is to
decide whether, “after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the
nonmovant, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Miller v. N.Y. State
Police, No. 20-3976, 2022 WL 1133010, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248 and Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127, 129 (2d Cir. 2013)).
DISCUSSION
Goodman seeks summary judgment on all claims asserted against him in Plaintiff’s
Corrected Second Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 220.) In his Corrected Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following twelve causes of action: (i) Fourth Amendment
violation for an unreasonable search/violation of privacy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii)
Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable seizure/excessive force pursuant to § 1983; (iii)
malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983; (iv) abuse of process pursuant to § 1983; (v)
fabrication of evidence pursuant to § 1983, (vi) Eighth Amendment violations for cruel and
unusual punishment pursuant to § 1983; (vii) Fourteenth Amendment violations for substantive
due process violations pursuant to § 1983; (viii) assault and battery; (ix) intentional and/or
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (x) negligence; (xi) medical malpractice; and (xii) false
imprisonment. (See generally ECF No. 158.) The Court considers each asserted cause of action
in turn.
I. 	The Federal and Constitutional Claims
a. 	State Action Under Section 1983
To determine whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims survive summary judgment, the Court
must first decide whether Goodman was functioning as a state actor.
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A § 1983 claim “requires the plaintiff to establish two elements: ‘(1) the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law.’” Clay v. County of Suffolk, 404 F.
Supp. 3d 737, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 801
F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2015)). There are three tests used by courts to determine whether the
conduct of a private entity may be attributed to the state, satisfying the state action requirement:
(1) the compulsion test; (2) the joint action test; and (3) the public function test. Rene v. Mustafa,
No. 16-CV-4072 (JS) (ST), 2024 WL 1332556, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024) (discussing the
three tests).
The compulsion test considers whether the private entity acts pursuant to the “coercive
power” of the state or is “controlled” by the state. Id. The joint action test, sometimes referred to
as the close nexus test, is satisfied when the state provides significant encouragement to the
entity, the entity is a willful participant in joint activity with the state, or the entity's functions are
“entwined” with state policies. McNulty v. New York Racing Association, Inc., No. 03-CV-1368
(JS) (WDW), 2006 WL 8441289, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006). The public function test
considers whether the entity “has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate.” Rene, 2024
WL 1332556, at *21 (quoting Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 2008)).
These parties encountered a situation nearly identical to the present one when Defendant
Hernandez filed his motion to dismiss the Corrected Second Amended Complaint. See Young v.
Lugo, No. 18-CV-04216 (JS) (JMW), 2023 WL 2815718, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2624346 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023). Indeed, this Court
concluded that “this case falls into the less common group of cases in which a private hospital
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employee does undertake state action.” Id. at *8. Specifically, Hernandez was considered a “state
actor” because he “would not have performed a cavity search and x-ray on Plaintiff had it not
been for the compulsion of the police officers to locate and seize contraband.” Id. at *9. Further,
it could not be said that Hernandez “acted on his own independent medical judgment,” but rather
“was acting at the bidding of the police and therefore a state actor” and his actions “were only
taken as an extension of the police.” Id.
Similarly, in Falls, the nurse who conducted a cavity search was considered a state actor
under nearly identical circumstances. See Falls v. (Police Officer) Detective Michael Pitt, No.
16-CV-8863 (KMK), 2021 WL 1164185, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021). There, the plaintiff
was brought to the police station where police officers conducted a strip search after plaintiff was
suspected of selling narcotics. Id. at *3-4. The plaintiff in Falls contended that officers restrained
him, conducted an invasive cavity search, and uncovered hidden drug contraband. Id. at *4. As
such, police officers later took Plaintiff to a private hospital where, after arriving, plaintiff
allegedly “overheard [the officers] saying to someone out in the hallway” that they had a search
warrant for a cavity search. Id. at *5. A nurse then came into plaintiff’s room, told plaintiff she
was authorized to conduct a body cavity search, and proceeded to perform an anal cavity search
while plaintiff was restrained by officers and further conducted an x-ray of plaintiff's stomach
and abdomen. Id. at *6. In finding that plaintiff could assert § 1983 claims against the hospital,
District Judge Karas concluded that by performing the search upon plaintiff “at the compulsion
of the police in order to locate and seize illegal narcotics, [the nurse] was perform[ing] a role
traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Id. at *50 (citation omitted).
Specifically, the court in Falls noted:
This case presents the less common scenario in which a private hospital employee
did act as an instrumentality of the state. In performing the cavity search and x-ray,
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[the nurse] was helping the police locate and seize any illegal narcotics, and thus,
she was primarily performing a law-enforcement function rather than a medical
function. While there may also have been a compelling medical interest in
identifying and removing any contraband secreted inside Plaintiff's body cavity,
this interest was ancillary to the law-enforcement interest.
Id.
So too here, based on the record before the Court, Goodman would not have performed
his cavity search on Plaintiff had he not discussed Plaintiff’s circumstances with law
enforcement prior. (See ECF No. 221-6, Goodman Dep. Tr. at 149:22-25, 150:2-6 (Goodman
answering “yes” when asked if law enforcement requested an examination for a foreign body);
68:7-19 (Goodman testifying that he obtained Plaintiff’s medical history from law enforcement
before conducting the search)). Notably, “[t]he police provided the basis for Dr. Godman to think
the Plaintiff had a foreign body in his rectum.” (ECF No. 221-16 at ¶ 108; see also ECF No. 220-
23, Goodman Dep. Tr. at 85:8-12 (establishing the “only basis” of Goodman thinking Plaintiff
had a foreign body in his rectum was what the police told him)). Further, in order for Plaintiff to
be “cleared for confinement,” law enforcement needed to have the Hospital staff “check out” the
potential secretion inside of Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 221-7, Lugo Dep. Tr. at 193:21-25, 194:2-18
(Parole Officer Lugo testifying that he “asked the doctor” to check out the concerns they had
about the potential for drugs inside Plaintiff, and “then the doctor did the job they had do to”).
Similarly, to ensure Plaintiff’s “benefit and safety,” Goodman needed to “validate the
information” presented by law enforcement by performing the search he did. (See ECF No. 221-
16 at ¶¶ 110, 111.)
This conduct indicates that Goodman was, like Hernandez in Lugo and the plaintiff in
Falls, acting as an extension of the police to search and potentially seizure of illegal narcotics,
Goodman was performing roles traditionally left to the prerogative of the state rather than merely
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providing ordinary medical care. See Falls, 2021 WL 11641845, at *50; see also Lugo, 2023 WL
2815718, at *9. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court find Goodman’s actions were fairly
attributable to the state and thus state action.
b. 	Fourth Amendment Violations and Qualified Immunity
Goodman seeks summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims in
the Corrected Second Amended Complaint: (i) unreasonable search/violation of privacy; and (ii)
unreasonable seizure/excessive force. (See ECF No. 158 at pp. 10-14.) Goodman also contends
that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from liability for the alleged Fourth
Amendment violations. (See ECF No. 220-48 at p. 15.) Plaintiff counters that questions of
material fact persist precluding summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims,
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and Goodman’s actions were objectively
unreasonable. (See ECF No. 221 at pp. 14-15.)
Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary functions ...
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir.
2009). Though typically applicable to law enforcement, “qualified immunity is a defense
afforded to individuals under color of state law who are sued for federal Constitutional violations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Torres v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow, 379 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). Thus, because Goodman was acting under “color of state law” when engaging
in the allegedly unconstitutional behavior, the Court must consider (1) whether the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged misconduct. Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 58 (2d Cir. 2022); Tracey v.
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Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2010). “To be entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage of a case, a defendant must show that, even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant’s actions did not violate clearly established
law.” Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *28 (citation omitted).
i. 	Unreasonable Search/Violation of Privacy
“Fourth Amendment protections extend only to ‘unreasonable government intrusions
into . . . legitimate expectations of privacy.’” United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)). “As the text makes clear, ‘the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 381 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). The reasonableness
of a search under the Fourth Amendment is “determined by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Massey, 461
F.3d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “It is well established that a warrantless search is
‘per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United States v. Diaz, 122 F. Supp. 3d 165, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
Indeed, “a visual body cavity search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest for any
offense must be supported by ‘a specific, articulable factual basis supporting a reasonable
suspicion to believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity.’” Sloley v. Vanbramer,
945 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Similarly, “[i]f an arresting officer has reason
to believe, based on specific and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, that an arrestee is secreting contraband inside a body cavity, then the officer is
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permitted to conduct a visual body cavity search.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)) (internal marks omitted). To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify the
intrusion complained of, a court “must look at the totality of the circumstances” to see if the
“officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, where genuine issues of material fact as to reasonableness of a search preclude
a grant of summary judgment on an unreasonable search claim, courts will deny summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity for similar reasons. See Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski,
112 F.4th 107, 129 (2d Cir. 2024); Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 367–68 (2d Cir. 2007)
(noting that although “the ultimate question of whether it was objectively reasonable for
[defendants] to believe that [their] conduct did not violate a clearly established right, i.e.,
whether officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the lawfulness of such conduct,
is to be decided by the court,” the jury must first “resolve[ ] any disputed facts that are material
to the qualified immunity issue.”); Mangino v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue, 739 F. Supp.
2d 205, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying summary judgment on claim for unreasonable search
where material factual issues existed as to the reasonableness of the search, and noting that
summary judgment with respect to the issue of qualified immunity was denied).
Here, genuine issues of material fact exist as to the level of reasonable suspicion behind
Goodman’s search of Plaintiff. For instance, Plaintiff repeatedly told Goodman that he had
hemorrhoids which was why law enforcement initially thought he had drugs in his rectum. (See
ECF No. 221-16 at ¶¶ 107-109 (noting that Goodman received “conflicting information” as to
whether Plaintiff had a foreign body in his rectum, namely that law enforcement provided the
basis for Goodman to think there was a foreign body in his rectum, whereas Plaintiff denied
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having one); see also ECF No. 220-23, Goodman Dep. Tr. at pp. 67-69.) Additionally, whether
the information gathered from law enforcement which was subsequently relayed to Goodman
amounted to reasonable suspicion is also factually disputed. For instance, the parties dispute
whether Plaintiff was observed putting his hands down his pants in the police car (see ECF No.
221-16 at ¶ 9) and that the officers observed drugs in Plaintiff’s rectum while performing their
own search. (ECF No. 221-16 at ¶¶ 11, 23.) This was the information explicitly delivered to
Goodman and accounts for the extent of his knowledge of the events and reasons for why he
conducted the search. (See ECF No. 220-23, Goodman Dep. Tr. at p. 86:4-22 (Goodman
testifying that he “had law enforcement that was providing me information” and based on this
information Goodman needed to validate those concerns)). Moreover, the right to be free from
unreasonable body cavity searches without reasonable suspicion has been clearly established
under recent precedent from this Circuit. See Sloley, 945 F.3d at 38; see also Sanchez v.
Bonacchi, 799 Fed. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A manual body cavity search, which is more
intrusive than a visual search, must at minimum be supported by the same reasonable suspicion
as a visual cavity search.”).
Accordingly, based on the sharply disputed information that was relayed from law
enforcement to Goodman, the undersigned recommends: (i) denying Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action—for unreasonable search/violation of
privacy cause of action, and (ii) finding that genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Goodman acted with reasonable suspicion preclude summary judgment in favor of Goodman on
the basis of qualified immunity. See Hester v. Salle, No. 6:23-cv-01171 (AMN/TWD), 2025 WL
1580824, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2025) (denying summary judgment and rejecting claims of
qualified immunity because of “the parties’ disagreements” and “questions of material fact” over
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whether “individualized reasonable suspicion to conduct the search” existed and given the
“unresolved questions [] about . . . defendants’ motivations to conduct [the search]”).
ii. 	Unreasonable Seizure/Excessive Force
“Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force ... should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989). A use of force violates the Fourth Amendment if the police officer's conduct is
“objectively unreasonable ‘in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.’” Cruz v. City of New York, 232 F. Supp. 3d 438,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted)); accord Mickle v. Morin, 297 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2002). Under
this test of objective reasonableness, Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, the inquiry weighs the particular
facts and circumstances of the disputed incident to balance the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the concerns of law enforcement. Harrison v. Inc. Vill. Freeport, 498 F.Supp.3d
378, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Amnesty Am. v. Town W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
For summary judgment on Fourth Amendment seizure/excessive force claims to be granted, “the
evidence must demonstrate that ‘no rational jury could have found the force used was so
excessive that no reasonable officer would have made the same choice.’” McKinley v. Crevatas,
No. 20 Civ. 3606 (KPF), 2023 WL 4364182, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (quoting Lennon v.
Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1995)).
“Both a claim of excessive force and a qualified immunity defense to such a claim
depend on whether or not the officer's actions were objectively reasonable.” Colon v. City of
Rochester, 419 F. Supp. 3d 586, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Matusak v. Daminski, 2026 WL 233791,
at *6 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (noting that for qualified immunity to apply, actions must be
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reasonable based on the “particular facts of the case”). Indeed, “[s]ummary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to
a determination of reasonableness.” Thomas v. Roach, 164 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1999). It
follows, therefore, that where triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment on an excessive
force claim, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is equally inappropriate. See
Wang v. Vahldieck, No. 09-CV-3783, 2012 WL 119591, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Pal v.
Cipolla, 2022 WL 766417, at *3 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (affirming denial of motion for
summary judgement on claims of excessive force under § 1983 where the parties disputed facts
concerning the reasonableness of force used and, therefore, finding qualified immunity did not
apply for the same reasons).
Here, Plaintiff maintains that Goodman “directed that Plaintiff be restrained so that he
could be forcibly sedated” followed by Goodman subjecting Plaintiff to a painful rectal exam.
(ECF No. 158 at ¶ 55.) Because, according to Plaintiff, he did not present a threat to the safety of
others, “any amount” of fore applied is excessive. (Id. at ¶ 57.) Notwithstanding these
allegations, genuine issues of material fact remain as to the reasonableness of the search and use
of force exercised by Goodman. For instance, there are sharp factual disputes over whether less
invasive methods were available to Goodman, or even mentioned to Plaintiff, at the time he was
performing the rectal exam. (See ECF No. 222-1 at ¶ 22; compare ECF No. 221-2, Nazziola
Report at p. 5 (noting the “recommended” “non-invasive means of expelling retained drug
packets” was not offered to Plaintiff), with ECF No. 220-7, Wackett Decl. at ¶¶ 29-33.) Further,
Goodman recalls his conversation with Terranova regarding the treatment of Plaintiff, after
which he determined it was in his “best medical judgment” to continue with the physical exam
including sedation and a rectal exam. (See ECF No. 220-49 at ¶¶ 127-128.) During this call,
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however, Goodman never advised Terranova that his plan was to sedate Plaintiff with ketamine
prior to administering the rectal search. (See ECF No. 221-8, Terranova Dep. Tr. at pp. 80:15-25,
81:8-11.) Terranova’s recommendation to act within Goodman’s medical judgment may have
been altered had she known ketamine was being administered. A juror should be entitled to
consider what effect this withheld information would have had on the recommended course of
action. Moreover, disputes exist as to whether the rectal exam and sedation were even done
based on Goodman’s better medical judgment or merely at the request of law enforcement. (See
ECF No. 220-49 at ¶¶ 110-111.) Furthermore, after Plaintiff received x-rays that were reviewed
by Goodman and demonstrated that no foreign body was present in Plaintiff, Goodman
nonetheless engaged in the rectal exam of Plaintiff without explanation as to why x-rays were
not, alone, sufficient to satisfy his suspicions. (See id. at ¶¶ 159, 164, 165-66.)
Accordingly, because “there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of
reasonableness,” the undersigned recommends denying Goodman’s motion for summary
judgment on Count 2 for unreasonable seizure/excessive force. Additionally, because there are
facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness, the undersigned further
recommends finding that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds inappropriate. See
Pal, 2022 WL 766417, at *3 (quoting Thomas, 165 F.3d at 143); see also Falls, 2021 WL
1164185, at *53 (finding the reasonableness of the physician’s cavity search should remain for
the jury and not be resolved at summary judgment).
c. 	Malicious Prosecution
“In order to prevail on [a malicious prosecution] claim under both Section 1983 and New
York State law, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate: (i) the commencement or continuation of a
criminal proceeding against her; (ii) the termination of the proceeding in her favor; (iii) that there
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was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (iv) that the proceeding was instituted with
malice.” Morrison v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-04508, 2019 WL 175121, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
10, 2019) (quoting Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff, in its Memorandum of Law, voluntarily withdrew
his claim of malicious prosecution against Goodman. (See ECF No. 221 at p. 19 (“After
reviewing the pleadings, the record, and conducting further research, Plaintiff voluntarily
withdraws his claim[] of malicious prosecution . . . against Goodman only.”)). Accordingly, the
undersigned recommends granting Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim. See Felderbaum v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP, No. 19-cv-4249
(KAM) (VMS), 2022 WL 256507, at *4 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2022) (granting defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on the cause of action initially asserted in plaintiff’s complaint,
but later voluntarily withdrawn by plaintiff in her opposition to summary judgment).
d. 	Abuse of Process
An abuse of process claim arises under section 1983 when a defendant “(1) employs
regularly issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of some act[,] (2) with
intent to do harm without excuse of justification, and (3) in order to obtain a collateral objective
that is outside the legitimate ends of the process.” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 203
(2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff, in
his Memorandum of Law, voluntarily withdrew his claim of abuse of process against Goodman.
(See ECF No. 221 at p. 19 (“After reviewing the pleadings, the record, and conducting further
research, Plaintiff voluntarily withdraws his claim[] of . . . abuse of process against Goodman
only.”)). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Goodman’s motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim.
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e. 	Fabrication of Evidence
To establish a fair trial claim based on fabrication of evidence, a plaintiff must show that
“an (1) investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to influence a jury's
verdict, (4) forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property as a result.” Gutierrez v. New York, No. 18-CV-3621 (MKB), 2021 WL
681238, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (quoting Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 90 (2d Cir.
2017) (quoting Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016))).
Plaintiff, in his Memorandum of Law, voluntarily withdrew his claim of abuse of fabrication of
evidence against Goodman. (See ECF No. 221 at p. 19 (“After reviewing the pleadings, the
record, and conducting further research, Plaintiff voluntarily withdraws his claims of fabrication
of evidence against Goodman only.”)). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting
Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence claim.
f. 	Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In the Correct Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Goodman acted
“jointly” with SCPD and DOCCS Defendants to inflict a punishment upon Plaintiff that was
“cruel and arbitrary in the extreme and was entirely unsupported by a lawful conviction or
indeed a legitimate basis of any sort.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 82-83.) Plaintiff neglects to address
the cruel and unusual punishment cause of action in its opposition papers.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. Amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment also prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). “A claim of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment has two components, one subjective, focusing
on the defendant's motive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the conduct's
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effect.” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Sims v. Artuz,
230 F.3d 14, 21 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992))); see Harris
v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that the two elements to an Eighth Amendment
cause of action involve the allegation that the defendant “acted with a subjectively sufficiently
culpable state of mind” and “that the conduct was objectively harmful enough or sufficiently
serious to reach constitutional dimensions”).
Critically, the “Eighth Amendment applies only to claims of cruel and unusual
punishment imposed on an individual after he or she has been convicted of a crime.” Younger v.
City of N.Y., 480 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Muhammaud v. Murphy, 632 F. Supp. 2d
171, 175 (D. Conn. 2009) (“The Eighth Amendment, which protects inmates against cruel and
unusual punishment, may be invoked only after an individual has been adjudged guilty of a
crime.”). This is because the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to protect
those convicted of crimes, and consequently the Clause applies only after the [government] has
complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)
(discussing “punishment” in the context of pretrial detention).
As Plaintiff concedes in the Correct Second Amended Complaint, he was not yet
incarcerated at the time of the body cavity search and sedation. (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 79.) Indeed,
“[a]lthough a parolee, plaintiff had been convicted of nothing when he was subjected to the
deeply perverse and arbitrary indignity of being sedated and subjected to an involuntary body
cavity search. In fact, Plaintiff had not even been arraigned for his supposed parole violation.”
(Id. at ¶ 80.) Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
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Amendment. See Clark v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-210 (ENV) (ST), 2016 WL 11469535, at
*5 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2016) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s cruel and unusual
punishment claim against municipal defendants where plaintiff was not charged with a crime let
alone convicted and punished for one).
g. 	Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff, in his Memorandum of Law, voluntarily withdrew his substantive due process
claim against Goodman. (See ECF No. 221 at p. 22 (“Plaintiff has viable constitutional claims
against Goodman under the 4th and 14th Amendments for unreasonable search/seizure and
excessive/unnecessary force. Plaintiff recognizes that the constitutional claims may be
duplicative. Accordingly, Plaintiff will voluntarily withdraw the substantive due process claims
against Goodman.”)). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Goodman’s motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim.
II. 	The State Law Claims
a. 	Supplemental Jurisdiction
Should the District Judge agree with these recommendations, and conclude that some
federal claims survive, the Court must undertake an analysis to determine whether Plaintiff’s
state law claims should be heard. The Court’s jurisdiction in this action is predicated on federal
question jurisdiction by reason of the § 1983 claims. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶ 5.)2 As such,
Plaintiff’s remaining state law causes of action for assault and battery, intentional/negligent
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment rest
upon the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Romero v. Bestcare,
Inc., No. CV 15-7397 (JS) (GRB), 2018 WL 1702001, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding
2 Diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case, nor do the parties argue or plead the existence of
diversity. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 7-18.)
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where a claim does not otherwise carry an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.
federal question or diversity, that claim must meet § 1367's criteria for supplemental
jurisdiction.), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1701948 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018).
Section 1367(a) confers on the Court “supplemental jurisdiction over all [ ] claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). “For purposes of section 1367(a), claims ‘form part of the same case or controversy’ if
they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’ ” Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest.
Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures,
Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff has met the “common nucleus of operative fact standard set forth in in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (“The federal claim must have substance
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”) (internal citation omitted). State and federal
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact when, as a practical matter, they are so
related that the plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding.” Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Loc. 272, 642 F.3d 321, 332 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). The exercise of jurisdiction is proper over state law claims
when “the facts underlying the federal and state claims substantially overlapped,” or “the federal
claim necessarily brought the facts underlying the state claim before the court.” Lyndonville Sav.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s Corrected Second Amended Complaint is premised upon Goodman’s, among
others, alleged wrongful touching, restraining, sedating, threatening, and unlawful searching of
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Plaintiff’s body—conduct which also forms the basis behind the causes of action for assault,
battery, infliction of emotional distress, negligence, medical malpractice, and false
imprisonment. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 3, 93-96, 101-103, 108, 116, 122-123.) Both the state law
claims in the Corrected Second Amended Complaint and the federal claims involve the same
facts, the same misconduct, and the same or similar parties. Styleline Studios Int’l Ltd. v. Litvack,
No. 24-cv-01192 (OEM) (JMW), 2025 WL 2306738, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2092288 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2025). Moreover, the
“conclusion [here] is further buttressed by considerations of fairness, judicial economy,
convenience and comity. See Itar–Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d
442, 446–48 (2d Cir. 1998). As such, the state law claims in the Corrected Second Amended
Complaint arise from the common nucleus of operative facts as the federal claims.
But that is not all. The “trial court must consider whether any of the four grounds set out
in subsection 1367(c) are present to an extent that would warrant the exercise of discretion to
decline assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.” Jones, 358 F.3d at 214. Under subsection
1367(c), a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive
counterclaim if: “(1) the claim raises novel issues or complex issues of State law; (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction;
or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” Here, none of the four exceptions apply, nor do the parties even address why the
Court should refuse to hear the state law claims under one of these grounds. Accordingly, should
the District Judge agree that some federal claims survive summary judgment, the undersigned
recommends exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
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Should the District Judge disagree with the undersigned’s recommendation on the federal
claims, and find that no federal claims survive, the Court may also decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. “The decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims once the claims over which the district court had original
jurisdiction have been dismissed ‘is within the sound discretion of the district court.’” Silverman
v. Miranda, 116 F. Supp. 3d 289, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Silverman v. Teamster Loc.
210 Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund, 725 F. App'x 79 (2d Cir. 2018), as amended (June 7, 2018)
(quoting Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, 711 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2013)).
“Where a court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may, in its
discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims.” Kneitel v.
Silvery, No. 15-CV-6811 (NGG) (SJB), 2018 WL 526486, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction....”)). “In the interest of comity, the Second Circuit instructs that ‘absent exceptional
circumstances,’ where federal claims can be disposed of pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or summary
judgment grounds, courts should ‘abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction.’” Snyder v.
Neurological Surgery Practice of Long Island, PLLC, No. 24-cv-06911 (JMW), 2025 WL
1434032, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025) (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44,
53 (2d Cir. 1986)).
The “trial court must consider whether any of the four grounds set out in subsection
1367(c) are present to an extent that would warrant the exercise of discretion to decline assertion
of supplemental jurisdiction.” See Jones, 358 F.3d at 209. One of these grounds includes where
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“the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c).
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of courts in this Circuit, the undersigned
recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims should the District Judge dismiss
all of the federal claims. See, e.g., Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 307-08 (2d Cir.
2003) (finding that the district court abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over a state-
law claim following summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' federal claims); Delaney v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In general, where the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well”); Paschalidis v. Airline Rest.
Corp., No. 20-cv-2804 (LDH) (LB), 2024 WL 4607230, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2024)
(“Because the Court has granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
federal claims, it ‘decline[s] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over Plaintiff's state law
claims [because] ‘it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”’”) (quoting
Kolari v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).
This result squares with the approach taken in the § 1983 cases within the Circuit. See
e.g., Chroscielewski v. Chroscielewski, No. 16-CV-6640 (DG) (CLP), 2024 WL 5089540, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2024) (“In light of the dismissal of Plaintiff's federal-law claim (the First
Cause of Action, brought under Section 1983) . . . the Court declines at this stage to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims and those claims are dismissed without
prejudice to the parties pursuing any appropriate relief in state court.”); Rivera v. Jahmi, No. 22-
cv-2233 (KAM) (VMS), 801 F. Supp. 3d 129, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (dismissing state law claims
after granting summary judgment on the § 1983 claims—the only federal claims brought);
Myers v. Davenport, No. 21-cv-0922 (AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 4892741, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
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2024) (granting summary judgment on all “remaining state law claims” after granting summary
judgment on “the sole federal claims” under § 1983).
b. 	Qualified Immunity and State Law Claims
Similarly, should the District Judge disagree with the undersigned’s recommendation on
qualified immunity and conclude as a matter of law that Goodman is entitled to qualified
immunity, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the state law claims against Goodman
under the same grounds.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity is generally understood to only protect government
officials from federal, not state, causes of action. However, New York common law fills this gap
by providing government officials with a similar form of protection against state law claims.”
Bancroft v. City of Mount Vernon, 672 F. Supp. 2d 391, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Jenkins v.
City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2007)). Indeed, “New York law . . . grant[s]
government officials qualified immunity on state-law claims except where the officials’ actions
are undertaken in bad faith or without a reasonable basis.” See Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 63
(2d Cir. 2006)). “The only difference between the federal and state doctrines is that the
reasonableness of an officer's action is judged with references to state law and the state, not the
federal, constitution.” Bancroft, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing Doyle v. Rondout Valley Central
School District, 3 A.D.2d 669, 670-71 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2004)). Notably, under New York
law, “governmental officers are immune from tort liability based on ‘official action involving the
exercise of discretion even if resulting from negligence or malice.’” Lynch v. City of Mount
Vernon, 567 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Tango by Tango v. Tulevech, 459
N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983)).
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For example, in Rene, defendants argued “if the Court determines they are state actors
entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's federal and constitutional law claims, then the
Court should also afford them qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's state law claims” and “[based]
upon such immunity, Plaintiff's medical malpractice and false imprisonment causes of action
should be dismissed.” 2024 WL 1332556, at *19. The Hon. Joanna Seybert agreed, concluding
that if the court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, “Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s state law claims because the record evidence
established the Defendants acted reasonably” in making their determinations, thus supporting the
finding of qualified immunity on “Plaintiff’s federal and constitutional claims” as well. Id. at
*23.
Accordingly, like in Rene, if the District Judge concludes that Goodman is entitled to
qualified immunity on the constitutional claims, the undersigned recommends dismissing the
state law claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment. See
Bancroft, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09 (dismissing state law claims of gross negligence, negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and false imprisonment/false arrest
under the doctrine of qualified immunity where the officers acted reasonably and consistent with
acceptable practices considering the same reasonableness determination guided the court’s
decision to grant qualified immunity on the federal and constitutional claims).
Alternatively, should the District Judge agree with the undersigned’s recommendation
that material facts preclude a finding that Goodman is subject to qualified immunity, the
undersigned proceeds to analyze each of Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Jones, 465 F.3d at 64
(affirming decision to deny defendants motion for summary judgment on the constitutional
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claims considering disputed material facts were presented as to the reasonableness of force used,
and denying qualified immunity on the state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, assault, battery and the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress because the “resolution of these claims rests heavily on the same facts [and
reasonableness] that form the heart of the federal claims”).
c. 	Assault and Battery
Under New York law, “assault is an intentional placing of another person in fear of
imminent harmful or offensive contact” and a “battery is an intentional wrongful physical contact
with another person without consent.” Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing Charkhy v. Altman, 678 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1998)); see Baker v. City of New York,
551 F. Supp. 3d 258, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Under New York law, to plead an assault claim,
Plaintiff must allege “physical conduct placing [her] in imminent apprehension of harmful
contact. To plead a battery claim, Plaintiff must allege “bodily contact, made with intent, and
offensive in nature.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (quoting Fugazy v. Corbetta, 825
N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2006)).
Where an excessive force claim under § 1983 survives summary judgment, claims for
assault and battery will also survive because “except for § 1983’s requirement that the tort be
committed under color of state law, the essential elements of excessive force and state law
assault and battery claims are substantially similar.” Cornell v. Village of Clayton, 691 F. Supp.
3d 608, 622 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Lee v. City of Troy, 520 F. Supp. 3d 191, 198 (N.D.N.Y.
2021)). In circumstances like here, where material facts preclude summary judgment on
plaintiff’s excessive force claim, it is entirely appropriate to deny summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims. See Pizarro v. Ponte, No. 17 Civ. 4412 (LGS), 2019 WL
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568875, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2019) (denying summary judgment for the state claims of
assault and battery where summary judgment was denied as to excessive force). Accordingly, the
undersigned recommends denying Goodman’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
assault and battery claims.
d. 	Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
i. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)
Under New York law, “in order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must plead: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or
reckless disregard or a substantial possibility of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Callahan v.
City of New York, 90 F. Supp. 3d 60, 75-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation omitted). “In New York,
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are ‘extremely disfavored,’ and ‘[o]nly the
most egregious conduct has been found sufficiently extreme and outrageous to establish’ such a
claim.” Taylor v. City of Rochester, 459 F. Supp. 3d 133, 145 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2020) (quoting
Medcalf v. Walsh, 938 F. Supp. 2d 478, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
“For conduct to meet the standard of ‘extreme and outrageous,’ ‘it must be so outrageous
in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in civilized society.’” Callahan, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 76
(citation omitted). “Whether the conduct alleged may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery is a matter for the court to determine in the first instance.” Stuto
v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1999).
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress “may be invoked only as a last
resort, to provide relief in those circumstances where traditional theories of recovery do not.”
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Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, “intentional infliction of emotional distress is generally unavailable where
other traditional tort remedies are available.” Warr v. Liberatore, 270 F. Supp. 3d 637 (W.D.N.Y.
2017) (collecting cases dismissing IIED claims as duplicative of other tort liability theories, like
assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution).
Here, Plaintiff claims that Goodman “intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently, caused
Plaintiff severe emotional distress, mental trauma, and actual bodily harm by holding [Plaintiff]
down, involuntarily sedating him, and conduct an unlawful and intrusive search of his body
cavities while he was sedated.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 102.) These assertions mirror those Plaintiff
alleges in essentially all other tort theories Plaintiff brings—like assault and battery (see id. at ¶¶
95-96). Indeed, Plaintiff’s opposition merely recharacterizes the same allegations throughout all
tort theories to argue that those same actions arise to an “outrageous,” “atrocious,” and “utterly
intolerable in a civilized community” level sufficient for an IIED claim. (See ECF No. 221 at pp.
24-27.)
Fatally, however, Plaintiff neglects to delineate how these occurrences differ from those
underlying the other tort causes of action. Like here, where the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress arises out the use of excessive force and is subsumed by other “traditional tort
theor[ies]” it must be dismissed as duplicative. See Taylor, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (granting
summary judgment on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where it arose from the
same actions underlying the excessive force and assault and battery claims). Accordingly, the
undersigned recommends granting Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
ii. 	Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”)
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“Under New York law, a plaintiff may establish a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress under one of two theories: (1) the bystander theory; or (2) the direct duty
theory, both of which require a threat or danger of physical harm.” Quinn v. United States, 946 F.
Supp. 2d 267, 278 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir.
1996)). A plaintiff may recover under the bystander theory when “(1) she is threatened with
physical harm as a result of defendant's negligence; and (2) consequently she suffers emotional
injury from witnessing the death or serious bodily injury of a member of her immediate family.”
Mortise, 102 F.3d at 696 (citation omitted). Additionally, for a plaintiff to recover under a direct
theory when “she suffers an emotional injury from defendant's breach of a duty which
unreasonably endangered her own physical safety.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s Corrected Second Amended Complaint lists IIED and NIED as an
“and/or” cause of action (see ECF No. 158 at ¶ 102), and, while arguing its IIED claim, Plaintiff
never once addressed his NIED claim in its opposition papers (see ECF No. 221 at p. 24) leaving
the Court to ponder whether Plaintiff intends for his NIED claim to proceed or whether he
abandoned these claims. “Federal courts may deem a claim abandoned when a party moves for
summary judgment on one ground and the party opposing summary judgment fails to address the
argument in any way.” Taylor v. City of New York, 269 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting summary judgment on the state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress can be granted on the sole basis that no opposition to those causes of action
was raised). Critically, Plaintiff’s failure to address Goodman’s arguments for dismissal of the
cause of action for NIED in its opposition papers suffices for granting of summary judgment in
Goodman’s favor. See Jourdain v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, No. 19-cv-1168
(ARR) (JO), 2020 WL 2513447, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020) (granting summary judgment on
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claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress that were raised in the amended complaint but
was unaddressed by plaintiff in the brief in opposition to summary judgment); see also Nzegwu v.
Friedman, No. 10-cv-02994 (CBA) (RML), 2014 WL 1311428, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2014) (citing Taylor, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 75). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting
Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim. See Douglas v. Victor Cap. Grp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (adopting a
report and recommendation recommending summary judgment be granted to state law claims
that defendant’s summary judgment motion addressed but the opposition papers neglected to
address).
e. 	Negligence
“Under New York law, where a claim for negligence ... [is] premised on the same facts
and seek[s] the identical relief as a claim for legal malpractice,” the negligence claim is
“considered redundant and should be dismissed.” Darley v. United States, No. 22-cv-00714
(PMH), 2025 WL 1159518, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting
Decker v. Nagel Rice LLC, No. 09-CV-09878, 2010 WL 2346608, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
2010)). A negligence claim is considered redundant and should be dismissed if its underlying
allegations “give[ ] rise to an action sounding in medical malpractice.” La Russo v. St. George's
Univ. Sch. of Med., 747 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2014). A claim will “sound in medical malpractice
when the challenged conduct constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to
the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.” Dilworth v. Goldberg, No. 10-CV-
2224 (JMF), 2014 WL 3798631, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2024) (quoting D’Elia v. Menorah
Home & Hosp. for the Aged and Infirm, 51 A.D.3d 848, 850-51 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008)
(internal quotations and citation omitted)).
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Indeed, under New York law, it is firmly established that “[w]hen the duty arises from the
physician-patient relationship or is substantially related to medical treatment, the breach gives
rise to an action sounding in medical malpractice, not simple negligence.” La Russo, 747 F.3d at
101 (quoting Stanley v. Lebetkin, 507 N.Y.S.2d 468, 468 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986)). To
distinguish between situations of medical malpractice and negligence, courts will inquire into
whether “the directions given [by a medical professional] or treatment received by a patient is in
issue.” Bridges v. Corr. Servs., No. 17-CV-02220, 2020 WL 2410506, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
2020) (quoting Coursen v. New York Hosp.-Cornell Med. Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (App. Div.
1st Dep’t 1986)). If either is so, the alleged breach in care gives rise to an action sounding in
medical malpractice, not negligence. See Garry v. McPhillips, No. 9:21-cv-172 (MAD/MJK),
2024 WL 4023890, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2024).
Here, Plaintiff’s negligence claim sounds in medical malpractice. Specifically, all of the
allegedly negligent acts by Goodman relate directly to the medical treatment Plaintiff received
from Goodman. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 106-107, 110.) These allegations underlying Plaintiff’s
negligence claim—those exclusive to Goodman’s treatment of Plaintiff—are further echoed in
Plaintiff’s opposition papers. (See ECF No. 221 at pp. 28-29 (focusing on Goodman’s sedation
and cavity search of Plaintiff as the basis for Plaintiff’s negligence claim)). Accordingly, because
Plaintiff’s negligence claim is indistinguishable from his medical malpractice claim, the
undersigned recommends granting Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
negligence claim. See Darley, 2025 WL 1159518, at *5 (granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligence claim because the negligence claim “sound[ed] in
medical malpractice” as “[a]ll the alleged negligent acts concern medical treatment” and
plaintiff’s opposition “focuse[d] exclusively on the medical treatment [plaintiff] received”).
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f. 	Medical Malpractice
Under New York law, the “essential elements of medical malpractice are (1) a deviation
or departure from accepted medical practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was a
proximate cause of injury.” Doane v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 3d 442, 446 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)
(quoting DiMitri v. Monsouri, 754 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003)). With respect
to the first element, a physician’s obligation to his patient is to, at the very least, possess “the
degree of knowledge and skill possessed by the average member of the medical profession in the
community in which he practices,” and to “exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
application of that professional knowledge and skill, and to use his best judgment in the
application of his knowledge and skill.” Mann v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419
(N.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1987)). With respect
to the second element, “[a] defendant's negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is ‘a
substantial cause of the events which produced the injury.’” Id. (quoting Mazella v. Beals, 57
N.E.3d 1083, 1090 (N.Y. 2016)).
In moving for summary judgment, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that he
or she “did not depart from good and accepted medical practice or that any departure did not
proximately cause plaintiff's injuries.” Doane, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (quoting Ducasse v. N.Y.C.
Health & Hosps. Corp., 49 N.Y.S.3d 109, 111 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2017); Ongley v. St Lukes
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 725 Fed. App’x 44, 46 (2d Cir. 2018) (same). A plaintiff opposing a motion
for summary judgment, therefore, “must submit evidentiary facts or materials, typically through
expert testimony, and “demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.” Doane, 369 F. Supp.
3d at 446-47 (quoting Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 501 N.E.2d 572, 574 (N.Y. 1986)); Berk v. St.
Vincent's Hosp. & Med Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Expert testimony is
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normally required to establish the applicable standard of practice and, in an appropriate case, to
determine whether an alleged deviation from that standard was the proximate cause of a
plaintiff's injuries.”).
“Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties
adduce conflicting medical expert opinions. Such conflicting expert opinions will raise
credibility issues which can only be resolved by a jury.” Buchanan v. Hesse, 521 F. Supp. 3d 348,
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Feinberg v. Feit, 806 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
2005); Doane, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 447 (same) (quoting DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 957 N.Y.S.2d 167,
171 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted)); see Kurtz v. Hansell,
664 F. Supp. 3d 438, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[C]ourts generally deny summary judgment [as to
medical malpractice claims] where the parties present conflicting expert opinions.”) (collecting
cases).
Here, Goodman submits the expert conclusions of Dr. Andrew Wackett (“Wackett”), a
physician practicing medicine in New York State since 1999, who contends that Goodman’s
actions were those “within the standard of care” (ECF No. 220-7, Wackett Decl. at ¶ 18),
whereas Plaintiff produced Eric Nazziola (“Nazziola”), a board-certified emergency physician
with over 21 years of experience practicing emergency medicine, who states that “Goodman
failed to meet the emergency medicine standard of care by several errors of commission and
omission.” (See ECF No. 221-2, Nazziola Report at p. 1.) The opinions expressed throughout
these reports, however, conflict in several aspects.
For example, Wackett and Nazziola dispute whether the presence of a foreign body inside
one’s rectum is a serious, life-threatening circumstance justifying the action Goodman took.
(Compare ECF No. 220-7, Wackett Decl. at ¶ 21 (“Goodman could not simply wait for the
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plaintiff to secrete the bag from his anus. The decision had life and death consequences”), with
ECF No. 221-2, Nazziola Report at p. 4 (“[S]imply having a foreign body in one’s rectum, even
a suspected package of street drugs, is not necessarily considered a high-risk, acutely life-
threatening condition.”)). Moreover, the experts sharply dispute whether Goodman made his
decision based on reasonable medical judgment or at the request of law enforcement. (Compare
ECF No. 220-7, Wackett Decl. at ¶¶ 18-22 (noting Goodman acted “well within the standard of
care” by contacting Terranova, considering what law enforcement told him that they believed a
bag of drugs was protruding from Plaintiff’s rectum, remembering Plaintiff’s history of drug use,
and observing Plaintiff’s ongoing belligerent behavior) and ¶ 24 (“Goodman’s decision] was
made based upon his medical judgment and was not made in consultation with any of the law
enforcement officers), with ECF No. 221-2, Nazziola Report at p. 6 (“Goodman made this
determination based on subjective information from law enforcement which contradicted the
word of the patient, Mr. Young.”). Additionally, the experts sharply differ on whether other, non-
invasive measures, or even a psychiatric or toxicologist consultation, should have been
performed on Plaintiff. (Compare ECF No. 220-7, Wackett Decl. at ¶¶ 25-29, 33, with (ECF No.
221-2, Nazziola Report at p. 5)).
These competing expert opinions illustrate a material factual dispute regarding whether
Goodman’s conduct fell below the standard of care and contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Goodman’s motion for summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice. See Downing v. Phelps Memorial Hospital, No. 16
CV 1114 (VB), 2020 WL 4570440, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2020) (noting the conflicting expert
opinions reflected a material dispute as to whether the physician’s conduct fell below the
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standard of care so as to deny the motion for summary judgment on the medical malpractice
claim).
g. 	False Imprisonment
In Plaintiff’s Correct Second Amended Complaint, he alleges a claim for false
imprisonment against Goodman that Goodman “willfully and maliciously detained Plaintiff, by
both physical restraint and chemical sedation for the purposes of subjecting Plaintiff to . . . a
cavity search” with “no exigent need or medical necessity to do so” and without “any lawful
justification to detain Plaintiff for this purpose.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 123, 124.)
“To succeed on a claim of false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the
defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) that the plaintiff was aware of the confinement,
(3) that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) that the confinement was not
otherwise privileged.” King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis
in original) (citing Brouhgton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314 (N.Y. 1975)). A confinement is
“privileged” when it is based on probable cause and serves as a complete defense to an action for
false arrest. See Jackson v. Suffolk County, 87 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding the
same four elements for false arrest, including that probable cause constitutes justification, “hold[]
true for [] false imprisonment claims because, under New York law, the claim is identical to a
false arrest claim . . . .”) (quoting Kilburn v. Village of Saranac Lake, 413 Fed. App’x 362, 363
(2d Cir. 2011)). Granting summary judgment is appropriate in false imprisonment cases where
there is no dispute as to whether the arrest or confinement was done “with legal justification,”
meaning with probable cause. See Arum v. Miller, 332 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A
claim for wrongful imprisonment cannot succeed where the undisputed facts establish probable
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cause because it vitiates a required element of this causes of action: that the arrest or confinement
be without legal justification.”).
Here it is undisputed that Goodman injected Plaintiff with Ketamine (see ECF No. 220-
23, Goodman Dep. Tr. at 100:8-10) for the purpose of confining Plaintiff who, up until being
given the injection, remained agitated. (ECF No. 221-16 at ¶ 150 (noting it is undisputed that at
the time Goodman administered the Ketamine, Plaintiff was still agitated)). It is further
undisputed that Plaintiff was aware of this confinement (see ECF No. 220-11, Young Dep. Tr. at
104:9-14) and that Plaintiff vehemently opposed the confinement. (See ECF No. 220-11, Young
Dep. Tr. at 103:16-20, 104:16-23 (Plaintiff responding “[d]on’t fucking touch me” when told by
Goodman that he was going to put Plaintiff to sleep)). The question, therefore, becomes whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the confinement was privileged (i.e.
whether it was done with legal justification/probable cause). For the reasons stated above with
respect to the genuine dispute that exists as to the reasonableness of the confinement, the
undersigned respectfully recommends denying summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of false
imprisonment. See Chillemi v. Town of Southampton, No. 12-cv-3370 (JFB) (AKT), 2017 WL
6520722, at *14-15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) (denying summary judgment for claims of false
imprisonment where disputed issues of fact exist as to whether probable cause existed for the
confinement).
III. 	Attorney’s Fees and Punitive Damages
Each of Plaintiff’s causes of action in his Corrected Second Amended Complaint seek
attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19883 and punitive damages. The parties dispute whether
3 Plaintiff admits in his Opposition papers that the issue of attorneys’ fees “is premature,” an admission
glaringly obvious considering the absence of any documented proof evidencing reasonableness of fees, let
alone a requested amount. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends a finding that Plaintiff’s request for
attorneys’ fees under § 1988 is premature.
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Plaintiff is entitled to these remedies in their motion papers. (See ECF No. 220-48 at p. 23; ECF
No. 221 at pp. 17-19.)
a. 	Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct
and to deter others from similar behavior. Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F. Supp. 2d 274,
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 n. 9,
(1986)). “‘Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action when the defendant's conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Milfort v. Prevete, 3 F. Supp. 3d 14, 23
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1996)). Indeed, to be
entitled to an aware of punitive damages, “a claimant must show a positive element of conscious
wrongdoing.” New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 121 (2d
Cir. 2006).
“‘Generally, the issue of whether to award punitive damages is an issue for the jury to
decide based on an evaluation of the plaintiffs[’] proof of sufficiently serious misconduct.’”
Cooper v. City of New Rochelle, 925 F. Supp. 2d 588, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Picciano v.
McLoughlin, 723 F.Supp.2d 491, 506 (N.D.N.Y. 2010)); see Russo v. Nat’l Grid USA, No. 23-cv-
03954 (NCM) (TAM), 2025 WL 2711522, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases
where questions of culpability are best left for the determination of the jury); Leichter v. Lebanon
Board of Education, 917 F. Supp. 2d 177, 196 (D. Conn. 2013) (rejecting claim for punitive
damages as premature and permitting the parties to “raise the issue of appropriateness of punitive
damages after summary judgment.”)
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For example, in Stokes, the court concluded that it was “premature” to award punitive
damages. No. 21-cv-06657 (EAW), 2025 WL 755437, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2025). There,
though plaintiff provided “sufficient evidence” to overcome summary judgment on several of his
claims” under Section 1983, the court concluded it was to be “left to the trier of fact to determine
if plaintiff’s proof meets the sufficiency of serious misconduct to merit an award of punitive
damages.” Id. This principle was echoed in Randolph v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority
as well. See No. 17cv1433 (DLC), 2018 WL 2943744, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018). There, the
Hon. Denise Cote court held that punitive damages sought against the individual defendants
“[could not] be granted at this juncture” because of the issues of fact that precluded summary
judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, thus making “summary judgment as to [plaintiff’s] claim
for punitive damages” improper.
The same holds true here in light of the issues of fact precluding summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims, thereby making an award of punitive damages premature at this stage.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff’s application for punitive damages
without prejudice as premature at this juncture.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends GRANTING in
part and DENYING in part Defendant Goodman’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
220), specifically as follows:
(i) 	GRANT as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, fabrication of evidence, cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due
process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and negligence; and
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(ii) 	DENY as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for Fourth Amendment violations, assault
and battery, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment.
OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served through ECF
on all counsel. 	Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of service of this Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 72(b); see also Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group LLP, No. 24-1103 (2d Cir.
Oct. 28, 2025) (addressing timing and scope of objections to Reports and Recommendations) .
Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to the District Judge
assigned to this action prior to the expiration of the fourteen (14) day period for filing objections.
Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days precludes further review of this Report and
Recommendation either by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 145 (1985) (“a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to
appeal”); Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008) (“failure to object timely
to a magistrate's report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate’s
decision”); see Monroe v. Hyundai of Manhattan & Westchester, 372 F. App’x 147, 147–48 (2d
Cir. 2010) (summary order) (same).
Dated: Central Islip, New York.
February 6, 2026
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED,
/S/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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