Whitfield v. John Jay University Criminal Justice Administration

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DEMITRIUS R. WHITFIELD,
Plaintiff,
– against –
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF
CORPORATIONS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-cv-05457 (NCM) (PCG)
DEMITRIUS R. WHITFIELD,
Plaintiff,
– against –
JOHN JAY UNIVERSITY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
26-cv-05572 (NCM) (PCG)
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On September 2 and 9, 2026, plaintiff Demitrius R. Whitfield, proceeding pro se,
commenced the two above-captioned actions against the New York State Division of
Corporations 1 and John Jay University Criminal Justice Administration. See generally
Compl., No. 26-cv-05457, ECF No. 1 (“Division of Corps. Compl.”); No. 26-cv-05572, ECF
No. 1 (“John Jay Compl.”) (collectively the “Complaints”). Plaintiff did not pay the
1 	Defendant is incorrectly named as the New York State Division of Corporation.
The case caption has been corrected.
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requisite filing fees for either action and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See
No. 26-cv-05457, ECF No. 2; No. 26-cv-05572, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s applications to
proceed IFP are granted for the limited purpose of this Memorandum and Order. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the Complaints and directs plaintiff to show
cause, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, why the Court should not enter
a filing injunction barring plaintiff from commencing any future action in the Eastern
District of New York without first seeking leave from the Court.
BACKGROUND
The Complaints are each handwritten on a form complaint. See Division of Corps.
Compl.; John Jay Compl. The Complaints are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), alleging each defendant deprived plaintiff of his rights under the First and Sixth
Amendments. Division of Corps. Compl. 4; John Jay Compl. 4. 2
Plaintiff’s complaint against the New York State Division of Corporations alleges
defendant made “[m]isleading claims of filing requirements; but are willing to dispose of
this case entirely if I receive my certificate of good status.” Division of Corps. Compl. 5. In
the section of the form complaint stating, “[i]f you are suing under Section 1983, explain
how each defendant acted under color of state or local law,” plaintiff states: “CPFB false
advertising; intentional misrepresentation of information.” 3 Division of Corps. 4. He
2 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
3 	When quoting from plaintiff’s filings, the Court has retained plaintiff’s original
spelling but has not in all instances retained plaintiff’s original capitalization or
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alleges these misleading claims were made on July 17, 2026, in New York State and asks
the Court to award him “100,000,000 and/or 74 million in escro[w] account [and] the
government contracts included in the IRS 8(a) application.” Division of Corps. Compl. 5–
6. Plaintiff marked “N/A” in the injuries section of the form complaint. Division of Corps.
Compl. 6. Attached to the complaint is a Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) form called
“Statement in Support of Claim” (“VA form”) filled in with handwritten notes stating that
“Demitrius R. Whitfield Esq. dba Valor Enterprises LLC; Valorprudential PLLC(s);
Goldies Bail Bonds LLC; Goldies Gifts & Charities LLC; will be submitting this paperwork
as 	reference 	to 	ordering 	the 	Certificate 	of 	Good 	Standing 	and 	received 	some
misrepresentation of information regarding the application process; so noted this will
serve as notice of duty.” Division of Corps. Compl. 8–9. Plaintiff subsequently filed a copy
of a money order for $25.00 made to the “NY State Department Division of Corporation”
and a VA form stating he “will be requesting a certificate of good status.” Notice, No. 26-
cv-05457, ECF No. 4.
Plaintiff’s suit against John Jay University Criminal Justice Administration (“John
Jay”) includes substantially similar allegations. He alleges defendant acted under color of
state 	or 	local 	law 	by 	“CPFB 	false 	advertising; 	intentional 	misrepresentation 	of
information; slander; defamation of character.” John Jay Compl. 4. He further alleges
that John Jay made “misleading claims of requirements; defamation of character; hazing;
targeting 	positive 	individuals; 	stopping 	usage 	of 	local 	& 	states 	funds 	regarding
formatting. Any alterations do not materially affect the meaning or substance of plaintiff’s
statements.
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entrapment; continuous deception; showing little transparency for resilience.” John Jay
Compl. 5. The events underlying the complaint occurred on July 7, 2026, at “New York
City University & College System []all CUNY schools are under John Jays Criminal
Administration” and 	specifically at “Hostos Community College; Queens Borough
Community College[.]” John Jay Compl. 5. Plaintiff marked “N/A” in the injuries section
of the form complaint, and describes the relief he seeks as “small business administrations
8(a) program for individuals and businesses experiencing hardships intentionally by
others in competition.” John Jay Compl. 6. Plaintiff seeks “74 million plus contracts from
the Federal courts or government.” John Jay Compl. 6.
LEGAL STANDARD
Courts are required to give special consideration to pro se litigants, those
individuals who are not attorneys and represent themselves in court. This means that they
are not expected to meet the same standards required for formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In giving pro se litigants special
consideration, the Court must look for the strongest arguments in the complaint. Id.;
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). 	“A pro se
complaint should not be dismissed without the Court’s granting leave to amend at least
once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might
be stated.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 4
4 	Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
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A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all
allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must provide
a short, plain statement of his claim against each named defendant so that they have
adequate notice of the claims against them. Id. (“Rule 8 . . . demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only
“tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. To
satisfy this standard, the complaint must, at a minimum, “disclose sufficient information
to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining
about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230
F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000). “The basic requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented
and counseled plaintiffs alike.” Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F. 3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019). A
court is empowered to dismiss a complaint on its own initiative where the complaint does
not comply with Rule 8. Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an IFP action where
it is satisfied that the action is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
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which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s actions must be dismissed in their entirety because, 	even when
construed liberally, each complaint lacks any arguable basis in law or fact and is thus
frivolous. El-Bey v. D.C., No. 17-cv-06203, 2019 WL 13548078, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2019) (“An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless,
such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (quoting Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage
Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff’s Complaints must be dismissed for the additional reason that each
defendant, an arm of the state, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have
waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir.
2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states
themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a
state.” Id.
Plaintiff does not allege that the Division of Corporations has waived its sovereign
immunity. Nor could he plausibly do so—“New York has not consented to § 1983 suits in
federal court” and “Congress did not [intend to] abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity
when it enacted §[] 1983.” Walker v. NYS Just. Ctr. for Prot. of People with Special Needs,
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493 F. Supp. 3d 239, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F. App’x
191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order)); see Longi v. New York, No. 02-cv-05821, 2006
WL 8441210, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2010)
(dismissing claims against the New York State Division of Corporations, among others,
as barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Accordingly, plaintiff’s suit against the New York
State Division of Corporations is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff’s Complaint against John Jay University Criminal Justice Administration,
a college in the City University of New York (“CUNY”) system, is similarly barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. CUNY is an “arm of the state” and therefore entitled to sovereign
immunity. Clissuras v. City Univ. of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that
New York State “is responsible for paying money judgments entered against CUNY senior
colleges” and that “ultimate control over how CUNY is governed and operated rests with
the state”); see also Bryan v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 20-cv-01627, 2020 WL 1434708, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020) (“John Jay College is one of CUNY’s senior colleges, and is
therefore an arm of the state . . . [and] immune from suit in federal court for claims
pursuant to § 1983.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s suit against John Jay is also barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
Even if not dismissed for frivolousness or barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the
Complaints should be dismissed for a third, independent reason: failure to meet Rule 8’s
minimal pleading requirements. Plaintiff fails to provide a “short and plain” statement of
his claims in either action so that either defendant has a “fair understanding of what the
plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.”
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Harnage, 916 F.3d at 141. He has neither asserted facts that suggest a violation of his
constitutional rights or federal law, nor linked either defendant to any such violation.
Plaintiff fails to explain the misleading statements made by either defendant or what
“filing requirements” are at issue in either action for the Court to determine whether a
constitutional right was implicated. See Division of Corps. 5; John Jay Compl. 5. Indeed,
the Court is unable to determine exactly what claims plaintiff is attempting to allege and
thus cannot evaluate whether plaintiff’s allegations state a claim for relief. See Hall v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Dep’t, No. 22-cv-06692, 2022 WL 17253530, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2022) (dismissing pro se complaint where the court was “unable to determine exactly
what claims [the] [p]laintiff [was] attempting to allege”). Even liberally construing the
Complaints in plaintiff’s favor, each complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Accordingly, the Complaints are dismissed.
* 	* 	*
The Court has considered affording plaintiff an opportunity to amend the
Complaints. Based on the incomprehensible nature of the Complaints and the number of
frivolous complaints plaintiff has filed in this Court this year, infra § Order to Show Cause,
the Court finds that any amendment would be futile and denies plaintiff leave to amend.
See Clifton v. Office of Temp. Disability OTDA, No. 15-cv-06806, 2016 WL 482021, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016) (“Whereas ordinarily the Court would allow [the] plaintiff an
opportunity to amend . . . it need not afford that opportunity here where it is clear from
[the] plaintiff’s submission and prior litigation history with the Court that he cannot state
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a plausible claim for relief. As such, any attempt to amend . . . would be futile.”); see also
Glass v. U.S. Presidents Since 1960, No. 17-cv-03141, 2017 WL 4621006, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 12, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff’s amended complaint rose “to the level of the
irrational,” and declining to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to further amend her
complaint “given that the deficiencies therein [were] not such that could be cured by
amendment”).
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
District courts may enjoin filings by litigants who persist in filing repetitive suits
that lack any merit. Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996); see
Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc., 704 F. Supp. 3d 502, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (observing
the Second Circuit has approved anti-filing injunctions that “prohibited the filing of any
matters in a designated category[,] against designated parties in demonstrated need of
protection[,] [and] that required leave of court for future filings”).
The Court previously issued a 	consolidated order on September 11, 2026,
dismissing five other suits commenced by plaintiff and directing plaintiff to show cause
why a filing injunction should not be entered. Whitfield v. Hostos Community College,
No. 26-cv-04489, 2026 WL 2676672, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2026). 5 Further, even
before the Court’s consolidated order, plaintiff was expressly warned against filing further
frivolous, vexatious, and repetitive actions. 6 Indeed, in just the past eight months,
5 	Prior to responding to the Order to Show Cause, plaintiff filed an appeal with the
Second Circuit. See Notice of Appeal, No. 26-cv-04489, ECF No. 6.
6 	In the Court’s July 17, 2026 Order, plaintiff was warned “against filing future
unintelligible IFP complaints.” Whitfield v. PNC Bank, No. 26-cv-03242, ECF No. 5 at 6.
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plaintiff has commenced at least 17 actions, 10 of which have been dismissed as frivolous.
See Nos. 26-cv-02968 (dismissed as frivolous), 26-cv-03143 (same), 26-cv-03139 (same),
26-cv-03242 (same), 26-cv-03296 (same), 26-cv-04489 (same), 26-cv-04492 (same), 26-
cv-04526 (same), 26-cv-05022 (same), 26-cv-05029 (same), 26-cv-05457, and 26-cv-
05572. And five others have been dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 8’s pleading
standard. See Nos. 26-cv-00471 (dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8), 26-cv-01079 (same), 26-cv-01080 (same), 26-cv-02103 (same), and 26-cv-02125
(same). Despite the Court’s warnings, the two actions considered in this Order, follow a
pattern of similarly incomprehensible and frivolous complaints by plaintiff.
Accordingly, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, plaintiff is hereby directed to
show cause in writing why he should not be enjoined from filing any new action in the
Eastern District of New York without first obtaining permission from this Court. See Lau
v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts have the power and the
obligation to protect the public and the efficient administration of justice from individuals
who have a history of litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to
other parties and an unnecessary burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.”).
“A federal district court may, after providing an appropriate opportunity to be heard,
prohibit a vexatious litigant from filing, in that particular court, any action pro se (that is,
See Memorandum & Order, Whitfield v. Kaiser Corp., 26-cv-02103, ECF No. 8 at 5 (same)
(July 1, 2026); Order, Whitfield v. Kaiser, No. 26-cv-02103, ECF No. 4 (May 6, 2026)
(“Plaintiff is warned that he may not continue to squander scarce judicial resources. . . .
Should [p]laintiff continue to submit complaints without the filing fee or completed IFP
application, the Court will enter an Order directing the Clerk of Court to return without
filing any civil action submitted by [p]laintiff that is not accompanied by the $405 filing
fee or a completed IFP application.”).
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without counsel), without prior leave of that court.” White v. Uhler, No. 14-cv-01400,
2017 WL 923345, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017) (collecting cases). The Court will evaluate
the following factors to determine whether to impose such an injunction:
(1) [T]he litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by
counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other
parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect
the courts and other parties.
Stora v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, No. 25-cv-05004, 2026 WL 41247, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
7, 2026) (quoting Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 919 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 2019)).
Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s order to show cause must explain why these
factors do not weigh in favor of imposing an injunction. Should plaintiff fail to adequately
show cause, or should plaintiff continue filing frivolous, vexatious, and repetitive
litigation, the Court may impose an injunction prohibiting him from future filings without
seeking leave of the Court. See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (“If
a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may
impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Complaints are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On or before October 29, 2026, the Court directs plaintiff to file a
response to the Court’s order to show cause setting forth why he should not be enjoined
from filing any new civil actions without first obtaining the Court’s permission. If plaintiff
fails to file a response within the time allowed or if his affirmation fails to provide good
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cause for why the filing injunction should not issue, the Court shall enter an order barring
plaintiff from filing any new action without first obtaining the Court’s permission.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing the
actions, mail a copy of the judgment and this Memorandum and Order to plaintiff, note
the mailing on the docket, and close the two cases.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this
Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	October 15, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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