Telesford v. Katz et al

C/M
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MARCUS TELESFORD,
Plaintiff,
-against-
MELINDA KATZ, District Attorney,
CHRISTINA MAVRIKS, Assistant District
Attorney, BRENDAN QUINONES,
Assistant District Attorney,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
25-cv-6914 (BMC)
Defendants.
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COGAN, District Judge,
Pro se plaintiff Marcus Telesford, incarcerated at the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on
Rikers Island, brings this civil rights action against three Queens County prosecutors. The Court
grants plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons
stated below, however, the Court dismisses the complaint.
SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff was arrested on November 14, 2024 for attempted murder.1 As part of his case,
plaintiff is charged with two counts of witness tampering under P.L. § 215.11 (third degree) and
§ 215.10 (fourth degree). Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors, apparently without a judge, held
a hearing under People v. Sirois, 92 A.D.2d 618, 459 N.Y.S.2d 813 (2d Dep’t 1983), to
determine if plaintiff had “intimidated the witnesses not to testify at the grand jury.” The
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the currently pending criminal case against plaintiff. See People v. Telesford,
Ind. No. 72246-25/001 (Queens Cnty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2024). Plaintiff refers to a transcript from this case but did
not include a copy with the complaint.
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supposed judgeless hearing resulted in a finding that plaintiff had intimidated witnesses.
Consequently, plaintiff contends that defendants violated his constitutional rights and seeks $4
million in damages.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations in the
complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to
construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nevertheless, the district court must screen a civil
complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); see also id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
It is unclear whether plaintiff sues defendants in their individual or official capacities, but
it does not matter. To the extent plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities, his
claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991) (“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in
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initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (extending prosecutor
immunity to failure to train or supervise prosecutors); Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d
231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a prosecutor acting “within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under
[section] 1983” (citations omitted)). Prosecutorial functions include “deciding whether to bring
charges and presenting a case to a grand jury or a court, along with the tasks generally
considered adjunct to those functions, such as witness preparation, witness selection, and issuing
subpoenas.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013).
Because the alleged wrongdoing occurred in their prosecutorial capacity, plaintiff’s
claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, and the claims are dismissed. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 1915(e)(2)(B).
To the extent plaintiff sues defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See D’Alessandro v. City of New York,
713 F. App’x 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (“if a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a
prosecutor, she is an agent of the State, and therefore immune from suit in her official capacity.”)
(citing Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993)).
In any event, plaintiff’s claims are baseless. A Sirois hearing is held when prosecutors
allege that a defendant’s tampering caused a witness’s unavailability at trial. People v. Cotto, 92
N.Y.2d 68, 75-76, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 39 (1998) (“[A]t a Sirois hearing, the People must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, by violence, threats or
chicanery, caused a witness’s unavailability.”). If the court overseeing the Sirois hearing rules
for the prosecution, “the defendant is precluded from asserting either ‘the constitutional right of
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confrontation or the evidentiary rules against the admission of hearsay in order to prevent the
admission of the witness’s out-of-court declarations.’” Id.
A Sirois hearing is not a prerequisite for charging a defendant with witness tampering.
Rather, it is a prerequisite for “admitting statements not subject to cross-examination only where
the requisite link between the defendant’s misconduct and the witness’s silence has been
established.” See People v. Kellum, 233 A.D.3d 1374, 1377, 225 N.Y.S.3d 406, 410 (3rd Dep’t
2024).
In this case, ostensibly because he is charged with witness tampering, plaintiff contends
that a Sirois hearing must have been held. But a Sirois hearing was not necessary to charge him
with those offenses, and may never be necessary unless prosecutors seek to introduce at trial
testimony “not subject to cross-examination” due to defendant’s alleged tampering. See id.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed because it seeks
damages against defendants who are immune from such relief. Any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case and mail a copy of this Order to plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
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U.S.D.J.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 22, 2025
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