USA v. Smith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
The defendants, professional pharmacists, were convicted after a three-week jury trial of
dispensing and distributing and conspiring to dispense and distribute oxycodone. The evidence
at trial established that the defendants and others — a medical office manager, other pharmacists
and street level drug dealers — conspired to push over one hundred thousand oxycodone pills
onto the street by filling bogus prescriptions and selling them to dealers.
Before the Court are the defendants’ motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 29 and 33 for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. (ECF Nos.
394, 395, 399-1, 399-2.) As explained below, the motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
Indictment
The defendants were charged in a superseding indictment with conspiring to distribute a
controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(b)(1)(C) (Count 1); conspiring to dispense a controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), outside the scope of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 4); and the substantive distribution and
dispensation offenses underlying those charges — that they each distributed, dispensed, or
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
– against –
YOUSEF ENNAB AND MOHAMED HASSAN,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
22-CR-464 (AMD)
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 1 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
possessed with intent to distribute or dispense oxycodone outside the scope of professional
practice (Count 2, as to Hassan; Count 3, as to Ennab). (ECF No. 179; ECF No. 321-2.)1
Trial
a. 	The Government’s Case
Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, is highly addictive and can cause
overdose or death. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 1061–63.) Because it is so dangerous, oxycodone
should be prescribed only “for three to five days;” a doctor treating a patient who has never taken
opioids before “needs to start with the lowest dose because that’s how powerful it is.” (Tr.
1061–62.) The FDA requires a “black box” warning for pharmacists and prescribers cautioning
that oxycodone is dangerous and should be prescribed only for a short period of time at the
lowest dose possible. (Tr. 1064–65.) Pharmacists and prescribers are also required to advise
patients about the dangers of taking oxycodone. (Tr. 1065.) Oxycodone 30 mg pills are “the
most popular by demand on the street.” (Tr. 927.)
Testimony from government and defense experts established that pharmacists and
prescribers are trained to look for “red flags” — signs that oxycodone is being “diverted,” or sold
on the street. According to Government expert Carmen Catizone, the former CEO of the
National Association Boards of Pharmacy, red flags suggest that a “prescription is not
legitimate” (Tr. 1069), and controlled substances like oxycodone are an “immediate red flag”
(Tr. 1075). In addition, pharmacists and prescribers should be alert to the following warning
signs:
• 	using slang to describe a medication;
• 	paying for prescriptions with cash;
1 References to count numbers are to the trial indictment. (See ECF No. 321-2.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 2 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
• 	geographic distance between the patient’s address and the pharmacy or the
provider;
• 	multiple patients with the same contact information and the same last name
prescribed the same controlled substance from the same provider; and
• 	“pattern prescribing,” where multiple patients are prescribed the same drugs in the
same quantities by the same provider.
(Tr. 1071–74.)
Defense expert Andrew Perugini explained that a practitioner who prescribes the same
controlled substance in the same dosage for patients who filled prescriptions at a particular
pharmacy is a red flag. (Tr. 1714.) Multiple patients at the same pharmacy filling prescriptions
for controlled substances with the same phone number is also a red flag. (Tr. 1717.) Both
experts agreed that as the number of red flags increases, a pharmacist’s concerns about diversion
should also increase. (Tr. 1070, 1710.) One way for a pharmacist to resolve red flags is to call
the prescribing doctor to verify that the prescription is legitimate. (Tr. 1046, 1710.)
The Prescription Monitoring Program (“PMP”), a database that tracks prescriptions for
controlled substances, is another resource for pharmacists to confirm or resolve red flags. (Tr.
1047–49.) Doctors and pharmacists enter information into the PMP when they prescribe or
dispense controlled substances. (Tr. 1047.) This creates a record, shared across pharmacies, of
the controlled substances a patient is taking. (Tr. 1047–48.) The PMP also contains information
about how often a patient is prescribed the controlled substance, whether the patient is also going
to other pharmacies, the number of doctors the patient is seeing, and whether the patient is
paying for medications in cash or with insurance. (Tr. 1048.) Pharmacists are supposed to check
the PMP before dispensing a controlled substance. (Tr. 1048.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 3 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
The defendants learned about red flags in pharmacy school, including in Professor John
Bova’s class, which included the study of laws, regulations, and rules for pharmacists. (Tr. 974–
982, 991.) Professor Bova covered the “red flags” for narcotics like oxycodone that are prone to
abuse: “A patient or caregiver that picks up multiple prescriptions from multiple patients on the
same day, a prescription written by a prescriber . . . in one borough a far distance from the
patient and a far distance from where the prescription is being filled at the pharmacy, perhaps
prescriptions that are for a long duration of therapy, [and] prescriptions outside the scope of
practice of the person writing it.” (Tr. 991, 995–96.)2
Leticia Smith was the office manager and receptionist at Linden Medical Center in
Brookyln, where Dr. Somsri Ratanaprasatporn, a general practitioner, saw patients. (Tr. 328–
329.)3 Dr. Ratanaprasatporn was Smith’s pediatrician, and Smith was a teenager when she
started working for the doctor. (Tr. 345–46.) Smith became the full-time office manager
sometime in 2019. (Tr. 347.) From 2018 through 2022, Smith used Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s
electronic prescription pad, without the doctor’s knowledge, to write and issue thousands of
prescriptions for 30 mg tablets of oxycodone in Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s name and license, in
exchange for cash. (Tr. 329–330; 359; 365.) Dealers or “crew chiefs” — Michael Kent,
Anthony Mathis, and Raymond Walker — paid Smith to issue the oxycodone prescriptions in the
names of “patients” that the crew chiefs supplied. (Tr. 332.) Then, the crew chiefs picked up the
2 Professor Bova, like the other experts, also testified that cash payment is a red flag. (Tr. 993–94.)
3 Smith pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and money laundering on September 21, 2023,
and testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Sep. 21, 2023; Tr.
338–39.) She is awaiting sentence. Dr. Ratanaprasatporn pled guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice
and conspiracy to unlawfully use a registration number to issue oxycodone prescriptions on August 6,
2024, and was sentenced to time served. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Aug. 6, 2024; ECF Minute Entry
dated Mar. 26, 2025.) At the time of sentence, she was in her late 70s and in the early stages of
dementia. At trial, witnesses referred to her as Dr. Somsri and Dr. Ratana. (See, e.g., Tr. 329.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 4 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
prescriptions from pharmacies and sold the oxycodone on the street. (Tr. 332–333.)4 Dr.
Ratanaprasatporn never examined these people, and they were not her patients. (Tr. 359.) Kent
and the other crew chiefs also referred patients whom Dr. Ratanaprasatporn examined, and Smith
issued illegitimate prescriptions for them, too. (Tr. 677, 713.)
The crew chiefs found the pharmacies to dispense the oxycodone, and told Smith where
to send the prescriptions. (Tr. 398–399.) Hassan had an ownership interest in pharmacies that
filled the bogus prescriptions: Nile Rx Pharmacy, Nile City Pharmacy, Prospect Care Pharmacy,
Downtown Rx Pharmacy, and Forest Care Pharmacy. (GX 261.) Ennab was the part owner and
supervising pharmacist at Forest Care, and had previously worked at another one of Hassan’s
pharmacies. (GX 261; GX 364; Tr. 1240.)5
Bassam Amin, Hassan’s partner at Prospect Care pharmacy during the conspiracy period,
also worked at Nile Rx and Nile City. (Tr. 1201, 1208.)6 According to Amin, Hassan monitored
his pharmacies “very closely,” and had remote access to the stores’ computer systems. (Tr.
1217, 1237.) Hassan and Amin split the profits from Prospect Care evenly. (Tr. 1217.) Amin
and other pharmacists and technicians who worked at Hassan’s pharmacies were part of a
WhatsApp group chat called “Pharmacists United.” (Tr. 1209–10.) Ennab, Omar Elsayed, who
4 Kent pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone on September 6, 2023, and was sentenced to 108
months in prison and three years of supervised release. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Sep. 6, 2023; ECF
Minute Entry dated Oct. 29, 2024.) Mathis pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone on
September 25, 2024, and is awaiting sentence. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Sep. 25, 2024.) Walker
pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone on October 15, 2024, and was sentenced to eighty-four
months in prison and three years of supervised release. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Oct. 15, 2024;
ECF Minute Entry dated May 7, 2025.)
5 Forest Care’s legal name was Brighton Care. (GX 261 at 14.)
6 Amin pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone on February 15, 2024, and testified pursuant to a
cooperation agreement. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Feb. 15, 2024; Tr. 1300–03.) He is awaiting
sentencing. Smith referred to Amin as “Sam.” (See Tr. 335 (“Prospect Care pharmacist’s name was
Sam.”).)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 5 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
was the pharmacist at Downtown Rx, and Mohamed Saleh, the pharmacist at Nile City,
participated in the chats. (Tr. 334–36, 837–38, 1209–1210, 1230–31.)7
Amin met Kent at Nile Rx when Kent came to pick up an oxycodone prescription. (Tr.
1244.) Kent paid in cash, which Amin thought was suspicious because it suggested Kent was not
using the medication himself. (Tr. 1244–45.) In late 2019 or early 2020, Kent came to Prospect
Care regularly. (Tr. 1245–46.) The visits followed a pattern. Kent called Amin, said that he had
prescriptions from Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s office, and asked when they would be ready. (Tr.
1247.) Then, Kent picked up multiple prescriptions at once. (Tr. 1249.) Kent wanted only blue
oxycodone pills. (Tr. 1250.) Although Amin knew that at least some of the oxycodone that he
gave to Kent would not be delivered to the patients for whom it was prescribed, he agreed to fill
the oxycodone prescriptions for Kent, because he was worried about Prospect Care’s finances.
(Tr. 1243–44, 1249–50.)
Hassan also knew Kent and met with him at Prospect Care in 2022. (Tr. 1252–53.)
Amin and Hassan split the cash Kent paid for the prescriptions evenly. (Tr. 1260; GX 514; GX
547.) Because cash payments for drugs like oxycodone were red flags that could alert regulators,
Hassan showed Amin how to make fake insurance profiles to hide the fact that Kent was paying
cash for the oxycodone. (Tr. 1273–1274.)
In February 2020, Hassan wrote in the WhatsApp group chat that “[a]s of this morning I
discontinued all of Dr. Somsris [sic] patients in both Nile Rx and Nile Ridge. If you wish to
continue working with patients from that doctors [sic] office in your pharmacy please be diligent
7 Elsayed pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, conspiracy to dispense oxycodone, and the
substantive distribution and dispensation offense underlying those charges on January 21, 2025, and is
awaiting sentencing. (See ECF Minute Entry dated Jan. 21, 2025.) Saleh, according to the government,
is an unindicted co-conspirator. (See ECF No. 409 at 17.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 6 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
in doing PMP checks and id verifications.” (GX 617.) Nevertheless, records established that
Hassan’s pharmacies continued to fill prescriptions from Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s office. (See GX
241.)
Smith sent oxycodone prescriptions to Nile Rx when Hassan was the pharmacist there.
(Tr. 405, 407–08.)8 Hassan never called Smith or Dr. Ratanaprasatporn to verify whether the
prescriptions were legitimate. (Tr. 408.) He did tell Smith to “make sure” that she sent other
prescriptions with the oxycodone, “whether it be a stool softener, an anti-inflammatory, [or]
vitamins.” (Tr. 408.) If she did not send other prescriptions, Hassan said, “it could get red-
flagged.” (Tr. 408.) Smith told him that those medications required a doctor’s prior
authorization, but Hassan — who was not a doctor — said he would “do” it. (Tr. 428–29.)
Hassan also suggested to Amin that he ask Kent “to bring in some medication[s] that are highly
reimbursable” with the oxycodone prescriptions. (Tr. 1265.) In addition, Elsayed asked Smith
to send expensive prescriptions with the oxycodone prescriptions. (Tr. 435–36.) Kent paid
Hassan’s pharmacies in cash, but the pharmacies also charged certain patients’ insurance
companies. (Tr. 414.) Thus, Elsayed asked Smith to send prescriptions for insured patients, so
that their insurance would cover the cost of the prescriptions. (Tr. 433–434.)
Hassan, Elsayed, and Saleh texted one another about getting more oxycodone patients
from Smith and Kent. (GX 1103-2.14; GX 1103-2.15; GX 1103-2.30; GX 1103-3.10; GX 1103-
2.33.) Elsayed was concerned that he had too many oxycodone patients. (See GX 1103-3.10
(“Just wanted some guidance on dispensing oxy 30s. From what you have seen, when and where
is the limit.”); GX 1103-2.36 (“I got 5 new pts from leticia yesterday. Too many.”).) Hassan
reassured him. (See GX 1103-2.30 (“Just do PMP and ur good.”); GX 1103-3.10 (“Ur good . . .
8 Smith referred to Hassan as “Mohamed 1.” (Tr. 334–35.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 7 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
U shud [sic] get maybe 3-4 more from dr. somsri. And that’s avout [sic] it.”); GX 1103-2.36
(“We can start shifting to other stores . . . Inwill [sic] call [Smith] and ask her to send to a
diff[erent] store.”).)
Smith and Kent coordinated sending more oxycodone prescriptions to pharmacies in
which Hassan had an ownership interest, including Prospect Care, Nile City, Downtown Rx, and
Forest Care. (Tr. 410–416, 428, 456–457.) In May 2022, Smith and Hassan spoke on the phone
about starting to send oxycodone prescriptions to Downtown Rx. (Tr. 421–423.)9 Hassan said
that “he would accept the oxycodone prescriptions for 30 milligrams at his new pharmacy,”
Downtown Rx, and asked Smith to meet in person to discuss it. (Tr. 421–423.) On June 3,
2022, Kent texted Smith that he went to Downtown Rx to speak with Hassan, but that Hassan
was not there, so he left his phone number. (GX 1112-2.19; Tr. 421.) Five days later, Elsayed
sent Hassan a picture of a note left at Downtown Rx with Kent’s phone number that said,
“Michael . . . for Ms. Smith.” (GX 1103-2.14.)
Ennab’s pharmacy, Forest Care, filled oxycodone prescriptions from Linden Medical
beginning in August 2022. At some point in 2022, Kent told Smith that he would have “no
problem” picking up oxycodone prescriptions from the Forest Care pharmacist, who was
Hassan’s cousin. (Tr. 457–458.)10 Kent also told Amin, who was no longer receiving
prescriptions for some of Kent’s oxycodone patients, that Hassan told Kent to send the
prescriptions to Staten Island or Atlantic Avenue pharmacies. (Tr. 1238.)11 Around the same
9 Hassan referred to himself as “Mohamed from Nile Rx.” (Tr. 760.) In addition, phone records show
that Smith and Hassan spoke several times in June, July and August 2022. (See GX 21 at 2023–34.)
10 Smith did not know that Ennab was the pharmacist at Forest Care. (Tr. 514.)
11 Ennab and Hassan dismiss this testimony as false, and say that the government should have known that
it was false. (ECF No. 395 at 13–15, 18; ECF No. 399-2 at 43.) The Court addresses these arguments
below.
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 8 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
time, Hassan and Kent communicated about sending more prescriptions to Hassan’s pharmacies.
(GX 1103-2.30 (August 22, 2022 text message from Hassan to Elsayed: “Omar, I spoke to Mike.
He will send u four new patients over the next few days.”).) On August 22, 2022, within a
minute of Hassan reporting to Elsayed that he had spoken to Kent, Kent called Forest Care for
the first time. (GX 1103-2.30; GX 924.)
On August 25, 2022, Kent texted Smith that he had an “issue” at Forest Care because the
pharmacist tried to give him the “big white” pills, which Kent rejected because he could only sell
blue pills. (GX 1112-2.6; Tr. 459–60.) Kent texted Smith that “[m]aybe tomorrow or the next
day it’ll be ready.” (GX 1112-2.6.) Smith replied, “Oh ok lol he knows better than that!!” (GX
1112-2.6.) According to Smith, “the pharmacist at Forest Care” “knew better” because Kent told
him that he wanted blue 30mg tablets. (Tr. 460.)
The next day, Ennab texted Kent, “Hey Mike. This is yousef from forest. Once
everything comes in I’ll give you a call.” (GX 1112-1.1.) A few hours later, Kent responded,
“… yousef do you think it will be today?” Ennab replied, “Yes it will… I won’t be there. But
my pharmacist will give it to you.” (GX 1112-1.1.) That same day, Forest Care filled three
prescriptions for oxycodone from Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s office. (See GX 356-1 (prescriptions
issued to Vance McMillian, Jennifer Lowman, and Kelvin Chekuse).)
On September 9, 2022, Kent sent Smith images of identification cards for various
“patients.” (Tr. 506–08; GX 1112-3.13.) Dr. Ratanaprasatporn did not examine any of these
people. (Tr. 509–10.) The identifications reflected that the “patients” lived in Brooklyn, so Kent
gave Smith fake Staten Island addresses for them, because it would be “pretty strange” for
Brooklyn residents to fill oxycodone prescriptions at a Staten Island pharmacy. (Tr. 508–09,
470.) Kent told Smith that he had spoken with the pharmacist at Forest Care, who knew that the
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 9 of 40 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
addresses in the patients’ profiles would not match their identification cards. (Tr. 470–71.) In
addition, he told Smith to use his phone number on the prescriptions. (Tr. 466–67.) Smith then
issued oxycodone prescriptions in these people’s names with Kent’s number to Forest Care. (Tr.
509–10, 467.)
On September 10, 2022, Kent texted Ennab that he had three prescriptions “sent over.”
(GX 1112-1.3.) Ennab responded, “I’ll have them ready tomorrow.” (Id.) Two days later, Kent
texted Ennab that he was on his way to Forest Care and sent him pictures of the same
identification cards he sent to Smith. (GX 1112-1.4.) Ennab did not contact Dr.
Ratanaprasatporn’s office to verify that the prescriptions were legitimate. (Tr. 510–11.) He
filled the prescriptions and used the Staten Island addresses, even though the addresses on the
identification cards were different. (Compare GX 1112.1-4 with GX 911.)
Ennab’s interactions with Kent were captured on video footage from the pharmacy, and
wiretap evidence, and confirmed by telephone records. On September 27, 2022, Ennab opened a
package, removed prescription bottles, and called Kent. (GX 125-A.) Ennab told Kent that they
had “a little problem,” because the pharmaceutical distributor sent “white ones.” (Id.) Ennab
said that he would “try to return the white ones, unless you want them,” and that he was
“reordering the blue ones right now.” (Id.) Kent called Ennab later the same day, and said, “I
know you, you gave me the white ones, but oh, the big ones? . . . Yeah, I can’t do nothing with
those.” (GX 127.) The next day, September 28, 2022, Kent came into the store, walked up to
the counter and handed Ennab a wad of cash, which Ennab pocketed without counting or giving
Kent change. (GX 1107-2; GX 11073.) Ennab then scanned prescriptions, put them in a bag,
handed them to Kent, and “fist-bumped” with him. (GX 1107-2; GX 1107-3.) Documentary
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 10 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

11
evidence established that these were three prescriptions for oxycodone for Linden Medical
“patients.” (Compare GX 1106-9 with 1107-2 and 1107-3.)
Ennab and Kent also discussed moving some of the prescriptions away from Forest Care.
In one call, Kent asked “I know you wanted me to take some people out . . . You still want me to
do that, right?” (GX 126.) Ennab replied that he did, and Kent said, “I’mma try to move, um, 5
of them out. Is that, is that good enough?” (Id.) Ennab responded, “That’s perfect.” (Id.) In
another call later that day, Kent confirmed “I’mma move 5 of them out . . . this week.” (GX
127.) Ennab replied, “No problem.” (Id.)
Ennab’s pharmacy filled 14 oxycodone prescriptions that Smith issued using Dr.
Ratanaprasatporn’s credentials. (GX 356-1.) Each prescription was for the same number and
dosage of oxycodone — 120 30 milligram tablets of oxycodone — a total of 1,680 pills. (Id.)
Two of the people in whose names Ennab filled prescriptions — Jennifer Lowman and Latoya
Richardson — testified that they had never been prescribed oxycodone, that they did not know
Dr. Ratanaprasatporn, and had never been to Forest Care Pharmacy. (Tr. 1522–23, 1577–80.)12
Nevertheless, Ennab not only filled prescriptions in their names, he represented that he counseled
them about the prescriptions. (GX 357.) He also represented that the cost of the oxycodone was
charged to patients’ insurance, even though Kent paid for the oxycodone in cash. (GX 241; GX
953.)
Together, Hassan’s pharmacies filled over 1,000 prescriptions for oxycodone from
Linden Medical, totaling over 100,000 pills. (GX 901.) The street value for these pills was over
$3 million. (Tr. 929–30 (explaining that in the New York tri-state area, the street value for a 30
mg oxycodone pill is $30).) Catizone, the government’s expert, examined data from Prospect
12 Richardson once worked at Mathis’s restaurant, and gave him a copy of her driver’s license so that he
could get her a food handling certification. (Tr. 1576–77.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 11 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

12
Care, Downtown Rx, and Forest Care and identified multiple red flags. (Tr. 1088, 1090–91,
1111.) Records showed that Hassan’s pharmacies filled prescriptions for oxycodone for multiple
“patients” every month, even though oxycodone prescriptions are typically prescribed for only
three to five days. (Tr. 1085–86, 1091, 1093, 1095.) As for the oxycodone prescriptions from
Forest Care, filling those prescriptions would not have been in the ordinary course of pharmacy
practice; there were “[m]ultiple red flags concerning the medication, prescriber, and the
legitimacy of [the] patient[s].” (Tr. 1111.)
b. 	The Defense Case
The parties stipulated that Nerli Guardado, Ennab’s classmate in pharmacy school, was a
pharmacist at Forest Care. (Tr. 1889–90.) Guardado filled the first three oxycodone
prescriptions Linden Medical sent to Forest Care. (Tr. 1890.) She “was comfortable filling
those prescriptions and did not see anything she thought was a red flag or a warning sign.” (Id.)
Guardado was at Forest Care when Kent came to pick up prescriptions on September 28,
2022, and was captured on video surveillance footage introduced at trial. (See GX 953.) In the
stipulation, Guardado claimed not to remember Kent, whom she described as “the person in the
video wearing a baseball cap who came to the register.” (Tr. 1893.) She agreed that she
“stopped in the aisle and did not approach while the man was at the counter.” (Id.) She did not
“have any specific memory of why she stopped and does not remember the events in the video
from 2022 . . . [however,] her usual practice is not to interrupt a patient being counseled by a
pharmacist or making a purchase, so she [was] not surprised to see[ ] on the video that she did
not walk up to the register while the man in the cap paid and signed.” (Id.)
According to Guardado, “if a person came into Forest Care and picked up oxycodone
prescriptions for multiple patients a few times, it would not necessarily have been a red flag for
her.” (Tr. 1891.) She also said that it was “not uncommon for patients to travel outside of the
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 12 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

13
area where they live to fill a prescription,” and “it was not uncommon for patients to prefer
certain sizes of pills or colors of pills.” (Tr. 1892, 1897.)
Teresa Wilbert, a retired law enforcement officer, testified about charts she made
interpreting data on the oxycodone prescriptions from Linden Medical, and which Hassan’s
pharmacies dispensed from October 2017 to December 2022. (See Tr. 1813–15.)
c. 	The Geaney Protocol
Prior to trial, the defendants moved to preclude statements of alleged co-conspirators.
(ECF No. 298 at 29–35; ECF No. 301 at 8–10.) The government responded that the statements
were admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). To admit statements under
this rule, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence “(a) that there was a conspiracy,
(b) that its members included the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered,
and (c) that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 173 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Court reserved judgment on the motions, and admitted the statements conditionally,
following the protocol established in United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) and
United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir. 1993), as courts in this circuit regularly do. See,
e.g., United States v. Chang, No. 18-CR-681, 2024 WL 3303717, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2024).
“Pursuant to Geaney, the court determines, after the evidence is in, whether the prosecution
meets the foundational requirements under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E), i.e., the existence of a
conspiracy, the defendant’s and the declarant’s participation, and that the statements were made
in further of the conspiracy.” Id.
After the government rested, the Court heard argument on whether the government met
its burden to show that the statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). (Tr. 1588–
1609.) Ennab argued that the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 13 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

14
that he was in a conspiracy with Elsayed or Amin. (Tr. 1589, 1605.) Both defendants argued
that the government had not established a single conspiracy; instead, they claimed, there were
multiple conspiracies, with each of Hassan’s pharmacies involved in a separate conspiracy. (Tr.
1595.) According to the government, the evidence established that Hassan’s pharmacies, Leticia
Smith, and the crew chiefs were part of the same conspiracy to dispense and distribute
oxycodone. (Tr. 1598.)
The Court ruled, outside of the jury’s presence, that the government established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ennab, Hassan, Smith, Kent, Elsayed, Amin, and Saleh were
members of a conspiracy, and that statements they made during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). (Tr. 1630–34.) The Court
precluded statements by other members of the Pharmacists United group chat, because the
government did not establish that Ennab or Hassan were in a conspiracy with those declarants.
(Id.) The Court instructed the jury that it could not consider statements by members of the
Pharmacists United group chat — other than Hassan, Saleh, Amin, and Elsayed — against
Ennab. (Tr. 2233.)
On February 12, 2025, the jury convicted the defendants of all counts. (See ECF No.
353.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal
A court evaluating a Rule 29(c) motion views “the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution,” and will uphold the jury’s verdict if it determines that “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Mahaffy, 499 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“To succeed, any Rule
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 14 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

15
29 motion must demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, no rational trier could have found the essential elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff’d, 283 F. App’x
852 (2d Cir. 2008). “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence ‘bears a heavy
burden.’” United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (alteration adopted)
(quoting United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017)). Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution means “drawing all inferences in the government’s favor
and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Aguiar,
737 F.3d 251, 264 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Moreover,
‘the evidence must be viewed in its totality, as each fact may gain color from others.’”
Landesman, 17 F.4th at 319 (quoting United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98–99 (2d Cir.
2005)). “If the court concludes that either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable
doubt, is fairly possible, the court must let the jury decide the matter.” Id. (alteration adopted)
(quoting United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)).
However, “a conviction based on speculation and surmise alone cannot stand.” United
States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d Cir. 1994). “Impermissible speculation . . . is ‘a
complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached.’” United States v.
Pauling, 924 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653
(1946)). “The jury’s inferences . . . must be reasonable.” Landesman, 17 F.4th at 320. “If the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal
circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 71
(2d Cir. 2008)).
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 15 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

16
Rule 33 Motion for A New Trial
Rule 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment
and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). While the
court has “broad discretion . . . to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a
perceived miscarriage of justice,” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992), “‘that discretion should
be exercised sparingly’ and only in the most extraordinary circumstances,” Landesman, 17 F.4th
at 330 (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414). See also United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353,
364 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Because motions for a new trial are disfavored in this Circuit the standard
for granting such a motion is strict.”). “In considering whether to grant a new trial, a district
court may itself weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, but in doing so, it must be
careful not to usurp the role of the jury.” United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 348–49 (2d
Cir. 2005).
The court should grant a Rule 33 motion only if “letting a guilty verdict stand would be a
manifest injustice,” because of “a real concern that an innocent person may have been
convicted.” Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is
no manifest injustice “unless the judge is prepared to answer ‘no’ to the following question: ‘Am
I satisfied that competent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence in this record supports the jury’s
finding that this defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?’” United States v. Goldstein,
No. 21-CR-550, 2024 WL 556163, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2024) (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at
1414).
Accordingly, “a district court may not grant a Rule 33 motion based on the weight of the
evidence alone unless the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict to such an extent
that it would be ‘manifest injustice’ to let the verdict stand.” United States v. Archer, 977 F.3d
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 16 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

17
181, 188 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414). Under the “preponderates heavily”
standard, “absent a situation in which the evidence was patently incredible or defied physical
realities, or where an evidentiary or instructional error compromised the reliability of the verdict,
a district court must defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence.” Id. (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Motions for Acquittal
The defendants move for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c).13 As explained
below, neither motion is persuasive.
a. 	Ennab’s Rule 29 Motion
Section 841(a)(1) criminalizes both distributing and dispensing controlled
substances. Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 makes it illegal “[e]xcept as authorized,”
“to distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to . . . distribute or dispense, a controlled
substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). “Distribute” means “to deliver (other than by administering
or dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed chemical.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). “Dispense”
means “to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user . . . by, or pursuant to the lawful
order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance and
the packaging, labeling or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for such delivery.”
21 U.S.C. § 802(10). See United States v. Ekinci, 101 F.3d 838, 842 (2d Cir. 1996) (“These
statutory definitions clearly indicate that ‘distribute’ and ‘dispense’ have different meanings
because ‘distribute’ is defined as a delivery other than by dispensing or administering.”).
13 As relevant here, a defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c) “within 14
days after a guilty verdict.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). “If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court
may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal.” Id.
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 17 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

18
While dispense and distribute have different statutory meanings, “there is no significant
difference between dispensation and distribution” in the context of § 841 and § 846. Ekinci, 101
F.3d 838 at 1996. Ennab argues, however, that unlawfully dispensing and unlawfully
distributing oxycodone are mutually exclusive under § 841(a) and on the facts presented at trial.
The essence of his claim is that he could not have had the requisite mental state to participate in
both a distribution and a dispensing conspiracy.14 Ennab says that there are only two options:
either he believed that a practitioner — Dr. Ratanaprasatporn — wrote the prescriptions, making
the appropriate charge unlawfully dispensing, or he believed a non-practitioner — Smith —
wrote the prescriptions, in which case unlawful distribution would be the appropriate charge.
(ECF No. 394 at 17–20.)
As for the first option, Ennab claims that he could not have known that Smith was writing
the prescriptions; at most, he says, he conspired to dispense, because he believed that Dr.
Ratanaprasatporn, a licensed physician, issued the oxycodone prescriptions that he filled, and
gave to Michael Kent. (Id. at 20–22.) Smith and Kent, on the other hand, could have been
engaged only in a distribution conspiracy because they knew that a practitioner did not issue the
prescriptions. (Id. at 22–23.)
To support his claim that he could not have known that Smith wrote the prescriptions,
Ennab cites Smith’s testimony that a pharmacist would not have known from the face of the
prescription that Smith, not Dr. Ratanaprasatporn, issued it. (Tr. 521, 526–27.) He also points
out that there was no direct evidence that he and Smith communicated, and that Smith did not
know the name of the pharmacist at Forest Care. (Tr. 511–14.) In addition, he relies on a
14 Hassan joins in this argument, but does not explain how it applies to him. (ECF No. 399-1 at 5.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 18 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

19
recorded phone call between Kent and Ennab, in which Kent told unindicted co-conspirator John
Sanders not to let Ennab know he was on the line. (GX 127.)
Ennab says that the proof that he knew the prescriptions were bogus and that Kent was
illegally distributing the oxycodone lends “equal, or nearly equal circumstantial support” to
prove a dispensing conspiracy as it does to prove a distribution conspiracy. (ECF No. 423 at 11
(quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008)).) He might have thought
that the people in whose names the prescriptions were issued were addicts to whom Kent
distributed the drugs. (Id. at 11–12.) Ennab concludes that if “the evidence was ‘sufficient to
prove that Ennab was [both] knowingly dispensing and distributing oxycodone,’ then it is not
sufficient to prove either because the two require opposing mental states.” (Id. at 12 (quoting
ECF No. 409 at 43).)
The reasoning goes like this: when Ennab gave Kent the oxycodone, Ennab intended to
deliver oxycodone illegally to the user by a prescription that was issued for an illegitimate
purpose or to deliver oxycodone to a drug dealer who would not give the oxycodone to the
patient for whom it was prescribed. But, according to Ennab, it cannot be both. Because he
could not also have conspired to distribute oxycodone, he argues, the Court should not have
admitted Smith’s and Kent’s statements against him as co-conspirator statements. (ECF No. 394
at 22–24.) He concludes that without those statements, the evidence was not sufficient to convict
him of anything. (Id. at 25.)15 Ennab also argues that he did not conspire with Amin or Elsayed
and that the evidence was not sufficient to prove his criminal intent. (Id. at 19–20.)
15 Ennab also argues that because the government relied on the same conduct to charge Ennab with both
conspiracies, it avoided a double jeopardy issue only by pursuing an “indictment and theory of the case
that made the different conspiracies turn on who the conspirators believed issued the prescriptions.”
(ECF No. 394 at 17.) Ennab did not raise double jeopardy concerns before or during trial. He now
reasons that “[t]he two conspiracy counts are not multiplicitous,” but asserts that “[i]f, however, the
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 19 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

20
The government responds that the evidence established that Ennab conspired to dispense
and distribute oxycodone, that it proved his participation in both conspiracies beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that there is no constitutional impediment to his conviction for those
crimes.
The government agrees that nonpractitioners like Smith and Kent could only personally
distribute oxycodone, because they were not doctors or pharmacists. (ECF No. 409 at 38.) They
could, however, aid and abet pharmacists and doctors in dispensing oxycodone illegally, and
they could also conspire to dispense oxycodone. (Id.) The government maintains that the same
logic applies to Ennab. He could dispense oxycodone himself, but could also aid and abet and
conspire with others, including Smith and Kent, to distribute oxycodone. (Id.)
The government’s theory has consistently been that the conspirators had two objects: to
dispense oxycodone and to distribute it. (Id. at 37.) These objects were related; dispensing the
oxycodone furthered the distribution of oxycodone. (Id. at 38.) Smith and Kent conspired to
distribute oxycodone, and Ennab, according to the government, joined that conspiracy. The
conspirators accomplished their object — distributing oxycodone — by conspiring with
pharmacists who dispensed oxycodone, a conspiracy that Ennab also joined. (Id.) The
government says that it proved Ennab’s knowing participation in the distribution conspiracy in
two ways: first, that he knew that Smith, not Dr. Ratanaprasatporn, issued the prescriptions; and
Government now combats this motion for a judgment of acquittal by arguing facts or theories that
would render the counts multiplicitous, that multiplicity would not have been ‘reasonably available’
before trial and so need not have been raised before trial under Fed R. Crim. P. 12.” (Id. at 17.) “[T]o
survive a double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved
‘distinct’ agreements.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 356 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir.2004)). Ennab’s argument that the conspiracy charges do
not raise a double jeopardy issue only because “the different conspiracies turn[ed] on who the
conspirators believed issued the prescriptions,” (ECF No. 394 at 17), is unconvincing. There was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the two conspiracies involved distinct agreements —
one to distribute oxycodone and one to dispense it.
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 20 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

21
second, that he knew he was not dispensing oxycodone to real patients, and Kent was selling or
otherwise illegally distributing the oxycodone that Ennab dispensed. (Id. at 40.)
Ennab’s claim that he could not be convicted of conspiring to dispense and to distribute
because they are “mutually exclusive” is not persuasive. As far as the Court is aware, there is no
authority for that proposition. The Second Circuit has said that there may not be a significant
difference between distribution and dispensing. See Ekinci, 101 F.3d 838, 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
While the court also observed that “dispense” and “distribute” have different definitions, that
does not mean that Ennab could not both conspire to distribute and conspire to dispense
oxycodone. Indeed, as Ennab concedes — and as the Court instructed the jury — a defendant
can dispense narcotics to further a distribution conspiracy. (See ECF No. 394 at 21.) And as the
government points out, Ennab could both dispense oxycodone and aid and abet Kent’s
distribution of oxycodone. (ECF No. 409 at 38.) Similarly, while Smith and Kent could not
dispense oxycodone as non-practitioners under the statute, they could aid and abet Ennab in
unlawfully dispensing oxycodone.
Nevertheless, Ennab maintains that his conviction cannot stand because there was “no
evidence at all that [he] knew that the prescriptions were actually issued by Ms. Smith.” (ECF
No. 394 at 20.) Even if that is true, there was more than sufficient evidence for a rational jury to
find that Ennab knowingly conspired to distribute oxycodone. Ennab’s dealings with Kent had
none of the signs of a pharmacist-patient relationship, and all of the signs of a narcotics
conspiracy. Ennab had no interaction with the supposed patients at all. He got their
identifications from Kent, who was not a doctor. (GX 1112-1.4.) The identifications showed
that the patients did not live in Staten Island. (Id.) While Kent used bogus Staten Island
addresses, Ennab had access to the identifications, which had Brooklyn addresses. (GX 911; GX
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 21 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

22
1112-1.4.) Each “patient” had the same telephone number — Kent’s. (Tr. 467.) And each
“patient” was prescribed the same dosage — 30 milligrams — and the same number of pills —
120, (GX 911) — a combination that was inconsistent with the guidance that oxycodone should
be prescribed for a short period in the lowest possible dose, and that was characteristic of
diversion.
Equally incriminating were Ennab’s conversations with Kent, for example about
exchanging white oxycodone pills for blue ones because Kent “[couldn’t] do nothing with
those,” (GX 127), and about “moving” patients to other pharmacies (GX 126). When Kent
picked up the prescriptions, he gave Ennab a wad of cash, which Ennab did not bother to count,
and put in his pocket instead of in the pharmacy register. (GX 953.) Ennab also represented that
he counseled certain “patients” about the prescriptions (GX 357), which was impossible, and that
the cost of the oxycodone was charged to their insurance, even though Kent picked up the
prescriptions and paid for them in cash (GX 241; GX 953).
Because there was ample evidence that Ennab conspired to distribute and dispense, his
co-conspirator’s statements were properly introduced against him. But even without the
evidence of Smith’s and Kent’s statements, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the
jury’s conclusion that Ennab was guilty. Accordingly, Ennab’s motion for acquittal is denied.
b. 	Hassan’s Rule 29 Motion
Hassan also argues that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to establish his guilt. The
record refutes that claim.
“A jury’s verdict must be upheld ‘if, crediting every inference that could have been
drawn in the government’s favor and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Hild, 147 F.4th 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 22 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

23
United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021)). “Deference to the jury is especially
important in the context of conspiracy convictions, as a conspiracy by its very nature is a
secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in
court with the precision of a surgeon’s scalpel.” United States v. Guldi, 141 F.4th 435, 444 (2d
Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[A] defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy and his participation in it with criminal
intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d
902, 906–07 (2d Cir. 1993). There was ample evidence — including testimony, documentary
evidence, and recordings — from which a rational jury could conclude that Hassan was an active
participant in the crimes charged, that he knew that pharmacists at his pharmacies were filling
prescriptions illegally, and that he encouraged it. The evidence demonstrated that Hassan was in
contact with Leticia Smith, and that his purpose in contacting her was to facilitate the crimes
charged. At one point while he was the pharmacist at Nile Rx, he told Smith that she had to send
“other medications . . . with the oxycodone 30 milligrams because if it didn’t, it could get red-
flagged.” (Tr. 408.) According to Hassan, a reasonable jury could only have concluded that
Smith spoke to a different Nile Rx pharmacist. (ECF No. 399-1 at 11–12.) But Smith testified
that she spoke to Hassan, who identified himself as the pharmacist at Nile Rx. (Tr. 423; 760.)
Phone records also confirmed that the phone number of the Nile Rx pharmacist Smith saved in
her phone was Hassan’s. (GX 659; GX 3.) Based on this evidence, a rational juror could
conclude that Hassan was the Nile Rx pharmacist who told Smith how to prevent red flags that
could alert authorities to their scheme.
According to Smith, Hassan never verified the prescriptions with Dr. Ratanaprasatporn.
(Tr. 408.) He set up fake insurance profiles to obscure that his pharmacies were filling
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 23 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

24
oxycodone prescriptions for which Kent paid cash (Tr. 1273–74), and discussed the need to
“shift[]” Smith’s oxycodone prescriptions “to other stores” in text messages (Tr. 1489; GX 1103-
2.36). While Hassan informed members of a group chat that he had “discontinued all of Dr.
Somsris [sic] patients in both Nile Rx and Nile Ridge” and urged them to “be diligent in doing
PMP checks and id verifications” for patients with prescriptions from her office (GX 617), a
rational jury could justifiably conclude that he was simply creating a front, especially since his
pharmacies continued to fill these prescriptions. (See GX 241.)
In addition, the jury knew from Amin that Hassan knew Kent (Tr. 1252–53), and that
Amin and Hassan split the cash with which Kent paid for the prescriptions (Tr. 1260). The
government also introduced a note Kent left for Hassan at Downtown Rx with his phone number
and “Michael . . . for Ms. Smith,” which a reasonable jury could conclude proved that Hassan
knew that Smith and Kent were working together. (Tr. 1468; GX 1103-2.14.) Viewing all of
this evidence together, the jurors could conclude that Hassan knew that his pharmacies were
illegally dispensing oxycodone. Accordingly, his motion for acquittal is denied.
* 	* 	*
The Court has “examine[d] the entire case, take[n] into account all facts and
circumstances, and [made] an objective evaluation.” United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251,
264 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution,” “deferring to the jury’s assessment of the witnesses’
credibility,” and considering the evidence “in its totality, not in isolation,” the Court finds that
the defendants have not sustained the “heavy burden” required for relief under Rule 29.
Id. (citations omitted).
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 24 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

25
Motion for a New Trial
The defendants also move for a new trial under Rule 33. The court has “broad discretion
. . . to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice,”
but that discretion should be exercised “sparingly and in the most extraordinary circumstances.”
Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133–34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendants’
arguments provide no basis for this extraordinary relief.
a. 	Ennab’s Rule 33 Motion
Ennab asserts that he was not in the same conspiracy as Amin and Elsayed, so Amin and
Elsayed’s statements should not have been admitted against him as co-conspirator statements.
He also argues that the government knowingly elicited false testimony from Amin and
improperly used evidence to create “false impressions” and draw “specious inferences.”
i. 	Hearsay / Nature and Scope of the Conspiracy
As explained above, a statement is not hearsay if it is “offered against an opposing party
and . . . was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). “Pursuant to that rule, a district court may admit an out-of-court
declaration that would otherwise be hearsay if it finds ‘by a preponderance of the evidence (a)
that there was a conspiracy, (b) that its members included the declarant and the party against
whom the statement is offered, and (c) that the statement was made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 246 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 161 (2d Cir. 2011)).
According to the government, the conspiracy in this case was a hub and spoke
conspiracy. (ECF No. 409 at 57–58.) “In a hub-and-spoke (or ‘wheel’) conspiracy, one person
typically acts as a central point while others act as ‘spokes’ by virtue of their agreement with the
central actor.” United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). “The key
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 25 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

26
question in determining ‘whether the spoke participants may be found to be members along with
the core conspirators depends on whether or not the ‘spokes’ knew or had reason to know of the
existence, but not necessarily the identity, of one or more of the other spoke participants.’”
United States v. McMahon, No. 21-CR-265, 2024 WL 896838, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2024)
(quoting United States v. Pauling, 256 F. Supp. 3d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)).
When a conspiracy includes members who are unknown to each other, “it is permissible
for the jury to find that there was a single conspiracy so long as a reasonable juror could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the scope of the criminal enterprise proven fits the
pattern of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and (2) that the defendant participated
in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent.” United States v.
Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 47–48 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“To prove a single conspiracy in such a situation, the Government must show that there was a
‘rim’ around the spokes, such that the ‘spokes’ became coconspirators with each other.”
Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 554. “In the absence of such a ‘rim,’ the spokes are acting
independently with the hub; while there may in fact be multiple separate conspiracies, there
cannot be a single conspiracy.” Id.
Here, there was sufficient evidence of the existence of conspiracies to dispense and
distribute oxycodone and Ennab’s knowing participation in those conspiracies. At trial, pursuant
to the Geaney protocol, the Court found that the government established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Ennab was a member of an overarching narcotics conspiracy that included at
least Smith, Kent, Hassan, Amin, El Sayed, and Saleh. (Tr. 1631–32.) Using the hub and spoke
analogy, the Court explained that one way to conceptualize the conspiracy was that “[t]he hub
can be described as Kent and Smith . . . [and] that the Hassan pharmacies are one spoke and
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 26 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

27
Hassan is the rim around that, around that particular conspiracy.” (Tr. 1631.) Rather than
“acting independently with the hub,” Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. at 554, each of Hassan’s pharmacies
and the men who ran them were acting with the common goal of illegally dispensing and
distributing oxycodone.16
As detailed above and as the Court concluded at trial, there was “substantial evidence,”
including video surveillance footage, wiretapped phone calls, and text messages, that Ennab and
Kent conspired to dispense and distribute oxycodone illegally. (Tr. 1632.) There was also
sufficient evidence that Ennab and Hassan were members of the same conspiracies. Smith
testified that she sent prescriptions to Forest Care at Kent’s suggestion, and that Kent informed
her that according to Hassan, Ennab would fill the prescriptions. (Tr. 457.)
The evidence also established that Amin and Elsayed were members of these
conspiracies. Elsayed and Amin spoke with Kent by phone about oxycodone prescriptions from
Linden Medical. (GX 118; GX 119.) Video evidence showed that Kent picked up those
prescriptions from Amin and Elsayed’s pharmacies. (GX 951; GX 952.) Hassan texted Elsayed,
“Omar I spoke to Mike . . . He will send u four new patients.” (GX 1103-2.30.) One minute
earlier, Kent called Ennab for the first time. (GX 924.) Kent told Smith to send prescriptions to
Forest Care at Hassan’s direction. (Tr. 457.) And Hassan had ownership interests in Ennab’s,
Amin’s, and Elsayed’s pharmacies. (GX 261.) Hassan’s involvement — and his connections to
16 The government argues that the conspirators had the common purpose of “making money for Hassan’s
network of pharmacies.” (ECF No. 409 at 59.) Ennab takes issue with this because “Mr. Ennab didn’t
seek to make money for any pharmacy other than his own: Forest.” (ECF No. 424 at 6.) Ennab says
that this is sufficient to show that he was not in a conspiracy with Amin or Elsayed. (Id.) Even if
Ennab’s primary concern was to enrich himself, however, that does not mean he was not part of the
conspiracy. As the Second Circuit has explained, “the participants’ goals need not be congruent for a
single conspiracy to exist, so long as their goals are not at ‘cross purposes.’” United States v. Beech-
Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1192 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Heinemann, 801
F.2d 86, 92 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 27 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

28
Amin, Elsayed, and Ennab — is “evidence of ‘interrelationship and interdependency.’”
McMahon, 2024 WL 896838, at *18 (quoting United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871
F.2d 1181, 1191) (2d Cir. 1989)).
There was also evidence that Ennab and Kent discussed shifting oxycodone prescriptions
out of Forest Care to other pharmacies. (See GX 125-A.) Citing Blumenthal v. United States,
332 U.S. 539 (1947), and United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), the government
argues that this discussion established Ennab’s knowledge that “Kent was handling a larger
quantity of oxycodone prescriptions than what Ennab could or would fill,” which is sufficient to
prove that Ennab “had reason to know of other spoke participants, even if he did not know their
identity.” (ECF No. 409 at 59.)
In Blumenthal, the government alleged that the defendants conspired to sell two carloads
of whiskey at prices above a ceiling set by the government. 332 U.S. at 542. The defendants
each purchased the whiskey from a single supplier and sold it to others. Id. at 558. The Supreme
Court concluded that this evidence established a single conspiracy: “True, each salesman aided
in selling only his part. But he knew the lot to be sold was larger and thus that he was aiding in a
larger plan.” Id. at 559.
The defendants in Barnes were charged with conspiracy to violate narcotics laws by
possessing and distributing heroin and cocaine. 604 F.2d at 131. The evidence showed that the
criminal organization was “loosely knit,” but that “several aspects of its operations serve[d] to
define a core group of wholesalers and retailers.” Id. at 155. For example, the government
proved that the criminal organization’s operations centered in two car garages that also stored
cars the defendants used, which were registered to the same companies. Id. The Second Circuit
found that “retailers whose existence is actually unknown to each other can be held to have
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 28 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

29
agreed in a single conspiracy if each knew or [h]ad reason to know that other retailers were
involved in a broad project for the importation, distribution, and retail sale of narcotics and had
reason to believe that their own benefits derived from the operation were probably dependent
upon the success of the entire venture.” Id.
Here, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Ennab knew that he was “aiding in a
larger plan” with Hassan’s other pharmacies. Ennab asked Kent to move oxycodone
prescriptions out of Forest Care, which demonstrates his knowledge that other pharmacies would
be filling the bogus prescriptions. That is corroborated by Smith’s testimony that according to
Kent, Hassan and Ennab discussed starting to send prescriptions from Linden Medical to Forest
Care. (Tr. 457.) In sum, the evidence at trial established that Ennab was part of the same
conspiracies to distribute and dispense oxycodone as Smith, Kent, Hassan, Amin, and Elsayed.
Accordingly, Amin and Elsayed’s statements were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
ii. 	Amin’s Testimony
On direct examination, Amin testified that “[a]t one point there were at least five or six
individuals, their prescriptions were not coming to Prospect Care. So when I asked Michael
Kent what’s going on with those guys, he told me that he was supposed to pick it up at Staten
Island or Atlantic Avenue pharmacies.” (Tr. 1238.) Amin also testified that Kent told him that
“Mo, referring to Mohamed Hassan, . . . directed him to go to these locations.” (Tr. 1239.)
Ennab argues that this testimony created the false impression that Ennab was “working in
tandem with Amin at Prospect and Elsayed at Downtown to hide oxycodone distribution and
dispensing conspiracies.” (ECF No. 395 at 14.)
Citing a spreadsheet of Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s controlled substance prescriptions
(GX 241), Ennab argues that Amin’s testimony was false because Prospect Care, Downtown Rx,
and Forest Care did not share any patients in common, and no patients had been shifted from
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 29 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

30
Prospect Care to Downtown Rx or Forest Care. (ECF No. 395 at 14–15.) Ennab also says that
Amin must have been lying because “none of Prospect’s Ratanaprasatporn patients moved away
in August or September of 2022,” making it “unlikely that Amin ever asked Kent about ‘five or
six patients’ that had stopped coming to Prospect.” (ECF No. 395 at 15 (emphasis in original).)
He also maintains that the government should have known the testimony was false. (ECF
No. 395 at 18.)
The government responds that there is no evidence that Amin’s statement was false, and
thus no evidence that the government knew it was false. (ECF No. 409 at 48.) The government
argues in any event that Amin’s testimony was immaterial because other evidence at trial
“powerfully corroborated” that Kent, Hassan, Amin, and Ennab were part of the “same scheme.”
(ECF No. 409 at 51.)
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Amin was lying when he testified that Kent
told him that Hassan was shifting oxycodone patients to Staten Island and Atlantic Avenue
pharmacies. The fact that the prescriptions were not ultimately moved to Downtown Rx or
Forest Care does not mean that Kent did not tell Amin that Hassan was planning to move them
there. As discussed above, some of the pharmacists, including Hassan, Elsayed, and Ennab,
expressed concern about filling too many oxycodone prescriptions at one pharmacy. The jury
had the opportunity to review the evidence that Ennab cites — that “from April 2022 to October
2022, there was no Ratanaprasatporn patient at Prospect who stopped having prescriptions filled
at Prospect” (ECF No. 424 at 17 (citing GX 241)) — and to consider Amin’s testimony in light
of that evidence. See United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 476 (2d Cir. 2009) (“It is the
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to assess the credibility of those witnesses who
testify.”); id. (“In short, where the resolution of the Rule 33 motion ‘depend[s] on assessment of
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 30 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

31
the credibility of the witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict
and granting a new trial.’” (quoting Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir.
1992), abrogated on other grounds as noted in Yung v. Lee, 432 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 2005))).
Further, “[e]ven where courts in this Circuit have clearly identified perjured testimony,
they have refused to grant a new trial unless the court could find that the jury ‘probably would
have acquitted in the absence of the false testimony.’” McCourty, 562 F.3d at 476 (quoting
United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir.1992)). “Where, however, the
prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury prior to the conclusion of the trial, the
conviction must be set aside where there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Scott, No. 17-CR-630, 2023 WL
6064329, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2023), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Greenwood, No. 23-
7199, 2025 WL 354692 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. United States, No.
25-90, 2025 WL 2824179 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As explained above, the record does not establish that Amin lied, but even if it did, Rule
33 relief would only be justified if the jury “probably would have acquitted” Ennab absent the
testimony. Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413–14. Ennab has not made this showing. There was
sufficient other evidence, including video surveillance footage and recorded phone calls, for the
jury to convict Ennab. As a result, he is not entitled to a new trial.
b. 	Hassan Rule 33
Hassan makes three arguments in support of his Rule 33 motion.17 First, he argues that
the Court should not have admitted Rule 404(b) evidence against him because it was “too
17 Hassan also argues that “the actual evidence showing Mr. Hassan’s knowledge fell too short for
purposes of Rule 33 and should warrant a new trial where he can be judged based on reliable evidence
and not speculation.” (ECF No. 399-2 at 11.) For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 31 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

32
confusing for a jury.” (ECF No. 399-2 at 30.) Second, he contends that the Court should not
have given a conscious avoidance instruction. (Id. at 39.) Finally, he asserts that the government
purposely elicited false and improper testimony from Amin, and mischaracterized Amin’s
testimony in summation. (Id. at 43–45.)
i. 	Rule 404(b) Evidence
Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act” is not admissible to
show a defendant’s character but “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), (2). The Second Circuit follows the “inclusionary” approach
to 404(b), admitting other acts evidence unless it is “introduced for the sole purpose of showing
the defendant’s bad character, . . . [is] overly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403[,] or not
relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402.” United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
Hassan argues that the Court should have excluded evidence of his “optimization
practices” — his instruction that Smith and others issue prescriptions for profitable prescriptions
that were reimbursable by insurance. (ECF No. 399-2 at 30.) Smith testified that Hassan asked
her to send high-cost medications to Downtown Rx with the oxycodone prescriptions (Tr. 756),
and that he made similar requests when he was the pharmacist at Nile Rx (Tr. 408). Amin
testified that Hassan suggested asking Kent to bring in prescriptions for medication and medical
equipment that are “highly reimbursable.” (Tr. 1265.) The government also introduced text
messages in which Hassan instructed Elsayed to tell a patient to switch to Downtown Rx, and
that he would not dispense “a single tablet of oxycodone” without accompanying high-cost
medications. (Tr. 1460; GX 1103-2.12.) Hassan also discussed high-cost medications in the
there was sufficient evidence to prove Hassan’s knowledge and declines to grant his Rule 33 motion on
this basis.
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 32 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

33
Pharmacist United group chat, writing “[i]t’s frustrating when I get a call that a store is not
making any money and I check the system and I find that no profitable scripts are being sought
out.” (GX 1103-7.5.)
The Court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury under 404(b):
[Y]ou may consider evidence of Mr. Hassan’s uncharged conduct
only for the limited purposes that I’m going to describe for you
now.
First, as evidence explaining the background and nature of the
relationship between Mr. Hassan and others with whom he is
charged with carrying out the charged crimes and the formation
and development of the relationship between and among them.
You may consider this evidence as evidence of the development of
relationships of mutual trust between Mr. Hassan and others with
whom he is charged with carrying out the charged crimes.
You may consider this evidence as evidence of conduct that is
inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged crimes. You
may consider it as evidence enabling you to understand the
narrative of the charged crimes. And you may consider the
evidence as corroborating the testimony of other witnesses.
You may not consider evidence of Mr. Hassan’s
uncharged conduct for any other purpose other than those
that I have just described and you may not consider evidence
of Mr. Hassan’s uncharged conduct against Mr. Ennab for any
reason or in any way.
(Tr. 2209–10.)
Hassan’s complaints are unconvincing. The optimization evidence explained the
background and nature of the relationship between Hassan, Smith, Amin, and Elsayed, evidence
that is admissible under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1119 (2d Cir.
1992). The evidence was also inextricably intertwined with evidence of the crimes with which
Hassan was charged and completed the narrative of the case. Again, this was proper. See United
States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994). Finally, despite Hassan’s arguments to the
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 33 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

34
contrary, the Second Circuit has held that such evidence “has been consistently held admissible
to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.” United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660 (2d
Cir.1987); see also United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that
evidence of other acts may be admissible under Rule 404(b) “even if the trial court finds that
such evidence is relevant only for corroboration purposes, provided that the corroboration is
direct and the matter corroborated is significant”); United States v. Cadet, 664 F.3d 27, 32 (2d
Cir. 2011) (listing “corroboration of witnesses” as one of the acceptable “non-propensity
purposes” for admitting other act evidence under Rule 404(b)); Carroll v. Trump, 124 F.4th 140,
169 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Evidence of a pattern may also be relevant for the non-propensity purpose
of corroborating witness testimony.”). Accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted.
ii. 	Conscious Avoidance Instruction
“A conscious avoidance instruction is properly given ‘(i) when a defendant asserts the
lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction, and (ii) the appropriate
factual predicate for the charge exists, i.e., the evidence is such that a rational juror may reach
the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of
the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.’” United States v. Ramirez, 320
F. App’x 7, 10–11 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Aina–Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170
(2d Cir.2003)).
Hassan argues that a conscious avoidance instruction may have been appropriate for
Ennab, who personally filled prescriptions for Kent, but that the Court should not have given one
for Hassan because there was no evidence that he filled prescriptions himself, interacted with
Kent or Smith about any prescriptions other than those issued for a single patient, or that he
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 34 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

35
knew Smith was issuing prescriptions without Dr. Ratanaprasatporn’s knowledge or
authorization. (ECF No. 399-2 at 41.)18 The record demonstrates otherwise.
In fact, there was ample evidence that Hassan knew that his pharmacies were diverting
oxycodone, and even if he did not know, that he consciously avoided knowing. Kent left him a
note at Downtown Rx with his phone number and the message “for Ms. Smith.” (GX 1103-
2.14.) Hassan texted with Elsayed and others that Kent would be “send[ing] u four new
patients,” (GX 1103-2.30), and about Smith’s instructions not to send prior authorizations to
Linden Medical “so Md doesn’t say anything” (GX 1103-2.21). Hassan also discussed in text
messages limiting the number of patients with Linden Medical prescriptions and shifting them to
other stores. (See GX 1103-3.10; GX 1103-2.36.) Hassan was clearly aware of issues with
Linden Medical as early as February 2020, but allowed his pharmacies to continue filling their
prescriptions. (See GX 617; GX 241.) Therefore, the conscious avoidance instruction was not
erroneous.
In any event, even if there were an error — and there was not — it was harmless because
of the compelling evidence, discussed above, that Hassan actually knew what was going on.
“[A]n unwarranted conscious avoidance instruction is harmless error where there is
‘overwhelming evidence’ of actual knowledge.” Aina–Marshall, 336 F.3d at 171 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2000)).
18 At trial, Hassan objected to the conscious avoidance instruction because “[t]he government has argued
that Mr. Hassan had actual knowledge of the charged crimes and was a willing participant. There is no
reasonable view of the evidence presented by the government of Mr. Hassan consciously avoiding
anything.” (ECF No. 347 at 2.) Citing United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 542 (2d Cir. 1995), the
Court included the instruction over Hassan’s objection, reasoning that “[e]ven if the Government's
theory is that the defendant had actual knowledge, the Government is also permitted to claim in the
alternative that if [the] defendant did not have that knowledge, it was only because he deliberately
avoided it.” (Tr. 1855.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 35 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

36
iii. 	Amin’s Testimony
Like Ennab, Hassan claims that Amin was lying when he testified that Kent told him that
Hassan directed that prescriptions be moved from Prospect Care to pharmacies on Staten Island
or Atlantic Avenue. (ECF No. 399-2 at 25–26, 43.) As explained above, the record does not
establish that Amin was lying, and even if he was, Hassan has not shown that the jury “probably
would have acquitted” him if the testimony had not come in. Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413–14.
Hassan also objects to the testimony Amin gave on re-direct examination:
Q 	As you sit here today, based on all your interactions with him, are you absolutely
clear that Mohamed Hassan agreed with you to sell oxycodone to Kent?
A 	Yes.
Q 	Do you have any doubt about that whatsoever?
A 	No.
Q 	Are you absolutely clear based on all your interactions with him that Mohamed
Hassan had Kent work with others in Mr. Hassan’s pharmacies?
A 	I have no doubt.
Q 	Are you absolutely clear based on all of your interactions with him, that
Mohamed Hassan had Kent bring prescriptions to Staten Island?
A 	Yes.
Q 	Do you have any doubt about that whatsoever?
A 	No.
(Tr. 1397.)19
19 Hassan did not object to this line of questioning during Amin’s testimony. Before Amin testified,
Hassan filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude testimony about Amin’s opinions or impressions of
Hassan’s knowledge. (See ECF No. 337.)
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 36 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

37
Hassan now argues that the government “asked [Amin] to give an opinion that was not
helpful for the jury in part because it necessarily called for some degree of legal opinion.” (ECF
No. 399-2 at 43 (emphasis in original).)
As an initial matter, the government’s questions were appropriately responsive to
counsel’s questions on cross examination:
Q 	And Mr. Hassan’s — the conversations you had with Mr. Hassan wherein you say
he agreed with you to distribute oxycodone with Michael Kent and Leticia Smith,
those conversations, the only thing we have regarding those conversations is you
saying they happened, correct?
. . .
A 	Can you repeat that question?
Q 	Other than you saying that you agreed with Mohamed Hassan to distribute
oxycodone with Michael Kent and Leticia Smith, you’re not aware of any other
evidence of that occurring, correct?
A 	I don’t know.
(Tr. 1391.)
The government’s examination on redirect was a proper response to these questions.
Nor is relief required on any other basis. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay
witnesses are permitted to give opinion testimony as long as it is “(a) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Rule 704 further provides that
“[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue,” except that “[i]n a
criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did
not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a
defense.” Fed. R. Evid. 704. Accordingly, “the fact that a lay witness’s opinion testimony might
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 37 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

38
go to an ultimate issue in this case does not, by itself, mean that it must be precluded.” United
States v. Awadallah, 401 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2006). “[T]here are two express preconditions to its admissibility: first, the opinion evidence
may be allowed only if the court finds that the opinion is ‘rationally based on’ the witness’s own
perceptions; and second, it is to be allowed only if the court concludes that it will be ‘helpful’ to
a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” United
States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir. 1992).
Hassan does not argue that Amin lacked firsthand knowledge about Hassan’s role.
Indeed, Amin testified that he and Hassan split the cash that Kent gave them for the oxycodone
prescriptions and discussed having Kent bring in prescriptions for highly reimbursable
medications in addition to oxycodone, that Hassan showed Amin how to create fake insurance
profiles for Kent’s patients, and that he saw Hassan and Kent interact at Prospect Care. (Tr.
1252–53, 1260, 1265, 1273–74.) This was sufficient to satisfy the first requirement of Rule 701.
See Rea, 958 F.2d at 1216 (“There are a number of objective factual bases from which it is
possible to infer with some confidence that a person knows a given fact. These include what the
person was told directly, what he was in a position to see or hear, what statements he himself
made to others, conduct in which he engaged, and what his background and experience were.”).
Hassan claims that the testimony was “not helpful for the jury in part because it
necessarily called for some degree of legal opinion.” (ECF No. 399-2 at 43 (emphasis in
original).) “[W]hen a witness has fully described what a defendant was in a position to observe,
what the defendant was told, and what the defendant said or did, the witness’s opinion as to the
defendant’s knowledge will often not be ‘helpful’ within the meaning of Rule 701 because the
jury will be in as good a position as the witness to draw the inference as to whether or not the
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 38 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

39
defendant knew.” Rea, 958 F.2d at 1216. It is true, of course, that the jurors could assess the
evidence that formed the basis of Amin’s opinion testimony and decide for themselves whether
Hassan had agreed to distribute oxycodone with Kent.
“[P]ermitting a witness to give opinion testimony that is not helpful to the jury, is not an
error of constitutional magnitude.” Rea, 958 F.2d at 1220. Any error is harmless if the court
“can conclude that that testimony was ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’” Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500
U.S. 391, 392 (1991)). As explained above, there was a wealth of evidence to support the jury’s
conclusion that Hassan knowingly joined the conspiracy. Accordingly, even if Amin’s brief
testimony was error, it was harmless.
Finally, Hassan argues that the government mischaracterized Amin’s testimony during its
summation, and “used this misstatement to argue that Mr. Hassan had personal knowledge that
Kent was working with Smith to dispense illegal oxycodone that Kent was working with Smith
to dispense illegal oxycodone years before the wiretaps.” (ECF No. 399-2 at 45.) Hassan
challenges the government’s remark to the jury that “Amin told you that he saw Kent bring cash
for oxy at Nile RX.” (Tr. 1913.) Hassan seems to misread the government’s argument to be that
Hassan saw Kent bring the cash to the pharmacy. Since Hassan registered no objection to the
comment when it was made, there was no opportunity for the government to respond to his
current argument. Nevertheless, the far more logical reading is that the government was saying
that Amin saw Kent pay for prescriptions in cash. After all, that is what Amin said in his
testimony. (See Tr. 1244.) Moreover, there was abundant evidence that Hassan — who was the
owner and supervising pharmacist of Nile RX and interacted with Kent — knew that his
pharmacies were filling oxycodone prescriptions illegally, and actively encouraged it. See
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 39 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>

40
United States v. Dohou, 382 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The arguments raised in closing
referred to the testimony that was presented, and asked the jury to draw reasonable inferences
from the proffered evidence. Accordingly, the Government’s closing argument was proper.”).
In sum, none of Hassan’s arguments for a new trial are persuasive. Accordingly, his
motion for a new trial is denied.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial
are denied.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 15, 2025
s/Ann M. Donnelly
Case 1:22-cr-00464-AMD-JRC Document 471 Filed 12/15/25 Page 40 of 40 PageID
#: <pageID>