Mastellos et al v. Devlieg-Bullard, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------X
IGNATIOS MASTELLOS and ERATO
MASTELLOS,
Plaintiffs, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
-against- 17-cv-415-MKB-ST
DEVLIEG-BULLARD, INC.,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------------X
TISCIONE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Ignatios Mastellos (“Ignatios”)1 and Erato Mastellos (“Erato”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
sued Devlieg-Bullard, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Devlieg-Bullard”) for breach of implied warranties,
negligence, and loss of consortium. See FAC, ECF No. 117. Before this Court is Plaintiffs’ motion
for default judgment against Defendant (the “Motion”). For the reasons discussed below, this
Court respectfully recommends that the District Court GRANT the Motion.
BACKGROUND2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1979, Powermatic-Houdaille, Inc. manufactured the Powermatic Table Saw, Model 66.3
Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. In 1986, Powermatic-Houdaille was sold to Stanwich Industries, which changed its
name to Devlieg-Bullard in 1989. Id. ¶ 6. The sale agreement between Powermatic-Houdaille and
Stanwich Industries provided that Powermatic-Houdaille “shall not have any liability for any
1 The Fifth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) uses two different spellings for Plaintiff’s first name. Compare, e.g., FAC
¶ 11 (spelling “Ignatios”) with ¶ 13 (spelling “Ignantios”). This Court will use the former spelling, as that is how
Plaintiff’s name appears in the FAC’s case caption.
2 This Court takes the following facts from the FAC, and assumes that the well-pleaded factual allegations, except
those concerning damages, are true. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 83 n.6, 84 (2d Cir. 2009).
3 While possibly a typo, the FAC alleges two different serial numbers for this product: 7956706 and 7966706.
Compare, e.g., FAC ¶ 1 with ¶ 5.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
claims made subsequent to the date of the Closing in 1986.” Id. ¶ 8. The sale agreement further
provided that:
Effective as of the beginning of the day immediately following the Closing, the
Purchaser shall be responsible and liable for all workers’ compensation claims,
general liability (including, without limitation, product liability) claims and
automobile liability claims of the Corporations on a claims made basis (irrespective
of whether the incident giving rise to the claim occurred prior or through the
Closing) and any and all deductibles with respect thereto. Neither Houdaille nor
any Predecessor shall be liable for all claims or liabilities referred to in this Section
6.02(b).
Id. In 1999, Devlieg-Bullard filed for bankruptcy. Id. ¶ 9.
On October 16, 2013, while working as a carpenter, Ignatios was using the Powermatic
Table Saw when the saw “kicked-back.” Id. ¶ 11. Ignatios’s left hand moved into the saw’s moving
blade, “causing the amputation” of three of Ignatios’s fingers. Id. At the time of the accident, the
saw had no blade guard. Id. Ignatios’s spouse, Erato, alleges to have been deprived of Ignatios’s
“society, services, and consortium” following the accident. See id. ¶ 48.
Plaintiffs argue, based on a successor liability theory, that Defendant is liable for the
injuries arising from Ignatios’s incident with the Powermatic Table Saw. See id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs
specifically assert that while Defendant “may not have been the original designer and/or
manufacturer of the subject product,” Defendant is nevertheless liable through its “acquisition of
company, Powermatic, its products, assets, liabilities, etc., and/or as Powermatic’s successor.” Id.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs have been litigating this case for nearly a decade. On April 7, 2016, Plaintiffs
sued “Powermatic” in New York state court for claims arising from Ignatios’s injuries. See Notice
of Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. In response, company JPW Industries, Inc. (“JPW”)—which had
purchased Devlieg-Bullard’s Powermatic assets following Devlieg-Bullard’s bankruptcy—
declared itself the properly named defendant and, on January 25, 2017, removed the action to
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id., ECF No. 1; see Mem. & Order at 3, ECF No.
114.
On August 14, 2017, despite JPW’s appearance in the lawsuit, Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint against “Powermatic.” See Am. Compl., ECF No. 19. The amended complaint also
named Devlieg-Bullard as a defendant. See id.
On November 6, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, substituting JPW for
Powermatic. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 23. JPW moved to dismiss the second amended
complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of Civil Procedure, which the Court granted. See Docket
Order, December 12, 2018. On February 25, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a third
amended complaint, which Plaintiffs had previously filed on January 14, 2019 for the Court’s
consideration. See Docket Order, dated February 15, 2019; Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 43.
While JPW moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, see ECF Nos. 52–55, Devlieg-
Bullard failed to answer the third amended complaint or otherwise appear in the action. See Entry
of Default, ECF No. 58. Accordingly, upon Plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk of Court entered a default
against Devlieg-Bullard on September 30, 2019. See id. Plaintiffs then moved for default
judgment against Devlieg-Bullard. See Mot. Default J., ECF No. 59. Thereafter, the Court granted
JPW’s motion to dismiss three counts contained in the third amended complaint and permitted
Plaintiffs to file a fourth amended complaint. See Minute Entry, dated March 13, 2020.
On March 31, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the fourth amended complaint against both JPW and
Devlieg-Bullard, which JPW answered on April 14, 2020. See Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 61;
Answer, ECF No. 62. On September 4, 2020, the Court issued an order deferring the ruling on
Plaintiffs’ outstanding motion for default judgment against Devlieg-Bullard until Plaintiffs and
JPW had filed all dispositive motions. See Docket Order, dated September 4, 2020. The litigation
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
continued and on February 6, 2023, JPW moved for summary judgment. See Mot. Summary J.,
ECF No. 101. In a Memorandum & Order dated September 9, 2023, the Court granted JPW’s
summary judgment motion and dismissed all claims against JPW. See generally Mem. & Order.
On December 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint—the FAC—against
Devlieg-Bullard. See generally FAC. Defendant failed to answer the FAC or otherwise appear in
the action. See Entry of Default, ECF No. 124. Upon Plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk of Court entered
a default against Defendant. See id. Plaintiffs then moved for default judgment against Defendant
on November 5, 2024. See Mot., ECF No. 126. On April 9, 2025, this Court filed a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that the Honorable Margo K. Brodie deny that motion for
default judgment for noncompliance with Local rules 55.2 and 7.1. That Report and
Recommendation was adopted on July 14, 2025. On July 2, 2025, Plaintiffs renewed their motion
for default judgment against Defendant.
LEGAL STANDARD
Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. Step one is to
obtain an entry of default from the Clerk of Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). Step two is
to seek default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain
or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” the clerk must, “on the plaintiff’s request, with
an affidavit showing the amount due . . . enter judgment for that amount and costs against a
defendant . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). “In all other cases,” a party must move for a default
judgment before the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
When a plaintiff moves for default judgment, the court must accept the complaint’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as true. Finkel, 577 F.3d at 83 n.6, 84; see City of New York v. Mickalis
Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“a defendant who defaults thereby admits all
‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). From there, the court must
determine whether the facts alleged establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law. Mickalis
Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 137. After all, “liability does not automatically attach from the well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint, as it remains the court’s responsibility to ensure that the
factual allegations, accepted as true, provide a proper basis for liability and relief.” Rolls-Royce
PLC v. Rolls-Royce USA, Inc., 688 F.Supp.2d 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
After determining that a defaulting party is liable, the court decides whether, and how
much, to award in damages. See Finkel, 577 F.3d at 83 n.6 (“a default is not an admission of
damages”). The court must “conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with
reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.
1999). To show entitlement to damages, the movant must show that the “compensation sought
relates to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pleaded.” Morales v. B&M Gen.
Renovation Inc., 14-cv-7290 (MKB) (MDG), 2016 WL 1266624, at *2 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 9, 2016)
(citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1258482 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2016). The court can decide whether, and how much, to award in damages without an evidentiary
hearing if “sufficiently detailed affidavits and documentary evidence” support the request for
damages. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. LX Food Grocery Inc., 15-cv-6505 (NGG), 2016 WL
6905946, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016).
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
JURISDICTION & VENUE
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Before granting a default judgment motion, “a court must first determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Creek B LLC, 20-cv-
150, 2021 WL 4427016, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021). Here, this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction because there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
II. Personal Jurisdiction
Before granting a motion for default judgment, a court may assure itself that it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d
207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiffs are residents of the State of New York. SAC at ¶ 13.
Defendant Devlieg-Bullard, Inc. is a domestic corporation incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Ohio and conducts business with the state of New York. Id. at ¶ 15-
16. As such, this court has jurisdiction over Defendant. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d
619, 622 n. 1, 627 (2d Cir. 2016).
DISCUSSION
I. LIABILITY
Plaintiffs advance three causes of action against Defendant in their FAC: (1) for
Defendant’s breach of implied warranty; (2) for Defendant’s negligence; and (3) for a loss of
consortium claim on behalf of Plaintiff Ignatios’ spouse, Erato, co-plaintiff in this case. For the
reasons discussed below, this Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to establish liability on
all three claims.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
A. Successor Liability
Issues regarding liability arise here as Defendant was not the original designer,
manufacturer, or distributor of the saw in which this case is predicated. FAC at ¶6. That saw was
manufactured in 1979 by Powermatic-Houdaille, Inc., which was later sold to Defendant in 1986.4
Id. So, in order to impose liability on Defendant for their three causes of action, Plaintiff advances
a theory of successor liability.
"Under both New York law and traditional common law, a corporation that purchases the
assets of another corporation is generally not liable for the seller's liabilities," including contracts.
Byrd v. Republic of Honduras, 613 F. App'x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting New York v. Nat'l Serv.
Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also NY State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy
Corp., 766 F.3d 212, 227- 28 (2d Cir. 2014) ("When a corporation purchases the assets of another
corporation, it does not acquire its liabilities . . . . " (citing Nat'l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d at 209)).
However, "a buyer of a corporation's assets will be liable as its successor" if "(1) it
expressly or impliedly assumed the predecessor's tort liability, (2) there was a consolidation or
merger of seller and purchaser, (3) the purchasing corporation was a mere continuation of the
selling corporation, or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape such obligations."
Nat'l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d at 209; see also Byrd, 613 F. App'x at 33-34 (quoting Nat'l Serv. Indus.,
460 F.3d at 209); FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d at 227- 28 (quoting same).
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs only argue a theory of successor liability under the first
factor- that Defendant expressly assumed its predecessor’s (Powermatic-Houdaille, Inc.)
liabilities. The purchase agreement between Defendant and Powermatic-Houdaille support
Plaintiff’s argument as it provides that Powermatic-Houdaille “shall not have any liability for any
4 In 1986, Powermatic-Houdaille, Inc. was originally sold to Stanwich Industries, who later changed its name to
Devlieg-Bullard, the current Defendant. FAC at ¶6.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
claims made subsequent to the date of the Closing in 1986.” FAC at ¶ 8. Paragraph 6.02(b) of the
agreement further provides that:
Effective as of the beginning of the day immediately following the Closing, the
Purchaser shall be responsible and liable for all workers’ compensation claims,
general liability (including, without limitation, product liability) claims and
automobile liability claims of the Corporations on a claims made basis
(irrespective of whether the incident giving rise to the claim occurred prior or
through the Closing) and any and all deductibles with respect thereto. Neither
Houdaille nor any Predecessor shall be liable for all claims or liabilities referred to
in this Section 6.02(b).
Id. Therefore, since per the agreement, Defendant did expressly assume Power-Houdaille’s tort
liabilities, successor liability under the first factor applies here.
B. Breach of Implied Warranty Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable for breach of implied warranty as they claim that
the saw in contention was not fit for its ordinary and intended use. To state a breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the buyer must establish that [1] the seller had reason
to know, at the time of contracting, the buyer's particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that [2] the buyer was justifiably relying upon the seller's skill and judgment to select and
furnish suitable goods, and [3] that the buyer did in fact rely on that skill. Marache v. Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc., 2010 WL 908467, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010) (citing Saratoga Spa & Bath v.
Beeche Sys. Corp., 230 A.D.2d at 331, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 790.). Thus, “[u]nder a theory of ... breach
of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the inquiry is focused on consumer
expectations when the product ‘was being used for the purpose and in the manner intended.’”
Henry v. Rehab Plus Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 435, 443 (E.D.N.Y.2005). Therefore, in short, “[t]o
establish that a product is defective for purposes of a breach of implied warranty of merchantability
claim, a plaintiff must show that the product was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose, an
inquiry that focuses on the expectations for the performance of the product when used in the
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
customary, usual and reasonably foreseeable manners.” Humphrey v. Diamant Boart, Inc., 556 F.
Supp. 2d 167, 182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Wojcik v. Empire Forklift, Inc., 14 A.D.3d 63, 783
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y.App.Div.2004)) (internal citations omitted).
The facts on the record support Plaintiffs’ claim that the saw was not reasonably fit for its
intended purpose when used in the customary, usual, and reasonably foreseeable manners.
Plaintiffs allege that the saw’s intended purpose was to cut materials such as wood. Mot. at 7; see
also FAC at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs further allege that saw utilized an easily detachable 3-in-1 blade guard5,
which itself impeded the “ability of the saw’s user to make cuts – the very purpose of the saw.”
Mot. at 8. Plaintiffs further allege that the saw could not effectively be used for its intended purpose
with the guard equipped, necessitating Plaintiff Ignatios Mastellos to remove the guard to cut
wood. Id. Plaintiffs allege that removal of the guard and use of the saw without the guard was
foreseeable, which in turn unreasonably increased the user’s risk of harm. Due to this, Plaintiffs
allege that the saw was not fit for its ordinary and intended uses, and failed to meet “the
expectations for the performance of the product when used in the customary, usual and reasonably
foreseeable manners.” Id. Thus, Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, supported by record evidence,
are enough to establish that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for breach of implied warranty under
a theory of successor liability.
5 The 3-in-1 guard bears resemblance to the 3-in-1 guard in Duval v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp. No. 1:13-CV-4270-
GHW, 2015 WL 4522911 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015). In Duval, Plaintiff’s expert witness opined that the 3-in-1 guard
on the saw in question “is often taken off the saw and discarded by operators.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s expert concluded
that “[b]y furnishing the saw with [the 3–in–1] guard, [Defendant] Delta increased the likelihood that it would be
removed and separated from the saw. This created the dangerous unguarded condition of the Unisaw which injured
[Plaintiff] Duval.” Id. Presented with the above expert witness evidence, to which Defendant contested, the Court in
Duval determined that there was an issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s use of the saw without a blade guard was
reasonably foreseeable. As a result, that court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim
for breach of implied warranty.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
C. Negligence Claim
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant is liable for negligence as a successor to Powermatic
because Powermatic was negligent in its design of a saw that did not function properly with the
blade guard equipped. Although strict liability and negligence are distinct theories, courts, in
interpreting New York law often analyze strict liability and negligence claims together on the
theory that they are “functionally equivalent.” Erazo v. SCM Grp. N. Am., No.
16CV2386RRMRER, 2019 WL 1044365, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019); see also Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (1995) (“In general ... the strict
liability concept of ‘defective design’ is functionally synonymous with the earlier negligence
concept of unreasonable designing.”) (internal citation omitted).
“A defectively designed product is one which, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, is in
a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous
for its intended use; that is one whose utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in its
introduction into the stream of commerce.” Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d
655, 659, 695 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522, 717 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). A claim
premised upon a defective design theory requires that Plaintiff show: (1) the product as designed
posed a substantial likelihood of harm; (2) it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner;
and (3) the defective design was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injury. See Barban v.
Rheem Textile Systems, Inc., 2005 WL 387660, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Lent v. Signature Truck Sys.,
Inc., No. 06-CV-569S, 2011 WL 4575312, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011); Delehanty v. KLI, Inc.,
663 F.Supp.2d 127, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 107, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 450 N.E.2d
204; Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs’ negligent design claim pleads sufficient facts to satisfy all three elements of this
cause of action under the pre-established theory of successor liability. First, Plaintiff alleges that
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
the predecessor company designed the saw in a way that it could only function as intended with
the safety guard removed, which in turn, posed a substantial likelihood of harm to its users. Mot.
at 10; see FAC at ¶¶ 40-41. Second, Plaintiffs contend that it was feasible for the saw to be designed
in a way in which it included a feature that would prevent the saw from functioning without the
guard in place. Mot. at 10. Lastly, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the design defect was a
substantial factor in causing Plaintiff Ignatios’ injury as the saw’s use was impeded by the guard,
which in turn necessitated removal of the guard, resulting in the injury to Plaintiff Ignatios when
the saw “kicked back.” Id.; see also FAC at ¶¶ 40-43. Thus, Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations,
supported by record evidence, are enough to establish that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for
negligent design under a theory of successor liability.
D. Loss of Consortium Claim
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant is liable for Plaintiff Erato’s loss of consortium
claim. The common law concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services of a
husband or wife; “it also embraces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual
relations, solace and more.” Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 1108, 1124
(W.D.N.Y.1996) (applying New York law) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim for loss of
consortium is a derivative one, and can only be sustained if defendant is found to have been
negligent on the primary claim.” Jones v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 355, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(citing Maddox v. City of New York, 108 A.D.2d 42, 49, 487 N.Y.S.2d 354, 359 (2d Dep't) (1985),
aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 270, 487 N.E.2d 553, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726).
Plaintiffs plead that Plaintiff Erato Mastellos was “deprived of the society, services and
consortium of the Plaintiff Ignantios Mastellos and shall forever be deprived of said society,
services and consortium” due to Defendant’s negligence and breach of warranty. FAC at ¶48. Thus,
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, in addition to a finding of liability on Plaintiffs’ previous two
claims, are sufficient to establish that Plaintiff Erato is entitled to judgment for loss of consortium.
II. DAMAGES
Since liability has been established, this Court must now ascertain damages with
“reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.
1999). To prove damages, the movant need only show that the “compensation sought relate[s] to
the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pleaded.” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v.
E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1992). An evidentiary hearing is not required so
long as there is a basis, demonstrated through detailed affidavits and other documentary evidence,
for the damages awarded. See Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp.,
109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Action S.A. v. Marc
Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs provided a statement of damages, listing the injuries
sustained from the accident along with other statements regarding lost wages, pain and suffering,
etc. See Exh. H to Mot. Plaintiffs believe that their total damages exceed three million dollars, but
have not provided detailed accounting supporting that number. Rather, Plaintiffs request a hearing
to determine the amount in damages for which Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation. See id. Since
the Court is unable to ascertain damages with reasonable certainty based on the current record, the
Court will schedule an in-person damages inquest hearing for April 21, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 910 at the Central Islip Courthouse at 100 Federal Plaza, Central Islip, New York
11722. Plaintiffs may submit any written documentation in support of their claims for damages
by April 14, 2026, and shall also submit a list of expected witnesses for the hearing by the same
date.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully recommends that the District Court
GRANT the Motion for Default Judgment as to liability, but defer ruling on the amount of damages
awarded until the scheduled inquest hearing.
OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file
written objections. Failure to file timely objections shall constitute a waiver of those objections
both in the District Court and on later appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. See Frydman
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 743 F. App’x 486, 487 (2d Cir. 2018); McConnell v. ABC-Amega, Inc.,
338 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2009); Tavarez v. Berryhill, No. 15-cv-5141 (CS) (LMS), 2019 WL
1965832, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2019); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
SO ORDERED.
/s
Steven Tiscione
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 13, 2026.
Case 1:17-cv-00415-MKB-ST Document 129 Filed 02/13/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>